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Abstract 
My own experience working with professionals is that while ongoing professional learning is valued, in 
most cases there is little that is done well to support such learning. The dominant foci in both practice 
and the relevant academic fields tend more towards issues connected to linear features of 
dissemination, to the development of programmatic change approaches, and to scientism. My 
perception is that these fields are wedded to outdated and problematic foundational metaphors such as 
‘trajectories,’ ‘impacts,’ and ‘outcomes,’ to the quantification of learning processes and outcomes, and 
to the idea of knowledge and research as things that are somehow “transferable.” The aim of this 
dissertation is, therefore, to find a grounding way to think and talk about professionals’ learning in situ. 
In turning to Wittgenstein I shift the fundamentals underlying our talk about professional learning 
towards a picture of language and meaning. I draw a picture of professional learning based on 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, emphasizing Wittgenstein’s notion of a ‘picture,’ versus 
a ‘theory’ (i.e., a hypothetical, causal explanatory account), of language. 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning can be seen as a reaction to the representationalist 
(cognitivist, intellectualist) approach to language and meaning initiated mainly by Frege. Wittgenstein 
sketches a picture of language and meaning consisting of the interrelated parts of ‘language-games,’ 
‘grammar,’ and ‘rules,’ focused around the ‘use’ of signs. My own view of Wittgenstein’s picture 
emphasizes language-games, and thus emphasizes moves and move-making. I develop this perspective 
further by taking up ethnomethodologist David Sudnow’s picture of language as a matter of ‘moving 
between places.’ In turn, ‘grammar’ is a matter of the sets of connexions between signs, and ‘rules’ the 
formal aspects of language-games. Thus, professional learning can be viewed as a matter of being able 
to play more relevant language-games, or to play language-games better, and to have more and better 
moves to make and places to go. As games, it is the interrelationships between players (i.e., language 
speakers), that is of paramount importance. ‘Understanding,’ in this picture, is a matter of ‘being able to 
go on’ in the correct ways in the contexts of community and the ‘institution’ of language; professional 
learning, then, is viewed not in terms of ‘knowledge’ but rather in terms of meaning, i.e., mastery of the 
use of signs. 
I demonstrate the application of this picture of professional learning, first by exploring a species of the 
classic ‘learning paradox,’ and second by considering the discourse of educators in actual learning 
sessions. First, a professional learning paradox emerges through the application of Wittgenstein’s ideas 
concerning novices’ training into a practice, a paradox bolstered as well by the thought of certain 
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theorists of education such as Donald Schön and Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger. Emphasis on 
developing professionals’ abilities in language-games of inquiry is one way in which we might begin to 
address – though not resolve – the professional learning paradox. Second, in applying this picture of 
professional learning in the case of professional educators’ discussions in peer-group learning sessions, I 
show a way to view the efforts and struggles of those professionals on the basis of their use of relevant 
signs (i.e., by way of meaning). In this part of my thesis, I describe the educators’ discussions but do not 
evaluate or explain them. The insights that can be drawn from this perspective have to do with the ways 
in which the professional learners attempt to forge for themselves new (and ‘correct’) connexions 
between signs, to be able to use new signs or use old signs in new ways. By turning to Wittgenstein and 
his picture of language and meaning, one finds the extraordinary in the ordinary. 
In summary, I emphasize that I am not developing novel forms of professional learning – as if these new 
ways of learning would somehow do what all other forms could not – nor am I working out programmes 
of improvement to existing forms of professional learning initiatives. Rather, I am working to find a 
perspective from which to view professional learning and to be able to think in a deeper and more 
fruitful way about it.   
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Chapter One 
Introduction – Coming to Terms with Language, Learning, and Wittgenstein 
 
1.1  My background: Journey to Wittgenstein 
Over the course of my own professional work as a community researcher, first at a university research 
centre and then as an independent consultant, the focus of my work became more and more about 
professional learning, i.e., how people in the workplace learn in order to evolve in their practice. As a 
researcher producing social indicator reports early in my career, the key question was whether and how 
people were taking up the research information, what they were doing with that information and how it 
entered into the flow of their professional work.1 As a researcher and consultant engaged in various 
community, participatory research projects and ‘knowledge mobilization’ and ‘research utilization’ 
initiatives, the question of how adults in the workplace learn became of paramount importance. For me, 
taking seriously the notions of ‘learning’ and ‘understanding’ in developing professional learning 
initiatives began to far outweigh the dominant foci in the relevant fields, which tended more towards 
issues connected to linear features of dissemination, to the development of programmatic change 
approaches, and to scientism. My perception was that these fields were wedded to outdated and 
problematic grounding metaphors such as “trajectories,” “impacts,” and “outcomes,” to the 
quantification of learning processes and outcomes, as well as to the idea of knowledge and research as 
things that were somehow “transferable.” In practice, applying such pictures has meant that 
professional learning and its study2 have followed certain paths and not others. 
Let me give an example of this from my own working experience. Much of my early professional work 
consisted of various activities delivering a range of documentation about the nature, health, and well-
being of populations of children, youth, and families in communities, as well as facilitating substantial 
engagement by relevant community members (e.g., service providers, parents, agency executive 
directors, school principals, politicians, ministry bureaucrats, researchers, business leaders) in both 
                                                          
1 See Offord et al (1999), and Wong et al (2000). 
2 See my literature review in Chapter 2. There I deal mainly with theoreticians of professional learning and not as 
much with those doing empirical research in this area – though the latter are not completely neglected in my 
review. In addition, and perhaps as an indicator of the general understanding of professional learning, it is 
interesting to note that the Encyclopedia of Education (Guthrie, 2003), contains no entry for ‘professional learning’ 
nor for ‘professional development,’ though does contain an entry for ‘professional development schools.’ 
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producing and discussing the documented findings. Our desire in this work was that people and 
organizations in communities would engage with some seriousness in the research syntheses we 
produced and would come together in their organizations and communities to discuss issues important 
to them in their work. The goal of our work was that participants reach more elevated ways of thinking 
and talking about the matters relevant to their lives as professionals and citizens.3 The idea was that 
‘better’ decision-making would result in institutions and communities, leading in turn to what was 
identified as ‘improvement’ or ‘positive growth’ in communities. 
Despite such goals and hopes, what became clear, instead, was that my colleagues and I were more-or-
less simply adding to large repositories of such documentation and information that already existed, or 
that we were simply rephrasing in one form of talk what was already well understood by different 
members of communities.  In a sense a lot was known but little was understood; and in the cases where 
understanding existed it existed in very local circumstances, e.g., in the talk and practice of only a few 
‘experts.’ In both cases the question was how all relevant professionals could learn from what was 
already known, e.g., in the research literature, or from what was well understood by the few. For 
example, the advantages to be gained in ongoing professional learning through interaction between 
educators and scientists of human development as a natural and desired part of the educators’ own 
evolving expertise seem obvious, but such initiatives are in fact scathingly difficult to put into fruitful 
practice.4 Thus, for me, the issue of professional learning began to dominate my thinking about my own 
profession, and led me to return to university to work on this doctorate.5 My return to university to 
work on these ideas was also stimulated by my own emerging but ungrounded intuitions that 
engagement and ongoing discussion form the basis of learning. To jump ahead in my story, I eventually 
concluded that looking to philosophy of language would be the best way to follow out these threads and 
to develop my abilities to articulate better these thoughts and intuitions. 
                                                          
3 ‘Elevated,’ that is, certainly in quality of talk, but also in quantity of talk, given that many professionals and 
groups of professionals have few occasions to discuss and work through with peers and knowledgeable others on 
an ongoing basis the issues and challenges of their professional work. 
4 My work was centered in Hamilton, Ontario, which, as the home of several health-related research institutions, 
meant that there was a considerable population of researchers, scientists, clinicians, and research-clinicians 
accessible and ready at hand. However, apart from organizationally-mandated interventions for consultation, 
diagnosis, or treatment, interactions expressly for purposes of professional learning rarely occurred. 
5 Ironically I had largely to leave my own professional work in order to facilitate my own professional learning. 
However, note that in the course of my doctorate I made many efforts to continue working with professionals in 
the field and within the university to develop and support various professional learning efforts. While I continued 
to learn from those experiences, I can also say – surprisingly so, perhaps, for being within an explicitly educational 
setting – that my train of experiences was an uneven and difficult one. 
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Further, in the course of my working experience as a community researcher and ‘knowledge mobilizer,’ I 
found and continue to find that professional working environments are challenging ones in which to 
pursue issues concerned with the process of learning. In my own experience both conducting and 
observing professional learning initiatives, I perceive that ‘learning’ is generally (and perhaps quite 
naturally) considered to be very much secondary to the work of the professional. At the same time 
professional learning is still generally identified as important and an essential part of ongoing 
professional growth.6 In some institutions, ‘learning’ is identified with practical mastery of programmatic 
approaches and protocols, with professional learning events largely organized around such goals. For 
the rest, apart from ad hoc, ‘informal’ or casual learning, professional learning is largely restricted to 
one-time, didactic, presentation-heavy conferences, symposiums, or workshops. It is more typical now 
that such ‘learning events’ include time for small-group discussion with report-back to the large group – 
though little or nothing is done to carefully observe and think about what happens in such moments of 
dialogue, nor to track over time how such dialogue changes in a professional cohort, nor generally to 
help support participants to make the most of such, mainly peer-group, learning opportunities.7 In 
professional learning initiatives that are intentionally developed to unfold progressively over time, there 
is still a tendency to organize these around didactic principles, for example, concerning material that 
needs to be mastered (at least, as judged often enough by others than the learners themselves). 
Further, attendance in such ongoing initiatives is sporadic, defeating the aim of the progressive nature 
of the learning, and there is resistance from some professional quarters to engage genuinely and openly 
in small-group dialogue-based learning events, due in part to the risk aversion characteristic of 
professionals protective of their reputations and career possibilities (though this is just my 
observation).8 Finally, professional learning events are often initiated and developed in top-down 
manners, are the result of an organization’s interest in taking up some form of a programmatic 
approach and disseminating it throughout the institution, or emerge from outside researchers’ or 
                                                          
6 See, for example, the Ontario College of Teachers Standards of practice for the teaching profession, in which 
three of the five standards (i.e., ‘Ongoing professional learning,’ ‘Professional knowledge,’ and ‘Professional 
practice’) concern professional learning and growth. (See https://www.oct.ca/public/professional-
standards/standards-of-practice.)  
7 For example, in an important series of recent papers in the health-sector ‘knowledge mobilization’ literature (see 
Boyko et al, 2012; Lavis et al, 2014; Boyko et al, 2014; Boyko et al, 2016), it is precisely this lack that stands out. 
The real focus of the investigations by Boyko, Lavis, and their colleagues has mainly to do with the reception by 
participants of the written materials. 
8 Though it is the beginnings of an understanding of why it can be difficult to get middle managers and bureaucrats 
to participate in anything but the safest of learning initiatives, and why learning events involving a mix of 
professionals and their management often results in strange and stultifying discussions. There are various lines of 
inquiry that can be taken up to develop better descriptions of such interactions, e.g., through Bourdieusian frames. 
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research groups’ attempts to disseminate the results of their own particular work. None of the features I 
have catalogued in these observations are necessarily negative or wrong-headed; indeed, in some cases 
some of these approaches are exactly what are needed and desired. However, I conclude that this range 
of features does limit and constrain the possibilities for professional learning, and my interests turn to 
the theoretical assumptions and commitments that underlie these activities so characterized. 
A final word about my own experiences in the field seems in order here, which might throw further light 
on what motivates me to pursue this thesis project. My own values in my professional work and in my 
research have been and continue to be directed towards a kind of equity in learning, geared around the 
principle that professional learning ought to begin with the professionals themselves in situ. Stemming 
in part from my growing intuitions about what is important for learning, it is in terms of their own 
identifications of the different needs and problems of their evolving professional practice, and in terms 
of their own existent discussions and abilities to talk about their practice, around which thinking and 
activity concerning professionals’ learning should be organized, on both ‘theoretical,’ practical, and 
ethical grounds. As a very general programmatic direction, my own values lead me to different forms of 
professional learning initiatives that are emergent. Finally, my interest is in the professional qua front-
line service provider, whether teacher, clinician, artist, or bureaucrat/manager, etc., and not in the 
administrative/organizational side of professional work. I am more interested in all professionals as 
actively-engaged experts and collaborative citizens in communities than as individual leaders displaying 
special characteristics of ‘leadership’. 
I have travelled some distance in my intellectual journey, from the observations and intuitions in my 
own professional working life and on to university to develop this thesis, where I hope to ground better 
the work I have been doing. In my journey I first began by considering John Dewey and his pragmatist 
approach to knowledge and inquiry as instructive for my purposes. I then considered Jean Lave and 
Etienne Wenger’s (1991) work concerning situated learning, finding highly illuminating their 
communally- or collectively-oriented conception of learning and knowing as a matter of being drawn 
into the practices of a community, and as forming a useful match to my own intuitions and somewhat 
pragmatist ideas about knowing. During this time I also developed an interest in science studies (e.g., 
Latour & Woolgar, 1979/1986; Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; Bloor, 1991; Lynch, 1992), at least with regard 
to the sociology of scientific practice; then in ethnomethodology/conversation analysis (e.g., Garfinkel, 
1967; Sacks & Garfinkel, 1970; Sacks et al, 1974), as suggesting ways to consider the discourse of 
professional practice (and suggesting later to me a way to think about Wittgenstein’s notions of 
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‘grammar’ and ‘language-games’); and finally in some of the practice literature itself (e.g., Bourdieu, 
1977; Schatzki, 1996; Schatzki et al, 2001). What I was searching for was a way to make alive and more 
compelling the challenges and possibilities of adults learning in the context of their professional work. 
The galvanizing pedagogical experience for me, however, was confronting ‘realist’ positions about 
mental entities (e.g., beliefs as causally-operative propositional attitudes – see, for example, Apperly, 
2011; Andrews, 2012; Zawidzki, 2013)9 in university course work in the philosophy of cognitive science. 
It seemed to me then that much of the explanatory power attributed to such things as beliefs as real, 
mental entities by these philosophers could be better accounted for by a more behaviour-oriented 
approach, and that the more parsimonious and elegant account, and one more consistent with post-
modern approaches that began with Frederick Nietzsche, William James, and Dewey, could instead be 
given in terms of a picture of our practices in doing things in the world. The work of thinkers like Daniel 
Hutto (2003, 2009a, 2009b, 2013), and especially his incorporation of certain ideas from Wittgenstein in 
his arguments contesting the dominant representationalist picture of cognition, gave me some 
encouragement that I was on at least a walkable path in my thinking.10 
And so, finally, I came to Ludwig Wittgenstein. In Wittgenstein I found what was for me the most 
profound, serious, and rigorous effort to work out those ideas that had begun to resonate with me. The 
thought as well was beginning to grow, with what little I had begun to take on from Wittgenstein, that in 
different ways his ideas rooted many of the approaches I found attractive. It seemed apposite, then, to 
go to the source, as it were. The first moment my interest substantially caught onto Wittgenstein’s 
project was in grappling with his notion of understanding as ‘knowing how to go on’ (e.g., see 
Wittgenstein’s comments at PI §§179-181; BB, pp. 40-41). In my own ongoing work with professionals 
and organizations, and from my own reading in some neo-pragmatist literature and in some of the 
literature concerned with the debate between ‘knowing-that’ versus ‘knowing-how’ (see Ryle, 1949; see 
as well, Carr, 1979; Stanley & Williamson, 2001; Kumar, 2011), I was gaining the sense that knowing was 
better framed as understanding, and understanding framed best as a knowing-how. In a sense, I was 
                                                          
9 For example, as Zawidzki (2013) notes: “Philosophers typically understand propositional attitudes and other 
mental states as concrete, unobservable, causes of behavior” (p. 11). 
10 I will say more about representationalist – and cognitivist – approaches to language, meaning, and learning in 
the next sections of this chapter and in Chapter 2. These are the main theoretical competitors to Wittgenstein’s 
picture of language and meaning, as well as to my own developing picture of professional learning; I discuss both 
briefly in order to provide the necessary context to both Wittgenstein’s project and my own. As well, that we talk 
of Wittgenstein’s “picture” of language and meaning, as opposed to “theory,” is extremely important and will 
weave its way throughout my thesis. I return to this aspect of Wittgenstein’s thought later in this chapter and in 
Chapter 3. 
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here beginning to think about this family of concepts in terms broader than those supplied in the arena 
of epistemology. The work of Barry Allen (2004, 2008) and his arguments for an understanding of 
knowledge as ways of “performing (well) with different kinds of artifacts,” as “a kind of accomplishment, 
a sort of success in artifacts,” and that the good of ‘knowledge’ “lies in the value of superlative 
artifactual performance” (2008, p. 37), further dislodged any representationalist inclinations I might still 
have been holding onto. All of this was making me more amenable to the movement of Wittgenstein’s 
thinking, in which I saw a concerted, thorough-going effort to situate the notion of activity as deeply as 
possible in thinking about language and meaning. Discovering Jeff Stickney’s (2005, 2008) important 
work considering Wittgenstein’s project in the context of education gave my own thinking the final 
impetus it needed. All of this in turn led to my own intuitions that Wittgenstein’s project in philosophy 
of language could be carried on in a fundamental and satisfying way into my own project concerning 
professional learning. Just so, in reading some of the most important works in the professional learning 
literature (see my literature review in Chapter 2), I find myself unsatisfied with the representationalist 
and cognitivist underpinnings of much of this (otherwise very important) work as providing a 
fundamental way or perspective from which to move forward to think and talk about professional 
learning. 
Thus, to situate this thesis project as a moment in my own professional learning, I am trying to find ways 
to articulate things that are important about the learning of adults in professional workplaces. In order 
to provoke and push my thinking about these issues I am looking primarily to what Wittgenstein says 
about language and meaning. It is my hypothesis that thinking with Wittgenstein about language and 
meaning will open up useful and interesting paths to think practically about what it is to learn in the 
professional workplace. As I note later, it is both important and difficult to situate how Wittgenstein 
talks about language, in working to connect his project with my own which is concerned with how we 
can talk about professional learning; the road here between language and learning can be a difficult, 
slippery one at times. And while Wittgenstein did have a lot to say about learning and teaching, it was 
principally in service of sketching out and applying his picture of language and meaning. Thus, in my 
project I turn my focus most seriously on what Wittgenstein calls “language-games” and “grammar,” as 
well as on the picture of training attached to these notions (i.e., learning and practicing to make moves 
in games), as providing insight in developing a picture of professional learning. The purpose of my thesis, 
then, is to explore how the picture of language and meaning sketched out by Wittgenstein can be 
applied to sketch a picture of professional learning. What difference does it make to talk about 
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professional learning to view professional learning from the perspective of a particular picture of 
language and meaning? 
Finally, in terms of what I want to do to develop further practical ideas and directions concerning 
professional learning as emerge from my thinking with Wittgenstein, I certainly hold no illusions about 
the possibilities of creating anew entire learning environments in professional workplaces, given the 
well-noted constraints in organizations.11 All the same I hold to the ideal that those ‘educators’ of 
different kinds, those engaged in their own professional learning and those who support such learning 
(e.g., learning facilitators, managers, consultants, administrators, educational publishers) need think 
deeply about this topic in order that learning opportunities that can be made available are used well and 
result in the positive evolution of participants’ expertise. The goal of this thesis is to develop further my 
own perspectives and approaches to think and talk about and to support professional learning through a 
careful and serious engagement with Wittgenstein’s ideas about language and meaning. 
1.2  A note on demarcation: Professionals and non-professionals 
The notion of a ‘professional’ can be developed in several ways – administratively (e.g., legislative 
arrangements, professional standards, registration and disciplinary offices and procedures), in terms of 
the nature of the social contract made between professional and professional body and society, 
functionally in terms of professionals’ relations to the ‘systematized body of knowledge’ with regard to 
which they have some practical mastery, and in terms of the nature of the expertise of the 
‘professional.’ In this thesis I consider anyone a professional who (I) belongs to a legally-accredited 
professional association, or (II) whose practice is characterized by autonomy and by high levels of 
developed, specialized expertise. These two features can stand in some measure of conflict with one 
another, but the assumption is that (I) is connected to and justified by the presence of (II).12 Thus we see 
                                                          
11 As Eraut (1994) observed 25 years ago – and his statement holds true still today – that the fact that there are no 
structures for knowledge exchange between higher education and the professions, “is matched by the lack of 
appropriate opportunities for mid-career professional education, whereby professionals can (1) reflect on their 
experience, make it more explicit through having to share it, interpret it and recognize it as a basis for future 
learning; and (2) escape from their experience in the sense of challenging traditional assumptions and acquiring 
new perspectives” (p. 21). I add here that an argument can be made that such constraints on learning in 
professional workplaces can be talked about as the result of managerial interest in controlling an organization’s 
professional workforce precisely by constricting professional learning environments and opportunities. I briefly 
suggest something along these lines near the end of Chapter 4, though given that the focus in my thesis is not on 
the political, I make very little of this matter here. 
12 Following Wittgenstein in this, I suspect that how we use the word “professional” will be a matter of what he 
calls “family resemblances” (see for example BB, pp. 17-19, 25-27; PI §67), that ‘professional’ can be as arbitrarily 
loosely or tightly bound a concept as works for our particular interests. However, working out in a more thorough-
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the literature on professional learning ranging over various professions and areas of expertise (and as 
well without tying down the general lessons to be drawn from the research as particular to any one 
profession over others). Donald Schön’s seminal work, for example, approaches each instance of 
professional learning he considers (e.g., training in design, psychoanalysis, city planning, piano playing, 
counseling skills) as exemplifying exactly the same set of themes. 
Finally, a brief terminological note. When I speak of “professional learning initiatives/opportunities”, I 
am referring to a broad range of discrete initiatives, formal or informal activities, deliberate or ad hoc 
learning occasions, or more diffuse learning spaces, learning environments, and so on. Even thinking 
about, supporting, and assessing ex tempore hallway conversations between professionals in institutions 
is certainly possible and within my purview. In other words, it is with general positive evolution of 
expertise and ability in professional practice that I am concerned in this project. 
1.3  My argument: Turning to language and meaning in order to talk about professional learning 
To reiterate, the question I ask in this thesis is what difference is made by applying Wittgenstein’s 
picture of language and meaning to both the topic and practice of professional learning. My hypothesis 
is that applying this picture of language and meaning does make a considerable difference, and the 
purpose of this thesis is to begin to explore the nature of this interesting and intriguing relationship. In 
this chapter and in Chapter 2, I set out the context and problem-set I am interested in discussing 
concerning professional learning. 
This, then, is a project that looks to fundamentals for its place to begin. To clarify my interests here, I do 
not consider language in terms of how professionals in various fields do as a matter of fact think or talk 
about language (e.g., what their theories or pictures of language and meaning might be). Whatever 
theories, pictures, views, or opinions professionals might have or be able to articulate about language 
and meaning is completely incidental to my purpose here. Rather, I am locating a way to frame talk 
about professional learning from a perspective afforded by very fundamental talk about language and 
meaning. One might still speculate about the empirical question, viz., that how people do think and talk 
about language, thought, and the relation between language, mind, and the world, will be strongly 
associated with their thinking and talk about learning, even if those connections are difficult for people 
to articulate. But however diagnostically useful the sort of approach suggested by this statement might 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
going way here issues of demarcation is not at all to the point of this thesis. The set of conditions I have outlined 
above are more than sufficient for my purposes here. 
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be, it is not at all my concern here and I spend no time exploring it. My focus is on the picture of 
language and meaning sketched out by Wittgenstein, and I contend that it is a powerful and unique one, 
and that applying it, if we choose, means something important for our talk about professional learning. I 
am urging that we can apply this picture of language and meaning both to how we talk about 
professional learning in its many guises and to how we talk within any of the varied instances of the 
actual professional learning occasions themselves.13 That is the brunt of my exploration in this thesis.  
There are two main parts to the overall argument of my thesis: (1) a philosophical core, on Wittgenstein 
on language and meaning (i.e., Chapters 1 and 3), and (2) an analytical/practical core, on the learning of 
professionals (i.e., Chapters 4-6). (Chapter 2 consists of a literature review of the professional learning 
literature, which helps further set the context for my thought.) The basic philosophical problem at root 
behind (1) is the problem of (linguistic) meaning. In (2), the problematic concerning professional learning 
and development emerges through the application of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning: 
viz., given that picture, how can we begin to view and talk about professional learning, in its specific 
instances and in general? And it is indeed one of the main challenges in coming to grips with 
Wittgenstein that his (methodological) emphasis is that he is ‘sketching a picture’ of language and 
meaning (e.g., see the Preface to the Investigations), and not constructing a causally explanatory theory 
of language. This is a key point in Wittgenstein’s approach, but one all the same difficult to adhere to in 
writing with Wittgenstein. A picture gives us a way to look at things, for good or for ill. Thus we can 
develop, apply, and adopt or discard pictures (e.g., see PI §130), but we can also be ‘held captive’ by 
pictures (e.g., see PI §115), with our talk and perception in such cases influenced by the picture in what 
turn out to be problematic ways.14 Further, in writing with Wittgenstein, it is important to see through 
his eyes both the simplicity and the complexity of language, and of the deep ambiguity he pictures in 
language. Consider, for example, his remarks on a sample sentence taken altogether out of context; he 
says of the question whether he ‘understands’ this sentence, that “it’s not altogether easy to give an 
answer … [a]nd yet I do not understand it in the sense in which I would understand it if I had read the 
story” (PG §5). For Wittgenstein, it is an important part of his picture of language that signs are 
                                                          
13 And of course I am also not saying that we talk about philosophy of language as part of discussions within actual 
professional learning occasions. Rather, I am saying that having this picture of language and meaning in mind as a 
way to view or look at professional learning will make a difference both to how we organize talk within 
professional learning occasions and how the participants (and observers, if there are any) can consider how that 
talk unfolded. 
14 For example: “And if the picture of the thought in the head can force itself upon us, why not much more that of 
thought in the soul?” (RPP I §279). Wittgenstein’s particular notion of a ‘picture’ has drawn some attention in the 
literature: e.g., see Crittenden (1970); Baker (2001); Egan (2011). 
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meaningful in context, i.e., in their use in the particular surroundings in which they are uttered, that 
“our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings” (OC §229; see also: “Only in the stream of 
thought and life do words have meaning” Z §173; see also Z §135).15 Finally, the picture of language and 
meaning Wittgenstein sketches is mainly drawn in terms of a close inter-connection between what he 
calls “language-games,” “grammar,” and “rules,” in the context of the ‘use of signs,’ though the 
relationship between these is, perhaps necessarily, difficult to make clear. All of this will be covered with 
more depth in Chapter 3. It is from this view on Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning that I 
begin to sketch a picture allowing for a certain perspective on professional learning. 
To begin the second core part of my thesis, i.e., regarding professional learning itself, I discuss an 
interesting problem (the ‘paradox of professional learning’), a variation of the classic learning paradox 
that emerges from the picture that Wittgenstein sketches and from the situationist perspectives of 
other theorists of professional learning important to my thinking, in particular Donald Schön and Jean 
Lave and Etienne Wenger. (I set up this professional learning paradox in my brief discussion of Schön’s 
work in Chapter 2, though I give it fuller treatment in Chapter 4.) Part of the purpose of this chapter is 
also to begin to show how the picture of language can guide our view and talk concerning professional 
learning. I then consider in Chapter 5, through my work on an empirical study, the actual talk of 
educational professionals in peer-group learning sessions, to show how reading Wittgenstein in the way 
I suggest in Chapter 3 makes the difference I am suggesting it can in our talk about professional learning. 
These peer-group learning sessions constituted efforts by these professionals to learn more about the 
developmental construct of self-regulation (see Shanker, 2013).16 I will have more to say about the 
construct of self-regulation itself in Chapter 5, mainly to provide some of the context for the educators’ 
discussions. Suffice it to say here that self-regulation is one of a number of constructs from the 
developmental sciences that can provide important insights into human behaviour useful for the many 
professionals practicing in the human service sector, broadly understood (e.g., education, health, social 
                                                          
15 One of the current descendants of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning that focus on the context 
sensitivity of meaning are the pragmatic semantic theories of language. See, for example, Travis (1997) and Emma 
Borg (2004, 2007). 
16 However, to some extent the topics actually taken up in various professional learning situations are of secondary 
importance to my interests in this thesis – though, of course, not secondary to the interests of the participants in 
the actual learning initiatives themselves. At the same time it is the very particular that primarily interests me in 
such situations in my own professional work, i.e., how learning participants’ real talk actually does unfold, and this 
is what I look to in the case of interacting with actual groups of professionals intent on developing their own 
learning and learning practices and environments. In other words, this thesis sets out a way to view, or a 
perspective to take, on the particulars of what actually happens or can happen in professional learning. (This will 
be made more obvious in Chapters 5 and 6.) 
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work, recreation, justice and police work). Finally, to conclude both this second main part of my thesis 
and the thesis as a whole, I briefly discuss what I take to be some of the more important practical 
implications that grow out of this way of talking about professional learning, which itself is a result of 
applying Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning (i.e., in Chapter 6). Learning new language-
games, expanding grammar, and ‘having (new) places to go,’ are the basic parts of the picture of 
professional learning I sketch out; these aspects of a picture of professional learning are sketched out 
precisely on the basis of the application of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning. This I 
emphasize is the important and contentious feature of this thesis work. 
This turn to language and meaning that I begin to chart out in my thesis in order to discuss professional 
learning might at first glance seem a strange one. My overall contention is in fact a fairly straightforward 
one: that a lot of what we have to say about professional learning can usefully be played out on the 
ground of what we have to say about language and meaning. It is important in this ‘turn’ to recognize 
that the metaphor or picture of games pervades Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, and 
thus much of what I have to say about professional learning on the basis of language and meaning will 
take its cue from Wittgenstein’s discussion of games and language-games. Among the many ways he 
leads us to this kind of picture of language and meaning, Wittgenstein sets out this kind of route: 
No one will deny that studying the nature of the rules of games must be useful for the study of 
grammatical rules, since it is beyond doubt there is some sort of similarity between them. – The 
right thing is to let the certain instinct that there is a kinship lead one to look at the rules of 
games without any preconceived judgement or prejudice about the analogy between games and 
grammar. (PG §134) 
I take this cue from Wittgenstein seriously, as will be seen throughout the rest of my thesis, as I return 
over and over again to games and the picture of language-games in my guide to drawing a picture of 
professional learning. 
However, by highlighting Wittgenstein’s notion of language-games and claiming for this notion a 
primacy in Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, I depart somewhat from the important and 
interesting work of several Wittgenstein scholars (e.g., see, McDowell, 1994; Luntley, 2008a, 2008b, 
2017; Bakhurst, 2011, 2015).17 For this group, primacy, at least in a transformational developmental 
                                                          
17 As Wittgenstein says, “Look on the language-game as the primary thing” (PI §656), and, “I shall also call the 
whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the “language-game”“ (PI §7). 
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sense, attaches to being able to use reasons, i.e., to having entered the ‘logical space or reasons’ (see 
Sellars, 1963a) or to have gained the ability to ‘give and ask for reasons’ (see Brandom, 1998), a primacy 
granted perhaps to maintain the centrality of focus on the idea of rationality in language learning and 
learning in general. In identifying ‘use of reasons’ with the key transformative moment in language 
speakers’ development, I wonder whether the wish of these scholars is to protect something of the 
Enlightenment ideal of the individual, “autonomous, critical rational agent ‘at home in the world’” as 
emerging from the developmental process (see Bakhurst, 2011, p. 9).18 To continue briefly this 
important sideline to the main path of my thesis, for my own part what I see as in keeping with the 
primacy of the picture of language-games in Wittgenstein’s thought is that the developmental stage of 
learning how to play a game would be the key transformational moment. Learning how to give and ask 
for reasons thus becomes another set of language-games one learns to play, though without doubt an 
important one. Further, once one has learned how to play games, which requires one kind of training, 
then the fundamental picture of what happens in learning from that point on remains fundamentally the 
same, i.e., one learns new games and new artifacts with which to play them (i.e., signs, in the case of 
language-games).19 In other words – and this is how Wittgenstein talks about this aspect of his picture – 
one is initiated into a way of going on, which is a matter of move-making, and one does then go on by 
oneself in whatever are the various appropriate circumstances (which one also learns about as part of 
learning how to play various language-games). One sees something of this in Jean Piaget’s (1955) 
empirical work recording and analyzing the progressively changing patterns of young children’s talk. I 
take it that this kind of thing is the main thrust of Wittgenstein’s comments in The Blue and Brown Books 
                                                          
18 Also see Bakhurst (2016) in this vein: “McDowell (1996), for example, argues that the distinctive character of 
human minds resides in our responsiveness to reasons,” and that “McDowell gives pride of place to language 
learning in the process of the formation of reason” (pp. 17-18.). I find it interesting to note that Wittgenstein does 
not actually speak of the individual as autonomous, but only of language, ‘calculus,’ or grammar as being so (e.g., 
“Language must speak for itself” PG §2; “The calculus is as it were autonomous. – Language must speak for itself” 
PG §27; ““It’s only in a language that something is a proposition” is what I want to say” PG §121; “That is why the 
use of language is in a certain sense autonomous” Z §320; see also PG §55,122-123, etc.). For me, Wittgenstein is 
alluding to something like an organic, dynamic systems perspective, in which relationships, and not individuals, are 
fundamental, and the life of the system the primary concern. (Note that this is not attributing to Wittgenstein a 
systematic approach regarding these things, or forcing ontological commitments onto him.) This discussion flags 
many of the directions I start to follow out in subsequent chapters and sections of my thesis, but it is important to 
keep in mind particularly in my discussion about the developing autonomy of learning professionals in Chapter 4. 
There I briefly draw attention to Wittgenstein’s method in thinking about such issues. 
19 Though not only signs, in the case of language-games. Actions, gestures, physical movements, facial expressions, 
etc., can all be part of playing a language-game. (Indeed, observe how little use is made of signs, and how much 
action, constitute the language-game(s) in Wittgenstein’s example of the builders in PI §2ff.) And context and 
circumstances have extremely important roles in playing language-games. The picture is further complicated in 
that signs (and meaning) do not stand separate from their use in games, but are in the first instance constituted 
and maintained by that use. 
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on learning, language, and language-games, and is thus a promising way to view this part of 
Wittgenstein’s picture. There Wittgenstein says that “language games are the forms of language with 
which a child begins to make use of words” (BB, p. 17). While describing language-games in this passage 
as “primitive forms of language,” or as “simple forms of language,” Wittgenstein does so in the 
expository terms of being able to discuss more clearly our “ordinary use of language,” and goes on to 
say that, 
On the other hand we recognize in these simple processes forms of language not separated by a 
break from our more complicated ones. We see that we can build up the complicated forms 
from the primitive ones by gradually adding new forms. (BB, p. 17)20 
Further on in The Blue and Brown Books, Wittgenstein says that language-games “are more or less akin 
to what in ordinary language we call games. Children are taught their native languages by means of such 
games, and here they even have the entertaining character of games” (BB, p. 81). He concludes this 
section with what is a rather important statement for my own purposes concerning professional 
learning: 
When the boy or grown-up learns what one might call special technical language, e.g., the use of 
charts and diagrams, descriptive geometry, chemical symbolism, etc., he learns more language 
games. (Remark: The picture we have of the language of the grown-up is that of a nebulous 
mass of language, his mother tongue, surrounded by discrete and more or less clear-cut 
language games, the technical languages.) (BB, p. 81) 
This emphasis on the picture of language-games carries over into the general notion of training as 
important for the picture of professional learning that I sketch out in this thesis. People are active 
learners at every stage of development, from initial training how to play a game – which depends not 
only on the reactions of the infant learner but on the mutual reactivity or responsivity between (infant) 
learner and (adult) teacher as well (e.g., see Fogel, 1993) – to the more sophisticated training and 
learning in which various learned language-games are played as part of the learning process and in 
which the learner can be said to have an autonomy in their active learning that the pre-linguistic infant 
                                                          
20 In this vein, see also PI §31: “One can also imagine someone’s having learnt the game without ever learning or 
formulating rules. He might have learnt quite simple board-games first, by watching, and have progressed to more 
and more complicated ones.” It is interesting to see this picture of learning games at work in On Certainty as well; 
see, for example: “And their [i.e., propositions describing a world-picture] is like that of the rules of a game; and 
the game can be learned practically, without learning any explicit rules” (OC §95). 
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does not (i.e., because the infant cannot yet play these games). This is what Wittgenstein would call a 
“grammatical” or “logical” point, that is, as simply following from the picture of language and meaning 
being sketched (or, perhaps, as part of what makes up that picture). The promise of exploring this idea 
in connection, for example, with the idea of play-based learning (e.g., see Bennett et al, 1997; Latta, 
2001; Van Hoorn et al, 2015) would be considerable, I think, though well beyond the purview of this 
thesis project. (I briefly return to this latter intriguing and difficult point in Chapter 6.)21 
This matter concerning difference in emphasis on the parts of Wittgenstein’s picture of language seems 
important to me, and tugs at my intuitions. Is it that the autonomous individual is a rule-follower, and 
that following rules intentionally and deliberately, following them on the basis of their normativity, 
yields the sought-after agentic quality? On the other hand, is the person as game-player understood 
fundamentally as in relationship, i.e., that game-players live and work within the context of the 
relationships inherent in the game? This latter is drawn up much more in the situative perspective and, 
as indicated above, is more the angle from which I view Wittgenstein’s picture of language, though 
without discounting our talk of ourselves as autonomous and reason-using. 
To return to setting the general context for my thesis, given that I propose that looking at language and 
meaning from different perspectives has powerful implications for how we look at professional learning, 
the natural question would then be whether different ways of looking at language and meaning have 
different sets of implications for how we look at professional learning. As indeed there are various 
theories of language and meaning (for example, description theories, causal theories, psychological 
theories, verificationist/truth-condition theories, possible worlds semantics, speech act theory, 
pragmatic theories), I hold that in a general way these ways of looking at language and meaning entail 
different ways of looking at professional learning. 
Setting out the context in this way serves two purposes. First, it gestures a little more substantively 
toward the greater project of which this thesis is a part, viz., a discussion of the relation between 
theories or pictures of language and pictures or approaches to professional learning. Second, it 
describes the particular philosophical context out of which Wittgenstein sketched his picture of 
language and meaning, in part as a response or reaction to the dominant perspective on meaning in his, 
                                                          
21 What makes the kind of discussion I allude to here ‘difficult’ is that we need to remember that the idea of the 
language-game is a ‘picture,’ a way of viewing things. Thus our focus in such intriguing investigations is to maintain 
the right attitude or distance from the realism of scientific research, and not to treat the picture of the language-
game as an hypothesis or piece of causal-theoretical apparatus.  
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and our, time. This is the position of representationalism. It thus naturally becomes incumbent upon us 
to consider why one picture of language gets preferred over the others, as well as to consider what 
important differences there may be in the application of the different pictures to different areas of life – 
such as to professional learning. Among other things, that will tell us how sensitive our pictures of 
professional learning are to differences in pictures of language and meaning. 
Standing in opposition to Wittgenstein’s perspective on language and meaning, representationalism 
includes as variations intellectualism or folk psychology, cognitivism or computationalism, and the 
dynamic systems approaches to cognitivism, such as neural network and parallel distributed processing 
accounts. Representationalism holds that signs (i.e., words, sentences, etc.) represent things in the 
world, either directly, or mediately through relations to ideas. The meaning of a sign is given in terms of 
what it represents, or in more complicated accounts as connected to such features as truth conditions, 
for example.22 Those who are concerned with representationalism comprise an army of theorists, with 
the great philosopher of mathematics and language, Gottleib Frege, as perhaps that position’s most 
prominent proponent. For Frege, and for the representationalist theorists who follow in his wake, what 
represents is, in general, sentential-type, abstract entities, such as propositions or thoughts.23 One 
species of representationalism is cognitivism, which holds that meaning derives from representations 
manipulated in folk-psychological or computational structures. 
                                                          
22 Representationalism has the added epistemological-ontological import, viz., that of getting the world right. 
Representations somehow mirror the ‘real’ world, which stands separate from the representations; a representing 
proposition is true insofar as it mirrors the world without any distortion in the mirror image. There are many 
variations on this theme, as there are many variations of realism (e.g., see the entries for ‘Realism’ (Miller, 2014), 
‘Challenges to metaphysical realism’ (Khlentzos, 2016) and ‘Truth’ (Glanzberg, 2013), in the online Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy). 
23 Representationalism in one form or another dominated philosophy of language (including Chomskyism) 
throughout the twentieth century, and continues as a main theme in current philosophy of language (and may 
indeed be how most lay people think of language and meaning – though this is an empirical question and outside 
of my purview). See for example, Scott Soames (2010): “The central fact about language is its representational 
character. … [A] meaningful declarative sentence S represents the world as being a certain way. To sincerely 
accept, or assertively utter S, is to believe, or assert, that the world is the way S represents it to be. Since the 
representational contents of sentences depend on their grammatical structure and the representational contents 
of their parts, linguistic meaning is an interconnected system” (p. 1). As part of the representationalist perspective, 
Colin McGinn (2015) in turn emphasizes the connection between sentences and propositions, with propositions 
doing the representing work: “[I]t is important to gain some familiarity with two concepts: sentences and 
propositions. A proposition is what is expressed by a sentence: the proposition expressed by a sentence 
constitutes the meaning of the sentence. Thus it is possible for two different sentences to express the same 
proposition. Two sentences that are synonymous with one another will express the same proposition. Sentences 
can differ in their constituent words and be synonymous, having the same meaning, and thus express the same 
proposition” (p. 2). 
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Frege, whose work greatly influenced Wittgenstein (e.g., see Geach, 1976; Travis, 2006; Diamond, 
2010),24 analyzed the nature of language and meaning in a decompositional manner, which analyses 
take up two main terms, i.e., Bedeutung, translated as “reference,” “standing for,” “designates,” and 
even as “meaning,” and Sinn, or ‘sense,’ with both existing in fundamental relationship to truth values 
and truth conditions. As Michael Dummett (1973) says: 
Frege’s first task was, thus, to give an analysis of the structure of the sentences of our language, 
adequate at least for such sentences as occur in a train of mathematical reasoning [given his 
main interest in formalizing the process of proof in mathematics]. This analysis could not stop 
short at the specification of which sentences were well-formed: it must explain also how the 
meaning of each sentence was determined from its internal structure.” (p. 2) 
Thus, the nature or role of these different representationalist perspectives on language, meaning, and 
mind is that they are explanatory approaches, that is to say, they attempt to explain how otherwise 
meaningless sounds and marks, etc., are meaningful. This leads me to one of the difficulties in writing 
with Wittgenstein, which is that he discounts these kinds of explanatory accounts, identifying 
description, as he puts it, as the only way to talk about language.25 As I will discuss shortly, this puts one 
on tricky ground discussing and applying Wittgenstein’s thought. For my own part, I attribute no theory 
of language or learning to Wittgenstein, nor do I attempt to derive such from his writings, nor am I even 
developing my own theory about professional learning motivated by what Wittgenstein says. What I am 
doing is getting clear on a way to talk about language and meaning, viz., the picture of language and 
meaning sketched out by Wittgenstein, and then getting clear on its possible application to develop a 
picture, i.e., a way to talk about, professional learning. These ‘ways of talking’ are not theoretical 
explanations of phenomena, setting out, for example, the causal conditions and theoretical entities 
productive of meaning (as per Frege). Wittgenstein does not discuss language in theoretical, explanatory 
terms, and neither does anything get explained in this way in my thesis. Rather, a way of looking at 
                                                          
24 For example, Diamond (2010) says: “While Wittgenstein’s explicit discussions of Frege on the objectivity of logic 
are in the context of lectures or writings on the foundations of mathematics, the issue is one of vital significance 
for all of Wittgenstein’s later thinking” (p. 553). Geach (1976) says that, “the influence of Frege on Wittgenstein 
was pervasive and life-long, and it is not of course just confined to places where Frege is mentioned by name or 
overtly referred to …” (p. 55). Travis (2006) says that, “… if you want to understand what Wittgenstein is up to at 
some given point in the Investigations, always look to Frege – to how what Wittgenstein says may be a reaction to 
something Frege said …” (p. 1). Finally, Wittgenstein states, among his many references and allusions to Frege, 
that, “The style of my sentences is extraordinarily strongly influenced by Frege. And if I wanted to, I could establish 
this influence where at first sight no one would see it” (Z §712). 
25 See Wittgenstein: “The false note in this question [re. ‘primary’ versus ‘secondary’ signs] is that it expects an 
explanation of existing language instead of a mere description” (PG §46).  
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language and meaning gets described and talked about, with the aim that a kind of clarity in talk about 
language and learning be achieved. This constitutes part of the challenge of writing with Wittgenstein. 
Another way to think about the different ways in which we might picture language and meaning is to 
consider the different basic, central metaphors around which different pictures of language and 
meaning (and mind) can be seen to take form – metaphors which themselves might be considered as 
kinds of pictures that guide our talk (see, for example, PI §§1, 115, 144).26 The kind of perspective 
afforded by this approach is important for me, insofar as I am suggesting that different pictures of 
language and meaning inform different pictures of professional learning. Ana Sfard (1998), for example, 
directs our attention in this direction, distinguishing between the metaphors of ‘acquisition’ and 
‘participation’ as a way to begin to talk about the different approaches to learning (and knowing, mind, 
and language). She says in this regard that: “Different metaphors may lead to different ways of thinking 
and to different activities. We may say, therefore, that we live by the metaphors we use. … [A]s a basic 
mechanism behind any conceptualization, they are what make our abstract (and scientific) thinking 
possible” (p. 5). 
For my own part, I see three main metaphors around which different pictures of language and meaning 
organize (assuming that ‘relationship’ does not constitute a fourth, separate metaphor). The first 
underlying metaphor concerns having or possessing – such as might be found in representationalist 
theories of language and meaning (and of theories of mind), in which content in the form of 
propositions or thoughts is the key feature. Connected to this metaphor are secondary metaphors such 
as grasping, acquiring, and apprehending things like meaning. One does not grasp a representation per 
se – but having a representation, in combination with other representations in certain syntactic or 
computational structures, would allow for the grasping of a sense, for example.  ‘Having’ entails certain 
kinds of relationships, particularly between the thing ‘had’ and what it represents, in relationships of 
referring, signifying, etc. The theoretical project of representationalism is thus how different things – 
thoughts, propositions, ideas, truth values, objects and states of affairs ‘in the world’ – connect one to 
the other. 
                                                          
26 As pertaining to this idea of ‘basic metaphors’ as ‘pictures,’ Wittgenstein says that one gets their “picture of the 
world” as the “inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false” (OC §94; see also OC 
§209). There is a connection here to what Wittgenstein also calls a “world-picture,” a connection which emerges 
particularly in his On Certainty. See Michael Peters and Jeff Stickney’s (2018) interesting and valuable discussion of 
this relation (esp. see pp. 103-105).  
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A second, distinct underlying metaphor is based around the idea of activity, concerning doing or 
performing rather than having. And a third underlying metaphor is more spatially-based, concerned with 
moving and with getting around or movement from place to place.27 
The first kind of metaphor grounds representationalism and the kind of approach to language and 
meaning worked out by Frege. The second kind of metaphor can be seen at work in how Wittgenstein 
pictures language and meaning – he writes, for example: “it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our 
acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game” (OC §204); and “The question “What do I mean 
by that?” is one of the most misleading of expressions. In most cases one might answer: “Nothing at all – 
I say …”” (Z §4). The third kind of metaphor is most clearly and powerfully seen in the work of the 
ethnomethodologist David Sudnow (1978/2002, 1979); I will argue that, for my purposes, the latter 
metaphor as seen in light of Sudnow’s work provides a very useful angle from which to contemplate the 
picture of language and meaning sketched by Wittgenstein and from which to work out that picture’s 
application to professional learning. 
The representationalist perspective focuses around a picture of meaning as there being ‘a something 
had’ (e.g., a proposition, thought, or idea) that is the source of meaning; meaning is prior to use, in the 
sense that use is dependent on meaning. In other words, we do something with what we have because 
of the nature (i.e., the ‘content’) of what we have, in contrast to the other two metaphors in which 
‘doing/performing’ and ‘moving’ of themselves constitute meaning. Doing something with signs is itself 
what makes those signs meaningful, is the meaning of those signs, and the signs are not signs until they 
are used; a (meaningful) sign and its use are essentially intertwined. As Wittgenstein says in this regard: 
Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? – In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it 
there? – Or is the use its life? (PI §432) 
                                                          
27 Two things might be added here. First, an additional feature of quantity might usefully be added to the 
exposition of these metaphors I provide here. Quantity can be understood in terms specific to each of these 
metaphors: for example, one only gets part of something or only some of the relevant things, or only learns a skill 
to a certain limited extent – enough to get by in the relevant circumstances, for instance – or one is only able to 
get to some of the possible places. This quantitative aspect would be part of the explication for various things, such 
as for the development that occurs in the progressive process of learning, for example, for partial understandings 
(relatively speaking), or for mistakes in understanding. Second, I have identified these basic metaphors as having – 
doing – moving. The case can be made that another metaphor based around the sensory faculties should be 
recognized, viz., that of seeing. It is not necessary, however, that all possible such metaphors be canvassed here, 
but that we see variation between these fundamental organizing metaphors or pictures and that this effects the 
pictures we construct and go by in our talk about learning.  
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Which metaphors we align and orient ourselves around, I contend, makes a difference to our talk about 
meaning and learning. What basic pedagogical implications emerge, then, from these three basic 
grounding metaphors?28 
The first metaphor leads to an understanding of learning in terms of processes of getting or coming to 
have or possess something which, in some sense, can be held or owned. It grounds the idea that 
learning is, in fundamental terms, the acquiring of some desirable thing (e.g., a concept, an idea, a 
proposition, a bit of knowledge), with the idea that cognitive machinery carries on from the acquired 
thing. Teaching, then, is facilitating students’ getting the desired things, and thus, in the first instance, 
getting the right representations. Change the set of representations, change how those representations 
get associated or connected with one another, and change how they operate in the causal chains 
leading to behaviour, and these would be the basic operative concerns for education. Teaching and 
learning, then, at least theoretically, would amount to finding ways to determine the ‘what’ and the 
‘how’ of these internal representations and by what sensory or intellectual means they can be changed. 
The second metaphor (i.e., doing, performing) takes us in a different direction regarding learning than 
does the first metaphor, instead to considerations of skills and craft and participation, i.e., as 
fundamentally concerned with the development of increasingly skillful mastery in the doing of things 
and in the expertise of performance, within the context of belonging to and acting in concert with a 
community of adepts. The concern is not for the production through doing – rather, the doing is 
meaning, and by extension is understanding or knowing. This emerges from Wittgenstein’s emphasis on 
game-playing and move-making as central to his picture of language. 
The third metaphor leads to a rather interesting though challenging understanding of learning which is 
formed more around a concern for places and with how to move between them and with how to reach 
or achieve them. Learning is seen as developing the ability to find and get around to places (though 
getting to a place is not the same as getting a ‘something’). In other words, this metaphor leads to a 
                                                          
28 Here I depart from my main thesis to talk briefly about learning in general. I take caution in how I use the phrase, 
“in general,” here; I am simply roughing out a little of how we apply three different pictures (or, perhaps, the 
underlying gesture drawings of pictures). These metaphors are ways to look at language and meaning, and they 
can be as well pictures from which we can take certain perspectives on learning. In other words, what I say here 
can be taken more as a comment about the application of pictures. My point, as part of the overall context in 
which to understand Wittgenstein and my application of his picture of language and meaning, is that we talk 
differently about learning given different ways of talking about language and meaning. In turn, my thesis is 
principally focused to explore how we can talk about professional learning through the application of 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning. 
20 
 
picture of learning as focused on having (more, or ‘better’) places to go and on a learning of how to 
move from place to place, of how to find one’s way around.29 It is movement that is essential here, the 
reaching out towards, achieving, and moving on from, the right places; one travels from, to, and through 
places. In these latter two metaphors, what is learned is a knowing-how (i.e., a knowing how to do, and 
a knowing how to get around), and teaching is more a matter of training abilities to do or perform than 
facilitating a ‘getting’ of some thing. All three metaphors provide context to Wittgenstein’s picture of 
language and to the picture I sketch of the learning of professionals. 
To conclude this section of the chapter, I indicate very briefly something of the sense of Wittgenstein’s 
rejection of representationalism and of the Fregean picture of language. Emerging from this first 
metaphor and from representationalism is the idea that a ‘knowing-that’ is at the core of language and 
meaning. Wittgenstein’s game-based picture of language as the mastery of a technique (e.g., see PI 
§§150, 199) thus stands strongly in contrast to this view, and for Wittgenstein it is a ‘knowing-how,’ as it 
were, that is central to language and meaning.30 Throughout his work Wittgenstein objects to the 
Fregean/representationalist approach to investigating language and meaning, where theoretical work 
concerns how the different hypothetical entities connect with each other. For example, he says in this 
regard that, “A primitive philosophy condenses the whole usage of the name into the idea of a relation 
[i.e., between sign and object] which thereby becomes a mysterious relation” (BB, p. 173).  The idea of 
‘meaning’ and ‘sense’ as scientific-like, theoretical entities that stand in functional-causal relationships 
with one another, Wittgenstein calls “obsolete” (see 1932 Cambridge Lectures, p. 30). Wittgenstein 
emphasizes the need to return to the ‘normal use’ of language, to return to the ‘original homes’ (see PI 
§116) of signs, as making for the appropriate way to investigate language and meaning (qua language 
and meaning). Wittgenstein rejects the Fregean commitment to the analytic separation of signs from 
the life of their use (e.g., see PI §432), rejects hypothetical meaning-giving elements or features such as 
Sinn, Bedeutung, representations, thoughts, propositions, truth values, ideas, and so on. Rather, as 
Wittgenstein says, 
Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our 
problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, 
                                                          
29 Wittgenstein says in this regard that “language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know 
your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about” (PI §203; 
see also, for example, PI §§525, 534, and Z §349, for the metaphor of ‘familiar paths and places’). 
30 For example, Wittgenstein says: “If I am drowning and I shout “Help!”, how do I know what the word Help 
means? Well, that’s how I react in this situation. – Now that is how I know what “green” means as well and also 
know how I have to follow the rule in the particular case” (RFM VI 35). 
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caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different 
regions of language. (PI §90)  
Wittgenstein speaks also of our being “bewitched” by words and by language (PI §109, OC §435), and 
that “A misunderstanding makes it look to us as if a proposition did something queer” (PI §93). 
Part of the attraction of the Fregean/representationalist approach is that, as rooted in our grammar, we 
‘naturally’ look for things that are named by substantive words, and thus we lead ourselves into 
problems in asking, “What is meaning?” Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of this tendency is exceptionally clear: 
The questions “What is length?”, “What is meaning?”, “What is the number one?” etc., produce 
in us a mental cramp. We feel that we can’t point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to 
point to something. (We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: 
a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.) (BB, p. 1) 
Thus Wittgenstein urges that we adopt a re-orientation of perspective, a change in picture such that 
“the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need” 
(PI §108). Meaning is not something we do, it is not something separate that runs alongside and is 
somehow added to utterances; rather, meaning is what language is. Speaking, writing, reading, hearing 
and understanding, etc., is to partake in the flow and movement of the life of language.31 In other 
words, the re-orientation that Wittgenstein encourages in his sketches of language militate against the 
idea or picture of language in which we need to go outside of the word or sign (or outside of language) 
to discover, or to infer, what the sign means. Certainly it is the case that words and statements, etc., fit 
in with other things we do – though they fit in precisely because they are part of our very form of life, 
because, in a sense, life and word grew up together in mutual sustenance. The general Fregean 
approach to language and meaning basically holds that what an assertive sentence means is what would 
make it true, i.e., the sentence’s truth conditions. Wittgenstein’s approach is that what any sign (i.e., 
word, expression) means is the places with which it is located in grammar and how it is and has been 
played in various language-games, the circumstances of the relevant utterances made with that sign, 
                                                          
31 Marie McGinn (2011), for example, frames Wittgenstein’s investigations into language and meaning from his 
resistance to “our tendency to sublime the logic of our language” (p. 651), which leads to various problems and 
paradoxes (i.e., leads to philosophy in the problematic sense). For McGinn, Wittgenstein works to resolve or 
overcome in piecemeal fashion these problems “that surround the sublimed picture of understanding, meaning, 
and thinking as remarkable acts of mind” (p. 653). The means to accomplish this is largely through what 
Wittgenstein calls ‘grammatical investigation,’ which is “that we should instead ‘look into the workings of 
language’ if we want to recognize how the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking actually function” (p. 
651). (The “looking into the workings of language” phrase is from PI §109.) 
22 
 
and how the relevant interlocutors go on with it (for example, see again Z §§135, 173). To utter 
something meaningful is to make a recognizable move in a recognizable game that the interlocutors are 
playing as bound up in the context of their form of life (e.g., “It is what human beings say that is true 
and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life” 
PI §241; see also Peters & Stickney (2018, pp. 96-99) on background and form of life). 
1.4 Learning to write with Wittgenstein 
Learning to write in step with Wittgenstein about language and meaning is a difficult process, and it is 
easy to be uncertain whether one has indeed succeeded in doing so. One aspect that makes for 
difficulties is Wittgenstein’s approach to explanation. With regard to language, the difficulty is that we 
must accept what is there as it is, to describe it and not to explain it.32 Insofar as we are concerned with 
meaning, we are concerned with ‘just’ language itself, and with the primacy of games highlighted in this 
understanding. As Wittgenstein says,  
We are not interested in any empirical facts about language, considered as empirical facts. We 
are only concerned with the description of what happens and it is not the truth but the form of 
the description that interests us. What happens considered as a game. I am only describing 
language, not explaining anything. (PG §30) 
That is Wittgenstein’s project. Is it reasonable, however, to resist in the case of language and meaning 
the explanatory impulse? Can one always follow in step with it? As Wittgenstein points out repeatedly, 
and as I have experienced, it is easy to go astray: “While thinking philosophically we see problems in 
places where there are none. It is for philosophy to show that there are no problems” (PG §9). 
What gets ruled out in Wittgenstein’s discussion are hypothetical or theoretical causal explanations of 
meaning. To explain something in this way is to identify the cause(s) of its existence, that is, to show in 
this manner why it is, or why it is as it is. If we follow Leibnitz, for example, to explain and theorize about 
                                                          
32 As Wittgenstein says, “We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place” (PI 
§109). (Though Wittgenstein notes difficulties in ‘describing’ as well, i.e., in doing too much – e.g., see RPP §257.) 
Early in Philosophical Grammar, Wittgenstein says that “what is spoken can only be explained in language, and so 
in this sense language itself cannot be explained,” and that “language must speak for itself” (PG §2). This connects 
with Wittgenstein’s comment in the Investigations concerning the focus of his work: “Your questions refer to 
words; so I have to talk about words” (PI §120). Further, Wittgenstein says that, “An explanation of the operation 
of language as a psychological mechanism is of no interest to us. Such an explanation itself uses language to 
describe phenomena (associations, memory etc.); it is itself a linguistic act which stands outside the calculus; but 
we need an explanation which is part of the calculus” (PG §33). I take it that the explanations which are ‘part of the 
calculus’ are what Wittgenstein will later call “grammatical investigations.” 
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language and meaning would be to attempt to identify the efficient or final causes that (fully) account 
for why there is language and/or meaning, or to account for why there is just this particular meaning, 
attached, for example, to just these sounds, gestures, or marks.33 This rejection of causal explanation 
throws up a considerable difficulty for those trying to follow and make sense of Wittgenstein. For 
example, how does one account for the normativity of meaning without theorizing about it, without 
setting out general causal explanations of it? If one is forbidden from doing this, how does one talk 
about meaning? 
As I have indicated earlier in this chapter, Wittgenstein affords us the possibility that we can talk about 
language and meaning on the basis of pictures that we can sketch of these ‘things.’ A picture so-called 
provides a way of looking at the phenomena, but do not explain the phenomena, do not attempt to 
account for why they are, in terms, for example, of Leibnitzian efficient or final causes. We apply 
pictures in the sense that they lead us both to view and talk about things in certain ways. On the basis of 
the picture of pictures, one can go on to talk about things untroubled by the problems and dead-ends 
that plague other ways of going on which are characterized in terms of causal explanatory accounts. 
To talk about language from our position within language requires a re-orientation of our approach to 
the ‘subject matter,’ and this is why Wittgenstein proposes that we employ the idea of pictures as 
necessarily tentative attempts to represent, outline, or sketch ‘aspects’ of language. Pictures, however, 
do not stand in a strict representing or corresponding relationship to their object. The pictures are what 
we have of the ‘object’ or ‘state of affairs,’ and the picture in terms of the whole and of its parts stand 
on their own to be considered, discussed, or modified, and where the satisfactory usefulness or value of 
a picture emerges in the unfolding agreements, similarities, and differences with what else we say. For 
example, pointing to the nature of the picture of language and meaning that he is sketching, 
Wittgenstein says that “we look at games and language under the guise of a game played according to 
rules. That is, we are always comparing language with a procedure of that kind” (PG §26).34 It is the use 
                                                          
33 This is a cursory look, at best, at the issue of kinds of explanations and causes. For example, Aristotle identifies 
material and formal causes in addition to efficient and final causes (i.e., as per Leibnitz), connecting these causes to 
different kinds of ‘why’ questions. Working these angles out is not so much my concern here, though nevertheless 
the range of kinds of explanation would be important to a more robust thinking-through what Wittgenstein has to 
say in this regard. For example, we can ask what kind of explanation Wittgenstein has in mind when he talks about 
‘explanations of meaning’ (e.g., see PI §560). 
34 For example, as Wittgenstein says, “What does it mean to understand a picture, a drawing? Here too there is 
understanding and failure to understand. And here too these expressions may mean various kinds of thing. A 
picture is perhaps a still life; but I don’t understand one part of it; I cannot see solid objects there, but only patches 
of colour on the canvas. – Or I see everything as solid but there are objects that I am not acquainted with (they 
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of the picture – its ‘application,’ as Wittgenstein puts it – and not the ‘sketch’ in itself (as reified, 
perhaps, in a more or less fundamental way) that is the most important thing. Finally, in terms of how 
we use a picture, Wittgenstein says of the picture of language-games, that they are “set up as objects of 
comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, 
but also of dissimilarities” (PI §130).35 
For Wittgenstein, we discuss and examine language and meaning in terms of the pictures we sketch of 
it. We must not take the parts or elements of the sketch as theoretical entities, as Frege does, for 
example, or the picture as a theoretical explanation of how meaning works, or how a person can mean 
something by an utterance in language (or, to put it otherwise, how an utterance can mean something). 
Wittgenstein does not explain how language happens, but rather describes its happening. And he 
describes language by drawing up, in words, pictures of language. All of this is a source of considerable 
trouble in writing with Wittgenstein. 
To end this chapter, let me reiterate that what I want to explore is how insights about language and 
meaning drawn from Wittgenstein offer us a purchase on how we might go on to talk and think about 
professional learning. To put it otherwise, what I do in this thesis is first to work to get clear on the 
picture of language and meaning sketched by Wittgenstein, and then to apply it in drawing another 
picture, a picture of professional learning. In this thesis project I do not identify, describe, and apply a 
methodology per se; that, in a sense, would run afoul of Wittgenstein’s aversion to theory-based 
investigation in matters of meaning and language. Rather, by drawing and applying a particular picture 
of professional learning, I replace strict methodological procedure set up as the (theoretical) means to 
developing responses to some question, problem, or phenomenon, with a way (or a perspective from 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
look like implements, but I don’t know their use). – Perhaps, however, I am acquainted with the objects, but in 
another sense do not understand the way they are arranged.”(PI §526). Wittgenstein addressed this issue of 
‘picture parts’ in his earlier Philosophical Grammar as well. For example, he says there: “So what the picture tells 
me is itself. Its telling me something will consist in my recognizing in it objects in some sort of characteristic 
arrangement” (PG §115), and “”What the picture tells me is itself” is what I want to say. That is, its telling me 
something consists in its own structure, in its own forms and colours” (PG §121). 
35 I take Wittgenstein’s point here to be about the role of language-games as one part of the picture of language, 
and not about anything ‘real’ having explanatory force and which we refer to as “language-games.” The point is a 
tricky one, however, as I will go on to talk about language-games (and grammar and rules) as if these were ‘real’ 
things arrived at in the analytic decomposition of signs and meaning. But it is important to recall always that these 
‘items’ are parts of a picture of language that Wittgenstein is sketching (or are different pictures Wittgenstein is 
sketching of language), and thus are to be discussed in terms of their application, i.e., what we can do with them in 
our talk about language, what they highlight, or ‘bring into’ clear view (which itself can be a potentially misleading 
expression, implying that there is something beyond language which we are trying to reach and see better – see PI 
§104 as one of the ways Wittgenstein cautions us against going down such roads). 
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which) to view and talk about how we talk about things – in this case, how professionals talk about 
things in learning about them.36 If, however, it is suggested that we can indeed appropriately speak of a 
methodology being applied here, it would be something along the lines of Wittgenstein’s idea of the 
descriptively-oriented ‘grammatical investigation’ that one employs from this standpoint. The result of 
such investigations are ‘perspicuous’ overviews (i.e., an Übersicht) of how we, the relevant persons, 
actually do talk about some thing(s), i.e., in terms of the signs we do use, the connexions between signs 
we make in our talk and our action, and the ways in which we make those connexions. In other words, in 
performing a grammatical investigation we end up with a clearer, more perspicuous overview of what 
signs we use and how we use them.37 An important part of grammatical investigation will also be 
discernment of the pictures that are operative in our talk, i.e., those pictures around which our talk gets 
oriented. Note that I add in later chapters important caveats to the possibility of my own employment of 
grammatical investigation per se in thinking about and being active in professional learning initiatives. 
Regardless, the approach I follow out and which is the principal theme of this thesis, is to draw and 
apply a picture of professional learning on the basis of an application of the picture of language and 
meaning drawn by Wittgenstein.38 
I suggest that it is this that captures what is of the most significant value of Wittgenstein to educators, 
viz., the drawing of such a picture of learning on the basis of his picture of language and meaning. For 
my own part, I resist attempting to draw out a theory or picture of learning from Wittgenstein’s many 
‘educationally’ oriented remarks having to do with learning, teaching, training, instruction, etc., or from 
his employment of a varied set of pedagogical techniques, such as question-and-answer remarks, 
examples both real and outlandish (see his many ‘anthropological’ and fantastical examples – e.g., see 
RFM I 143ff, for the case of wood cutters with strange measuring practices), dialogues, humour, and so 
on. My own view is that Wittgenstein employs these remarks (and techniques) in service of bringing into 
clearer view the developing picture of language and meaning he is sketching.  We can, of course, take 
                                                          
36 One might even suggest here some affinity with Donald Schön’s emphasis on the creative framing of problems of 
practice through the artistry of the reflective practitioner’s unfettered expertise. (See Chapter 2 for more on 
Schön.) 
37 At the same time I am not suggesting here that we end up with an ‘objective,’ value-free, theoretically-neutral 
analysis of talk. Rather, we do simply end up with more talk, which itself can be grammatically investigated for its 
‘what and how’ of sign use. However, all of what I am suggesting be done here is still situated on the plane of 
meaning. 
38 I would suggest as well that my use of some of the provocative ideas of Sudnow in gaining a perspective on 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning (see Chapter 3), is also interesting, useful, and contentious. Note 
that my employment of Sudnow’s thinking concerns linguistic meaning, and represents a considerable departure 
from the Fregean, representationalist approach to meaning. 
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and develop from Wittgenstein the method of the ‘grammatical investigation,’ and apply it to various 
important terms used within educational circles, perhaps with an eye to versions of deconstructive 
results, and such efforts would be both revealing and useful (e.g., see Winch, 2017). 
Thus, from the perspective I build in this thesis project, what I take to be most salient for both the 
philosophy of education and the field of professional learning and development lies in the application of 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning to drawing a picture of professional learning. And so 
bringing to bear a picture of language and meaning on the development of a picture of professional 
learning is my focus here. As Wittgenstein asks and answers in a paragraph from Zettel: “Am I doing 
child psychology [i.e., in discussing children’s learning language]? – I am making a connexion between 
the concept of teaching and the concept of meaning” (Z §412). Similarly, in my thesis project I am 
working to ‘make a connexion’ between a picture of language and meaning and a picture of professional 
learning. Further, cued by this assertion by Wittgenstein from Zettel, I take here a line from Deborah 
Britzman (2003) as illuminating something of my own purposes in this thesis. She says: 
So readers will meet the conflicted narratives made from teacher education. And it is here that 
the research will take the narrative turn. The reason we engage with narratives of learning is to 
create a different conversation on the problem of experience in education. (p. 23) 
This seems to me a fair representation as well, mutatis mutandis, of what I am trying to do, i.e., create a 
different conversation with regard to the situations of professionals learning in situ through a reading of 
Wittgenstein on language and meaning. Those situations I have begun to describe in the opening pages 
of this chapter, and go on to consider how others have considered them through the literature reviews I 
conduct in Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapters 4 and 5 I further consider those situations of professional 
learning – the conflictual aspects and the struggles – in light of the perspective afforded us by 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning and by the picture of professional learning I have begun 
to sketch myself, influenced by the major gestures and lines of Wittgenstein’s picture. 
Finally, with the background context set out in this chapter now in place and situating my discussion, I 
can usefully begin to sketch out a picture of professional learning in terms of Wittgenstein’s notions of 
grammar, language-games, and having ‘places to go’ in one’s professional talk. In the next chapter, I 
briefly look at some of the more important pieces in the literature on professional learning, in part to set 
further the context for my move to Wittgenstein and his picture of language and meaning, but also in 
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part to seek out what is valuable and useful there for me in my work to talk better, in fundamental 
terms, about professional learning. 
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Chapter Two 
Some Theorists of Professional Learning 
 
2.1  Preamble 
My aim in this section is to provide a reasonable path into the rather substantial literature on 
professional learning. I have selected particular thinkers for this brief literature review on the basis of 
several factors, and my selections have not been made in order to obtain a representative sample. The 
first factor concerns the seminal nature of the work – these are, for the most part, key and influential 
documents in the field. The second factor is my interest to show some of the contrast both within the 
literature and to my own developing way of thinking and talking about professional learning. As will 
become evident, guided by my reading of Wittgenstein I break away from the cognitivist and 
epistemological assumptions which frame many of these thinkers’ investigations. Third, several of these 
pieces were chosen because they focus on dialogue, conversation, and relationship as important to the 
course of professional learning, a point which will strongly echo the thinking I do later about 
professional learning. Last, I have selected certain thinkers because their work provides rich descriptions 
of professional working life; from these characterizations of working life these authors develop 
inferences about the kind of learning that makes possible and supports just those kinds of practice. 
These descriptions and associated inferential moves are, of themselves, valuable to have in hand when 
thinking about professional learning. 
By giving a sense of the sweep of the literature on professional learning we can begin to observe how 
different theorists talk about professional learning and how they frame their talk. As a negative kind of 
finding this chapter will also serve to show that, despite the range of the literature, no one has chosen 
to consider these issues about professional learning from the perspective of a theory or picture of 
language and meaning. In the context of my thesis, then, this scan of the literature serves to indicate 
something of the space that is available for the treatment I propose, viz., to explore professional 
learning in light of the view afforded by Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning (i.e., see 
Chapter 3). Thus there is some need for a deeper look at the arguments and themes of the thought of 
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each thinker, to ascertain whether they do treat language and meaning in their discussions of 
professional learning.39 
There has been a longstanding and rich history of academic interest on professional learning, and, as 
just noted, it is a substantial literature.40 A considerable amount of this literature is located within the 
education sector, focusing on the learning and cognitive life of education professionals. There has been 
as well over the last two decades an explosion of interest in the new fields of ‘knowledge 
mobilization/transfer’ and ‘research use/utilization/translation’; in the health sciences there has also 
been much interest in how professionals and organizations manage the rapidly changing bodies of 
pertinent relevant research, research syntheses, ‘official’ guidelines,’ etc., and changing health care 
environments; and there has long been interest in the nature of expertise and how experts become 
experts. Despite ostensible focus on organizational development, policy making, and institutional 
processes in the knowledge mobilization and research utilization literatures, there is a considerable 
amount here that is, in effect, precisely about professional learning (in whatever guise it might take). 
While an organization can be said in various ways to use information, or to be structured in accordance 
with certain ‘best’ understandings, it is also still individual professionals and groups and networks of 
                                                          
39 Which entails that I can only consider a smaller set of thinkers than I would otherwise. In order to keep this 
chapter to a reasonable length, I have ended up neglecting thinkers in the field of adult/workplace learning such as 
Malcolm Knowles, Knud Illeris, David Kolb, and Peter Jarvis (and others).  
40 As might be expected, not all of this literature is explanatory or exploratory in design. Some of it expresses 
discontent with the relevant current state of professional learning. For example, Showers et al‘s (1987) important 
paper articulated serious issues concerning the support and interest in professional learning in the education 
sector. Desimone (2009, 2011) and her colleagues (e.g., Garet et al, 2001; Desimone et al, 2002) have done 
important work providing the empirical characterizations and conditions for successful, quality professional 
learning interventions (e.g., indicating in clear terms the temporal conditions requiring to be met), in the course of 
which they also effectively describe many learning interventions which have not been successful. Fenwick (2004) 
summarizes some of the discontent with professional learning  in education reported in the literature: “[R]eports 
of analyses of school-based initiatives to foster teachers’ professional development tend to report similar 
conclusions, such as limited commitment from senior administrators or limited time; teacher commitment varying 
according to individual philosophies, attitudes, and experience of teaching; and the lack of monitoring, support, 
and adjustment that are required to sustain change over the long term” (pp. 262-263). Finally, a good deal of this 
literature is prescriptive, recommendation-based, or programmatic in design. For example, see Dufour & Eaker 
(1998), who assemble a basic list of the components (i.e., the ‘fundamental terms’) of a ‘professional learning 
community,’ basing their description on the principal assumption that collaborative learning and work are more 
effective than when these are done individually (e.g., see pp. 25-29). See as well the Continuing Professional 
Development (CPD) literature, which, while impressive in its scope and in the research and thinking on the 
practical matters of professional learning, from the point of view of my own interests is more empirical and 
prescriptive in theme and does little to spell out the foundations of the approaches put forth (e.g., see Cordingley 
(2008) in which CPD is discussed in the context of ‘transforming knowledge into practice’).  
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professionals that learn from that research; their changing, evolving, increasingly sophisticated use of 
research is professional learning. 
My overall observation is that there is indeed much of profit to take from this literature on professional 
learning, and identifying those aspects that I find conducive to the work I am doing with ideas of 
Wittgenstein will be important to my efforts. One feature of the literature of considerable interest and 
significance is the underlying cognitivism which many of the theorists in the field frame their work, 
which stands in strong contrast to my own direction. Cognitivism (as one variant of representationalism 
– see Chapter 1) is the main alternate view to the one that I am developing in this thesis. Put simply, 
cognitivism holds that some more-or-less discrete and containable thing, i.e., a representation, a ‘unit’ 
of knowledge, a particular concept, content, proposition, or a rule or rule formulation, is cognitively 
captured or grasped by the learner through being transferred, transmitted, or transformed in some 
manner, becoming the source of subsequent external or internal actions in concert with other such 
cognitive entities through a person’s cognitive (e.g., computational) mechanisms.41 That a person knows 
or understands something, or speaks meaningfully about something, becomes a fact about them, 
insofar as they are said to have, possess, or grasp a concept, content, proposition, etc. The concept, 
proposition, etc., is the source of meaning, and thus the question is whether such things in their discrete 
particularity are in fact within a person’s cognitive system.42 Jerry Fodor (1975), for example, succinctly 
formulates the cognitivist perspective in the following way: “What cognitive psychologists typically try to 
do is to characterize the etiology of behavior in terms of a series of transformations of information [i.e., 
representations]” (p. 54). Charles Taylor (1993) also provides a good synopsis of the perspective: 
In the mainline epistemological view, what distinguishes the agent from inanimate entities 
which can also affect their surroundings is the former’s capacity for inner representations, 
                                                          
41 Here is how Carey (2009) puts it in her important book on concepts: “Concepts are units of thought, the 
constituents of beliefs and theories, and those concepts that interest me here are roughly the grain of single lexical 
items. Indeed, the representations of word meanings are paradigm examples of concepts. I take concepts to be 
mental representations – indeed, just a subset of the entire stock of a person’s mental representations. … I assume 
that representations are states of the nervous system that have content, that refer to concrete or abstract entities 
(or even fictional entities), properties, and events” (p. 5). See also Carey (2011) – “As with all mental 
representations, a theory of concepts must specify what it is that determines the content of any given mental 
symbol (i.e., what determines which concept it is, what determines the symbol’s meaning). (In the context of 
theories of mental or linguistic symbols, I take “content” to be roughly synonymous with “meaning.”)” (p. 113). 
42 A dynamic systems/network approach to cognition may not be entirely well-described in these simple terms; but 
though the active structure may be different, in essence these are still basically internalist, mechanistic models of 
mind, meaning, understanding, and learning. See, for example, McClelland & Cleeremans (2009) on such models 
(i.e., connectionist or parallel distributed processing models), where learning is taken to be “the process of 
connection weight adjustment.” 
31 
 
whether these are placed in the “mind” or in the brain understood as a computer. What we 
have which inanimate beings don’t have – understanding – is identified with representations 
and the operations we effect on them. (p. 34) 
The cognitivist perspective has been strongly at work in education shaping views on learning in more-or-
less subtle ways. In George Posner et al’s (1982) classic and influential article in education, for instance, 
in the context of explaining the feature of intelligibility of concept and discourse as part of the 
mechanism of learning, the authors claim that: 
In fact, we would claim that no theory can function psychologically at all unless it is internally 
represented by the individual. In general, representations may be in the form of propositions or 
images, or networks of interrelated propositions and/or images. (p. 216) 
This view or picture of things, stemming from a representational view of language and meaning, has, as I 
have pointed out in the previous chapter, a series of implications for how we talk about learning and 
teaching. Typical of cognitivist approaches to learning are concept change/transfer theories: thus, 
learning occurs when the concept – a discrete thing – is acquired from some educational experience.43 
Concept transfer is considered completed when that concept is employed by the learner in cases or 
situations distinct from those in which the concept was acquired.44 As Paul Thagard (2003) describes: 
Concepts are mental representations corresponding to words. For example, the concept ‘dog’ is 
a mental structure that corresponds to the word ‘dog’ and refers to dogs in the world. 
Conceptual change is produced by mental processes that create and alter such mental 
representations. (p. 666) 
                                                          
43 One of the early and classic accounts of language and learning as transfer of ‘ideas’ (i.e., concepts) is given in 
John Locke’s (1640/1959), An essay concerning human understanding (Book III, Chapters I-II), where he says: “The 
use, then, of words, is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate 
signification. The use men have of these marks being either to record their own thoughts … or, as it were, to bring 
out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others … When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be 
understood: and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer” (p. 9) 
44 Mark Rowlands (2003) supplies a good description of this in what he calls the “inner process model”: “We have 
various thoughts, ideas and other conscious states. These have a definite content. When we speak or write, what 
we do is give outer expression to this inner content; we, so to speak, drape the inner meaning in outer garb.  Thus, 
when we mean something by a sign (e.g., a word), the content of the inner state is externalized: transmitted to an 
outer expression. And when we understand something by a sign, the reverse takes place. The content of an outer 
expression is internalized: transmitted to an inner state of understanding. Thus, to mean or understand something 
by a sign is in both cases to be the subject of an inner state or process. … This picture of meaning has become 
deeply entrenched in philosophical – and, indeed, everyday – consciousness” (pp. 76-77). 
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Bradley Love (2003), in the course of comparing the different models of concepts (i.e., rules, prototypes, 
exemplars, and neural networks), speaks of the ‘encoding of training examples,’ from which the 
abstraction necessary to conceptual representation is drawn (see pp. 651-652). Identifying which 
cognitive states or processes exist in learners is thus an important factor in considering learning 
situations, and educator, learner, or investigator need turn to those instruments that help pick out just 
those relatively discrete things.45 Such instruments are used to describe what people currently believe, 
understand, or know; how what they believe, etc., affects what they do; to infer what learners need to 
understand or know (given some set of concepts or behaviours as target); and to assess learning 
interventions from the perspective of what changes have taken place in what learners now have (‘in 
their heads’) as a result of those interventions.46 
While I am interested in this brief review to pick up on how cognitivist assumptions made by these 
thinkers influence their investigations, it is important at the same time to recognize how complicated 
the situations are which are described by these theorists, and how indirect and diffuse the cognitivist 
assumptions in their thought can be. One area in which these assumptions emerge clearly is the 
literature concerned with teacher thinking and belief. For example, amongst a variety of important, 
well-cited papers which focus on this topic, Dona Kagan’s (1992) work stands out as explicitly identifying 
beliefs as held by educators, the contents of which need to be elicited through various means and which 
are to be distinguished from the activities and practices to which they are variously and causally 
connected. She discusses this cognitive aspect in terms of ‘internalized’ belief systems possessed by 
individuals, and in terms of (mental) transfer and translating mechanisms such that beliefs effect 
classroom instruction. In Simon Borg (2003, 2015), a similar approach is taken. He identifies ‘thinking, 
knowing, and believing’ as “mental constructs”, and discusses the relationship of these to what teachers 
do in classrooms. In the Introduction to his 2015 book he says in this regard that, “coupled with insights 
from the field of psychology which have shown how knowledge and belief exert a strong influence on 
human activity, this recognition has suggested that understanding teacher cognition is central to the 
                                                          
45 Even cognitive processes are considered in this way. Take as an example the nature or functioning of serial 
processing of the executive control system, understood to be a basic and important feature in explaining a 
person’s ability to learn (see, for example, Bryan & Luszcz, 2001; Diamond & Ling, 2016). 
46 Speer (2005), as one example among many, encapsulates this overall kind of view concerning measurement of 
cognitive states and processes perfectly. She says: “It is possible that researchers have just been unable to gain the 
necessary kind of access to the beliefs that teachers possess. For example, it is possible that researchers have 
accessed beliefs in ways that do not actually capture what teachers believe and then are attempting to help 
teachers modify those beliefs (which are not the ones they really hold) and measuring changes in the beliefs that 
were never really the relevant ones” (p. 387). 
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process of understanding teaching” (p. 1). Natasha Speer (2005) in her important paper similarly 
approaches issues concerning teacher belief from a cognitivist perspective, though she offers a 
cautionary note with regard to such approaches (e.g., due to the emergence of alternative explanatory 
frameworks such as discursive psychology or situative approaches). Finally, M. Frank Pajares (1992), in a 
well-cited paper, in the course of clarifying the belief-knowledge distinction identifies belief as a 
psychological construct, writing that, “the result [i.e., of his literature review investigations concerning 
belief] is a view of belief that speaks to an individual’s judgment of the truth or falsity of a proposition” 
(p. 316). 
Now, having thus situated matters, let me turn to my brief review of the literature. Anticipating things, it 
is interesting to see that the positions on professional learning sketched out by many of these theorists 
will emerge from their descriptions of the nature of professional/expert work/practice. By describing 
what is done by the professional in their practice, these theorists in essence work backwards to consider 
the nature of the learning that brought individuals to such positions of professional expertise. I begin 
with Michael Eraut, who in many respects exemplifies both the cognitivist stance while respecting and 
responding to the complexities of professionals’ work, their relationships, and their learning. 
2.2  Theorists of professional learning 
Eraut makes the primary focus in his various writings (see 1994, 2000, 2004, 2010) the complexity of 
professional learning and work, which he argues involves multiple forms and modes of knowledge and 
cognitive ability. Eraut argues that the ongoing education of professionals at all levels of their 
development calls for a robust, holistic approach.  He writes that: 
Professional work of any complexity requires the concurrent use of several different kinds of 
knowledge in an integrated, purposeful manner.  Yet this is difficult to achieve without 
significant interaction between formal teaching and professional practice, and specific attention 
given to developing the appropriate modes of thinking. (1994, p. 119) 
Eraut’s theory of professional learning is essentially an elaboration of one fundamental distinction 
concerning kinds of knowledge: that between tacit or implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge.  
Connected to these is the distinction between implicit and explicit learning, with the crux of this 
distinction concerning the conscious awareness of learning (see, for example, 2010, p. 39) and the 
nature of the intention to learn (see, for example, 2000, p. 115). 
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With these distinctions as foundation, Eraut develops a fairly complicated cognitive/epistemological 
typology. For Eraut, one difference between tacit/implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge is a matter 
of the consciousness or awareness of the knowledge itself (i.e., one is not aware of the former but is 
aware of the latter). In connection to this Eraut sets up another distinction, between codified knowledge 
and personal knowledge. Codified knowledge is propositional knowledge objectified in official 
documents (e.g., journal articles, textbooks) and which has the warrant of the appropriate intellectual 
and institutional authorities. Personal knowledge, encompassing both propositional and non-
propositional knowledge, is a large category containing many different kinds of ‘knowledge,’ and largely 
revolves around individuals’ use of knowledge and so is importantly concerned with procedural or 
process knowledge or ‘know-how.’ Eraut defines ‘personal knowledge’ as “what individual persons bring 
to situations that enables them to think, interact and perform” (2010, p. 38; see also 2000, p. 130). Eraut 
claims that process knowledge of all kinds ‘should be accorded central importance’ in professional 
learning/performance (see 1994, p. 121). One further distinction Eraut makes and leans heavily on is 
between formal and informal learning in professional life, though this is more a distinction between 
different contexts of learning. More explicit learning occurs in formal learning contexts than in informal 
learning contexts, and learning kinds range from implicit learning to reactive learning to deliberative 
learning in informal contexts (see 2000, p. 115). What further distinguishes formal learning contexts 
from informal learning contexts has mainly to do with the level of intention to learn and subsequently 
the nature of the activities organized to support the relevant learning kinds. 
Personal knowledge, which encompasses the kinds of knowing where knowledge is used, is the general 
category where the work of professional learning and development needs to be focused.  Within this 
category are various sub-categories of knowledge and cognitive modes, and Eraut’s argument is that 
these sub-categories are the appropriate targets of appropriately discriminating professional learning 
efforts; development of these categories within the individual learner leads to the development of 
professional competence and behaviour. Knowledge is acquired through its use, initially within a narrow 
context (e.g., the context of exposure, as through a lecture or conversation with a colleague); a deeper 
acquisition of knowledge is attained through transfer of learning from one context to another, a difficult 
process mediated via an extended set of contexts of further learning, application, and interpretation 
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(1994, p. 33).  Thus using knowledge is what makes it knowledge: “the meaning of a concept [i.e., a 
piece of knowledge] for its knower is embedded in a cluster of experiences of using it” (2000, p. 133).47 
After marking out different sets of categories of knowledge (e.g., see 1994, pp. 76-98) existing in varying 
measures of interdependence in their particular instantiations in professional practice, Eraut details 
some of the practical activities that can support the development of each kind of knowledge.48 For 
example, in the case of ‘process knowledge,’ which is “knowledge of how to do things and how to get 
things done” (1994, p. 93), Eraut suggests such developmental activities as “both to observe the skills in 
action and to undertake practice with feedback” done in a non-threatening and safe way within a formal 
course setting (1994, p. 93). What is emphasized throughout Eraut’s work is the importance of 
appropriate, well-timed, and well-adjudicated feedback of all sorts to professional learning: “developing 
process knowledge depends not only on seeing or hearing about others’ performance, but also on 
getting sufficient feedback on one’s own” (1994, p. 94). In multiple ways, positive change in professional 
performance is sensitively dependent on feedback (e.g., see 2000, p. 134).49 
Finally, Eraut suggests a cognitive mechanism for knowledge acquisition pathways which emerges from 
his own evolving account of the implicit-explicit knowledge distinction. Such cognitive models Eraut 
takes as instructive in gaining better focus on salient elements in professional learning, knowledge, and 
development. Eraut proceeds to make claims for what needs to be in place to support professionals’ 
learning on the basis of just such cognitivist accounts (see, for example, his discussion of ‘interpretation 
                                                          
47 I am unsure how this claim affects the epistemological status of explicit/codified knowledge as previously set out 
by Eraut. (A ‘family’ of meanings for “knowledge,” perhaps.) 
48 Eraut produces a number of such lists. He discusses a “map of professional knowledge” that includes (i) 
propositional knowledge, (ii) impressions, personal knowledge, and the interpretation of experience, and (iii) five 
kinds of process knowledge (e.g.., ‘acquiring information, skilled behavior, various metaprocesses for directing and 
controlling one’s own behavior’) (1994, see pp. 102-115).  Elsewhere he outlines the tacit knowledge required in 
professional work as comprising tacit knowledge of people, contexts, and organizations (2000, pp. 121-123).  As a 
last example he details the nature of personal knowledge as including ‘personalised codified knowledge, know-
how (viz., skills and practices), personal understandings of people and situations, accumulated memories of cases 
and episodic events, self-knowledge, agency, values, emotions, and reflection, and other aspects of personal 
expertise, practical wisdom, and tacit knowledge’ (2010, p. 38ff.) 
49 All of this, Eraut emphasizes, is part of the ‘social perspective’ important for professional learning, which stands 
opposed to the ‘individualistic perspective’, i.e., the intellectualist-internalist view of learning (this latter perhaps 
being closer to the thought of Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1993). This is not to suggest that this is a particularly 
innovative idea concerning professional learning.  Early in the history of the literature, for example, Schein (1972) 
also pointed out the importance of feedback: “It is not sufficient to send students into the community to try their 
hand at practicing their skills; it is essential that supervision and feedback be built into the process” (p. 118). 
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of guidelines’ in decision-making in individual cases in his 2000 (p. 125), in the context of three types of 
cognition he has identified, i.e., “analytic, intuitive and deliberative”). 
Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus’s (1986) seminal and influential study sets out the classic theory of 
the stages of novice-to-expert development. Their study fits in the tradition of studying experts and 
expertise, and the graduated approach they set out has longstanding precursors in the relevant 
literature. For example, Fitts (1964) lays out a continuous (i.e., non-discrete) three-phase process of the 
development of skilled performance/skill learning. Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s position carves out its own 
territory within this tradition inasmuch as it developed as a reaction against the claims made in the 
field(s) of artificial intelligence, particularly those centering around the technical notion of ‘rule-
following,’ and stems in part from the Dreyfus’ work in phenomenology (e.g., see Dreyfus, 1991). 
For Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986), there are five stages of novice-to-expert development: Stage 1 – novice; 
Stage 2 – advanced beginner; Stage 3 – competent; Stage 4 – proficient; and Stage 5 – expert. Moving 
from novice to expert is moving from deliberate, detached, analytical use of context-free rules to 
automatic (i.e., intuitive) ‘involved action’ in situations (for these ‘stages,’ see mainly Chapter 2, pp. 16-
51, and also Chapter 4, pp. 101-121). The movement through the different stages is characterized by the 
gradual replacement of deliberate, conscious rule-application with more and more intuitive action based 
on the perception (i.e., the automatic recognition) of more and more patterns. One gets to be an expert 
through experience, which yields the ability to see situations more holistically rather than breaking 
down situations and behaviours into discrete components to which rule protocols can be consciously 
selected and applied. This experience-won intuitive know-how is the “product of deep situational 
involvement and recognition of similarity” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 28), i.e., effortlessly perceiving 
similarities to previous experiences. Progress from novice to expert, then, is progress in the 
development of know-how or skill and not in propositional knowledge, i.e., ‘knowing-that.’  Common 
examples of expertise provide them with some of the force of their argument.  They say in this regard: 
You can ride a bicycle because you possess something called “know-how”, which you acquired 
from practice and sometimes painful experience. The fact that you can’t put what you learned 
into words means that know-how is not accessible to you in the form of facts and rules. If it 
were, we would say that you “know that” certain rules produce proficient bicycle riding. … All of 
us know how to do innumerable things that, like bike riding, cannot be reduced to “knowing 
that”. (1986, p. 16) 
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Thus repetition through experience is the key to professional learning and development for Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus (see also Dreyfus, 1992, pp. xxvii - xxviii). 
Jack Mezirow (1991, 1997) integrates a fundamental cognitivist approach within a context of reflexive 
inquiry and transformative learning, in terms of a complicated architecture of reflection and learning. 
For example, he says both that, “learners need to appropriate a critical stance and language that will 
enable them to understand the ways in which these different discourses encode different meaning 
perspectives and schemes” (1997, p. 9), and that “a transformative learning experience, involving a 
transformation of meaning structures, requires that the learner makes an informed and reflective 
decision to act” (p. 8). That it is a cognitive architecture being proposed, and not, for example, a 
narrational, rhetorical, or discursive architecture, comes out clearly in Mezirow’s (1991) claims that, 
“our perceiving, thinking, feeling, and acting may be carried out either habitually or thoughtfully … [and] 
these modes of action can be influenced significantly by errors in content or process as well as distorted 
by unwarranted epistemic, social, or psychological presuppositions resulting from prior learning” (pp. 
108-109). Indeed, he identifies the major sub-processes of reflective action in terms of “scanning, 
propositional construal, reflection, imaginative insight, a resulting interpretation that can lead to a 
change … in a meaning scheme or, in the case of premise reflection … to the transformation of a 
meaning perspective” (1991, p. 108). Apart from its connection to modern cognitivist approaches, this 
also recalls to mind Scholastic efforts to unwrap cognitional structure.50 
Perhaps the best way to consider Mezirow’s thought is as both cognitivist and constructivist, i.e., his 
constructivist approach is delivered via the mechanism of a transformative, cognitive architecture of 
reflective action. He is perhaps a constructivist more in the Piagetian mould, setting out the explanatory 
mechanism for how, in casual terms, we do reflect and do experience transformation in our learning. 
The combination of these two approaches emerges in Mezirow’s statement that: “The idea that 
uncritically assimilated habits of expectation or meaning perspectives serve as schemes and as 
perceptual and interpretive codes in the construal of meaning constitutes the central dynamic and 
fundamental postulate of a constructivist transformation theory of adult learning” (1997, p. 4). 
Chris Argyris (1991, 1994) develops an interesting approach to the issue of professional learning, 
focusing more on the conditions for its optimal occurrence than on how professionals learn the content 
for their expertise. Argyris’ celebrated contribution to the field is his proposal that professional learning 
                                                          
50 See in this regard, for example, Lonergan (1964/1967). 
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occurs in two forms, i.e., in single-loop and double-loop learning. Single-loop learning is restricted to 
one-dimensional questions and answers; double-loop learning takes additional steps in inquiry, turning 
questions back on the questioner and questioning one’s own assumptions and behavior (and so involves 
aspects of anti-learning or unlearning). Single-loop learning is concerned with finding straight-forward 
solutions to problems that have been formulated in straight-forward ways. Double-loop learning, on the 
other hand, is more reflexive, looking deeper into the whole context of the problem and the learner’s 
interaction with it. Argyris holds that this latter is generally the more productive form of learning. 
Intimately connected with these kinds of learning are two kinds of reasoning (i.e., Models I and II) 
pertinent to the context of professional, organizational life. Model I concerns basic values in the ‘design 
of one’s actions’ such as remaining in unilateral control, maximizing ‘winning’ and minimizing ‘losing,’ 
suppressing negative feelings, and evaluating behavior purely on goal identification and achievement 
(see 1991, p. 103). This approach to reasoning leads to what Argyris calls “defensive thinking” and to 
organizational defensive routines which get set in the practices of the organization. It is principally 
unreflective, unreflexive, and protective.  People in organizations use Model I thinking in order to “avoid 
vulnerability, risk, embarrassment, and the appearance of incompetence” (1994, p. 80), and also 
prevents those who employ it “from examining the nature and causes of that embarrassment or threat” 
(p. 81). Model II is based on different basic values, such as obtaining valid information, creating 
conditions for free and informed choices; and accepting personal responsibility for one’s actions (see 
Christensen, 2008, p. 12). Argyris’ close colleague, Schön (1987), frames the third value as “internal 
commitment to the choice and constant monitoring of the implementation” (p. 258).  Schön also adds 
that “Model II aims at creating a behavioral world in which people can exchange valid information, even 
about difficult and sensitive matters, subject private dilemmas to shared inquiry, and make public tests 
of negative attributions that Model I keeps private and undiscussable” (p. 259). A third distinction – 
between ‘espoused theories of action’ and ‘theories-in-use’ – allows Argyris to tie these different things 
together. Espoused theories of action are what individuals or groups might articulate as their governing 
principles, though in fact these articulations are inconsistent with the theories that are actually 
operative and observable in behaviour.  A Model I theory-in-use encourages defensive learning, and 
thus the more ineffective single-loop learning, discouraging double-loop learning and its openness and 
potential for vulnerability.  A Model II theory-in-use, on the contrary, promotes and supports double-
loop learning, making genuine positive change possible in professional lives and organizations. 
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Professional learning, then, is in a sense a kind of meta-learning, or even preparation for contentful 
learning. But, for Argyris, in the main professional learning is learning about these distinctions 
concerning learning and reasoning and bringing more clearly to awareness the actually operative theory-
in-use beneath the espoused theory. In this way professionals are enabled to learn by focusing on the 
possible inconsistencies in their own working lives and critically examining them.  Training in the Model 
II approach to reasoning and double-loop learning can then begin, which, Argyris claims, will have 
important consequences for the organization’s success (see, for example, 1994, p. 83).51 Breaking away 
from inefficient patterns of interacting and learning starts with professionals being taught to identify the 
reasoning they do use, to see inconsistencies in their practice because of the misalignment between 
espoused theories and theories-in-use, and to recognize organizational problems due to Model I 
theories-in-use in play (e.g., see 1991, p. 106). 
Donald Schön (1983, 1987, 1995, 2001) mostly considers professional learning in the form of student-
teacher relationships, dialogue, and situations (and teachers are called “coaches” by Schön). Indeed, 
Schön considers the student-coach relationship both logically and developmentally necessary for 
achieving any significant learning. The development of the professional, skilled, expert practitioner is 
primarily the developing of a reflective practitioner, and this mainly involves the development of the skill 
or practice that Schön calls “reflection-in-action” – or “artistry,” as he often characterizes it. Regarding 
artistry he says: “on the alternative epistemology of practice suggested in this book, professional artistry 
is understood in terms of reflection-in-action, and it plays a central role in the description of 
professional competence” (1987, p. 35). Thus, developing reflection-in-action and ‘artistry’ are the 
general basic tasks of professional learning and development. I turn first to see how Schön describes 
professional practice, and then to how he sees professional learning, which follows from the nature of 
practice and the practice situation. 
Reflection-in-action as Schön describes it has similar aspects to how Wittgenstein discusses 
‘understanding’ (see Chapter 3), and so I find Schön to be one of the more important of the professional 
learning theorists for my purposes. Reflection-in-action is to be distinguished from reflection-on-action, 
the latter being post hoc thinking about what happened, expressible mainly in statements, descriptions, 
and explanations. Reflection-in-action, however, is thinking about what to do within the current 
situation in which one is actively engaged, and manifests itself most immediately in action and not in 
                                                          
51 I return to something of this same approach in the interest I express in the role of inquiry in professional 
learning, and thus in the development of professionals’ abilities to play these sets of language-games. See 
Chapters 4 and 6. 
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‘thoughts.’ In other words, the action is the thinking or reflection; we think in the doing, the thinking is 
the doing. This is a crucially central piece of the structure of Schön’s position. Temporally, reflection-in-
action may occur in the (ongoing) present or may be drawn out over time (e.g., even over the course of 
months – see 1983, p. 62). What is key in reflection-in-action is immediacy: “what distinguishes 
reflection-in-action from other kinds of reflection is its immediate significance for action” (1987, p. 29).52 
And while its boundaries are not distinct ones, Schön’s discussion in his texts directly concerning 
reflection-in-action do seem to respect that indistinctness. But this is how I think he can be best read, 
particularly given the way he works through the concrete, detailed examples of professional practice 
and learning that he considers. In turn, the ‘artistry’ in practice emerges in instances of professionals 
‘designing an intervention’ in response to the unique circumstances of the practice situations and as 
result of the ‘reflective conversation’ between practitioner and situation. In this regard the skilled 
practitioner deals with the uncertainty and complexity of the practice situation in an “artistic 
performance” (1983, p. 130), which is bound up with both intuition (e.g., see p. 49) and the virtual (e.g., 
see p. 157). 
The idea of professional artistic performance/practice can appear anomalous if professional practice is 
understood as the “application of established techniques to recurrent events” (1983, p. 19) rather than 
a doing “that cannot be reduced to explicit rules and theories … a matter of skill and wisdom” (1983, p. 
237). Artistry and reflection-in-action characterize an approach to the activity and learning of 
professionals that stands in contrast to what Schön calls “Technical Rationality.” Technical Rationality 
takes up a Positivist perspective on the practice situation which leads to a different kind of view of the 
nature of the professional practitioner, i.e., as embodying something like a deductive-nomological 
approach to situations, in which covering laws are programmatically applied to circumstances to yield 
actions/interventions. Technical Rationality is concerned with programmatic approaches which are 
developed through the application of statistical decision techniques (e.g., see Schön 1983 p. 47). 
The need for ‘reflective practice’ itself is a response to a different understanding of the nature of the 
practice situation. He calls practice situations or encounters, “indeterminate zones of practice” (1988, p. 
69; 1995, p. 237), and these are characterized by uncertainty, uniqueness, and (value-) conflict, as well 
as by instability. The effect of facing such situations is to focus “attention on the context of practice” 
(1995, p. 241). In the first instance, the professional/expert needs to attend to problem-setting in such 
                                                          
52 Schön (1983) also characterizes reflection-in-action in terms of what he calls “on-the-spot experimenting” (e.g., 
p. 147; see also 1987, p. 29, for this connection as well). 
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circumstances (1988, pp. 65-66), and while this is a necessary condition for (technical) problem solving, 
it is not itself a technical problem. To begin to frame such situations in full view of their properties of 
complexity and uncertainty is to enter into the ‘swampy lowland of practice’ (1988, p. 67; 1983, pp. 42-
43).53 In working within such contexts, Schön’s model of professional practice moves away from 
explicitly rational, instrumental reasoning in the performance of professionals and turns instead toward 
such things as tacit recognitions, judgments, skillful performances, and artistry. As Cameron (2009) 
identifies it, “the professional’s creative and idiosyncratic response to the unanticipated and perplexing 
practice problem was the heart and soul of professional practice. … Schön saw professional practice, 
essentially, as the idiosyncratic activities required by the unique features of practice situations in all 
their messy, unpredictable uncertainty” (p. 125). 
 In this regard Schön’s idea of the ‘reflective conversation’ is an important one, both in the case of the 
practitioner entering into a ‘reflective conversation’ with the practice situation, where means and end 
are uncertain and emergent, and in the case also of the student-coach dialogue. There is much that 
Schön discusses about the practice situation that pertains to how he describes and sketches out the 
processes of professional learning situations. To some extent, the reflective conversation between 
practitioner and practice situation mirror the conversation between coach and student (beyond the 
learning situation with the student being the coach’s practice situation). 
Schön picks up on Argyris’ notion of “theories-in-use,” which in their application guide how people do in 
fact interact. These pictures are particularly important as they can lead to such problems as “learning 
binds” (e.g., see 1987, pp. 125-137, 166-168), which involve deterioration of the relationship between 
coach and student, leading to fruitless and unproductive learning relationships, processes, and 
outcomes and to less optimal outcomes in actual professional practice (e.g., see 1983, pp. 204-235). 
Schön argues that the working relationship between student and coach, the attitude of each to the 
other and to the process and to the uncertainty embedded in it, is crucial. Schön speaks of the “career of 
the dialogue” (1987, p. 169) between coach and student as emerging from this relationship and as the 
vital operative element in professional learning.54 
                                                          
53 Schön (1983) also characterizes the ‘swampy lowland’ of practice as “where situations are confusing “messes” 
incapable of technical solution” (p. 42). (See also Schön, 1995, p. 233, for this characterization.) 
54 All of this resonates with the ideas discussed by Bakhurst (2016) that concern dialogue and ‘conversation’, 
‘different voices,’ and the education and development of individuals and communities. I will return later to briefly 
discuss Bakhurst’s ideas in this regard. 
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In terms of professional learning and the need for coaching, Schön (1987) says that “the student cannot 
be taught what he needs to know, but he can be coached” (p. 17). That is, the learning situation is an 
active, generative one for both parties in the learning relationship. For Schön the idea of concept or 
knowledge transfer is not salient in professional learning: the coach shows, corrects, encourages, 
suggests alternatives; the student follows, repeats, tries to project in direct response to the coach’s 
showings and urgings and questions, and tries to go on with what the coach has shown or said. What is 
important in this process is the skillful and sensitively-responsive intervention of the coach, who is 
ideally a professional practitioner themselves. A student not able to break free on their own from their 
way of framing some problem will need the coach’s carefully disruptive intervention in suggesting or 
showing a new way to go on with the problem. The relationship between student and coach needs be a 
vital one in learning; influenced by the particular interpersonal pictures (i.e., the theories-in-use) held by 
each, these influence the ‘career of the dialogue’ and the possibility for breakthroughs. 
Inquiry is important for Schön, in a two-fold sense: first, inquiry in the reflective practitioner’s 
professional work, i.e., asking questions of the situation as part of the reflective conversation with the 
practice situation, and, second, inquiry in the training of reflective practitioners, i.e., the coach’s skillful 
question-asking which leads the student to mastery of the practice. Schön makes an important insight 
about inquiry and the nature of the learning dialogue between coach and student, viz., that dialogue 
and inquiry begins in the situation in which “the coach may frame a question that directs the student’s 
attention to a new aspect of the design situation. … His question may advance an idea the student has 
not yet entertained. … The coach may pick up the exact words a student uses to describe her intention – 
developing them, however, in a direction different from the one she had in mind” (1987, p. 106 – 
emphasis mine). This sensitive responsiveness of the coach to the student’s performance is crucially 
important. How the student talks reflects how they see the situation – it is how they see the situation – 
and their capacity for relevant reflection-in-action goes no further than this. Thus it is important to get 
the student to perform in the course of the learning process, to say or do anything in the context of the 
practice in question. This is precisely the (always ongoing) place for the coach to begin, and guides how 
the coach themself judges how to go on with a particular student in the process of teaching/learning.55 
                                                          
55 Note that the coach’s intervention in the specific context of the student’s actual doing, in conjunction with the 
coach’s educational question-asking (see above – and Schön, 1987, p. 106), also creates the space for the student 
to take on the practice of inquiry as well. This will become more pertinent in light of comments I make in later 
chapters of this thesis. 
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The above comments also reflect on the emergence of what Schön calls the “learning predicament,” 
which he frames as a restatement of the learning paradox from Plato’s dialogue, the Meno, i.e., that one 
already has to know that which one is trying to learn.  Certainly this learning predicament is relevant to 
such phenomena as the student’s ‘being stuck’ or being able to take on board new ways of seeing and 
doing things. This predicament finds its resolution, when it does, through the coach’s skillful and inquiry-
based engagement with the student and through the student’s own doing. The student as novice must 
be led into – and trained into – the practice of the discipline, by context-sensitive coaching work. All of 
this has connections with Schön’s notion of learning to ‘see aspects’ of the practice situation and to his 
notion of ‘learning by doing.’ He says that the coach “helps his student to learn to recognize design 
qualities by guiding her through a particular kind of learning by doing,” and the student “learns to 
recognize a [new aspect] in the same process by which she learns to produce it” (1987, p. 160). (I discuss 
further this version of the ‘paradox of learning’ in Chapter 4.) 
Doing and dialogue are, for Schön, general principles for all of professional learning: 
… learning all forms of professional artistry depends … on conditions similar to those created in 
the studios and conservatories: freedom to learn by doing in a setting relatively low in risk, with 
access to coaches who initiate students into the “traditions of the calling” and help them, by 
“the right kind of telling,” to see on their own behalf and in their own way what they need most 
to see. (1987, p. 17) 
This notion of learning through doing and dialogue with the coach is an important one for Schön in 
training the student in the knowing-how of reflection-in-action.  For example, he says: 
Whatever the coach may choose to say, it is important that he say it, for the most part, in the 
context of the student’s doing. He must talk to the student while she is in the midst of a task 
(and perhaps stuck in it), or is about to begin a new task, or thinks back on a task she has just 
completed, or rehearses in imagination a task she may perform in the future. (1987, p. 102) 
In other words, this is training in thinking as doing. A basic sequence for professional learning might 
proceed in this way (e.g., see 1983, pp. 130-133): the student struggles with a problem, and the coach 
indirectly criticizes the way the student has framed the problem and helps the student reframe it. The 
coach in dialogue with the student begins to draw out implications of this new way of framing the 
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problem through experimenting with the reframed problem (i.e., “reflection-in-action is a kind of 
experimenting,” 1983, p. 132). The coach by their performance leads the student into reflective 
conversation with the practice situation, helping the student to see new ways to explore the problem 
and different aspects to exploit in getting the practice situation to fit the reframing of it. As the situation 
“talks back” to both practitioners, new and unintended features and aspects become apparent, which 
can lead to further attempts by both to reframe the situation: “The process spirals through stages of 
appreciation, action, and re-appreciation. The unique and uncertain situation comes to be understood 
through the attempt to change it, and changed through the attempt to understand it” (p. 132). 
This dialogue between coach and student is part of what Schön calls a (virtuous) “learning circle,” 
involving the professional practice itself and the practice of reflection-in-action, each kind of practice 
feeding the other (and thus the ‘circle’ – e.g., see, 1987, p. 164).56 The learning circle begins with the 
coach providing some initial instruction or demonstration and the student responding in some way. The 
student responding here in some way is critical, insofar as it is going to be used to set up the possibility 
for feedback and engagement with the coach: “So the stage is set for a continuing dialogue of actions 
and words, of reciprocal reflection in and on action” (p. 166). To sum up, the student’s learning depends 
“on the career of his dialogue with the coach” (p. 169), and the nature of this dialogue dependent on 
the relationship between coach and student (“the communicative work of the dialogue … depends not 
only on the ability of coach and student to play their parts but on their willingness to do so,” p. 166). 
This learning process is one in which the dialogue between student and coach is a matter of 
performance (i.e., action, doing) and correction, encouragement, expansion, and further doing. 
Importantly, the student must come to understand that this process is one “in which imperfect actions 
are continually modified through reflection-in-action” (1987, p. 291). 
Carl Bereiter and Marlene Scardamalia (1993) reject the acquisitive approach of expertise development 
taken by thinkers like Dreyfus & Dreyfus and Eraut. Their work can be viewed as more strongly linked to 
the work of Schön and Argyris in terms of their respective emphases on inquiry. Bereiter and 
Scardamalia write that expertise is a process – the process of asking questions and setting out and 
dealing with problems – and that the notion of expertise characterizes a career, rather than being a 
                                                          
56 Schön at times does seem to come close to giving a situative reading of reflective practice in his discussion of 
professional learning.  He says: “When someone learns a practice, he is initiated into the traditions of a community 
of practitioners and the practice work they inhabit. He learns their conventions, constraints, languages, and 
appreciative systems, their repertoire of exemplars, systematic knowledge, and patterns of knowing-in-action” 
(1987, p. 37). 
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state.  For Bereiter and Scardamalia, learning is integral to being an expert (i.e., a professional). It is this 
processual feature that differentiates the expert from the ‘experienced non-expert,’ which distinction is 
Bereiter and Scardamalia’s main concern (i.e., as separate from the question of what differentiates the 
expert from the novice).57  They say, 
The career of the expert is one of progressively advancing on the problems constituting a field of 
work, whereas the career of the nonexpert is one of gradually constricting the field of work so 
that it more closely conforms to the routines the nonexpert is prepared to execute. (p. 11)58 
For Bereiter and Scardamalia, expertise is constituted of three main features: (1) reinvestment in 
learning; (2) seeking out more difficult problems; and (3) tackling more complex representations of 
recurrent problems (pp. 93-95). Experts, then, are those who continually reinvest in progressive problem 
solving that strain their limits of competence.59  To be an expert (or professional) is, in essence, to be 
engaged in the process of learning. 
Experts often work within expert sub-cultures (i.e., ‘second-order environments’), in which support, 
challenge, and expectation is generated.  For example, participating experts adapt to the changing 
achievements of such sub-cultures, changes which “keep raising the ante, by setting a higher standard of 
performance, by reformulating problems at more complex levels, or by increasing the amount of 
knowledge that is presupposed” (p. 106). However, as Bereiter and Scardamalia describe it, this 
communal aspect of professional learning is more a matter of adaptation to change in environment 
rather than anything more communitarian or situative in spirit or practice. (See Lave & Wenger, 1991, 
for a strong contrasting view in this regard.) Bereiter and Scardamalia, at least in their 1993, characterize 
expertise as more an individualistic phenomenon than emerging itself from the collective (as, for 
instance, as a feature of the collective). 
Similar to Schön, Bereiter and Scardamalia say that “the process of expertise … is an inherently creative 
process” (p. 123). To support this important creativity – which is just part of what it means to reinvest 
mental resources into progressive problem solving – the authors encourage organizations to find ways 
to encourage the existence and operation of these ‘second-order environments’ (i.e., expert sub-
                                                          
57 As Bereiter and Scardamalia (1993) state, “the problem is how to ensure that novices develop into experts rather 
than into experienced non-experts” (p. 18). 
58 The authors also call this ‘reinvestment’ in progressive problem solving “the process of expertise” (1993, p. 82). 
59 Another formulation of ‘expertise’ is given as “a process of progressive problem solving and advancement 
beyond present limits of competence” (1993, p. 199). 
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cultures) and to minimize or replace those environments which “encourage the reduction of everything 
to routine” (pp. 123, 145). Connected to the ongoing process of creative expertise is the notion that 
experts develop a ‘knowledge of promisingness’ (e.g., see p. 125). This notion is introduced in the 
context of a discussion about the nature of “real-world problems” (p. 132), which has clear overtones of 
Schön’s notion of the ‘swampy lowlands of practice’. In this regard Bereiter and Scardamalia say that, 
Creative experts are distinguished by their ability to identify promising constraints, which offer 
promising paths of action.  They are able to do this by having built up a large body of informal 
and impressionistic knowledge about promisingness within their domains. (p. 152) 
The last chapters of Bereiter and Scardamalia (1993) see the authors gradually develop notions of 
‘knowledge-building’ and ‘knowledge-building communities’, which have been the focus of much of 
their more recent work (e.g., see their Institute for Knowledge and Innovation and Technology (IKIT)60).  
This is a move more indicative of the importance of the communal process of expertise, i.e., it 
recognizes that participation in a “progressive knowledge-building discourse” is “to be initiated into an 
ongoing discourse [and] is to begin learning how to function as an expert in the domain of that 
discourse” (p. 208). Indeed, these communally-oriented knowledge-building approaches are seen by 
Beretier and Scardamalia as the principal model for education and learning (e.g., see Scardamalia, 2004, 
for a study of IKIT’s online discussion forum ‘Knowledge Forum’). 
Like Bereiter and Scardamalia (1993), Jean Clandinin and Michael Connelly (1995, 1996; Connelly et al, 
1997) make the general point that “we want to think about professional life as an educational life, not in 
the sense of this life being part of the profession of education but, rather, that being a professional has 
educational qualities” (1995, p. 153, emphasis mine). The crux of the position that Clandinin and 
Connelly work out is that knowledge and understanding are narrative matters, i.e., what we know is 
embedded and embodied in the stories we develop and tell: “our best understanding of teacher 
knowledge is a narrative one” (1995, p. 12).61 They hold that learning is a process in which we form, tell, 
and re-tell stories, to ourselves and others, and in the telling and re-telling in more-or-less reflective 
circumstances, those stories change. Thus, assuming new stories and committing to change in old 
                                                          
60 See http://ikit.org/index.html. 
61 Clandinin and Connelly do not make clear what ‘narrative’ includes and excludes. However, narratives are 
usually contrasted with such things as chronicles, compendia, lists, etc.; and, conversely, a case can be made that 
theories can be considered as narratives. But perhaps the principal distinction Clandinin and Connelly want is 
between narratives and ‘information,’ the latter lacking the essential weave that stories and narrated lived 
experience have. 
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stories is learning. Of course, simple ‘change of story’ can be ‘progressive’ learning or can be, on the 
other hand, some species of an adverse learning development. For example, in Clandinin and Connelly 
(1995), one of the educators contributing to that volume describes competing stories of professional 
development circulating among staff at one school, and how one officially-sanctioned story wins out 
over another new and purportedly ‘better’ story being developed and circulated by this educator and a 
colleague.62 Here a change in narrative is not a change (or learning) for the better (see pp. 114-117).  
There does seem to be in this regard an implicit moral narrative running throughout Clandinin and 
Connelly’s work, i.e., such as informs determination of ‘better’ narratives and ‘positive’ changes. 
Assuming that Clandinin and Connelly’s position is roughly generalizable across most professions, their 
main concern is to make plain the nature and optimal conditions of teacher/professional learning and 
knowing. Mostly working within large, hierarchized, bureaucratic structures, teachers are seen by 
Clandinin and Connelly as professionals operating in several different ‘landscapes’, employing different 
kinds of stories in accord with the particular landscape and its demands/scope of freedom. Teachers 
exist on a professional landscape and a personal landscape; the personal landscape and the professional 
knowledge landscape are “each understood in terms of personal and social narratives of experience,” 
each of these landscapes “weav[ing] a matrix of storied influence over one another” (1995, p. 27). (It is 
interesting that this point about the holism of practical/professional knowledge and personal knowledge 
is also reached by Eraut, though from quite a different perspective.) Within the professional landscape 
exists the professional knowledge landscape, and the professional knowledge landscape for teachers 
consists of in-classroom and out-of-classroom places. The professional landscape for teachers – and the 
professional knowledge landscape within it – is typically dominated by what Clandinin and Connelly call 
the “conduit”, which is the authoritative source of ‘learning’, ‘knowledge’, and professional conduct in 
the form of the transmission through bureaucratic, hierarchical channels of prescriptive information 
(see, for example, 1996, p. 25, for a concise description of the ‘conduit’ ).63 
Clandinin and Connelly identify three kinds of narratives operative in teachers’ lives. First, they call the 
stories to be learned and followed that emerge from the conduit “sacred stories,” and the most 
important of these for teachers is the “sacred theory-practice story.” Sacred stories contain two main 
                                                          
62 How one narrative ‘wins out’ over other narratives is an important and complicated issue. For some insight into 
the matter, Callon (1986), Latour & Woolgar (1979/1986), and Latour (1987), amongst many others in several 
fields, provide useful examples and analysis of this. 
63 Another embodiment of the ‘conduit’ is the professional school system in which pre-service teachers are trained 
and established teachers gain new credentials. In these institutional places, the practice of teaching “is thought to 
be practicing the various levels of theory experienced in the conduit” (1995, p. 69). 
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assumptions: (i) that teachers have incomplete knowledge, and (ii) that teachers “are not knowers who 
can teach one another; they are learners to be taught by experts” (1995, p. 126). Clandinin and Connelly 
describe theory that emerges from the conduit, which is prescribed for teacher consumption and 
implementation, as stories removed from their socio-historical contexts of inquiry and stripped of most 
of their meaning.64 Such sacred stories have been reduced to “codified outcomes of inquiry” (1995, p. 7) 
or to a “rhetoric of conclusions” (1995, p. 9). On the other hand, the stories that emerge from in-
classroom spaces are “secret stories”, i.e., lived stories of classroom practice (see 1995, p. 13; 1996, p. 
25). Whether secret stories need only be connected to in-classroom spaces is unclear: Clandinin and 
Connelly also associate ‘secret stories’ with “real talk”, that is, “talk about things that actually happened 
and things that actually mattered in the day-to-day life on both places on the professional knowledge 
landscape” (1995, p. 127). But the main point is that the concreteness of secret stories is to be 
contrasted with the ‘rhetoric of conclusions’ and abstraction characteristic of the material delivered by 
the conduit: “The language of the conduit permeates the out-of-classroom landscape. This is not a 
language of story, it is a language of abstraction” (1995, p. 14). (Incidentally, these distinctions between 
the kinds of stories bring to mind Schön’s distinction between ‘technical rationality’ and professional 
reflective/artistic practice.) Finally, the stories that teachers live and tell to others in potentially risky, 
conduit-influenced, out-of-classroom spaces are called “cover stories”, i.e., fabricated stories that are 
consistent with conduit demands and that help protect the professional lives of teachers. 
The real work of professional learning happens through the secret stories, which are particular, 
descriptive and evaluative stories built out of, among other things, in-classroom experience (the other 
things being, for example, ‘theory-stories’ taken on in professional training, and ‘mythic-stories’ taken 
on in teachers’ own school careers). In part expressions and descriptions of problems, puzzles, 
anomalies, etc., secret stories can be the stories which guide teacher practice in the classroom (i.e., 
stories teachers actually do tell themselves and live by). Secret stories are told in out-of-classroom 
places, and in the reflective telling and re-telling, those secret stories, problematic in nature or not, have 
the potential to evolve into stories that help guide practice in the classroom. Despite their suspicion of 
theory-practice stories, it may still be the case that Clandinin and Connelly are not entirely discounting 
the positive role of such stories, which indeed may turn out to be part of the dialogue involved in 
reflective telling and re-telling of a particular secret story. This does seem to be Clandinin and Connelly’s 
                                                          
64 For example, see Mischler (1979); the sense of ‘meaning’ employed here in Mischler’s article and by Clandinin 
and Connelley is at least in part importantly different from the linguistic or semantic sense which is my main 
concern in this thesis project. 
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position at different points in their work (i.e., the integration of theory into teachers’ secret stories and 
their ‘personal practical knowledge’ – see in this regard Connelly et al’s 1997 narrative analysis of the 
storied professional life on one teacher). This is important if professional learning is to move from ‘mere’ 
sharing to genuine, fruitful dialogue. Categorizing theory-practice stories as ‘sacred’, i.e., as being 
limited to the conduit and so conducive to only one type of learning situation, pushes Clandinin and 
Connelly to consider the sharing (i.e., the reflective telling and re-telling) of secret stories in ‘safe places’ 
as the only means or process of genuine learning. At the same time, their concerns with theory-practice 
stories have principally to do with the manner in which the conduit allows teachers to engage with this 
material (i.e., through what they call “cultivation”), which leaves open the possibility for their 
productive, positive inclusion in professional learning. 
Grounding Clandinin and Connelly’s approach is what they identify as “basic human desires” (1995, p. 
163): the desire to tell stories, the desire to retell stories, and the desire for relationship with others. 
One part of their argument, then, is that, given the basic nature of these desires, they cannot be denied 
and should be the basis upon which professional learning happens. If having and telling and living by 
stories is how we know, and the desire to tell stories is a basic human feature, then this has important 
implications. The upshot of Clandinin and Connelly’s argument is that, not only will policy and theory be 
of little use if it does not match up with the lived and narrated experience of the professionals in 
question, but forced engagement with it will be disrespectful of the teacher’s professionalism and 
expertise, and thus on that basis be quite counterproductive. In this vein, Fenwick (2004) provides a 
useful caution from a different perspective, one asserting the importance of this communal aspect of 
professional life and learning: “Lifelong learning appears to become an individualistic enterprise, its 
purpose to consume skills even as it turns teaching into an endless human resource development 
project … this focus threatens the solidarity and collective nature of teaching that grounds learning in 
ideals of equity and participatory democracy” (p. 263).65 
Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger (1991) set out an importantly different kind of approach than those 
canvassed in this chapter, viz., what can be called the “situative approach”. In Lave and Wenger’s work 
we see a more radical approach to the issues of meaning, knowledge, and learning, one which stands 
very much apart from the cognitivist tradition; it does tie in strongly, however, with the positions of 
Argyris, Schön, Bereiter & Scardamalia, and Clandinin & Connelly – and in a different way even with 
                                                          
65 I return to the kind of issues Fenwick points out here, in my brief discussion in Chapter 4 of the political aspects 
or implications of the picture of professional learning I draw through my application of Wittgenstein’s picture of 
language and meaning. 
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Eraut, in particular with his emphasis on process and relationships.  In brief, for Lave and Wenger the 
fundamental character of knowledge and learning are their relational aspects, that is, they are 
constituted in the first instance by social activity.66 Lave and Wenger’s (1991) position grows out of the 
more Marxist-oriented sociological work principally by Lave (e.g., 1988) and continues on in different 
ways in work conducted by both (e.g., Lave, 1993, and Wenger, 1998). 
The construct they develop, ‘legitimate peripheral participation’, is an analytical perspective, and “is not 
itself an educational form, much less a pedagogical strategy or a teaching technique. It is … a way of 
understanding learning” (1991, p. 40). This finds reverberations in Wittgenstein’s thought, insofar as 
(linguistic) meaning can only emerge, or be made sense of, in socio-cultural contexts (e.g., in ‘forms of 
life,’ as Wittgenstein puts it). As Lave and Wenger (1991) describe, “activities, tasks, functions, and 
understandings do not exist in isolation: they are part of broader systems of relations in which they have 
meaning” (p. 53), viz., meaning is sets of relations with broader systems of relations. Learning, then, “is 
not merely a condition for membership [in a particular community of practice], but is itself an evolving 
form of membership” (p. 53). In other words, one doesn’t learn first in order to join a community of 
practice (though one would do so in order to join a professional association); the process of learning is 
the process of joining and moving within the community of practice, i.e., becoming a participant in the 
community moving in from the periphery of practice. Foreshadowing Wittgenstein again here, learning 
is being able to do more and more of what the other members of the community can do and would 
sanction, especially as these activities are performed and modelled by the adepts in the community. 
Learning is increasingly knowing how to go on in the ways the community can go on.67 
In this Lave and Wenger explicitly pull away from the notion promoted by Schön concerning learning as 
deriving primarily from the master/coach-student relationship (and, in part at least, from the more 
                                                          
66 To make this point a little more explicit, knowledge and learning are not constituted through social activity, but 
rather they are a kind of social activity, with emphasis on the temporal dimension (e.g., “conceiving of learning in 
terms of participation focuses attention on ways in which it is an evolving, continuously renewed set of relations,” 
1991, pp. 49-50). This is a strong identity thesis being worked out in Lave and Wenger which has powerful 
implications for epistemology and for pedagogy. To emphasize the latter point, Lave and Wenger say, “learning is 
not merely situated in practice – as if it were some independently reifiable process that just happened to be 
located somewhere; learning is an integral part of generative social practice in the lived-in world” (p. 35). Later, in 
the context of their discussion about the historicizing of the processes of learning, they say, “this view [i.e., the 
relational view] also claims that learning, thinking, and knowing are relations among people in activity in, with, and 
arising from the socially and culturally structured world” (p. 51, emphasis mine). I again put the emphasis on the 
“are” in this statement, to highlight the identity relationships between these terms. 
67 As Lave (1993) says, “… there is no such thing as “learning” sui generis, but only changing participation in the 
culturally designed settings of everyday life. Or, to put it the other way around, participation in everyday life may 
be thought of as a process of changing understanding in practice, that is, as learning” (pp. 5-6). 
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individualist approach to professional learning sketched out by Bereiter and Scardamalia). They say that 
“rather than a teacher/learner dyad, this [e.g., the evolving membership in a community] points to a 
richly diversified field of essential actors and, with it, other forms of relationships of participation” 
(1991, p. 56).68 This ‘decentering’ of the master-student relationship is important, emphasizing that it is 
how a community organizes itself, both in general but specifically with regard to its learning resources, 
that is the context of any learning. The focus thus is shifted away from teaching and the view of the 
“master as pedagogue” and onto the notion of movement within “the intricate structuring of a 
community’s learning resources” (p. 94). 
As indicated, this situative approach has powerful epistemological implications as well. Lave and Wenger 
say that a community of practice “is an intrinsic condition for the existence of knowledge” (1991, p. 98, 
emphasis mine), and that “knowing is inherent in the growth and transformation of identities and it is 
located in relations among practitioners, their practice, the artifacts of that practice, and the social 
organization and political economy of communities of practice” (p. 122, emphasis mine). Thus, epistemic 
features are practice features, i.e., they have intrinsically to do with activity, performance, and 
relationships within a specific community of practice. Learning, then, i.e., coming to know or 
understand, is a matter of continual “centripetal participation” (p. 100) in the community, and further, 
that since “the place of knowledge is within a community of practice, questions of learning must be 
addressed within the developmental cycles of that community” (p. 100). As in ecological dynamic 
system models, here as well there is flux, change, and evolution in the identities of learner and master, 
and thus so too in the community of practice itself. These more global changes happen not only as new 
masters emerge to replace old masters, but also as movement in from the periphery by new 
practitioners comes to represent shifts in the nature of the practices constitutive of the community in 
question. Change and evolution of the community of practice does not so much mirror change in 
knowledge as constitute it. 
Finally, there is a large and rapidly growing literature concerned with ‘knowledge mobilization’ and 
‘research utilization,’ particularly emerging from the health sciences. The important and influential work 
of Sandra Nutley and her colleagues (Nutley et al, 2007; Nutley et al, 2009) largely focuses on linear 
models of the dissemination, reception and pick-up, and use in practice of research, with important 
gestures towards more complex and interactive models of knowledge building in non-research 
                                                          
68 Lave & Wenger (1991) say as well in this vein that, “apprenticeship opportunities for learning are, more often 
than not, given structure by work practices instead of by strongly asymmetrical master-apprentice relations” (p. 
93). 
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organizations (e.g., see Nutley et al, 2008, and Davies et al, 2008, which examine the interactional 
perspective on building research-informed practice).69 While Nutley et al (2007) tend to frame their 
discussion in terms of old, ‘Newtonian’ metaphors (e.g., ‘assessing impacts’), all the same they make 
genuine efforts to break free of those limited perspectives in favour of complexity, networks, 
interaction, and contexts. However, for my own purposes and interests, the (soon to be) seminal work 
of John Gabbay and Andrée le May (2004, 2011) is of considerably more direct salience regarding 
professional learning and development. In keeping with the research utilization field, they articulate 
their main research interest in terms of the “successful implementation of research evidence” (2004, p. 
1), and set out their research aim in this study as “the ways in which primary care practitioners … use 
evidence in their day to day decisions about the management of patients, both at an individual level … 
and in their collective discussions about best practice … and how these interact” (p. 1).70 They go on to 
consider as important the distinction between explicit research knowledge that is codified in formal 
ways (e.g., in practice guidelines, text books) and practitioners’ tacit knowledge or “knowledge in 
practice” (p.1). Developing relevant tacit knowledge in practitioners turns out to be their primary 
interest; explicit knowledge is secondary in the sense that it is one part of what is necessary to develop 
current, robust tacit knowledge. 
The form in which knowledge gets into practice across organizations and environments is through what 
Gabbay and le May call “mindlines.” The authors emphasize that the development of ‘mindlines’ is 
primarily through a range of different kinds of relationships and interactions, with little of that 
development due to engaging with codified research documents (e.g., guidelines). ‘Mindlines’ are: 
Collectively reinforced, internalised tacit guidelines which [are] informed by brief reading, but 
mainly through [practitioners’] interactions with each other and with opinion leaders, patients, 
                                                          
69 See as well the important work by Knott & Wildavsky (1980) and Rich (1997), who set out a linear process model 
of information/research utilization. This model has proved to be influential in the knowledge mobilization 
communities and research literature (e.g., see the equally important work done by Landry et al, 2003, which 
explicitly takes up this process model). 
70 They also discuss their development of a theoretical model in terms of “the ways in which evidence and 
information became built into clinical or policy decisions” (2004, p. 2). Again, as noted earlier in this chapter, it is 
important to recognize that this is the way that professional learning is explored from the perspective of research 
use/utilization, despite the prima facie appearance of a different kind of discussion happening in this literature. 
The explicit concern in this part of the literature, especially as it pertains to the health sciences sector, is principally 
about determining how (quality) research and research findings do and can (and might better) influence practice in 
the various health care professions. Despite emphasizing how ‘research’ or ‘knowledge’ gets taken up and used by 
practitioners and practitioner groups, policy makers, etc., this is still in my view largely about professional learning. 
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and pharmaceutical representatives and by other sources of largely tacit knowledge that built 
on their early training and their own and their colleagues’ experience. (2004, p. 3) 
The key to professional learning, then, is the ongoing development of practitioners’ mindlines, which 
Gabbay and le May argue is largely done through the varied interactions within practitioners’ networks. 
Thus they say that mindlines are “iteratively negotiated with a variety of key actors, often through a 
range of informal interactions in fluid communities of practice, interactions with and experience of 
patients, and practice meetings. The result [is] day to day practice based on socially constituted 
knowledge” (2004, p. 3). Much of this fits with at least some of what both Eraut and Bereiter & 
Scardamalia discussed, for instance, though I hesitate to push a claim of kinship here with Lave and 
Wenger’s more radical notion of ‘communities of practice,’ despite some surface similarity. Gabbay and 
le May emphasize that expertise is not so much mastery of content as rather a relationship-intensive 
process. Gabbay and le May say “the real skill of the practitioner [is] that of learning reliably from the 
knowledge of trusted sources either individually or through working in a community of practice” (2004, 
p. 4). 
On the basis of how mindlines develop and the vital role that personal interaction within networks of 
colleagues, patients, and especially opinion leaders has on this development, Gabbay and le May 
suggest targeting the education of key opinion leaders as a professional learning strategy that responds 
to the actual nature of practitioners’ working environments. They suggest, for example, that the training 
of opinion leaders in critical appraisal of research would result in improvement in the ‘implementation 
of research evidence.’ They conclude, thus, that the responsibility to ensure proper (i.e., evidence-
based) development of mindlines need be a collective professional one, and that quality networking 
must be supported as part of professional learning and development. 
2.3  Some concluding thoughts about the field 
So where does this lead me? I remark first that there is much here that is insightful and valuable in this 
literature, and that the work of Schön and Lave & Wenger is particularly salient for my own purposes. It 
is something as well to note how many well-cited studies take up in one way or another a cognitivist 
stance in exploring and discussing professional practice, understanding, and learning. One of the things 
that most impresses me in some of these thinkers’ work is the effort and attention devoted to looking at 
how the learners (professional or otherwise) themselves talk in contexts of practice and learning. One 
sees this most strongly in Schön, Clandinin & Connelly, and Gabbay & le May. But perhaps the most 
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important feature of this literature is the emphasis on various forms and degrees of relationship as 
forming the core of professional learning. This in a different way is at the center of Wittgenstein’s 
picture of language and meaning, and it is a piece of the puzzle that bears much emphasis. 
In the end, however, I find that this important work goes only so far to support my own interests to find 
a satisfyingly grounding way (if I can put it like that) to talk about professional learning. My review of the 
literature thus helps motivate my own turn to Wittgenstein to look for such a way in the picture of 
language and meaning that he sketches. The field is open to experimentation with a different kind of 
approach to framing talk about professional learning, i.e., one that considers such talk from the 
perspective of theories and pictures of language and meaning. It is not an approach attempted by any of 
the theorists covered in this brief review of the literature, and certainly no one has ventured such an 
investigation taking up Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning (though Schön does make use of 
some of Wittgenstein’s insights in his work – e.g., see 1987, pp. 106, 165).71 All the same, given the kinds 
of direction I will draw in considering Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning (see the next 
chapters), there is much for me to take away from all these investigative efforts here. 
  
                                                          
71 Trisha Greenhalgh has also taken up Wittgenstein in some of her recent work having to do with professional 
learning, though this in the guise of discussions about ‘knowledge translation’ (Greenhalgh & Wieringa, 2011) and 
about policy-makers learning from history (Greenhalgh et al, 2011). 
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Chapter Three 
Wittgenstein – Language, Meaning, and Learning 
 
3.1  Preamble 
In this chapter I first work to present a clear representation of the picture of language and meaning 
drawn by Wittgenstein (Section 3.1). My intention in this section is to start with a discussion about 
Wittgenstein’s view of language and meaning and then to move progressively to material more and 
more pertinent to sketching a picture of professional learning. As I have stated in Chapter 1, my view of 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning emphasizes the notion of the language-game, and so 
from that perspective I highlight the part of the picture that is about active move-making as constitutive 
of meaning. In the continuing development of my thought, this particular perspective afforded on the 
one picture is what I principally carry over into the picture of professional learning I work to sketch out. 
In the second part of this chapter (i.e., Section 3.2), I briefly review some of the literature in the 
philosophy of education that finds some basis in Wittgenstein’s ideas. The main purpose of this review is 
to set out what has been done by others in a Wittgensteinian mode that illuminates professional 
learning. My main finding is that little has been done in this regard, and that what has been done, 
intriguing as it is, carries me little distance in meeting the needs and interests expressed in Chapter 1 
such as would further my own views on professional learning. My conclusion from this is that there is 
indeed space for the consideration of professional learning from the view given us of language and 
meaning by Wittgenstein. 
3.2  Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning: Language-games, grammar, and rules 
Let me begin here with a few words about the publication of Wittgenstein’s thought. Wittgenstein’s 
‘early work’ is generally considered to be his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), the only book by 
Wittgenstein published in his lifetime. He left academic philosophy during most of the 1920’s to work as 
a school teacher in Austria, until his return to Cambridge in 1929. His return to philosophy was marked 
first by an attempt to respond to problems posed to his thinking in the Tractatus, in particular problems 
about how to talk about so-called “atomic propositions,” particularly concerning the independence and 
‘mutual exclusion’ of such fundamental elements. This resulted in a short paper, “Some remarks on 
logical form,” published in 1929 in the journal, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. However, 
Wittgenstein remained unsatisfied with the Tractarian approach he had developed and broke away from 
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the lines of thought charted out in the early years of his life. (Norman Malcolm (1966) gives a good 
picture of Wittgenstein’s struggles concerning his Tractarian ideas.) 
While there were a number of works of different kinds that appeared after 1930 (some of which I have 
found to be important to my own work), it is principally the ideas expressed in the Philosophical 
Investigations (1953) that comprise Wittgenstein’s ‘later work’ or ‘late-Wittgenstein.’72  Various other 
books that have been published belong to this period of his opus as well, such as Remarks on the 
Foundation of Mathematics (1967), Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980), On Certainty 
(1969), and so on. Wittgenstein died in the Spring of 1951, and so all of this ‘later work’ was published 
posthumously. Much of it was in the form of manuscripts he was working on (such as On Certainty), or 
are compilations by his literary executors/administrators of notes that he had made (e.g., Zettel, 1981; 
Culture and Value, 1980), or are lecture notes, etc. The authoritative biography of Wittgenstein is Monk 
(1990), which contains an appendix of all of Wittgenstein’s published work. 
My thesis works almost exclusively with the ideas of the ‘later’ Wittgenstein, in particular with how he 
develops and applies a picture of language and meaning. So far in this thesis I have set the context to 
Wittgenstein’s thought (and to my own project) in terms of representationalism, cognitivism, and the 
Fregean theory of language. To set further the context to that picture of language and meaning, I will 
outline very briefly something of Wittgenstein’s Tractarian position, to which the work of the later 
Wittgenstein stands in contrast and as response. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein develops a theoretical 
position very much in line with the onto-logic tradition stretching back to Plato and Aristotle. The onto-
logic framework holds that there is a determinate, stable, self-identical world or reality with fixed 
structure that is independent of minded perceivers and language-speakers. Truth in the onto-logic 
tradition is set out in terms of a kind of sameness between what we say of the world and how the world 
actually is. As Aristotle states, “A falsity is a statement of that which is that it is not, or of that which is 
not that it is; and a truth is a statement of that which is that it is, or of that which is not that it is not” 
                                                          
72 For example, there have been assembled from notes, lectures, drafts, and various writings what are considered 
to be transitional works of a sort, resulting in such documents as Philosophical Remarks (1975 – which was a 
manuscript written by Wittgenstein over the course of 1929-early-1930, and given to Bertrand Russell), 
Philosophical Grammar (1974 – a manuscript written over the course of 1931-1934), and various of his lectures at 
Cambridge over the course of the early- to mid-1930’s (probably the most important of which are notes taken by 
two of his students, Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald, and published as Wittgenstein’s Lectures: 
Cambridge. 1932-1935), and The Blue and Brown Books (1975 – lecture notes or notes dictated to students at 
Cambridge). All of this work is taken to lead up to his most famous book, Philosophical Investigations (1953 – 
published posthumously, and comprised of two parts; Part I was completed by 1945, and Part II was written over 
1946-1949). I myself find much of the mature Wittgenstein’s thought already appearing in these early ‘late-
Wittgenstein’ texts. 
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(Metaphysics, Book Γ, 1011b25-28). Aristotle argues that the correspondence of form in 
thought/statement and thing is what makes for truth and falsity. Hence the issue of commensurability, 
that there is something the same between thought (and language) and the world, characterizes part of 
the onto-logic programmatic from the start. 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein continues to wrestle with this same problem concerning ‘the harmony of 
thought and the world,’ as he puts it in later work (e.g., see PG §§95, 112-113; see also PI §429; Z §§55-
60). The Tractatus is thus a thoroughgoing exploration of how truth in signs is possible, and how the 
being of the world connects to truth. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein says that “we make to ourselves 
pictures of facts” (TLP 2.1) and that “the picture is linked with reality; it reaches up to it” (TLP 2.1511) 
and that “it [i.e., the picture] is like a scale applied to reality” (TLP 2.1512).73 For Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus, it is logical form (or ‘logical structure’ or certain features within ‘logical space’) that will be 
what is common between thought/language and reality and which makes possible their ‘harmony’ and 
the truth and falsity of statements. In an analogical argument he states: 
The gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound, all stand to one 
another in that pictorial internal relation, which holds between language and the world. To all of 
them the logical structure is common. (TLP 4.014) 
Developing this onto-logic position, he says, “the proposition communicates to us a state of affairs, 
therefore it must be essentially connected with the state of affairs” (TLP 4.03), that “Reality is compared 
with the proposition” (TLP 4.05), “Propositions can be true or false only by being pictures of the reality” 
(TLP 4.06), and, importantly, that “The propositions show the logical form of reality. They exhibit it” (TLP 
4.121). All of this reflects the spirit of the Aristotelian position, almost its apotheosis. Note as well 
Wittgenstein’s explication in his 1929 paper, regarding his own statement from the Tractatus that a 
proposition ‘reaches up to reality’ (TLP 2.1511), that “the forms of the entities are contained in the form 
of the proposition which is about these entities” (p. 169). This underlying ‘logical form’ that inhabits 
both world and words is key to Wittgenstein’s own version of representationalism in the Tractatus. 
In contrast to the identification in the Tractatus of logical form as what is the ‘same’ between 
propositions and reality, Wittgenstein in his later writings rejects such onto-logic commitments. 
Wittgenstein’s turn is away from onto-logy to language and practice: thus Wittgenstein moves from 
                                                          
73 Note that this latter statement (i.e., TLP 2.1512) is particularly important, as the notion of the function of 
measurement, the measuring rod, and the standard of measurement play important, subversive roles in 
discussions in his later work. See, for example, Philosophical Investigations §50. 
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“logic must take care of itself” (TLP 5.473) to “practice has to speak for itself” (OC §139). In other words, 
Wittgenstein shifted from his Tractarian onto-logic commitments to grammatical commitments in his 
later work (though some of the ideas and approaches of the Tractatus still served to shape 
Wittgenstein’s later work). This shift receives explicit formulation by Wittgenstein in remarks such as 
that “grammar tells what kind of object anything is” (PI §373). In direct contrast to the Tractarian view 
of propositions (e.g., “a proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so 
stand.” TLP 4.022), Wittgenstein now views propositions (i.e., signs, expressions), as well as the word 
“proposition,” in terms of their role and place in language. He says, making specific reference to the 
Tractatus, “one thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing’s nature over and over again, and one 
is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it” (PI §114). Wittgenstein continues his 
assault against the Tractarian view of propositions further on in the Investigations: “we call something a 
proposition when in our language we apply the calculus of truth functions to it” (PI §136), and that 
“what a proposition is is in one sense determined by the rules of sentence formation (in English for 
example), and in another sense by the use of the sign in the language-game” (PI §136). 
As I noted above, Wittgenstein’s later, post-1930’s thinking about language not only stands in strong 
contrast to Frege’s representationalist understanding of meaning as constituted through ‘hidden’ 
theoretical entities (i.e., ‘reference,’ ‘sense,’ ‘thoughts,’ etc.), and to his own Tractarian picture of 
meaning as committed to the idea of logical form as running ‘hidden’ beneath linguistic traffic, but stand 
also as responses to these views. The shift is from logical form to a picture of language based wholly on 
how we use signs. It is the life of signs tied up intimately and inextricably with the rest of our lives (i.e., 
the two comprising what Wittgenstein calls our “form of life”) that becomes the focus of Wittgenstein: 
language is a practice that “has to speak for itself” (OC §139). The shift, I emphasize, is to a picture of 
language as activity, and thus a shift from the metaphor of ‘having’ to the metaphors of ‘doing,’ 
‘performing,’ and, perhaps, ‘moving’ (see Chapter 1). Wittgenstein gives further specificity to this 
picture of language as activity by developing in it the picture of games – i.e., of language-games.74 
Wittgenstein’s methodology is guided by his notion of philosophy as the work of solving problems that 
emerge from misuses of language; in Gordian knot fashion, philosophy untangles us from the problems 
                                                          
74 See, for example, Moyal-Sharrock (2016): “Wittgenstein’s leitmotif was action. Wittgenstein saw action (or 
behaviour) as the root, manifestation and transmitter of meaning” (p. 117); Moyal-Sharrock (2010): “One of the 
important things Wittgenstein said about language is that it has its root in gesture – or, as he has also put it, in 
‘action’” (p. 292); and Smeyers & Burbules (2008): “Wittgenstein’s later work revolved around the idea that human 
life begins in doing, not in thinking” (p. 185). I discussed the importance of the picture of language-games in 
Chapter 1, and will continue that discussion later in the current chapter. 
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we make for ourselves, showing us the way out of the intellectual traps (e.g., the “fly bottles,” as 
Wittgenstein sometimes calls them – e.g., PI §309) that we work ourselves into. Philosophy does so by 
describing what we do, and by making ‘perspicuous’ our actual use of the relevant words/concepts (e.g., 
see PI §122). Thus philosophy lays out what we already know in ways that make more clear what was 
evident or obvious to us – that is why there is no point in philosophy setting out theses ‘because 
everyone would agree with them’ (PI §128)– philosophy just is bringing into view what we all of us 
already do know but have lost sight of (see PI §129). Thus, the ‘grammatical investigation,’ as 
Wittgenstein’s basic philosophical method, is in the first instance employed to resolve the philosophical 
problems which cause so much trouble, and to clear away “the confusions which occupy us” in 
philosophy (e.g., see PI §§132-133). One part of his careful, though not systematic, look at our use of 
signs is to consider how we learn how to use signs; that is, returning to and considering how we learn 
how to use signs is part of obtaining a clear picture or ‘overview’ (i.e., an Übersicht) of the signs we use. 
The ‘scenes of learning and instruction’ Wittgenstein describes throughout his works relate directly to 
the picture of language and meaning he is sketching. These scenes further show that we use signs in 
language without recourse to hidden entities which are the source of those signs’ meaning. That is to 
say, we learn in the first instance how to use signs, i.e., how to do something. Most importantly, we do 
not, in the first instance, learn how to represent things separate from or independent of the signs we 
are learning to use. Further, in learning language we do not internalize rules as things, but rather we 
learn how to do things, i.e., make moves, recognizably so within a frame of rules. Consideration of 
scenes of learning and instruction is important in terms of developing a picture of learning that does not 
contain a picture of a gain in possessions (see the first metaphor discussed in Chapter 1), but that does 
contain a picture of increase in know-how, in technique, in ability, all of which are fully manifested in 
(actual) doing (e.g., see Williams, 1994). Here, again, we are shown a picture of language and meaning 
which takes games as its main, underlying gesture drawing. 
It is also important that philosophy for Wittgenstein does not work in the coin of causal explanations – 
those are the games of physics, chemistry, or psychology, etc. (see Chapter 1). One danger in forming 
theories in philosophy is that we try to push our use of certain words beyond the ‘normal’ use(s) of 
those words, to take them out of their “original home” (PI §116) and mis-use them (see PI §90), and in 
doing so form the very ‘fly bottles’ into which we trap ourselves. A key methodological move by 
Wittgenstein in his philosophy is the shift from the idea of theory to the approach of ‘forming pictures’ 
of matters, i.e., of language and meaning; and the value (and danger) of pictures is in how we apply 
them. As I noted in Chapter 1, this is part of what makes writing with Wittgenstein so difficult – ‘ to 
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describe and not explain’ – and to use pictures in place of theories.75 Wittgenstein begins the 
Investigations with an example of just such a picture, saying that what Augustine provides is a picture of 
words and their meaning (PI §1). Wittgenstein is emphasizing that our use of a picture is quite different 
from our use of a theory, and that he saw himself only to be ‘sketching pictures’ of language. 
Wittgenstein describes his own endeavour in just these terms, in his “Preface” to the Investigations: 
The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which 
were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings. / The same or almost the same 
points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches made. 
Very many of these were badly drawn or uncharacteristic, marked by all the defects of a weak 
draughtsman. And when they were rejected a number of tolerable ones were left, which now 
had to be arranged and sometimes cut down, so that if you looked at them you could get a 
picture of the landscape. Thus this book is really only an album. (p. vii) 
Pictures in this philosophical context are used to compare, to highlight, to bring out through contrast – 
pictures have an illustrative, illuminating function rather than an explanatory one (e.g., see PI §§141, 
352, 570; Z §§ 245, 638; RFM IV 12ff). And the picture is, indeed, all we have: “it is not so much as if I 
were comparing the object with the picture set beside it, but as if the object coincided with the picture. 
So I see only one thing, not two” (PI §605; see also Z §262).76 
Thus, within language one can propose theories, which comprises whole sets of inter-related language-
games that make up a part of our language, i.e., making and proposing theories is one of the activities 
that we do in language. But one cannot propose causal-explanatory theories about language; within 
language no theories about language can be legitimately proposed, grammatically speaking, if they 
aren’t to be ‘inept or empty’ (see PI §§120, 131). In the end one can only show or display (i.e., describe) 
a language, but not give explanations or accounts justifying or grounding it – doing these latter things 
are what language enables us to do. Wittgenstein points out in an extremely important section (i.e., PI 
                                                          
75 The further difficulty here in learning to write with Wittgenstein concerns my own methodology, viz., how to 
progress from one picture to another picture without appearing to derive the second picture through a logical 
inference of some sort, and without appearing to be developing a theory derived from the first picture. In my 
methodology, one way of talking and viewing something is applied in developing a way of talking and viewing 
something else, but without change in the parts and organization of the first picture. 
76 Standish (2017) provides the relevant cautionary and instructional note here: “Wittgenstein is avoiding the 
fantasy that we just make it up as we go along, but he is also weaning us away from the idea that our thought 
merely traces articulations already inherent in reality” (p. 183). 
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§50) that a paradigm making commensurability and measurement possible cannot itself be measured. 
Similarly language makes explanation possible, but cannot itself be explained. 
It is interesting that some of the groundwork setting out the logical (i.e., grammatical) impossibility of 
theorizing about language qua language was laid down in the Tractatus. A key claim in that earlier work 
was that language cannot be the object of its own explanatory investigations, but that rather language 
can only show itself. Wittgenstein delivers a series of points developing this argument in the Tractatus, 
saying: “A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it” (TLP 2.172), and that “A 
picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form” (TLP 2.174). He continues: 
Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. / What finds its reflection in 
language, language cannot represent. / What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by 
means of language. / Propositions show the logical form of reality. / They display it. (TLP 4.121) 
He concludes by asserting that, “What can be shown, cannot be said” (TLP 4.1212). These passages from 
the Tractatus resonate with what Wittgenstein says in his later work: “In giving explanations I already 
have to use language full-blown (not some sort of preparatory, provisional one); this by itself shews that 
I can adduce only exterior facts about language” (PI §120, italics mine). Thus Wittgenstein argues that 
language shows only itself, and does not show any ‘other,’ ‘deeper’ reality beneath or behind it. That we 
talk about the world is just that we talk about the world. It is the talk that we have, and only the talk 
that we have to deal with. We don’t have things about which we talk; we ‘have things’ only because we 
talk about them. What exists behind, beyond, or beneath talk is, by definition, unspeakable, unworded, 
non-worded. “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” (TLP 7).77 All of this applies 
with equal force as well to language as object of talk – there is no deeper reality concerning language 
itself to which we penetrate when we talk about language. All of this connects importantly to the notion 
of ‘seeing aspects’ that Wittgenstein discusses in Part II of the Investigations; indeed, this basic idea 
pervades and orients the whole of this thesis.  
                                                          
77 The Canadian poet Tim Lilburn (1999) discusses this Wittgensteinian theme in a series of remarkable assays on 
the topic: “How does one address what falls outside reason’s caricatures, that eludes language’s efforts to 
circumscribe, that has no being if being is equal to comprehensibility, espiability of form? Here naming may be 
nothing more than ovation, or a mark of the assertions and reversals of apophasis, or a slight domestication of 
being in which we participate in what is beyond us, enjoy a brief contiguity with that uncontainability, like feeding 
birds in winter” (p. 62).  Seeing and being in the world only in and through the signs we use – and the impossibility 
for us to get around signs – is a picture that both Wittgenstein and Lilburn work to develop. 
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Thus one is able to see a world, a world of things, only when one has words, a language. As Cavell (1979) 
has pointed out, “To know how to use the word “anger” is to know what anger is. (“The world is my 
representation”)” (p. 185); that is, learning the meaning of words is to learn to see more-or-less 
determinate things. In Wittgenstein’s remark: “The somewhat queer phenomenon of seeing this way or 
that surely makes its first appearance when someone recognizes that the optical picture in one sense 
remains the same, while something else, which one might call “conception”, may change” (RPP vol. 1 
§27), this telling phenomenon, which incorporates sameness (“in one sense”) and change (in aspect), 
tells us something, i.e., gives us a clue, about words and the world, that we can only have the ‘two’ (i.e., 
words and world) together. Without words there are no things; ‘what’ is perceived without words (e.g., 
by a non-linguistic animal) is unspeakable; beyond or outside of statements, categories, and concepts, 
there is in such attempts to speak the unspeakable nothing we can say anything about. Thus, the signs 
we use and the uses of those signs we master, is how we ‘see’ things and ‘see’ a world, in this or that 
particular way. (“”But after all, you must feel it, otherwise you wouldn’t know (without looking) how 
your finger was moving.” But “knowing” it only means: being able to describe it” PI, p. 185.) 
Considering how Wittgenstein talks about measurement and its possibility in light of his picture of 
language and meaning may be helpful. It is in the context of a practice that we have things to measure 
and things that are measurable. Commensurability only emerges in practice; things do not exist having 
the property of being x units in measure in themselves, but only insofar as a practice of measurement, a 
contingent artifact of our body of performances, produces such a feature, i.e., those units of 
measurement and procedures of measurement. Wittgenstein says, “I am trying to say something like 
this: even if the proved mathematical proposition seems to point to a reality outside itself, still it is only 
the expression of acceptance of a new measure (or reality)” (RFM III 27). 
Let me now begin to set out what Wittgenstein does say in the course of sketching his picture of 
language. This picture of language and meaning that Wittgenstein draws is composed of the ‘parts’ (e.g., 
see PI §526, PG §§115, 121) of grammar, language-games, and rules.78 By sketching pictures of language 
                                                          
78 “A picture is perhaps a still-life; but I don’t understand one part of it: I cannot see solid objects there, but only 
patches of colour on the canvas. – Or I see everything as solid but there are objects that I am not acquainted with 
(they look like implements, but I don’t know their use). – Perhaps, however, I am acquainted with the objects, but 
in another sense do not understand the way they are arranged” (PI §526). Wittgenstein never clearly or explicitly 
brings together language-games, grammar, and rules into the unity of a single picture (though see Wittgenstein’s 
statement from the ‘Preface’ to the Investigations quoted earlier in this chapter), but I find it useful to think of it 
this way. Each ‘part’ may indeed be just one of several sketches drawn of the landscape of language, as per 
Wittgenstein’s preface to the Investigations, and which can only in a loose sense be said to assemble together into 
one, unified picture. At any rate, this is one way to take the picture of things that Wittgenstein offers us. And 
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that include these parts, Wittgenstein provides a way of looking at and talking about signs and our use 
of signs, i.e., about language, meaning, and speaking meaningfully. As I have noted in my comments on 
language-games (i.e., in Section 1.3), Wittgenstein insists that we “look on the language-game as the 
primary thing” (PI §656), and this I take as encouragement to view language and meaning and our use of 
signs emphasizing the perspective of the picture of the language-game (Hintikka & Hintikka, 1986, for 
example, also emphasize language-games in their reading). Language-games depict most directly the 
active, motile, or moving aspect of language in the picture being sketched. Taking this encouragement 
seriously means that the picture of move-making in the (normative) context of games becomes central 
in considering and applying this picture of language (see my discussion of the second metaphor in 
Chapter 1). Wittgenstein says: “Of course, in one sense mathematics is a branch of knowledge, - but still 
it is also an activity. And ‘false moves’ can only exist as the exception” (PI, p. 227). Comments such as 
these by Wittgenstein make explicit the nature of language-games as being about activity, and more 
importantly about move-making. That Wittgenstein talks here about a ‘false move’ is interesting – 
“false” in the sense that it violates the rules of the game, not “false” as in not getting reality right. That 
this is what Wittgenstein is drawing out in this picture is made clearer in the next line from this 
paragraph: “For if what we now call by that name became the rule, the game in which they were false 
moves would have been abrogated” (PI, p. 227).79 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
again, this picture is not a theory intended to explain in causal terms language or meaning or particular instances 
of meaning, but is a way to survey the plain of life and language. Further, the ways I do talk about language-games, 
grammar, and rules are simply different ways to take, or look at, this picture that Wittgenstein sketches. One looks 
at pictures from different positions, and different ways of looking at a picture prove their usefulness and value in 
how one is able to go on in applying them, in how they allow one to go on (e.g., see PI §§352, 422-424). Further, as 
I suggest later, each of these parts of the picture may also profitably be viewed as different views of the same 
picture. 
79 Obviously there is a long list of passages in Wittgenstein’s texts that name, identify, and/or articulate the nature 
of specific language-games. I will only provide a sampling of them here. In Zettel, for example, Wittgenstein 
identifies different kinds of language-games such as: ‘determining how long an impression lasts by means of a stop 
watch’ (Z §82); “the language-game of giving information” (Z §160); the language-games played in uttering, “what 
is that?” versus “what do you take that for?” (Z §417), the language-game played in uttering, “I am afraid” (Z 
§489); the different language-games, “Look at this figure!” and “Imagine this figure!” (Z §§621, 646). Perhaps the 
best list of specific language-games is set out by Wittgenstein at PI §23: “Giving orders, and obeying them – 
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements – Constructing an object from a description (a 
drawing) – Reporting an event – Speculating about an event … Making a joke; telling it – Solving a problem in 
practical arithmetic – Translating from one language into another – Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.” At 
PI §25 Wittgenstein adds “Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting” to the list. Note that these latter 
examples from the Investigations are all in an active verbal voice, i.e., present participles. Language-games are 
actions, doings, either basic, ‘topic-neutral’ actions – such as the “language-game of reporting” (see PI, p. 190) – or  
are identified by Wittgenstein as being more along the lines of regular patterns of certain (key) words – such as the 
language-games of “I mean (or meant) this,” “I thought of …. as I said it,” and “It reminded me of ….” (see PI, p. 
217). As a last example, and one which begins to draw out the distinction between language-games and grammar 
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Rules, in turn, are the part of the picture that concern giving active form to the different movement 
kinds or motile possibilities, i.e., they give form to the language-games that we use to make, follow, or 
move between the connexions between different signs/concepts. It may be helpful to view this picture 
as kin to Aristotle’s form-matter distinction in order to make sense of the relation between language-
games and rules. Rules in the first instance concern the ‘how’ or mode of movement; but rules have a 
secondary sense captured in Wittgenstein’s expression, “the rules of grammar” (e.g., see PG §§12,14; PI 
§497), which may have to do with the connexions between signs understood in a normative way, i.e., 
connexions that we simply accept insofar as they are, in a sense, part of the group of ‘logical musts’ of 
our language (e.g., see PI §497; see also: “The connexion which is not supposed to be a causal, 
experiential one, but much stricter and harder, so rigid even, that the one thing somehow already is the 
other, is always a connexion in grammar” RFM I 128).80 
Rules of language-games (and of grammar) – what Wittgenstein calls “grammatical rules” – need be 
distinguished from rule-talk concerning ordinarily productive means-ends type relationships (e.g., causal 
relationships, legal and legalistic rules, ‘rules’ of safety), and which have the basic form: ‘in order to get 
A, do B.’ Wittgenstein’s picture of grammatical rules is that they bring one from one sign to another such 
that only in attaining the result has one followed a rule. To follow the grammatical rule is to achieve the 
result, and achieving the result is following the rule; the result is contained in the grammatical rule, as 
definitive of the rule.81 A rule that is productive, on the other hand, can be successfully followed and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(see below in text), Wittgenstein, in a discussion in The Blue and Brown Books about the problems we tend to have 
with indexical words, says “but nothing is more unlike than the use of the word “this” and the use of a proper 
name – I mean the games played with these words, not the phrases in which they are used” (BB, p. 109). 
80 Speaking of ‘rules of grammar’ is interesting, and this locution may be an artifact of Wittgenstein’s idea or 
strategy of likening language to chess. Chess, like language, is defined by its rules, and so “these rules belong to the 
grammar of a word “chess”” (PG §13). This is unobjectionable – the word “chess” is connected to these 
expressions of the rules of that game – that is part of the grammar of the word “chess.” At the same time, the 
game of chess, as chess, must be played according to a finite set of rules, which nevertheless do not circumscribe 
all possible actions and aspects that feature in actual games of chess. Thus, Wittgenstein might move from 
grammar as connexions to the picture of those connexions as rules for moves that are made in otherwise rule-
bounded language-games. More significantly, perhaps, we find Wittgenstein engaged in a back-and-forth 
discussion at PG §§ 133-134 trading between various expressions containing “rules” and “grammar.” The picture 
that emerges from this particular discussion is somewhat fuzzy (again, as perhaps it has to be). Just which 
language-games Wittgenstein is playing with “grammar” and “rules,” and what grammar of “grammar” and “rules” 
he is showing us, is not clear; further, the picture he is sketching out here is also entangled with the idea of the 
autonomy of language. Thus, as I point out in the text, it can be a struggle to find one’s way to any kind of 
unambiguous picture (though that indeed may not be the expectation). 
81 In this regard, Wittgenstein says: “The arithmetical proposition is not the empirical proposition: ‘When I do this, I 
get this’ – where the criterion for my doing this is not supposed to be what results from it” (RFM VI 22). See as 
well: “To accept a proposition as unshakably certain – I want to say – means to use it as a grammatical rule: this 
removes uncertainty from it” (RFM III 39). 
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result not be achieved, for one reason or another. Such a rule is used to produce results, whereas 
grammatical rules must lead to the result, in that sense the grammatical rule contains its own result as 
part of the rule/rule-following. Further, rules that are productive can produce a range of results, all of 
which are acceptable as proper results of following the rule. But only by moving from one argument of 
the rule to the other indicated argument does one follow the grammatical rule. Getting to the right 
place is what amounts to following the rule correctly; the result is contained within the rule, and thus 
getting just this result is to follow the rule (e.g., see RFM I 7).82 
I find tricky getting a clear view of this part of Wittgenstein’s picture having to do with rules. One danger 
here is a temptation to subtly reify rules, to make them into a kind of ‘hidden thing’ that Wittgenstein 
was so adamantly set against (“… as if our usual forms of expression were, essentially, unanalysed; as if 
there were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light” PI §91; and “Since everything lies 
open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us” PI 
§126). Thus it is a matter of the emphasis we put on the nature of the identity statements we make in 
picking up on these relevant parts of Wittgenstein’s picture, and which help us to resist the temptation 
to give a kind of priority (causal and ontological) to rules. For example, grasping a rule just is being 
bound in what one does; being bound in judgment is to be in accord with a rule. It is not a matter of first 
internalizing rules and then, as a result, being able to do things; and it is not that first internalizing rules 
gets you into the position of then being able to offer demonstrations to others (for example). Being able 
to do those things (or, better, doing those things), and being in the position to offer demonstrations (or, 
better, offering demonstrations) is internalizing rules. We could list rules for activities, but that would 
simply be one way to describe those activities that we do.83 Doing things correctly, meaningfully, going 
on in the right way, is to follow the rules; following the rules is doing things correctly.84 
                                                          
82 See, for example, “I want to say that the must corresponds to a track which I lay down in language” (RFM III 50). 
See as well: “For if you give me a description of how people are trained in following a rule and how they react 
correctly to the training, you will yourself employ the expression of a rule in the description and will presuppose 
that I understand it” RFM VII 26).  
83 Part of what makes all of this tricky comes back to the original analogy with games, i.e., with “games” in the 
‘ordinary’ sense, where we do talk of many games having rules that are prior in certain senses to instantiations of 
games-played, and rules that, in a manner, stand independent of the games themselves (for example, on the 
covers of the boxes of board games, in the clearly formulated rule books of games – and ‘sport-games’ – like golf, 
bridge, hockey, chess, and soccer). In such cases we recognize an institutionalized process of explicit, deliberate 
formulation or codification of rules that then can lead to changes in the way the games are played (e.g., in those 
cases where rules get changed). What thus is hard to grasp is that, for language, language-games and rules exist 
together, and one is simply another way to view the other, or are just different sides of the same ‘thing’ or activity. 
Even in mathematics, in simple equations like “252 = 625,” the doing of the equation, i.e., the moving from one 
side to the other, is simultaneously the rule of it. It is not the case in this picture that we (first) have the rule, and 
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Grammar is the depiction of the connexions between signs (i.e., between words, expressions, 
sentences), and grammar forms the basic material with which we play language-games (“I want to say 
the place of a word in grammar is its meaning” PG §23; “What interests us in the sign, the meaning 
which matters for us is what is embodied in the grammar of the sign. … Grammar is the account books 
of language” PG §44).  Grammar, for Wittgenstein, is wholly a matter of the connexions between signs. 
Wittgenstein says: “It [grammar] only describes and in no way explains the use of signs” (PI §496; see 
also Z §549 for an interesting view of this picture of grammar). Wittgenstein uses “grammar” to focus on 
connexions when, for example, he introduces the notion of the ‘perspicuous representation’ as a goal of 
grammatical investigation, inasmuch as some moment of grammar lacks in this sort of perspicuity, and 
“a perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in ‘seeing connexions’ “ 
(PI §122). Wittgenstein further gives us the picture of grammar as connexion between signs and 
connexion with ‘forms of life’: “If someone asks: “What do you mean by deterioration?” I describe, give 
examples. You use ‘deterioration’ on the one hand to describe a particular kind of development, on the 
other hand to express disapproval. I may join it up with the things I like; you with the things you dislike” 
(Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 10). 
This picture is not without its exceptions, difficulties, and obscurities in Wittgenstein’s discussion. 
Hintikka & Hintikka (1986) call Wittgenstein’s “grammar,” “his treacherous term” (p. 214), and at times 
there is indeed a slipperiness to his use of the concept. At one point in his Philosophical Grammar, for 
example, Wittgenstein talks oddly enough about the “grammar of a mental state or process” (PG §41). 
The relationship between rules, use, and grammar is hard to pin down at times (though the relationship 
between grammar and use can be developed with some clarity, I believe). As well, Wittgenstein says 
that one can play games without rules, making up the play as one goes along (see PI §83). This possibly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
because we have the rule, we can then move from one side of the equation to the other. We learn to do the 
equation, to use or produce it in appropriate ways in appropriate circumstances, and in this doing of it we have the 
rule of it. 
84 Wittgenstein draws attention to this difficult identity relation at many points in his later writing, though the 
exact import of what he says is rarely clear and evident (as perhaps it cannot be). For example, he says: “When I 
write down a bit of a series for you, that you then see this regularity in it may be called an empirical fact, a 
psychological fact. But, if you have seen this law in it, that you then continue the series in this way – that is no 
longer an empirical fact. But how is it not an empirical fact? – for “seeing this in it” was presumably not the same 
as: continuing it like this. One can only say that it is not an empirical proposition, by defining the step on this level 
as the one that corresponds to the expression of the rule. Thus you say: “By the rule that I see in this sequence, it 
goes on in this way.” Not: according to experience! Rather: that just is the meaning of this rule.” (RFM VI 26) 
Further, one sees emphasis on such identity statements in other thinkers’ approaches as well, as they work to 
show the differences between Wittgenstein’s picture of language and other pictures. For example, see Moyal-
Sharrock (2003): “[Wittgenstein] sees that basic know-how as logical – and logical, on no grounds. The know-how 
is the ground” (p. 126). 
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represents something of the creative angle in human life, i.e., the characteristic breaking free of bounds 
and limits (though see my Chapter 4 for more discussion on this point, in the context of the developing 
autonomy of learners). However, this does not threaten Wittgenstein’s picture of language and learning, 
which concerns games bounded by rules (e.g., see PG §26). Further, it is not obvious how clear and 
finely tuned we need get Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning for us to be able to apply it 
usefully – which, I suspect, will come out only when we do actually apply it.85 Fine-tuning this picture 
and trying to demarcate clean distinctions and roles of the parts within it, may indeed be to go too far. 
On the other hand, it cannot be so fuzzy and indistinct that we have no hope of achieving much in 
applying it and viewing language through it. (The kind of panacea Wittgenstein suggests (see PI §77) 
does not exactly work here, given that it is precisely the expression “language-game” we are trying to 
understand.)86 
What gets to be normative, as far as meaning and use go? Connexions between signs can be normative; 
the basic move-makings we judge as correct in particular language-games can be normative; and, 
following this, the rules which govern the form of language-games can be normative. All the same there 
is a looseness, a creative adaptability, and a tentative projective quality to language and the use of signs, 
and thus to what we can consider the normativity of meaning. For example, the words “rose” and 
“teeth” would seem to have little connexion between them (though one is sometimes said to “hold a 
rose between their teeth” in florid romantic gestures), but Wittgenstein’s description of the poetic 
                                                          
85 All the same, and as part of coming to grips with this picture of language and meaning, it is interesting to note 
that (1) Wittgenstein never speaks of the grammar of language-games, (2) that when he discusses grammar it is 
almost always exclusively in terms of the grammar of signs (apart from the few exceptions that I have noted 
above), and (3) that he never speaks of a sign as being a language-game (but cf. PI §71). For example, with regard 
to the connection between signs and grammar in this picture, Wittgenstein says such things as: “Cantor shews that 
if we have a system of expansions it makes sense to speak of an expansion that is different from them all. – But 
that is not enough to determine the grammar of the word “expansion” “ RFM II 30; “If we study the grammar, say, 
of the words “wishing”, “thinking”, “understanding”, “meaning”, we shall not be dissatisfied when we have 
described various cases of wishing, thinking, etc.” BB, p. 19; use and grammar go together for Wittgenstein, e.g., 
“It is one of our tasks here to give a picture of the grammar (the use) of the word “a certain”” BB, p. 135; “So is 
that what makes us believe a proposition? Well – the grammar of “believe” just does hang together with the 
grammar of the proposition believed” OC §313. As can be seen indicated in just these few quotations, there are 
subtleties and obscurities in Wittgenstein’s use of “grammar” throughout his opus, and obviously enough one can 
turn all of this into something enormously complicated and arcane (as with Fregean theories of language and 
meaning), but in the main it seems safe to say that it is signs that have grammar in Wittgenstein’s picture, and that 
the grammar of signs emerges aggregately from language speakers’ various uses of those signs. But, again, there is 
only the use of signs that is depicted in Wittgenstein’s picture, and a sign is only a sign insofar as it is used. 
86 That is, Wittgenstein recommends: “In such a difficulty [i.e., conceptual blurriness] always ask yourself: How did 
we learn the meaning of this word (“good” for instance)? From what sort of examples? in what language-games?” 
(PI §77). However, we only learn the meaning of “language-game” through Wittgenstein’s use of it, so the situation 
here seems quite different from what would usually happen in other grammatical investigations. 
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phrase, “the rose has teeth in the mouth of the beast” (PI, p. 222) makes it out as a meaningful 
expression, and thus shows that connexion can be made out between these signs through certain 
locutions and the language-games played. What gets to be taken as meaningful in discourse, then, is 
dependent not only on the three parts of the picture of language but on context, circumstances, and 
situation as well (e.g., see PI §§498-500 for Wittgenstein on combinations of signs and meaningfulness). 
Responding to “hello” with the utterance “rain” seems meaningless – there is no such connexion 
between these signs in this context. But in another context, the expression, “I said “hello” to the rain,” is 
not only meaningful but can also be moving. In some sense there is only a thin normativity operative in 
some (much? most?) of our linguistic traffic, just as the rules of hockey frame but actually govern very 
little of what happens on and off the rink in an actual game of hockey. All the same, everything that 
happens in an actual game of hockey is understandable, i.e., makes sense as hockey, insofar as it is 
participation in that game, and insofar as it is framed within just those rules. 
As I noted earlier, we can take up a perspective from which to view these main parts of the picture of 
language and meaning being sketched by Wittgenstein in terms of a unity of these parts – grammar, 
language-games, and rules – and thus how they relate to one another. One can conceive a strong 
mutuality between these parts of Wittgenstein’s picture, separable to some extent conceptually, but not 
to be talked about as identifying separate things in re, as it were. It is, in a way, a curious sort of picture. 
These different parts have to be taken together always; none can stand in isolation, but each must stand 
in a tight mutual interrelation with the others. All three aspects are in a kind of lock-step with each 
other. Signs come to have connexions (i.e., grammar) inasmuch as we actually make moves with them 
(“We may say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name 
except in the language-game …”PI §49). Making moves (and, as moves, they are normative) requires 
rules for the regularity and relative sameness of those moves. Move-making as such, as has been noted, 
is to be viewed through the picture-lens of rule-bounded games. Move-making is responsible to, as well 
as being generative of, the very connexions that constitute signs without which there would be nothing 
to move or move between; and these connexions forged in activity grow into the grammar that signs 
have, which we can view as normative ‘rules of grammar,’ as Wittgenstein sometimes has it. One can 
only do things recognizable as moves within the context of games, i.e., rule-bound forms of activity. 
Moves are repeatable as that (i.e., same) move only within certain bounds; though there is mutuality 
here as well, as those bounds (i.e., the relevant rules) do not stand somehow outside of the moves 
themselves as some kind of object-ive constraint. Indeed, language-games as the aspect of this picture 
of language that is primarily rule-oriented (e.g., see PI §§7, 66-70, 82-83), there is a way to view this 
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such that language-games are their rules: “Following a rule is a particular language-game” (RFM VII 
52).87 
As I have indicated elsewhere (e.g., see Chapter 1 and Section 3.2), one can make the focus of one’s 
view of Wittgenstein’s picture of language any one of these parts, and this will result in somewhat 
different views of things, as well as different attendant problems. The picture of grammar might mark 
out a path to semantic maps (e.g., see Van der Auwera & Plungian, 1998; Haspelmath, 2003); language-
games emphasize activity and relationality through participation in a game played (necessarily) by 
others and through game-playing move-making; and the picture of rules framing linguistic action can 
lead to the search for normative aspects of language and meaning and the different ways in which an 
individual speaker can stand in relation to a rule (e.g., see Sellars, 1963b, 1974). 
To complete the picture of language (at least for my purposes here), it is important to recognize the play 
of “same” and its cognates pervading the texts of Wittgenstein.88  Wittgenstein trains a spotlight on 
these signs/concepts, providing us a way to re-picture them and to re-orient our thinking about them.89 
The basic idea within Wittgenstein’s picture of language is that we do not see (‘actual,’ ‘real,’ 
‘independent’) sameness or similarity between things and then learn how to apply the word “same” to 
that (and thus neither do we see sameness in the world and obtain our concept from that source, i.e., 
                                                          
87 There are very many references in Wittgenstein’s work to this picture of a tight inter-relation between grammar, 
language-games, and rules as a way to view and talk about language and meaning. For example, see: “And that is 
why a concept is in its element within the language-game” (Z§391), with the “that” here referring to “… a 
language-game does not have its origin in consideration. Consideration is part of a language-game.”); “Let the use 
teach you the meaning” (PI, p. 212); “Let the use of words teach you their meaning” (PI, p. 220); “The meaning of a 
phrase for us is characterized by the use we make of it. The meaning is not a mental accompaniment to the 
expression. … We ask: “What do you mean?”, i.e., “How do you use this expression?”; “A game, a language, a rule 
is an institution” (RFM VI 32).    
88 There are many key passages in Wittgenstein’s opus that concern sameness and similarity, measurement and 
commensurability. Passages that are important for me include PI §§371-379 (e.g., “”Before I judge that two images 
which I have are the same, I must recognize them as the same.” And when that has happened, how am I to know 
that the word “same” describes what I recognize?” PI §378); RFM VII 59 (“How can I explain the word “same”? – 
Well, by means of examples. – But is that all? Isn’t there a still deeper explanation; or must not the understanding 
of the explanation be deeper? – Well, have I myself a deeper understanding?”); PI §208 (“How do I explain the 
meaning of “regular”, “uniform”, “same” to anyone?”); PI §225 (“The use of the word “rule” and the use of the 
word “same” are interwoven.”); and BB, p. 130 (“But why shouldn’t what we call “the similarity striking us” consist 
partially or wholly in our being prompted to use the same phrase?”). 
89 Independent of Wittgenstein’s work on this topic is a small but important literature which is troubled by this 
concept, and Wittgenstein’s comments on “same” are a crucial addition to this body of thought. As Goodman 
(1972) says, “As it occurs in philosophy, similarity tends under analysis either to vanish entirely or to require for its 
explanation just what it purports to explain” (p. 446). Goodman’s nominalism is not entirely in accord with 
Wittgenstein’s approach, but I think they are in some agreement in what a grammatical investigation yields of 
“same” and its cognates. 
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the concept ‘same’ is not to be explained in onto-logic terms). Learning how to use the word “same” and 
seeing sameness and similarity are intertwined with each other (once again I revert to Cavell’s (1979) 
statement, that “to know how to use the word “anger”, is to know what anger is” p. 185). We learn how 
to use “same” as we learn how to use any other word, i.e., by being shown, through training, and 
through practice and projection in community with others.90 The uniqueness of “same” is that it plays a 
kind of role in Wittgenstein’s picture of language not played by any other word. It brings together and 
focuses a range of features within this picture, e.g., of normativity, of being able to go on (in the same 
way) (“Now, however, let us suppose that after some efforts on the teacher’s part he [the student] 
continues the series correctly, that is, as we do it” PI §145; “One might say to the person one was 
training: “Look, I always do the same thing: I …..” PI §223), and our ‘agreement in judgment’ (“But isn’t 
human agreement essential to the game? Must not anybody who learns it first know the meaning of 
“same”, and do not the presuppositions of this include agreement? And so on” Z §428). Wittgenstein’s 
sketching of his picture of language is shot through with use of the sign “same” and its cognates, but 
despite its critical role in holding this picture together, it still has to be a part of this same picture, i.e., it 
cannot stand outside it in some independent, objective manner giving in that way solid foundation to 
language (recall PI §120). Indeed, basic judgments of similarity or sameness can be said to represent a 
significant proportion of the bedrock propositions that we need to ‘follow blindly’ (e.g., see Williams, 
1994, 2010). We learn what is ‘same,’ and what ‘different,’ at the same time we learn how to use new 
signs; practicing with new signs is at the same time learning the practices of comparing and 
measurement, of differentiating and identifying.  
Comparing is a language-game, a technique, a practice. We have to learn how to compare and we have 
to learn which things are commensurable, comparable, have to learn how to use “same” and 
“different.” In learning these things we simultaneously begin to see things as similar or the same.91 The 
practice of comparing/measuring and using the relevant signs is what gives the learner the ability to see 
things in terms of “same-different,” to see things this way only in the light of these aspects (“For only 
                                                          
90 “One does not learn to obey a rule by first learning the use of the word “agreement”. / Rather, one learns the 
meaning of “agreement” by learning to follow a rule. / If you want to understand what it means “to follow a rule”, 
you have already to be able to follow a rule” (RFM VII 39). 
91 There is an important though difficult distinction at work here, viz., between seeing things as different, and 
seeing difference in things, i.e., ‘simply’ seeing difference. As Wittgenstein has put it, the first does not belong to 
perception, while the second does. For example, Wittgenstein says: “If I saw the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, then I saw: 
these shapes and colours (I give them in detail) – and I saw besides something like this: and here I point to a 
number of different pictures of rabbits. – This shews the difference between the concepts [i.e., of ‘seeing’ and 
‘seeing-as’]. ‘Seeing as …’ is not part of perception. And for that reason it is like seeing and again not like” PI, pp. 
196-197. 
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through a technique can we grasp a regularity” RFM VI 2). Seeing ‘aspects’ of things is, in the end, the 
business of language, of having mastered the right words in order to see the ‘same’ thing in different 
ways. Seeing and asserting ‘same-different’ requires the practice of the relevant ‘measurement,’ broadly 
taken. Thus we find Wittgenstein working out in the Investigations (particularly in Part II, Section xi) the 
difficult question of how we can see similarity (i.e., likeness, the same) without committing ourselves to 
making the claim that we see similarity itself, i.e., to a claim about seeing a thing that stands 
independent of our words. Through a sustained grammatical investigation of the ‘change of aspect’ 
involved in seeing some new thing in another thing while that thing remains the same, Wittgenstein 
begins to show how thought, seeing, and talk fit together (“When the aspect changes parts of the 
picture go together which before did not” PI, p. 208). Wittgenstein’s analysis, as befits a grammatical 
investigation, ultimately concerns what we say and go on to say in the relevant circumstances. 
Wittgenstein always points to expressions (“Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about 
words” PI §120), and the expression is the dawning of some particular aspect, the words constitutive of 
the experience. 
Last, to reiterate what needs to be made clear in this part of the section, Wittgenstein’s three parts of 
his picture of language and meaning, viz., grammar, language-games, and rules, are not theoretical 
entities (as per Frege) or reified psychological or mental states or processes (as per cognitivists); this is 
not an explanatory theory in which different and separable constituents need to be brought together to 
generate meaning. These parts belong to a picture of language from which we can view and talk about 
language, e.g., comparing it in its application to other things we say and do.  It is a picture built upon the 
underlying gesture drawing of activity, of parts in motion. Further, the picture can show us a kind of 
unity or mutuality between the parts, depicting in a fundamental way an active relationality. There is no 
explanatory mechanism hypothesized here, no (cognitive/mental) apparatus manipulating representing 
entities, but rather a picture that allows us to look at language as many different ways to move between 
signs in connexion. Looking at language and meaning through this device of Wittgenstein’s sketch, we 
can say that we speak meaningfully on the basis of the grammar and legislated moves embedded in the 
ongoing practice of language, through its organic chain of speakers and through its artifacts and 
embodied history. Language exists in its play and in its being played. Anyone’s utterance is meaningful 
insofar as it is a sufficiently well-made and recognizable move in a language-game in which the play is 
with the grammar of the signs used. That is Wittgenstein’s picture. 
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Let me give a very basic example illustrating the thrust of this picture. In some particular (and 
familiar/recognizable) context, someone says something to me, and I go on to say something (back to 
that person or perhaps to relevant others), and/or I go away and do various things. And that is how to 
understand (tout court) the meaning of what that person said; in other words, this flow of a bit of life 
and action is a full description of the use of that person’s utterance.92 It is also part of Wittgenstein’s 
picture that this ‘particular and familiar’ context can be taken to be quite extensive, encompassing the 
general form of the relevant language-games played here, the grammar of the various signs used in 
those language-games, and the proximal and distal background circumstances, customs, routines, etc., 
of the culture to which these language users belong. But for the language move-makers in normal 
situations, this background remains as background.93 Isn’t this the import of Wittgenstein’s very first 
descriptions of use in the Investigations? He begins that book with this quotidian example, which in 
superbly terse form sets out much of the picture of language and meaning he is drawing: 
Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked 
“five red apples”. He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked “apples”; 
then he looks up the word “red” in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says 
the series of cardinal numbers – I assume that he knows them by heart – up to the word “five” 
and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer. – It 
is in this and similar ways that one operates with words. – “But how does he know where and 
how he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he is to do with the word ‘five’?” – Well, I assume 
that he acts as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere. – But what is the 
meaning of the word “five”? – No such thing was in question here, only how the word “five” is 
used. (PI §1) 
                                                          
92 Consider in this vein, among various other comments by Wittgenstein, the sequence of moves he makes 
between “meaning” and “understanding” in PG §34: “How was meaning given to the word “red”? Well, you point 
at something, and you say “I call that ‘red’”. Is that a kind of consecration of mystical formula? How does this 
pointing and uttering words work? It works only as part of a system containing other bits of linguistic behaviour. … 
And there is only one way to learn it: to watch how the word is used in practice. … So when I understand a 
sentence something happens like being able to follow a melody as a melody, unlike the case when it’s so long or so 
developed that I have to say “I can’t follow this bit”. … Asked “what happened when you read that sentence with 
understanding” I would have to say “I read it as a group of English words linked in a familiar way”. I might also say 
that a picture came into my mind when I heard it. But then I am asked: “Is that all? After all, the understanding 
couldn’t consist in that and nothing else!” Well, that or something like it is all that happened while I read the 
sentence and immediately afterwards; but what we call “understanding” is related to countless things that happen 
before and after the reading of this sentence.” 
93 In whatever sense one might want to take “background” here. An exploration of this sign/concept would open 
up a rather complicated discussion, which would only derail the current line of my thesis.  
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And isn’t this as well, at root, the main underlying gesture drawing upon which Wittgenstein’s picture of 
language and meaning is founded, and which he draws out for us (as an experienced and masterful artist 
might draw out as a demonstration for a novice) in the ‘Slab’ (or ‘building block’) language examples 
that also begin the Investigations, and that are also found throughout his later works? “Don’t you 
understand the call “Slab!” if you act upon it in such-and-such a way?” (PI §6), and “In the practice of the 
use of the language (2) [i.e., the “Slab” language] one party calls out the words, the other acts on them” 
(PI §7; see also BB, pp. 77ff.). It is in doing things that ‘meaning’ resides, if indeed we can talk about 
meaning here without confusion.94 
Making the right moves in language-games is certainly one way to take the picture of language and 
meaning being sketched by Wittgenstein. There is another, perhaps less obvious way, to take this 
picture, one that has considerable substantiation in Wittgenstein’s writing once you begin to look for it. 
This is to take the idea of ‘activity,’ central to this picture of language and meaning, as captured not in 
terms of ‘doing/performing’ but in the terms of the third metaphor (see Chapter 1), i.e., ‘moving.’ Thus 
‘move-making’ takes on different significance, and is to be understood not simply as ‘moves in a game’ 
but as mobility, travelling, reaching for, i.e., ‘moves that get us somewhere.’ In this way of looking at 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, having places to go and the means to traverse the 
paths between them correspond to the picture of grammar and language-games.95 
The two books that have emerged from ethnomethodologist David Sudnow’s (1978/2002, 1979) 
experiences learning and playing jazz piano have provided me with much insight into Wittgenstein’s 
                                                          
94 In other words, the main, underlying gesture drawing here is that understanding a sign is not the grasping of a 
thing, but is the doing of something. My understanding the call “Slab!” in Wittgenstein’s example is doing certain, 
specific, recognizable, familiar things, i.e., fetching a slab and bringing it to the person who uttered “Slab!” Further, 
this underlying gesture drawing leads us away from the picture that I first understand the call “Slab!” and then, by 
virtue of that understanding, bring a slab to the utterer. That is to draw a causal picture of meaning. Rather, as I 
have said, for Wittgenstein, understanding “Slab!” is to fetch a slab and to bring it to the utterer of “Slab!” And so, 
to understand any sign, is to do appropriate, recognizable, familiar things. Thus one learns to understand signs (like 
“Slab!”) by learning to do things, e.g., to bring slabs when “Slab!” is uttered. Wittgenstein’s brief, action-oriented 
example of understanding your name near the end of The Blue and Brown Books is another clear example of this 
underlying gesture of the overall picture of language and meaning (see BB, p 172). 
95 There are many encouragements in Wittgenstein’s writing to search for different ways to understand meaning 
(viz., different primarily from the Fregean, representationalist approaches to meaning). For example, Wittgenstein 
provokes just such a search when he asks, in likening understanding a sentence to understanding a theme in 
music, “Why is just this the pattern of variation in loudness and tempo? One would like to say “Because I know 
what it’s all about.” But what is it all about? I should not be able to say. In order to ‘explain’ I could only compare it 
with something else which has the same rhythm (I mean the same pattern)” (PI §527). The turn to David Sudnow’s 
work – see the following paragraphs in my text – represents one avenue along which I search. Not being able to 
say ‘what it is all about,’ i.e., not being able to give the meaning of a sentence, leads us to a different way entirely 
of picturing meaning. 
74 
 
discussions concerning language and meaning. The core of Sudnow’s position concerns the metaphor of 
having, finding, and achieving places to go as at the root of both language (and thus linguistic meaning) 
and music (i.e., see the third metaphor identified in Chapter 1). I find this idea most helpful, for 
example, in absorbing Wittgenstein’s idea of understanding as knowing how to go on with its emphatic 
interest in movement, in getting to and arriving at next things correctly. Having this image of language in 
mind of having places to go makes more present the importance, depth, and range of the various spatial 
and travelling images and pictures throughout Wittgenstein’s work. Further, the embodiment of having 
places to go, and the reaching for those places, helps inspire one’s thinking about both the phylogenesis 
and ontogenesis of language development, as emerging from the activities of reaching, grasping, 
touching, gesturing.96 I also proffer the suggestion that this angle helps us to make better sense of 
Wittgenstein’s repeated insistence on Goethe’s phrase, “In the beginning was the deed” (see OC §402; 
CV, p. 31; Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 420). 
Sudnow (1979) argues that “improvised music-making and ordinary talking are deeply alike” (p. 3), 
stating: 
You go places, getting from place to place. You have to get places on time. You find places in the 
course of moving – without rehearsal, doing improvisation. You learn how to use your body to 
reach the whereabouts of places that form up the setting for such movements. There is reaching 
and stretching and recoiling and regrouping in this. In both music-making and talking, sounds 
are being produced – which is to say, distances are being traversed. There are communities of 
co-movers, and they define what good movements should be like. In both music-making and 
talking, there is a social world, an organization of ways of doing such movements, and an 
organization of ways of regarding them. … In all languages, pitch and tone are meaningful – or 
semantic, as they say – if pitch and tone are given a more useful and a broader formulation; that 
is, the achievement of places and not merely highs, lows, timbre. (pp. 3-4) 
                                                          
96 There are substantial research literatures that investigate just these phenomena and their implications in human 
development, writ large or small. See, for example, Butterworth’s (2003) seminal work on pointing and its 
emergence in human ontogenesis and its role in our socio-cultural history. See as well Zlatev (2015) on the 
emergence and role of gestures more generally in our species’ evolution and in individual human development. 
Tallis’ (2003) important book, The hand, takes up some of these issues as well, as do the earlier books by Wilson 
(1998) and Napier (1993) on the hand and its place in our socio-cultural evolution.   
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Sudnow goes on to reinforce this idea of movement as important, that “where by moving my mouth to 
say, “Please pass the butter,” I get you to move your hand – movements moving movements” (p. 5). He 
says that, 
In all instances, we find the employment of the human body to achieve places in an organized 
way, and the study of languages could well begin with the description of that accomplishment. 
As for questions of meaning and reference and symbolism, these represent elaborate ways 
language has of saying that it is talking about itself. … I define language as improvisationally 
choreographed courses of movements, and conceive the study of getting places as the way to 
begin. (p. 5)97 
This metaphor of ‘reaching for places’ (“a speaker who is reaching, stretching, finding places, knowing 
that he is finding places, speaking by knowing that he is finding places to go,” p. 37) strikes me as a 
promising angle from which to view Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, in particular with 
respect to the picture’s underlying gesture of activity. It is also a radical way to picture meaning – and it 
is linguistic meaning that we talk about here – one completely at odds with the Fregean picture. 
Taking up this angle on Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning opens up a different way to 
read the examples of arithmetical sequences that Wittgenstein is fond of using to illustrate important 
points concerning grammatical rules and understanding. With the image in hand of ‘moving between 
places’ that Sudnow fashions, even these dry, possibly undervalued, examples now take on a more 
vibrant, illustrative life, for they become sequences, movements from one element or member to the 
                                                          
97 Wittgenstein’s insistence on “in the beginning was the deed” (see above) is recalled to mind by Sudnow’s 
comments. Thus one might speak of such original deeds as connected to achieving places – i.e., as literally 
achieving places – and derivatively to include reaching for, and gesturing towards or about, places. The importance 
in our natural history – and the natural history of any animal in its environment – of being in safe or dangerous 
places, of being in places with or without resources, of being in places with conspecifics or alone – is the sort of 
natural history background that one might build a picture of language around, taking seriously Wittgenstein’s 
emphasis on deeds and on the roots of language in ‘non-ratiocination,’ ‘natural history,’ and ‘forms of life’ (e.g., 
see OC §475). The importance of the role of the hand, then, should not be overlooked, and should be part of a 
‘naturalistic’ evolutionary counter to the cognitivist impulse in developing accounts of language. We can say that 
the hand grasps things and so comes to have things (which leads to one set of metaphors extending into 
epistemology and philosophy of language); we can also say that the hand reaches for things which exist in spatial 
locations, and further that in doing so the hand is keenly attuned or adapted to timing, in the sense that reaching 
and throwing and clasping, etc., depend on the hand getting the timing right else the hand misses its mark or the 
caress turns into a blow. Consider finally the idea of the prehensile hand in which fingers feel each other (e.g., see 
Butterworth, 2003, for a summary of background research on primates’ capacities regarding the movement of 
fingers, etc.). All of this is more suggestive at this point than substantial. What is being suggested here is that there 
is considerable room to investigate the place of movement and reaching places in the phylogenesis of language 
and, by extension, in our pictures of language and meaning. 
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next, the lining up as in space and time (as indeed they are lined up when we speak, write, and read the 
physical signs). Here coming to ‘know how to go on’ in learning a sequence must be given a literal 
reading; we learn to go from one to the other, and from that one to the next, etc. And the sequence 
itself comes to life in our learning how to go from its members and from the sequence as a whole to 
other signs and sequences. A geography of sequences and numbers and their places with regard to each 
other and the movements from one to another to another begins to open up to the learner. In knowing 
how to go on one bridges the distance or gap between one member of the sequence and the next. It is 
not just about learning how to go on with numbers; it is about finding your way to the place of each 
number, travelling or moving back-and-forth sequentially, from number to number, from place to place. 
Similarly we can view a conversation as a sequence of things said, one thing said after another, one 
thing connected to another thing in the sequence through language-games and signs’ grammars, and 
opening up in temporal progression new places to go in the developing sequence. Our responsibility is 
to move or to get to one place after another in ways grammatically acceptable (i.e., this is a right place 
to go) in the sequence. Our ability to converse, to use language, is in our capacity to move from one 
place to the next in these sequences. 
To ‘say’ something (in speaking, signing, writing, typing) is to move your body; to have successfully said 
something is to get to a place in grammatical space, to have achieved an arrival at a place, and in doing 
so to open up a range of other places to travel. This is meaning, i.e., having places to go is constitutive of 
meaning; this is to speak meaningfully, i.e., to move in the life of language. Sudnow (1979) says: “It is 
not the sounds that are so important but the places … It is a context of places at hand and at mouth – 
customary routings [i.e., Wittgenstein’s “familiar paths”] and bodily manners of moving and aiming [i.e., 
language-games] and knowing where you are going from where you are” (p. 121). Grammatical rules, 
then, can be talked about as both the active form of language-games and rules, i.e., the how of ‘moving 
from place to place,’ and the paths that exist between places in a language, i.e., grammar. 
There is indeed a proliferation of “place,” “path/road,” and “travelling” images throughout the later 
Wittgenstein. At multiple points in his work, Wittgenstein modifies the locution, “knowing how to go 
on,” into “knowing one’s way about”. For example, Wittgenstein asks: “Can ‘knowing one’s way about’ 
be called an experience? Surely not. But there are experiences characteristic of the condition of knowing 
one’s way about and not knowing one’s way about” (Z §516); “A philosophical problem has the form: “I 
don’t know my way about”” (PI §123), and, last, that, “Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach 
from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer 
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know your way about” (PI §203).98 Compare these with Sudnow’s (1979) statement that: “I play the first 
seven notes of the eight-note major scale, and if I say I know what the last note will sound like, what I 
really mean is that I know just exactly where to go next” (p. 119). 
Having set the stage through my discussion of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, I will 
begin the shift to the application of that picture to sketch out a picture of professional learning and 
training. The material here in turn will be brought out more explicitly as I begin to apply this new picture 
of professional learning to more specific cases in Chapters 4-5. Learning and training, once one knows 
how to play (language-)games, is a matter of being shown examples, practicing move-making, and 
having more places to go, and professional learning is no exception to this basic picture. Again, I am 
strongly guided in the development of this picture of professional learning by an emphasis on language-
games and grammar. Thus the main parts of this picture of professional learning will be (1) a picture of 
the process, or accomplishment, of having more places to go, or having more and ‘better’ moves to 
make, and (2) of having the means to travel between places, or in developing greater mastery over 
various language-games or techniques. Another way we might picture the process of professional 
learning is by talking of change of different kinds in knowing how to go on. In the context of this picture, 
the expression “knowing how to go on” can connect to many things: e.g., deeper familiarity with the 
grammars of relevant signs (which might be pictured as increasing familiarity with more connexions 
between signs); dropping ‘incorrect’ connexions; being able to play more language-games, or to play 
language-games ‘better’ in wider ranges of circumstances and situations. A passage emerging from 
Wittgenstein’s development of his picture of language that is key for me is as follows: 
But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I shall teach him to use the words by means of 
examples and by practice. And when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know 
myself. In the course of this teaching [i.e., in this case, of the word “same”] I shall shew him the 
same colours, the same lengths, the same shapes, I shall make him find them and produce 
them, and so on. … I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by expressions of agreement, 
rejection, expectation, encouragement. I let him go his way, or hold him back; and so on. (PI 
§208) 
                                                          
98 I would offer as well that many of the things Wittgenstein says can be taken, in this reading of them, to suggest 
these metaphors of movement and places. To give one example (which has ramifications as well for the idea of the 
autonomy of language – see earlier in Chapters 1 and 3), Wittgenstein says that: “”There is no such thing as an 
isolated proposition.“ For what I call a “proposition” is a position in the game of language” (PG §124). 
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While this picture of ‘training,’ i.e., ‘shewing examples,’ practice, encouraging, discouraging, correcting, 
‘holding back,’ etc., holds for all learning once we know how to play (language-)games, it is a picture 
that must hold for professional learning as well. 
To begin, learners need both to share and develop a ‘form of life’ in common with those training them. 
That is, learners need to go along with encouragements in certain ways recognizable to their teachers, 
they need to care that others correct them, and care that others care to correct them, see that others 
are in the position to encourage or correct them and to care about this, etc. For all learners at whatever 
stage, these are in part natural reactions (e.g., what might otherwise be called “temperament,” how one 
basically orients oneself to pain and pleasure and their objects) and part developmental or emergent 
reactions (e.g., reactions that develop as a result of life-course events and interactions with significant 
others, such as parents). How one receives the unfolding processes of training and carries on from 
there, we can say, depends on natural reactions and on the form of life in which one comes to dwell, 
which in turn depends on how one develops these abilities or capacities to receive and carry on with the 
elements of training. For example, Medina (2004) says in this regard that, “the learner needs to be 
sensitive and responsive to certain signs of approval and disapproval that are used to structure her 
behaviour normatively” (p. 83). 
How does training, then, work for the mature language user in the context of professional learning? The 
objection can be that the notion of training is acceptable as a picture of what happens in the learning of 
novices, e.g., in the first learning of language or numeracy. But once a certain level of mastery of 
language has been achieved, that picture of learning needs to shift to a characterization of a person’s 
learning as independent and autonomous and as controlled by one’s own actions – in other words, the 
learner at this point in their development must be pictured as an autonomous, rational individual.99 As a 
mature language user, one is no longer learning moves, but is making moves on their own in the 
relevant language-games in the relevant circumstances, all in the context of their own projects. A 
mature language user having, for example, mastered the techniques or language-games of asking for 
and giving reasons, asking for and delivering explanations, asking “why?” and saying why, etc., would 
constitute ways in which such speakers now operate with regard to their own continued learning. How 
                                                          
99 This is part of my developing response to those Wittgenstein scholars who see the key transformative moment 
in an individual’s development to be their entering into what Sellars (1963a) has called “the logical space of 
reasons.” Those who take up this angle include Brandom (1998), McDowell (1994), and Bakhurst (2011, 2015). My 
initial analysis of this is that these thinkers emphasize the individual in their thought, whereas I emphasize the 
situative perspective, viz., participation in activity (i.e., in the language-game, what Wittgenstein calls “the whole, 
consisting of language and the actions into which it woven” PI §7). See my Chapter 1 for further comment on this. 
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much is left for training to do, especially in the case of professional learners, when there is at least some 
mastery of these language-games? 
To answer that, I return to the picture that in knowing how to play games one is by that fact now 
responsive to corrections and encouragement couched in normative terms, i.e., in the terms of how to 
make correct moves for this game or that game.100 That is part of the grammar of “game.” These 
corrections and encouragements take the basic form: ‘that is (not) how you ought to do/say that,’ with 
many variations of this basic formulation in practice, some of which are non-verbal (e.g., through 
gestures, facial expressions, body language). I note here some caveats. Putting the matter in this way is 
not to offer a causal explanation; in terms of the relevant empirical talk, the developmental move from 
non-game-playing to game-playing is a contingent business, and can possibly vary across individuals, 
language groups, and even linguistic species. In a way, therefore, the question of how one makes that 
transition is an incidental one for my purposes, and for the purposes Wittgenstein had in setting out a 
picture of language. Further, I am of course not suggesting here that what we really do when we use 
signs is play language-games, or that language-games and game-playing constitute the real, 
subterranean, ‘hidden’ substrate of language. What I am doing is working out (with Wittgenstein as 
guide) a picture, a way of talking about things, and working out how the parts of that picture hang 
together. This applies as well with signs like “natural” and “form of life.” By using these terms we 
similarly do not penetrate to any deeper, ‘more real’ level of language and life, but rather draw and 
apply certain pictures.   
At the level of quotidian professional learning, such corrections and encouragements which bring one 
into or take one out of ways of talking and acting, might be complicated, subtle, and nuanced – but all 
the same the picture of training in professional learning adheres to this basic pattern. For example, a 
professional introducing new signs and explanations into their work environment may be encouraged 
insofar as others affirm or take up these new ways of talking, or corrected when their explanatory 
utterances fall flat and are not repeated or taken up in any way by their colleagues (i.e., as distinct from 
their utterances being explicitly negated or rejected in discussion with their colleagues). In the former 
case, the professional in question has received a kind of training in maintaining the use of these new 
                                                          
100 These normative blandishments and corrections regarding correct move-making begin to be framed in terms of 
reasons once the language-games of asking for and giving reasons (etc.) are learned. But the basic frame of the 
training here, into these (more ‘advanced’) language-games, follows the same pattern I have just depicted in this 
grammatically-oriented picture of learning. We will see how this picture falls out in terms of usefulness, insight, 
clarity, etc., once we begin to apply it to cases and to other things we say in contexts of actual professional 
learning. 
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terms; in the latter case, they have received an implicit correction and so drop their use of the new signs 
and explanations. (Matters become complicated when one takes into account the multiple relevant 
communities with regard to both the individual professional and the new ways of talking, as a particular 
way of talking may be discouraged in one community while encouraged in another. However, the basic 
picture itself that I am sketching is not affected by such complications in re.)  
What we can say, given Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, is that professional learning is a 
matter of (1) grammar, (2) language-games, and (3) pictures and their application. Learning the 
grammar of a word will, for professionals, be largely a matter of training in the broad sense outlined 
above. We cannot reason out the grammar of signs, but rather must be shown or exposed to how the 
word is used (“How did we learn the meaning of this word …? From what sort of examples? in what 
language-games?” PI §77; “One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn 
from that” PI §340; “Let the use teach you the meaning” PI p. 212; “Let the use of words teach you their 
meaning” PI p. 220). It will be a matter of use and ongoing training that govern the development of my 
abilities to use signs correctly and meaningfully, to project them into new particular instances beyond 
the examples I have been given or the successful uses I have thus far made of them. Using signs or 
concepts correctly, i.e., making the right moves with those signs, in accordance with the connexions 
constitutive of their grammar, would be the matter of ongoing training, e.g., through trial and error, 
correction, reinforcement, example, and encouragement. The grammatically-oriented (i.e., non-
empirical but developmental) picture of professional learning, then, that emerges from Wittgenstein’s 
picture of language and meaning is as follows: We learn how to move from place to place, and at the 
same time we begin to acquire places from and to which to move. Once we have started on this way, 
which we did when we first learned how to play games, the rest of our learning is just the coming to be 
able to do more and more of these things. What else would it be, given this picture of language and 
meaning? We do not need to be committed, I think, given the perspective afforded by this picture of 
language, to say that we begin to do things in an entirely new way once we achieve certain thresholds of 
competence or have mastered certain language-games. Entering the ‘space of reasons,’ i.e., being able 
to play the language-games of asking for and giving reasons (etc.) within all the various contexts and 
circumstances, does not change the picture I have been sketching so far about professional learning and 
training. (Again, see my comments on my emphasis on language-games in Chapters 1 and 6.) 
As I have argued, part of the picture of language and meaning that Wittgenstein sketches is that we 
cannot give a causal-theoretical explanation or account of language. At the same time, Wittgenstein is 
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not discounting that we still do play language-games of explaining.101 He says, after all, that we give 
explanations in “language full-blown” (PI §120). However, there is an important sense, I think, in which 
explaining is a matter of showing, i.e., that in an explanation, one shows to another how to use the 
relevant signs in different language-games and in accord with certain contexts/circumstances. One 
comes to understand the explanation insofar as one does in fact go on to use the relevant signs similar 
to how one was shown how to use them. Thus, in the end, giving explanations is a matter of showing 
someone how to use the relevant signs, i.e., one shows another how to make just these moves with 
these signs, or one shows another just these kinds of paths between places. This angle of view is 
extremely important in the context of developing a picture of professional learning. In this way, then, I 
read such comments as Wittgenstein’s, “Any explanation has its foundation in training. (Educators ought 
to remember this)” (Z §419), as drawing for us more of a picture of identification (i.e., ‘an explanation is 
a kind of training’) than one of genealogy (i.e., ‘explanations have their roots in training, for example, in 
other practices or language-games in which we were trained’).  
There is some textual evidence for this angle of view on Wittgenstein’s picture. For example, 
Wittgenstein’s comments at PI §§208-209 are important here (and this is a text to which I have referred 
above): “… I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and by practice. – And when I do 
this I do not communicate less to him than I know myself. … I do it, he does it after me; and I influence 
him by expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, encouragement. I let him go his way, or hold 
him back” (PI §208). At Z §319 Wittgenstein says: “I may now e.g. make a talkie of such instruction. The 
teacher will sometimes say “That’s right.” If the pupil should ask him “Why?” – he will answer nothing, 
or at any rate nothing relevant, not even: “Well, because we all do it like that”; that will not be the 
reason.”102 
In much professional learning, a good deal of explanation concerns attributing some general feature to 
some other general thing, or concerns re-describing a particular case in terms of general governing 
principles or laws, as might emerge from different kinds of research. To give a simple, concrete case, 
                                                          
101 Which exactly are the language-games of explaining I think would not always be easy to determine, as what 
counts as an explanation is context-sensitive. For example, a description often counts as an explanation in the right 
circumstances of inquiry, and in other circumstances it serves just as a description, e.g., in the context of a story 
(though in stories explanations might be described). 
102 Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics contains many passages working this vein as well. 
For example, Wittgenstein says there: “How can I explain this language-game to anyone? Well, I can describe an 
example (or examples). – In order to see whether he has understood the language-game, I may make him work out 
examples.” (RFM VI 25). 
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one asks in a professional context (e.g., in a learning occasion involving social workers, or ministry 
bureaucrats with portfolios having to do with children, youth, and families), how some children are able 
to navigate successfully through significant developmental threat while many others do not. The 
explanatory-type response might be to attribute the feature or property of ‘resilience’ to children in the 
former group (and its absence in the second group), and to discount possible explanatory roles of other 
properties such as individual ‘grit’ (e.g., see Perkins-Gough, 2013). The language-games played here 
would vary according to the actual lived contexts of the various occasions, but certainly language-games 
of ‘asking’ and ‘answering questions’ are involved, as is the display in these explanations of certain signs 
and their connexions. 
What happens in forming and delivering such an explanation? I suggest that in such discussions, the 
different signs are shown to stand in certain specific ways with regard to each other, i.e., “navigating 
through significant threat” stands in connexion with “resilience” but not in connexion with “individual 
grit.” In explaining this, the grammar of the various signs is arrayed such that the learners are shown 
another way to use these terms, i.e., to make correct moves in the context of “resilience” talk. Learners 
are shown ways to use “navigating through significant threat” such that the sign “individual grit” is not 
part of its grammar, or in which the connexion or path between these signs is weakened or cut off. Thus 
there is no occult rationality or (innate) faculty of reason at work here, or to which we need to defer, in 
drawing a picture of this sequence of explanation-and-new-understanding, i.e., a new way to go on in 
talk of this developmental pattern. It is just a matter of grammar and showing one another how we talk 
correctly about things. What else can we say happens? (Note that I am trying to maintain this 
description of the process of explanation as a grammatical remark. This is also part of what makes 
writing with Wittgenstein difficult to achieve.) The subsequent changes in the abilities to go on in the 
correct ways that do happen may be given other kinds of accounts, e.g., psychological ones, but that 
does not affect the main outline of the picture of this learning situation, which is kept on the plane of 
meaning. The ‘educator’ in this situation would now look to see how their interlocutor went on to use 
the relevant terms in their ongoing discussion or in future discussions. Thus it is important that there in 
fact be some kind of ongoing discussion in which learners can manifest their understanding so that there 
is some opportunity for any ‘relapses’ in grammar to be discouraged, and for any correct projections of 
the grammar new to the learners to be applauded and encouraged in various ways, e.g., by seamlessly 
going on from what they say in the discussion. The course of the explanation could have gone the other 
way, in which one or more of the learning professionals resist the explanation (i.e., the attribution of the 
feature of resilience as a way to explain certain general patterns in development), by showing the 
83 
 
‘educator’ and the others that the grammar of “resilience” cannot include such a connexion or pathway 
to “successful navigation through significant threat” due to its connexion to other (problematic) signs.  
‘That is just not how that word is used,’ would constitute the basic form of the rejoinder, and that the 
expression, “children who successfully navigate through significant developmental threat” requires talk 
in the form of a different account, i.e., that this sign needs to be connected up to other, different 
expressions through the links with different grammars.103 
The thrust of this kind of grammatical perspective forms the principal theme for the rest of my thesis, 
which is to sketch and apply a picture of professional learning in which expanding learners’ grasp of the 
relevant signs’ grammar (i.e., giving them more places to go) and/or showing them how to move around 
in the grammar that they have through different kinds of language games (i.e., showing how to get 
around from place to place) are the main parts. In very basic terms this is the picture of professional 
learning to which we progress from the picture of language and meaning sketched by Wittgenstein. 
Through this picture of language we can envision further the process of professional learning situations 
in which learners show how they know how to go on – viz., by showing the places they have to go – and 
show how they play the appropriate language-games to get from place to place or to find or establish 
new places to go (possibly showing in these latter imaginative, creative ways of moving from place to 
place). Moves between places in grammar, along the connexions and pathways between signs, is 
constitutive of meaning; and it is this overall design of a view of things which moves from language and 
meaning to learning that I find both compelling and instructive for work and thought in the field of 
supporting professionals in their own learning initiatives. 
Let me conclude this section of the chapter by observing that this is the start of my sketch of the picture 
of professional learning that I see can emerge from the application of Wittgenstein’s picture of language 
and meaning. In the next chapters (i.e., Chapters 4-5) I begin to explore how we can apply this picture of 
                                                          
103 Explaining the meaning of some word follows a similar, basic pattern as the above. We learn to use a new word 
in the way in which we use words with which we are already familiar: someone (or something) points to, gestures 
toward, or shows us these other sets of words. Otherwise put, to explain the meaning of a sign is to (begin) to set 
out the grammar of the sign, i.e., the web and weave of its connexions to other signs. In this way we learn to adapt 
to the existing grammar of signs; in learning a new word, we extend, multiply, or correct the connexions between 
the signs that we are familiar with. Questions of more refined differences between signs call for descriptions of 
variations in the circumstances and contexts which called for such differential use of the two signs. We offer up 
more signs, and by doing so present or show to others something of the connexions or paths between the signs 
proffered, i.e., we show the grammar of those signs. (A definition is a contribution to the grammar of a word; 
“Now a definition often clears up the grammar of a word” BB, p. 26.) 
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learning to more concrete issues and cases of professional learning. The discussion in the current 
chapter provides us with a way to look at and talk about actual professional learning activity, with one 
result that we tighten our focus in considering the work of actual professional learning in situ, to a view 
of the places the professionals have to go in their talk and the means they have of moving between 
those places. I turn now to consider how some philosophers of education have incorporated ideas of 
Wittgenstein’s into their work. 
3.3  Literature review 
How have scholars in philosophy of education taken on Wittgenstein’s ideas in discussing learning? Have 
any of these scholars made the attempt to discuss adult and/or professional learning? Have any of these 
attempts (if there have been any) been pursued from a perspective based on Wittgenstein’s picture of 
language and meaning? If yes, on the basis of what angle(s) on Wittgenstein’s picture have they taken 
their perspective and pursued their inquiries (e.g., focusing on games or activity, on rules, grammar, or 
on training)? In this section I very briefly review some of the literature in the philosophy of education, 
though I find little done there concerning adult/professional learning which incorporates ideas from 
Wittgenstein. My goal here is to continue to situate my own efforts to apply Wittgenstein’s picture of 
language and meaning in drawing a picture of professional learning. One finding from this review is that 
my thesis offers a new perspective to the field for consideration.104 
The literature on learning which takes up in a significant way a perspective from Wittgenstein can be 
divided loosely into three groups. The first group includes those scholars who concentrate mainly on 
early or initiate learning, that is, the first learning of novices (i.e., young children) into language, the idea 
here generally being that the learner is initiated (or ‘encultured’) into some practice. This group includes 
Meredith Williams, José Medina, Michael Luntley, and Paul Smeyers (though the work of Smeyers and 
his colleagues ranges over the learning of more mature speakers as well). I contrast this group’s 
approach to initiate learning and its connection to the normativity of meaning with the work of Hannah 
Ginsborg, who is connected with the recent Kripkean tradition in thinking with Wittgenstein. Ginsborg 
departs somewhat from the Kripkean body of literature by taking up a Kantian approach and claiming 
priority for a primitive normativity different in kind from that discussed by Medina. The second group 
includes those scholars who focus on the learning of young mature speakers, i.e., students in school. 
This group includes Per-Olaf Wickman & Leif Östman and Wolff-Michael Roth. Despite the non-
                                                          
104 As with the literature review I offer in Chapter 2, this is a necessarily truncated review, and I have had to leave 
out various thinkers and their important contributions to the literature. 
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professional status of the participants in their investigations, there is still much of value that can be 
taken away from these thinkers’ work, particularly in terms of their research methodology and 
sensitivity to the small changes in students’ developing discourse. The third group consists of scholars 
who have taken up ideas from Wittgenstein to investigate professional learning. This group includes the 
work of Domenic Berducci and Sébastien Chaliès and his colleagues, and focuses on a rules-based 
perspective from Wittgenstein as guiding their research. While I find their approaches unsatisfying (and 
based on problematic readings of Wittgenstein), I value the spirit of their inquiries and their close 
attention to the discourse of the participants in their studies. In general, I find it interesting to note how 
many scholars set the individual apart from language, language-games, and practice, with the result that 
the problematic of interest becomes how the individual relates to the practice(s), etc., in question. I do 
not take that this is Wittgenstein’s approach. 
The contention of Meredith Williams (1994, 2010) is that “understanding the role of learning plays [in 
particular ‘first learning’]  sheds light on the nature of normativity itself” (1994, p. 175). Her interest is 
with obtaining a “genuine explanation” (p. 177) of this feature of normativity, and with how a 
“normative practitioner whose actions are guided by rules” is created (p. 181); she says that 
“Wittgenstein’s concern is whether this picture of language and language learning [i.e., learning by 
ostensive definition] is adequate to explain the normativity of language” (p. 177). She provides a short 
summary description of normativity: “’Normativity,’ as I shall use it throughout this paper, is restricted 
to performances, nonverbal as well as verbal, that can be judged to be correct or incorrect” (p. 179). 
In her 1994 paper she discusses three roles that learning plays in the acquisition and determination of 
concepts and rules. First, learning plays a causally grounding role in fixing meaning for the initiate 
learner, and here she shows how Wittgenstein discounts ostensive definition in favour of ostensive 
training for this role, and introduces the notion of the ‘stage-setting’ by the mature language speaker to 
facilitate the training of the non- or early-language speaking child. Through stage-setting, in which “the 
status of the naïve learner’s utterances (that, for example, they are taken as judgments or requests) is a 
function of the status extended to those utterances by masters of the practice” (p. 180), the child learns 
“to adapt her behavior to norms without recognizing that her behavior is normatively guided” (p. 179). 
The learner’s behavior eventually shifts to being guided by norms qua norms. The second role that 
learning plays in the acquisition of concepts and rules is methodological. Here the key problems 
Williams identifies are: “How does the novice become a rule-follower?” and “How does the linguistically 
incompetent person become the competent language user?” (see p. 175). Here Williams introduces her 
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‘manifestation argument,’ i.e., that understanding is public, and the notion that understanding and 
practice are social, i.e., can only emerge in a social setting. These questions, then, are given a response 
in terms of a stage-setting that is “public and social” (p. 185) for initiate learning. In essence, Williams 
says, “we need to establish patterns such that individual behaviors occur because they are part of the 
pattern” (p. 187), and connects this to rule-following, in which there is a mutuality between acts and 
rules such that “the rule is made a guide, or standard, for action by our acting towards it in ways that are 
fixed by our training” (p. 188). This leads to the third role played by learning, viz., how we learn concepts 
is constitutive of what we learn. Here Williams argues that adopting or acquiring a concept is linked to 
mastery of technique (and that in training, techniques can only be shown). Techniques are “the 
regularities that create the space for going on in the same way” (p. 198) (i.e., make possible ‘judgments 
of sameness’), and that it is for this reason “that one can say the process of learning is constitutive of 
what is learned” (p. 203). 
José Medina (2002, 2004), following Williams, suggests that it is a “social and developmental account of 
normativity [that] is developed in Wittgenstein’s discussions of language learning” (2004, p. 82). It is 
through the development of a ‘second nature’ that (“primitive”) normativity is made possible, and “we 
acquire a second nature by being socialized or acculturated in shared linguistic practices structured by 
norms” (2002, p. 282). Medina says that, according to Wittgenstein, “what is acquired in language 
learning … is a set of normative standards for the application of words” (2002, p. 282). Medina says: 
Language learning is thus conceived, on Wittgenstein’s view, as a process of enculturation or 
apprenticeship: linguistic norms are learned by being acculturated into shared practices. In the 
training process, the teacher, by virtue of her competence in the practice, functions as a 
representative of the community of practitioners; and, as such, she has the capacity and 
authority to bring the behaviour of the novice into harmony with the behaviour of the rule-
following community. The goal of the training process is to bring the pupil into the practice, and 
this is achieved by effecting a ‘consensus of action’ between the pupil and the teacher, and 
hence … between the pupil and the community of practitioners. (p. 83)  
Even though Medina is speaking here of novice first-learning, I find what he says to be almost entirely 
applicable to the case of the learning of adults and adult professionals as well (mutatis mutandis). Taking 
Medina’s statement here as applying equally well to mature language speakers is of a piece with my 
perspective on Wittgenstein’s picture as a matter of learning language-games, move-making, and 
grammar, and as within contexts of appropriate communities of adepts and fellow speakers. As 
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indicated, my own position is that once one knows how to play games, it is a matter of exposure, 
training, and practice, in the embrace of community, to learn how to play any game; this is in essence a 
strong situative perspective. The important work of Gabbay & le May (2004, 2011), for instance, shows 
just this process in adult, professional learning (see Chapter 2). Teaching generally occurs in more 
diffuse ways in typical professional learning, though teaching can (and, for Schön, must) be instantiated 
in tightly paired relationships ideally between teacher/mentor/coach and student. All the same, the 
relationship, process, and outcome would be almost exactly as Medina describes it here. 
As per Williams, Medina emphasizes “blind rule-following,” which is the result of a process of 
‘internalization’ of “normative standards” and “standards of correctness,” which, in turn, is a result of 
acculturation (see 2004, p. 84; also see 2002, p. 183). And, like Williams, Medina is also concerned to set 
out an (explanatory) account in response to questions such as, “How does our behaviour become 
normatively structured?” and “How do we move from pure causal determinations to reasons and 
standards of correctness?” (2004, p. 84). Medina says that, “for Wittgenstein, a normative practice is a 
social practice that contains common ways of proceeding, shared techniques, which are culturally 
transmitted [i.e., which are taught and learned]” (p. 84). Thus for Medina it is learning that makes all the 
difference, and that the (‘radical’) transition he sees to be Wittgenstein’s concern is due wholly to 
learning: “the dividing line between normative activities and mere causal regularities is a line that runs 
between the learned and the unlearned” and that “the presence of learning processes is the only 
warrant for the ascription of behaviour that admits normative evaluation” (p. 85). However, Medina 
(2004) struggles to produce arguments that support this claim. Medina’s assertion that individuals 
develop ‘normative attitudes’ by joining (i.e., by being enculturated into) normative, social, common 
practices strikes me as circular. My own suggestion is that meaning is normative insofar as language says 
it is, as it were, i.e., that in the language-game these are the moves that can be made in such and such 
circumstances, and, by implication, that there are moves that cannot be made on pain of 
meaninglessness, confusion, the loss of ways to go on, etc. That is what I take the picture of 
autonomous language and meaning that Wittgenstein offers us: “Practice [i.e., language] must speak for 
itself” (OC §139). 
Paul Smeyers and his colleagues (Smeyers, 1998, Smeyers, 2017, Smeyers & Burbules, 2005, Smeyers & 
Burbules, 2006, Ramakers & Smeyers, 2008) re-focus talk of rules and language-games in terms of 
practices, and devote considerable attention to the notion they derive originally from Wittgenstein that 
education is training or initiation into practices. Reiterating that human life begins in doing and not 
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thinking (e.g., see Smeyers & Burbules, 2005, p. 337), Smeyers (1998) encourages us to recall that “for 
Wittgenstein education is surely a practice” (pp. 303-304). The applicability of this across a range of ages 
and learning situations can be seen in Smeyers & Burbules’ statement that, “[s]urely, there are parts of 
what constitutes formal education (schooling) that can still be seen as an initiation into practices, and 
the same is true for the professions, as in being trained to perform a particular job” (p. 446). 
Smeyers and his colleagues emphasize that training is different from conditioning: the associations 
formed in training are “structured by a practice, which, for Wittgenstein, is rule-governed, that is, 
normative” (Smeyers & Burbules, 2005, p. 337), though little is said in these papers about what 
constitutes training. Smeyers & Burbules (2005) talk about the “structuring provided by the community” 
being “logically necessary” for learning, and that this “complex pattern is necessary for the token 
utterance or action to have significance” (p. 337). 
Smeyers & Burbules (2006) discuss the notion that “part of learning a practice involves practicing” (p. 
447), and indicate that what activities constitute practicing in learning a practice can be a complicated 
matter. They go on to say, on this basis, that: 
Analyzing the highly specific and very different ways of learning and enacting such practices (or 
practicing) can help us answer such questions [i.e., what kinds of specific practicings in a 
particular profession make for mastery?], because these may vary from person to person and 
context to context. (p. 448) 
It is thus an empirical matter what learning activities lead to the ‘same’ practice, but that understanding 
one another, i.e., being able to go on in the same ways, making moves that are usefully recognizable by 
relevant others, is the end result of being initiated into practices and practicing. For Wittgenstein, and 
for the purposes of my thesis, the specific empirical-contingent activities that lead to mastery are 
incidental, as we proceed here on the picture plane of language and meaning only. All the same, the 
notion of doing as practicing will be important in my thinking about professional learning, and is as well 
guidance that emerges from the situative-type perspectives of Lave & Wenger and Schön  (e.g., see 
Chapter 2). 
For me, Smeyers’ (1998) discussion also guides me methodologically in considering my approach to 
study professional learning. As Smeyers says: 
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[I]t will be argued that instead of paying attention to prediction and interference in actions, 
educational research should focus on particular cases, on how things are. It too has to 
acknowledge the authority of the form of life: description and acceptance will therefore 
characterize primordially the endeavour to understand this area of the human. (p. 290) 
For my own research it will be important to follow out this Wittgensteinian vein tapped by Smeyers, to 
set myself to learn from the professionals themselves, particularly within and the occasions of their own 
learning activity. I am encouraged, then, to turn directly to the particular cases of the actual talk of 
professionals themselves in the context of their own natural professional practice, structures, and 
environments (see Chapters 5 and 6).105 
It is interesting to consider in which direction and in what kind of manner the line of influence runs 
between normativity and activities such as learning, initiation into social/common practices, training, 
enculturation, etc. I take it that these activities are emergent from the picture of language and meaning 
that Wittgenstein sketches, which includes the normativity of game-playing and move-making; for 
Williams, Medina, and Smeyers, the line of direction runs the other way, viz., learning, enculturation, 
etc., explain normativity in Wittgenstein’s picture of language. As Williams (1994) says in this regard, 
“understanding the role learning plays sheds light on the nature of normativity itself” (p. 175). The 
positions of Williams and Medina (and to an extent Smeyers’ position, though his concerns lean also 
towards the role that ‘forms of life’ play in practices and our initiation into them) unfold in the way they 
do because these scholars emphasize rules over moves (i.e., over game-playing). The position I have 
been developing from my perspective on Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, on the other 
hand, puts its emphasis on moves that one experiences or judges as correct, appropriate, and thus as 
meaningful. In the kind of position developed by Williams and Medina, moves (in language-games) are 
inferred to be correct, appropriate, and thus meaningful, because they manifest (appropriate) rule-
following, which is different from a position in which it is moves that are experienced as correct, etc.106 
The point, however, in canvassing these positions is mainly to situate better my own efforts, and my aim 
is not to take up such contentious issues as the nature and origins of normativity. 
                                                          
105 To some degree this accounts for my interest in the work being done by Berducci, Wickman & Östman, Roth, 
and Chaliès and his colleagues (see below), and for the value I attribute to such efforts. 
106 I.e., as an infant experiences one move as correct in a simple peek-a-boo game, for example, a move that allows 
them to go on, and another move that they experience as incorrect, and find disconcerting and disabling in the 
course of the relationship moment. Exactly the same happens in adult, sophisticated instances of professional 
learning. As I note, however, advancing a notion of experiencing moves as correct/incorrect leads me only at best 
to point to territory into which I cannot practically enter in this thesis project. 
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One kind of objection to the approach developed by Williams and Medina is the argument developed by 
Hannah Ginsborg (2011, Ginsborg & Haddock, 2012) concerning the notion of primitive normativity. This 
is her Kantian contribution to the growing literature stemming from Saul Kripke’s (1982) reading of 
Wittgenstein’s purported meaning skepticism, Kripke deriving most of the flavour for his argument, in 
turn, from his reading of PI §201 (e.g., see Kripke, 1982, pp. 7ff.).107 As with Williams and Medina, 
Ginsborg is concerned with how language and meaning become normative in the course of initiates 
learning language. Ginsborg takes Kripke’s principal question to be, “whether my present usage agrees 
with my past usage” (2011, p. 232) as the key move challenging whether it can be said legitimately that 
someone means one thing rather than another with any utterance (e.g., see Kripke, 1982, p. 11). The 
crux of Ginsborg’s argument turns on her rejection of the notion that the “ought” of language usage 
“has to be conditional on your past meaning or past intentions, or on a rule which you previously had in 
mind for the use of the term” (p. 232). This “ought,” she argues, is “[independent] of any assumption 
about what you, or indeed anyone, meant previously by [the term]” (p. 231). Rather, the “ought” in 
question “expresses” what she will call, following a Kantian approach, “primitive normativity” (p. 233). 
Primitive normativity is a (natural) disposition of humans to react in certain ways to certain kinds of 
training and environment, contra Williams and Medina (and Smeyers, to an extent) who assert that the 
normativity of language and meaning is a matter of acculturation or initiation into normative practice.108 
Ginsborg argues that normativity is a feature that emerges out of the individual learner in the right 
circumstances, while Williams, Medina, and Smeyers all argue that normativity is something outside the 
learner into which the learner must be brought, i.e., into which they must be trained. Ginsborg says, 
“[the child’s] being disposed to go on after “40” with “42” rather than “43” is a reflection not of how she 
has been trained, but of her natural tendency to go on in a way which tracks the series of even 
numbers” (p. 236). Again, this is part of Ginsborg rejection of ‘rule-following’ as any kind of source of 
normativity, i.e., a rejection of the idea that the “[learner’s] sense of the appropriateness of what she is 
saying thus derives from her recognition that it fits the rule she was following: a rule which she grasps, 
even though she is unable to articulate it” (p. 238). 
While this view – and the views of many of her colleagues – is at odds with the view of many 
philosophers of education in the Wittgensteinian mold, I find that it does resonate at times with things 
Wittgenstein does assert. For example, taking up the Kantian theme (from Kant’s Critique of Judgment in 
                                                          
107 E.g., see Boghassian, 1989; Wikforss, 2001; Hattiangadi, 2006, 2007; Glüer & Wikforss, 2009; Whiting, 2016. 
108 For example, Medina (2004) says that the “blind rule-following of competent practitioners [of language] … 
results from the internalization of standards of correctness [i.e., normative standards]” (p. 84). 
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particular), Ginsborg says that, “to exercise judgment in this independent way [i.e., as per Kant] is to 
judge particulars to be contained under rules or concepts which are, so to speak, not already in the 
understanding but rather made possible by those acts of judging themselves” (p. 253). I find this to be 
something of familiar theme in Wittgenstein’s work, not only in connection with the mutualities I have 
identified in the previous section and with what I have set out as the complicated and tight intertwining 
of language-game, grammar, and rule (i.e., through the ongoing use of signs), but connecting also with 
such related statements by Wittgenstein as, “My judgments themselves characterize the way I judge, 
characterize the nature of judgment” (OC §149). 
My concern with Ginsborg’s highly stimulating work is that no matter to what dispositions aim, they still 
in the end have nothing to do with meaning. Rather, the source of meaning lies in what a language 
does, as it were, and not what individual speakers do. It is the game of language and the appropriate 
moves thereof that make for meaning and for normativity. Utterances are meaningful by virtue of their 
place and role in grammar and language-games, and it is not that the speaker means (i.e., as an active 
verb) something by saying something, but that in speaking in context in accord with the rules and 
grammar, the speaker utters what is meaningful. Thus this problem of normativity that Ginsborg 
addresses and resolves in terms of a primitive normativity situated mid-way between (natural) 
dispositional and non-reductive accounts is a result of how she describes meaning and the use of signs 
in the first place. At the same time Ginsborg’s work also provokes me to consider again the initiate 
learner’s transition to game-playing. She says, 
Suppose that the child does react in this way [i.e., saying “42” after “40” and insisting that this is 
the right thing to say]. On the face of it, there is a normative claim implicit in her reaction: she is 
claiming that “42” is appropriate, or what she ought to say, given what she has said previously. 
(p. 234) 
For me, this is the crux of the issue in considering how to talk about the initiate’s beginning to recognize 
and play games, which, following Wittgenstein’s picture, is the entry ground into language for 
individuals. Secondly, it provokes me to wonder whether the normativity of first games (e.g., simple 
‘peek-a-boo’ games with infants) is different from the normativity of the child’s saying “mama” just to 
their mother or “wawa” just with regard to water.109 And is the normativity of these different – in kind? 
                                                          
109 Though my phrasing of things here is problematic (i.e., “just with regard to water”), as it appears denotational 
in tone, and thus also appears to commit me to an ontology to which I do not want to commit. Such formulations 
are both the source of many problems (i.e., they lead us into “fly-bottles”), and are part of the picture of language 
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– from the normativity in Ginsborg’s and Wittgenstein’s much more advanced examples of counting by 
two, understanding how to continue more complicated number series, of the ‘life of conversations,’ 
etc.? (And what hangs on sorting out whether there is difference in these kinds of cases?) 
Michael Luntley (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2017a, 2017b, 2018) is interested in much the same Wittgenstein-
oriented set of issues as Williams, Medina, and, to an extent, Smeyers, though he arrives as a radically 
different conclusion as a result of his investigations (though I find that he begins to approach something 
of Ginsborg’s position in terms of ‘natural reactions’ in his later work). Luntley develops a rather 
provocative position, basing his arguments on what can perhaps best be described as a rationalist 
reading of Wittgenstein (e.g., see 2008a, pp. 697-699). The crux of Luntley’s position is his development 
to the solution of the gap between being a non-language-using to a language-using being, which for 
Luntley essentially means the gap between a non-reasoning being insensitive to the normativity of 
meaning and a reasoning being who can ask for and give reasons justifying the correctness of their 
language use. As Luntley (2017b) asks in this regard: “Given the restricted ability of the pupil, how does 
a display of the teacher’s extensive ability provide them with the resources to upgrade their 
impoverished ability? … How do we teach activities to those who are not already party to them, which 
means that they lack the resources for taking part?” (p. 440). Luntley’s answer to such questions is that 
training cannot account for initiate learning, and thus the normativity of meaning for Luntley is only 
possible in terms of the ‘logical space of reasons,’ and requires a sui generis reasoning capacity.110 So the 
key question for Luntley, then, is how do we develop the capacity to reason. Taking up Wittgenstein’s 
notion of ‘training,’ which many philosophers of education have done in providing an account of how we 
become language-using beings on the basis of their reading of Wittgenstein, is, Luntley argues, 
conceptually inadequate to “bridge the breach between non-rational capacities and reasoning skills” 
(2008a, p. 699). Training, as such, can only causally impact non-reasoning capacities, and these can 
never of themselves result in children’s transition from non-language-using (and therefore non-
reasoning) beings to language-using (and reasoning) beings; only kind can lead to kind, and thus only 
reasoning can lead to reasoning (i.e., ‘minimal reasoning’ of some form can lead to reasoning in more 
robust forms). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and meaning that Wittgenstein is working to reject. See also the difficulty in judging ‘thresholds,’ so to speak, and 
thus the nature of the normativity involved, in Wittgenstein’s discussion of judging a ‘first word read’ at PI §§156-
157. 
110 Luntley (2008a) says: “Paradigmatically, this point occurs when the pupil uses words with the recognition that 
they are used according to standards of correctness and incorrectness. To realise that there are standards of 
correctness for the use of words is to acknowledge that the use of a word is something that stands in a web of 
reasons. It is something that can be challenged and defended by the giving of reasons” (p. 697).  
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If one’s goal is to think about an empirical solution to this problem of the gap between beings who can 
grasp the normativity of meaning (and thus who have the ability to use signs) and those who do not (or 
even, in my own terms, how infants make the transition from non-game-playing to game-playing), then 
Luntley offers useful guidance. In these papers he canvases three kinds of similar solution: (1) nativism 
(in 2007 and 2008a); (2) affective engagement as an innate transitioning mechanism (in 2008b); and (3) 
play, i.e., exploiting rhythmic patterning input and innate aesthetic sense (i.e., “the cognitive order in 
question is an order supplied by the imagination, an aesthetic sense that looks for, and creates, patterns 
that are, in the first instance, patterns of things like rhythm and rhyme” (2017a, p. 965). In the end, 
Luntley’s quasi-Wittgensteinian solution to the problem of the gap between language-users and non-
language-users is a matter of being born with enough of an innate “cognitive kit” that we can start to 
use reasons when stimulated by environments in the right ways. 
Luntley’s work, as I have indicated, stands in the tradition of rationalism, particularly in light of its 
emphasis on nativism, but more specifically it connects to the line of thought most strongly connected 
to Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor. For Chomsky, it is impossible, on empirical grounds, that we are able 
to learn a language principally through exposure as children to the spoken language around us. The 
amount of language we are exposed to, Chomsky argues, is simply insufficient to account for the 
language that we learn in the time we learn it. Fodor approaches the issue from the perspective of 
learning, arguing on conceptual grounds that learning through hypothesis formation and confirmation 
(which, he claims, is the only theory of learning we have), is conceptually incoherent, involving an 
irresolvable learning paradox, and so we must, in a strong sense, already know everything we need to 
know through what he calls a ‘Language of Thought.’ Both Chomsky and Fodor (and their adherents) 
thus adopt differing versions of nativism to resolve these genetic problems. Luntley follows their lead, 
though giving his solution a Wittgensteinian spin. 
Domenic Berducci (2010) takes up elements concerning rules from Wittgenstein’s picture of language to 
argue against an intellectualist conception of rules, which “assume[s] that rules are causal and mental 
phenomena” (p. 445). Berducci emphasizes the importance of employing “participant-generated rule-
formulations as analytic descriptors” (p. 445), I gather as part of the community-based orientation he is 
desirous to display with regard to rules and to rule-formulation and rule-following (see p. 446). He also 
wants to show that means-end technical practices in science are a matter of “constitutive” rules (see p. 
542), and to show the separation of “learning how (through the manifestation of a rule)” from “learning 
why (through rule formulation)” (p. 453). 
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Berducci explores the place and role of particular rule formulations in contexts of understanding, 
training and learning, and appropriate community (i.e., in the context of “community judgment”). While 
Berducci applies his thinking to rules that are productive in the context of empirical, contingent means-
ends relationships (and not to the grammatical rules that Wittgenstein is primarily interested in – see 
Section 3.1), he nevertheless works hard to establish both the nature of the functionality and the 
normativity behind such rule-following in terms of participation in the appropriate community. He does 
this largely through an analysis in professional learning interactions of such language-games as ‘giving 
rules,’ ‘following rules,’ ‘ordering,’ ‘instructing,’ ‘asking questions,’ and of the grammar of such words as 
“rule.” Telling others how to do things is certainly a part of professional training, and so articulating 
rules in professional practice is a language-game of much interest; a grammatical investigation of that 
would do much to clarify what we do and how the signs hang together in the practice of learning, and 
then following, such articulated rules. One utters meaningful rules (or orders, instructions, etc.) insofar 
as one makes moves legislated by the appropriate language-game(s) in the appropriate contexts and 
circumstances, and insofar as one plies to the grammar of the signs used in the utterances 
made/language-game(s) played. Only by following grammatical rules can we do things like utter 
(meaningful) rules, orders, instructions, questions and corrections. 
Berducci’s analysis focuses around a detailed description he provides of the case of the experienced 
biochemist teaching (i.e., ‘training’) the novice technician how to clean a specimen container called a 
“cell” (and then how to insert it properly into the spectrographic equipment). The actual, articulated 
formulation of the relevant rule, i.e., “cleaning the cell [i.e., the specimen container]” (p. 455) is minimal 
in the extreme, and is only ‘fully’ given through example demonstrations (i.e., by non-articulated, non-
verbal means). As Berducci points out (see pp. 459-460), the actual rule formulation and demonstrating 
actions hardly begin to cover the indeterminate variations of movements and micro-movements that 
would constitute to all concerned ‘cleaning the container’ or ‘a clean container.’ Thus one interesting 
finding of Berducci’s study, which is not highlighted by Berducci himself, is how little rule-formulation 
needs be articulated in teaching-learning situations in order for a rule to be taught, understood, and 
acted upon and followed. There is something remarkable in this kind of phenomenon (though its 
opposite is perhaps just as frequent), and is picked up by Wittgenstein in different ways, as well as by 
the conversation analysis researchers in their studies. 
In a series of articles describing their work assessing the impact and effectiveness of preservice teacher 
training programs in France, Sébastien Chaliès and his colleagues (Chaliès et al, 2010; Chaliès et al, 2012; 
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Chaliès & Bertone, 2017) ostensibly situate their studies in terms of Wittgenstein’s ideas about rules and 
learning to follow rules, ostensive teaching, and the use of examples. They state that this 
conceptualization comprises: 
Teaching the professional rules that will allow PTs [i.e., preservice teachers] to give meaning to 
their experience, explaining to PTs how the rules can be used, and helping the PTs to follow the 
rules in order to broaden their understanding of the classroom experience and enable them to 
act adaptively. (Chaliès et al, 2010, p. 768) 
Chaliès et al conducted qualitative studies, gathering data from video-recorded classroom observation, 
video-recorded sessions between PTs and their cooperating teachers (CT) and university supervisors 
(US), and audio-recorded researcher-led interviews with the PTs (i.e., which provided self-confrontation 
data). The main focus of their analysis of these discursive data turns on the attempt to identify the rules 
explicitly identified by the different participants and, for the PTs, to show how these rules are 
ostensively taught by the use of examples (both through real-life cases by the CTs and via verbal means 
alone by CTs and USs), and how correction and encouragement is used by CTs and USs in supporting the 
PTs to follow the rules. Analysis also looks at how the PTs perceive and understand the CT and USs’ 
efforts to exemplify and correct/encourage rule following. 
Chaliès et al found hundreds of explicit rules articulated by the various study participants, with varying 
levels of success recorded in terms of the PTs’ certainty about individual rules, their ability to “assign 
meaning” to their experiences (e.g., see Chaliès & Bertone, 2017, p. 662), and the extent to which they 
follow the rule(s) in their classroom practice. They also consider the nature of the PTs’ ‘interpretation’ of 
the rules that have been articulated and in transfer issues. Chaliès & Bertone (2017), for example, say: 
“They [the PTs] are now able to build a system for interpreting the rules that authorizes an “extended” 
use of the meaningful links outside of the original situations in which they were learned” (p. 663). 
For the most part, Chaliès et al are looking at empirical processes and the relevant means-ends rules 
which emerge from them – e.g., ‘core muscle work needs to be part of the warm-up’ – as exemplary of 
rules and rule formulations111 These studies may be doing valuable work showing how certain 
                                                          
111 This particular rule formulation was set for a PT in a physical education teacher training program (see Chaliès et 
al, 2012). Note that some of the rules that Chaliès and colleagues found articulated in the participant discussions 
were more straight imperatives, (e.g., “make sure the instructions are clear and concise” – Chaliès et al, 2010) or 
instructions or suggestions (e.g., “play with silence”, “lower your voice” – Chaliès & Bertone, 2017). That these 
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propositions become the “aphorisms, maxims, and old saws” of professional practice, as Karen 
Montgomery (2006) describes them in her study on clinical judgment, but I would suggest that these are 
not the grammatical rules that Wittgenstein is most interested in. Finally, I am uncertain whether 
Chaliès et al need a Wittgensteinian framework for their otherwise important work. An alternate 
framework focusing more on the staged development of expertise, as developed by Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
(1986 – see Chapter 2), may be more useful. 
My sense is that Berducci and Chaliès et al have both conflated grammatical rules with (ordinary) 
empirical rules that are contingently productive in a means-end sense. Grammatical rules (in the two 
senses) are what ground the meaningfulness of spoken statements, in this case, of spoken statements of 
rules or instructions, and thus are at root of our understanding, learning from, and following rules 
formulated in signs. Grammatical rules are for meaningfulness; rules that are productive are for 
achieving certain ends by certain means. When we misfire in our application of the former, there is 
meaninglessness, confusion, no understanding, and no way to go on (except in linguistically 
compensatory ways). When we misfire in our application of the latter, we simply do not achieve the 
ends we wanted, or do not achieve them as much or in the way that we wanted – but we still achieve an 
end, and it is easy enough to go on in different ways. Grammatical rules are more fundamental to 
language than this in the picture that Wittgenstein is drawing: “If you want to understand what it means 
“to follow a rule”, you have already to be able to follow a rule” (RFM VII 39).  
It is also perhaps easy to see the analyses of Berducci and Chaliès et al lending themselves more to basic 
programmatic approaches based on a particular reading of rule-following, though it is not clear how 
much they need draw from Wittgenstein for these purposes. Their studies work to identify the rule or 
rules the professionals in question articulate and follow, and by delineating these rules produce an 
understanding of those professionals’ practices and learning. For Berducci and Chaliès et al, professional 
training is a matter of being given rules (through various articulations) that have in some manner the 
sanction of the relevant community, and in following such rules develop the requisite professional 
understanding or ability to go on in the correct ways. Grammatical-type studies of the language-games 
of asking for, giving, and following rules would indeed be no small contribution to the literature, and 
Berducci and Chaliès and his colleagues have made a reasonable start in this endeavour (and see my 
similar suggestion in Chapter 4 with regard to the language-games of inquiry). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
various rule articulations represent empirical, contingently-productive rules is apparent in the papers’ discussions 
of them. 
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Per-Olaf Wickman and Leif Östman (2002) and Wickman (2012) set out a research programme for 
studying learning purportedly based on (i) change in language-games of learners and (ii) on 
Wittgenstein’s notion of propositions “standing fast,” which the authors assume from Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty. In these two papers, Wickman and Östman endeavour to examine in examples of real 
discourse how language games change in the course of ostensible learning events. Appearing to take up 
a kind of problem-solving approach to learning (see, for example, Barrows, 1996), they attempt to sort 
out how needs for “new relations” come to light in what they call ‘encounters’, i.e., in learning events, 
and how “gaps” (i.e., between a current discourse practice and what is presented as a new discourse 
practice – see, e.g., pp. 603, 605) get ‘filled’ in such learning encounters. The upshot of their position is 
that people learn by construing relations of similarity and difference to what stands fast such that 
identified gaps – even transient, momentary gaps – are successfully filled. The successful filling of a gap 
is when the newly construed relations in turn stand fast. The encounters Wickman and Östman (2002) 
talk about are principally discursive ones, though they can importantly involve non-discursive, physical 
things, such as the pinned insects in the case study the authors discuss. 
It is an interesting and provocative tactic for Wickman and Östman to draw from Wittgenstein the 
notion that some things within discourse or a language-game are “standing fast” (e.g., see 2002, pp. 
604-605; 2012, p. 147). They say that what stands fast “is “what is immediately intelligible” or 
“immediate”, that is, no additional explanations are needed for us to understand” (2002, p. 604).112 
Wickman (2012) says that ‘stand fast’ “is a very situational term”, and that “a certain word may stand 
fast in one situation as part of an activity, but not in another” (p. 147). For example, Wickman and 
Östman (2002) indicate that the students’ finding that what looks like “vessels” in the wings of their 
bumblebee specimen are called “wing veins” is a “putting fast” the relation between two things, i.e., 
between what looks like vessels and wing veins or, alternately, the relation of “similarity between 
bumblebees and wing veins” (p. 614); they go on to add that, “In [a passage of dialogue] the students 
talk about the antennae of bumblebees. Antennae are standing fast” (p. 614). However, I suggest that 
Wittgenstein does not hold that individual words are the sorts of things that can ‘stand fast’ – rather, it 
is empirical propositions playing certain roles that ‘stand fast’.113 It might be that Wickman and Östman 
                                                          
112 “That which stands fast are all the words and actions that teachers and students use without asking what they 
mean. They simply use them” (Wickman, 2012, p. 147). Let me also note here as an aside that there are problems 
with the references given to On Certainty provided by Wickman & Östman, i.e., their page references do not match 
up with the standard 1969 English version of OC edited by Anscombe and von Wright. 
113 See for example Wittgenstein’s comment that propositions of the form of empirical propositions, “form the 
foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language). – This observation is not of the form “I know …”. “I 
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are playing loosely with various comments by Wittgenstein’s concerning the sureness of language-games 
(e.g., see: “A language game exists in which this assurance is employed” OC §620; “The kind of certainty 
is the kind of language-game” PI p. 224). The notion that, as any quotidian, natural dialogue develops 
between interlocutors, new things that emerge in the course of conversation (e.g., words? phrases? 
observations?) are “put fast” (2002, p. 614) is puzzling, in any sense relative to the relevant notions set 
out by Wittgenstein. Better, perhaps, for Wickman and Östman’s to have framed their notion of 
‘standing fast’ through a consideration of notions more akin to ‘commitment in dialogue’ (e.g., see 
Walton & Krabbe, 1995). 
However, it is interesting and provocative that the basic organizing assumption in Wickman and 
Östman’s approach is that learning is a matter of comparing instances of something to what stands fast 
in order to construe relations of similarity and difference. This strikes me as important and heading in 
the right direction. Wickman and Östman (2002) say that “bumblebees perpetually receive new meaning 
during the encounters of the students, when they learn new things and new ways of talking about 
bumblebee morphology as the practical [sic] proceeds” (p. 615), and this seems basically right to me. 
The students learn how to use “bumblebee”, though at this point in their learning they still have very 
little ability in how to use the word – that is, they have mastered little of the grammar of the 
sign/concept. Finding their way to more and more of the relevant grammar through various means and 
coming to know better how to go on in more and more of the ways (i.e., having more places to go) that 
are recognized and approved of by adepts and masters such as their teacher and entymologists and 
apiaists, is what constitutes their learning about bumblebees. This process does not, however, entail 
that the meaning of “bumblebee” changes all the time, as Wickman and Östman suggest, but that it is 
more appropriate to say that the students are learning more and more how to use “bumblebee,” 
perhaps by employing the sign correctly in more and more language-games and in more and more 
situations. 
Wittgenstein has been a long-standing presence lurking in Wolff-Michael Roth’s thought (Roth & Bowen, 
1995; Roth, 1997, 1998, 2015). In many of Roth’s works, one or more ideas of Wittgenstein’s get 
gestured towards in the course of the paper’s argument or presentation. Roth (1997) appears to be 
Roth’s first significant attempt to bring to bear on concrete, classroom situations some of the ideas of 
Wittgenstein (and Heidegger), and to bring into sharper analytic focus what happens in these teaching-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
know …” states what I know, and that is not of logical [i.e., grammatical] interest.” (OC §401). Note, of course, 
Wittgenstein’s discontent with putting matters this way, i.e., concerning “propositions of the form of empirical 
propositions”, in OC §402. 
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learning situations. In this early paper Roth takes up two main ideas from Wittgenstein: (1) that the 
notion of ‘family resemblance’, as applied to language games, is a lever to understand how learning 
happens (pp. 148 ff); and (2) that the goal of students’ learning is to generate “some resemblance to 
language games in scientific communities” on the relevant topic (p. 150). In Designing Communities 
(1998), in which he which delivers careful and thorough analyses of actual classroom discourse and 
interactions, Roth sets out the notion of ‘language-games’ as one fundamental part grounding the 
analytical approach he takes here. However, in this text Roth works on the basis of a fairly unique 
understanding of ‘language-games,’ conceiving this as through various lenses outside of Wittgenstein’s 
own articulations of it, e.g., through pragmatism, Davidson’s notion of ‘passing theory’ (1986, via Rorty, 
1989), interpretive theory (via Winograd & Flores, 1987), and situated learning theory. Roth (2015) is his 
most concentrated effort to make sense of some of Wittgenstein’s ideas about language, and to draw 
these into his own thinking about teaching, learning, and discursive activity in classrooms. Roth insists 
we absorb in a serious way Wittgenstein’s point that we take “the language-game as the primary 
phenomenon” (p. 35; but see also the complexities of PI §656). Roth puts the emphasis here on (social) 
activity, on the game-playing aspect, and that we ought to take “the collective, motive-oriented, 
productive human activity as the fundamental unit of analysis” (p. 35). While conceding that 
Wittgenstein continued to use the terms “understanding” and “meaning”, Roth maintains that 
Wittgenstein at the same time still advocated for their abandonment (e.g., see p. 49), based a reading of 
selected passages from Wittgenstein’s early manuscript, The Big Typescript (2005), as well as from the 
Investigations. Roth hopes that this ‘pragmatic perspective,’ informed as it is by the work of 
Wittgenstein, will “[change] the ways in which we describe knowing and learning; and it changes the 
ways in which we have to consider and plan for learning experiences” (p. 48). 
Stimulated by this reading of Wittgenstein, Roth argues for an eliminativist position regarding 
“meaning” and “understanding,” pitching four main arguments for eliminating from use these 
words/concepts. I consider just one of these arguments here, i.e., that these terms refer to troublesome 
metaphysical entities. As such, they are (by definition) ‘inaccessible,’ and thus impossible to denote, 
refer to, or “point[ing] to” (e.g., see p. 29). If we cannot denote or ‘point to the thing directly,’ Roth’s 
assumption is thus that these purported/theoretical entities are not useful, ‘have no place in our 
considerations’ (p. 49), are not even “available in language itself” (p. 42), and thus we can have “no need 
to seek recourse” to such hidden things (p. 35). By making the case for an eliminativist approach with 
regard to the troublesome words “meaning” and “understanding” in considering learning in science 
classrooms, Roth infers that he can then open up space for what he calls a “pragmatic/pragmatist 
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approach” to language and therefore education. Wittgenstein’s (later) work is shepherded into duty for 
both these moves, though note Wittgenstein’s notions of language-games and the autonomy of 
language being corralled here into an uncomfortable partnership with the Marxist-oriented thought of 
Vygotsky and cultural-historical activity theory.114 Thus, given his reading of Wittgenstein, Roth holds 
that problems of denotation arise when we posit ‘immaterial, metaphysical entities/things’ as the 
referents of the words “meaning” and “understanding,” which, Roth claims, constitutes the normal use 
of these words. Since reference fails in such cases (though this conclusion is given to us only by 
stipulation), the words for these metaphysical things cannot be used in the kinds of accounts Roth wants 
to give for learning and teaching as, in effect, there is nothing there about which we can say anything. 
I find useful, and heading in a direction I favour, Roth’s interest in analyzing with close attention student 
and teacher discourse, particularly in the movement in discourse from idea to idea, from place to place, 
or from one way of talking about something to another way of talking (which involves change in the way 
participants see the relevant things). All the same I find Roth’s reading of Wittgenstein unsatisfying, 
noting among other things that the shift Wittgenstein makes, but Roth does not, is to talk of this 
movement from place to place in discourse as itself constitutive of meaning and understanding.  
 
In brief, this short review has illuminated the gap in the literature concerning a careful application of 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning in the context of professional learning, or the 
application of that picture to develop a picture in turn of professional learning. While I am sympathetic 
to, and interested in, the desires of various thinkers to find some kind of leverage in understanding 
learning through reading Wittgenstein, I cannot see my own way to a clearer view of professional 
learning by virtue of these otherwise interesting and profound efforts. I conclude that there is most 
certainly much room to explore in thinking about the application of Wittgenstein’s picture in these 
pedagogical matters. All the same, one thing with which I am most impressed in many of these thinkers’ 
work is the effort and attention they devote to looking at how the learners themselves talk. Given my 
developing interest in how professionals talk as key to viewing their learning – a direction I begin to 
                                                          
114 Recall again how it is that Wittgenstein does in fact speak about this feature of autonomy in the context of his 
picture of language and meaning. For example, he says: “Grammar is not accountable to any reality. It is 
grammatical rules that determine meaning (constitute it) and so they themselves are not answerable to any 
meaning, and to that extent are arbitrary” (PG §133). Here Wittgenstein re-positions us so that we view signs like 
“meaning” differently, shifting our perspective away from any manner of reifying meaning independent of 
language. As he says in the Investigations, “One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be 
rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need” (PI §108). 
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follow out through my consideration of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning – there is 
indeed something valuable to take away from these investigative efforts. 
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Chapter Four 
The Curious Case of the Professional Learning Paradox115 
 
4.1  Preamble 
In this chapter I explore a variation of the curious problem of the ‘learning paradox’ as it applies to 
professional learning. Specifically I argue that a ‘professional learning paradox’ can be seen to emerge 
from considerations concerning learning in the application of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and 
meaning, as well as from considerations concerning the thought of educational theorists such as Schön 
(1983, 1987) and situative theorists such as Lave and Wenger (1991). For my own part I do not believe 
that there is any particular (dis)solution of this species of the learning paradox. The work of this chapter 
is to show how it emerges and to describe it in the terms offered up by Wittgenstein. I hold that, given 
just these ‘premises,’ the professional learning paradox as I portray it is simply an unavoidable situation. 
I also hold, however, that there are better and worse approaches to working through it. Further, this 
chapter serves as a useful lead-in to the discussion in the next chapter where I begin to apply the picture 
of professional learning to the case of professionals’ actual learning. The current chapter serves as well 
as a kind of transition from the more abstract discussion about language and meaning in Chapter 3 to 
more concrete particulars concerning real professional learning situations. 
Let me offer first a quick word on the nature of paradox. Rescher (2001) says that, “a paradox arises 
when a set of individually plausible propositions is collectively [i.e., in the aggregate] inconsistent.” (p. 6) 
Thus Rescher claims that a paradox is not a problem/mistake in reasoning but in substance, as “a 
dissonance of endorsements” (p. 7). Rescher interestingly puts it that paradoxes all arise through 
“aporetic overcommitment” (p. 15) to all the propositions in the set being considered. Resolution is 
usually effected by abandoning those propositions to which we overcommitted. There are different 
kinds of paradoxes, the most dramatic being antinomies, which point to inconsistencies in the logical 
assumptions that we hold. The basic ‘learning paradox’ arises given a particular rendering of learning 
within the context of certain sets of assumptions about rationality and knowledge. Its general form is: a 
person can learn something if and only if they already know that thing. Note that I am not interested in 
this paper in the issues of properly formulating or resolving the learning paradox itself, which strikes me 
                                                          
115 This chapter is a version of my Gardner (2017). 
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as a deeply contested problem.116 Rather I wish to use it to help me to frame a more specific problem of 
practice pertinent to my own work in the professional development field, which concerns how 
professionals can make significant strides in their learning on their own or in peer groups.117 
The problem of the paradox of professional learning can be seen to emerge only through a consideration 
of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning and through the thinking of such educational 
theorists as Schön and Lave & Wenger. The learning paradox does not emerge in the same way from 
representationalist or cognitivist perspectives on language, meaning, and learning – though for some 
cognitivists the learning paradox is the route to inferring as necessary some form of nativism (e.g., in the 
work of Chomsky, Fodor, and Luntley). It is interesting as well that what I suggest is a problem here has, 
as far as I can see, been neither identified nor discussed in the literature concerning Wittgenstein and 
education. 
The classical version of the paradox of learning is set out by Plato (1961) in the dialogue Meno (see 80 d-
e for a concise statement of the argument). Moravcsik (1978) provides a clear formulation of the 
problem: 
It is not possible for a man to inquire either into what he knows or into what he does not know. 
He cannot inquire into that which he knows, since if he knows it there is no room for inquiry. On 
the other hand, he cannot inquire into that which he does not know, since in that case he does 
not know what it is that he should be seeking. (p. 54) 
This is the Meno version of the learning paradox, viz., that one cannot even start inquiry that can lead to 
knowledge. Plato’s later dialogue, the Theaetetus (1973), sets out a different version of the paradox. 
There the focus of the argument is on the nature or definition of ‘knowledge’, which in the relevant part 
of the dialogue for us is taken to be true judgment/opinion (see Theaetetus, 187e-201c). What is of 
interest here is the dialogue’s concern for the problem of how we can tell true from false judgment. The 
point that I am interested in (at 199e – 200c) is that, on the models of knowledge constructed in the 
dialogue, one cannot tell that one has knowledge or not-knowledge (i.e., true judgment or false 
judgment). The attempt to determine the one from the other leads either to an infinite or a circular 
regress (see 200b-c). So the two main issues of the learning paradox are, without already knowing what 
you set out to learn, (1) how one can even get started in inquiry (Meno version), and (2) how one can 
                                                          
116 See for example the innovative debate carried out in the American Educational Research Journal in 1999-2000 
with regard to Richard Prawat’s (1999) article on the learning paradox. (See AERJ 36(1) and AERJ 37(1).) 
117 And “significant” in terms of the goals and desires as set out by the learning professionals themselves. 
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know when one’s inquiry has succeeded (Theaetetus version). Versions of these two aspects will be 
important for our later discussion. 
Wittgenstein himself did not explicitly consider the learning paradox, for reasons which I will indicate 
below. However, a number of thinkers over the last 50 years have been interested in it. For example, 
Polanyi (1967) framed the problem in the context of the “experience of seeing a problem … for to see a 
problem is to see that something is hidden”, i.e., a possible comprehension of a (new) coherence of 
particulars (see p. 21). Polanyi sees the paradox emerging only insofar as it concerns what he calls 
explicit knowledge; the resolution of the paradox is through an intimation of the relevant tacit 
knowledge (or, otherwise, in the intimations that are afforded by tacit knowledge). For Polanyi, 
Tacit knowing is shown to account (1) for a valid knowledge of a problem, (2) for the scientist’s 
capacity to pursue it, guided by his sense of approaching its solution, and (3) for a valid 
anticipation of the yet indeterminate implications of the discovery arrived at in the end. (p. 24) 
So we have “tacit foreknowledge of yet undiscovered things” (p. 23), which answers for the Meno 
version of the paradox, and before the “fruitfulness” of the truth of discoveries reveals itself we are 
“aware also of the hidden implications of a scientific discovery” (p. 23), which answers for the 
Theateatus version.118 
Other modern versions of the learning paradox proceed on the basis of a kind of reductio argument, as 
powerful evidence of the ‘aporetic overcommitment’ spoken of by Rescher as characteristic of paradox. 
Fodor (1980) provided the seminal modern version of the paradox, setting it out in terms of the 
Chomskyan perspective in contrast to the Piagetian approach. The paradox emerges from the 
assumption that learning is a matter of hypothesis formation and confirmation by individuals, which 
                                                          
118 Burbules (2008) provides an interesting perspective on tacit knowledge and teaching, discussing these notions 
in terms of Wittgenstein’s comments on teaching and learning, on ‘showing,’ and in terms of Wittgenstein’s own 
example as a teacher. This is not the place here to dispute in detail Burbules’ argument, but as with a lot of 
thinking about the issue of tacit knowledge it rests on an unwarranted asymmetry, viz., if I say p, a proposition, it is 
assumed that p somehow exists in me, and if I do x, an action, it is assumed that the ‘know-how’ or ‘capacity to x’ 
somehow exists in me. However, why not similarly say that it is the ‘capacity to say-p’ that instead exists in me, 
rather than saying that p somehow exists in me, and thus that the saying of it is straightforwardly non-problematic 
and so not requiring the advertence to something tacit? It strikes me that this proposal is closer to the heart of 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language. 
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Fodor claims is the only theory of learning that we have.119 Thus Premise 1 of Fodor’s argument is the 
conditional: 
1. If someone learns concept C, then this was done through the formation and confirmation of the 
hypothesis that some set of instances are C (i.e., belong to category C). 
Such theories have no way of accounting for the origin or manner of acquiring concepts as contained in 
hypotheses (see Premise 2 below), and in fact must assume them as “given” in the learning schema 
(1980, p. 146). Assuming the child’s developing cognitive capacities to be a sequence or “series of logics” 
(p. 147), getting from one stage to the next in development by learning (i.e., hypothesis formation and 
confirmation) is problematic inasmuch as “such a hypothesis can’t be formulated with the conceptual 
apparatus available at [the earlier] stage 1” (p. 148). In other words, “it is never possible to learn a richer 
logic on the basis of a weaker logic” (p. 148). This amounts to Premise 2 in Fodor’s argument: 
2. But: someone can form and confirm hypothesis C if and only if they first use C to assemble the 
set of relevant instances. 
And that is the paradoxical result, i.e., that we have to use the concept in hypothesis formation prior to 
and in order to learn the concept. And so the conclusion is: 
3. Therefore: the reductio leads to the Platonic route, i.e., to a kind of nativism concerning (innate) 
concepts.120 
All that learning theories can do is to indicate how beliefs get fixed by studying statistical associations 
between hypotheses/beliefs and experience, circumstances, etc., but cannot account for how we get 
from one conceptual system to a ‘higher’ one. Such movement can only be explained within a nativist 
framework in which sets of innate concepts emerge as the individual matures, as stimulated by 
experience and maturational changes. As Fodor (1980) states in this much-quoted passage: 
… there literally isn’t such a thing as the notion of learning a conceptual system richer than the 
one that one already has; we simply have no idea of what it would be like to get from a 
conceptually impoverished to a conceptually richer system by anything like a process of 
learning. … The only intelligible theory of enrichment of conceptual resources is that it is a 
                                                          
119 Note that Bereiter, as I discuss below, follows Fodor in this in the body of his argument, but takes the reductio 
to lead in a different direction. 
120 Which concepts, or what in particular, is innate, has been part of the debate among nativists. 
106 
 
function of maturation, and there simply isn’t any theory of how learning can affect concepts. 
(p. 149) 
Like Fodor, Bereiter (1985) situates the learning paradox as properly located within constructivist and 
cognitivist perspectives: 
...learners must grasp concepts or procedures more complex than those they already have 
available for application.  Thus the learning paradox descends with full force on those kinds of 
learning of central concern for educators, learning that extends the range and complexity of 
relationships that people are able to take account of in their thought and action – the kinds of 
learning that lead to understanding core concepts of a discipline, mastering more powerful 
intellectual tools, and being able to use knowledge critically and creatively. (p. 202) 
Bereiter identifies the roots of this paradox in the general systems problem, viz., “how can a structure 
generate another structure more complex than itself?” (p. 204), with the more theoretical question 
specific to human development being, “how can the development of complex mental structures be 
accounted for by mechanisms that are not themselves highly intelligent or richly endowed with 
knowledge?” (p. 205). The learning paradox arises for Bereiter, as it does for most others, largely from 
the cognitivist stance he adopts: thus the paradox issues from the general question of “the extent to 
which experience can modify cognitive structures” (p. 202). Importantly, Bereiter situates the paradox in 
the context of the issue of “self-generated cognitive growth” (p. 205). 
Bereiter’s (1985) resolution of the paradox concerns combining various less-problematic mental 
resources for a constructivist approach, such as “adapting already-existing systems to new uses” (p. 
209), imitation (p. 211), various learning support systems (pp. 211-212), and so on. This solution, which 
Bereiter himself recognizes as insufficient, is not without its problems. Bereiter concludes this paper by 
clarifying that the source of the learning paradox is to be found in the constructivist perspective, i.e., 
that it “spring[s] from one central problem – the problem of explaining how complex knowledge is 
constructed by the learner” (p. 222).121 
                                                          
121 It is salient to point out here the contrast between this constructionism described by Bereiter from the kind of 
constructivism one might reasonably attribute to Wittgenstein, in which knowledge is not some item (i.e., a 
thought, a proposition) held or grasped by an individual cognitive agent, but should be talked about in terms of 
relationships to language and community, i.e., a form of moving from place to place within language. 
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Connected to his (1985) response, Bereiter’s (1991) later contribution takes up a complexity route, 
arguing that a connectionist approach holds the most promise for a resolution of the paradox, being 
neither a nativist argument nor a learning theory premised on hypothesis formation and confirmation, 
the latter of which, if taken “too literally” (p. 297), leads to just such problems. He formulates the 
paradox in terms of learning, i.e., “what is to be learned must already be known in order for learning to 
take place” (p. 294). The resolution of the paradox is given here through connectionist models, which 
“provide demonstrations of systems that can acquire apparently rule-guided behavior without its 
involving any internal representation of rules” (p. 295). Connectionism, then, would be the third way 
that Fodor could not see. 
Finally, Luntley (2008a) attempts to resolve a variation of Fodor’s formulation of the learning paradox, 
viz., concerning the genesis of new concepts. Taking up a cognitivist stance and developing further the 
main thrust of his general philosophical approach (e.g., see Luntley 1999, 2007), Luntley resolves this 
issue by working out an affective process that, through a mechanism of sub-conceptual discrimination, is 
able to generate a certain range of new concepts. This avoids the paradoxical aspect as Luntley 
describes it, i.e., hypotheses formed out of discriminations which assume the operation of the concept 
yet to be confirmed (e.g., see Fodor’s argument above). However all that Luntley might be said to have 
shown is that we can (i.e., might possibly) discriminate certain aspects of social behavior at a sub-
conceptual level – assuming that affective response is indeed sub-conceptual and minimally rational 
(i.e., assuming that it possesses enough of both ‘worlds’). Luntley’s evidence base for his argument 
“draws on developmental studies of infant cognition” (p. 12), though in fact this ‘base’ consists only of a 
few unsourced anecdotes which have the appearance of being constructed for just this purpose.122 As 
we have seen, however (see Section 3.3), Luntley has another reason for taking on the learning paradox 
which is more important for his overall project – it helps to support his general argument against what 
he considers the mistaken Wittgensteinian view of ‘training’ and socio-cultural influences as sufficient to 
account for the transformation of persons in their development from being non-linguistic and non-
reasoning to being reason-using and linguistic. 
                                                          
122 Various others have treated the learning paradox, taking up different approaches. For example, Prawat (1999), 
Glasersfeld (2001), Hoffman (2003), and others have explored solutions based on pragmatist perspectives 
employing Peirce’s notion of ‘abduction.’ Note finally that the term “learning paradox” is used in far looser ways as 
well in the contemporary literature. See, for example, Armitage et al (2008), where the paradox is identified as the 
practical problem that learning about resource and environment management is generally recognized as important 
though little is actually done in the relevant sectors to encourage it. 
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It is reasonable, I think, to hold that the learning paradox per se is not a problem in the terms set out by 
Wittgenstein. In brief, for Wittgenstein concepts are not self-identical mental-cognitive states or 
structures that one either has or does not have, but rather ‘general’ signs consisting of indeterminate 
connexions to which we travel according to context and circumstance by our move-making in language-
games. (Put more prosaically, concepts are signs that we actively employ in different ways to do 
different things in various circumstances.) The paradox depends on discontinuities between the 
contents and structures of understanding, whereas for Wittgenstein understanding is a matter of the 
continuous interactions within a community and its form of life. The problem of the paradox as it is 
understood by Fodor, Bereiter, Luntley, and others, is how structures can generate new, different 
structures; whereas for Wittgenstein, inasmuch as ‘meaning’ is not spoken of as the act of individuals or 
as facts about them, as members of communities we are invited to move actively into more and more 
sophisticated uses of signs within living economies of signs.123 At any rate, this brief survey is sufficient 
to set up my own problematic, and I turn now to what I call the “professional learning paradox”. 
4.2  The professional learning paradox 
In terms of the learning of professionals in situ, that is, in the context of their work environments, we 
can assume for the moment that there is little problem with regard to some of the learning that does in 
fact take place. In many situations there is already a place or ‘post’ ready (see, for example, PI §§29-31, 
257) for new information that is encountered in the course of daily work or in professional learning 
situations (given, of course, that one knows how to play “the language-game of giving [and receiving?] 
information,” Z §160).124 The learning paradox for working professionals arises more in terms of 
deepening of understandings or in learning new ways of seeing and going on in professional practice.  
The professional learning paradox begins to emerge from a reading of Wittgenstein that emphasizes (a) 
the notion of learning as ‘training’ and (b) that learning is gaining mastery of the grammar of signs and 
                                                          
123 At the moment I am not completely confident that the learner paradox finds no traction in the ideas of 
Wittgenstein. As I argue below in the terms provided by Schön, could it be the case that the learning paradox 
arises in those cases in which progress from mastery of one kind of language-game to another (more 
sophisticated?) language-game is in question? Something Wittgenstein says in On Certainty in this regard gives me 
pause. He says there that, “if we compare our system of knowledge with theirs then theirs is evidently the poorer 
one by far” (OC §286). This seems to resemble at least the kind of set-up for the modern species of the learning 
paradox. However, the notion of ‘training’ as fundamentally at root in all learning may be the way in which 
learning paradoxes get dissolved in the frame of ideas provided by Wittgenstein.  
124 Note that my parenthetical comment here is not a throw-away one; taking in new information is a skill that 
does need to be developed, and thus the training that might be necessary to develop one’s ability to play this 
particular language-game (or set of language-games, if it is complicated skill) would be on the table in terms of 
potential professional learning initiatives. (This is both an empirical and a grammatical comment, I should think.) 
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(possibly) the learning of new language-games or the enhancing of skill in the language-games one 
already knows to play, and the connection between these two. One cannot reason out in toto a 
particular sign’s grammar – see OC §475 and Z §545 for different kinds of perspective on this point – but 
rather must be brought into engagement with its grammar by other means, i.e., by being shown, 
through training, and then practice, encouragement, dissuasion, etc. (e.g., see PI §§143, 145; RFM  VI 
18). The grammar of a particular sign is contingent on the language, the result of the history of a culture, 
of the actual uses played with that sign in numerous language-games. Creative endeavours – scientific or 
artistic – are bounded on many sides by existing grammars and by the language-games familiarly played 
with the relevant signs surrounding the new. The new uses of (new) signs that may result may be taken 
up by others, entering practice and culture to become hardened as they might into forming new 
connexions within grammars, or these new signs may remain local and quickly fade away. One way of 
looking at professionals and their expertise is that they are adepts, or masters, in the grammar of certain 
signs and in how to travel between the places marked out by these grammars; they know how to go on 
in using these particular sets of signs (and in the associated material practices). Learners, novices, those 
on the periphery of the relevant communities of practice, on the other hand, know little of the places to 
go, and cannot find their way between places on their own. 
The point I need here to bring out the particular paradoxical aspect of professional learning is that we 
can learn certain things only by being shepherded along by others, that those who have mastered the 
relevant grammars and ways of moving between them must perforce guide novices into using signs in 
the prescribed ways. The problem in professional learning is thus that either one receives the relevant 
training into the grammar new to them from someone who has the necessary mastery, or one is left 
unguided to find a way into the new grammar. The problem begins to seem paradoxical insofar as, 
practically, it is for the most part impossible for relative novices in professions to be trained by masters 
– bluntly put, there are far more professionals wanting to learn than there are relevant masters able and 
willing to teach.125 This is especially so when the desired learning crosses disciplines; for example, in 
cases where educators or government bureaucrats desire training in developmental science. 
Obviously I am moving somewhat freely between philosophical remarks and empirical remarks about 
learning and teaching. However, what we can say is that this paradoxical problem of professional 
                                                          
125 This practical paradoxical problem is essentially a problem of the mismatch in numbers; in addition, existing 
adepts or masters who have the expertise in the relevant grammars, language-games, and material practices may 
have the desire but not the ability to teach. Certainly this can be ameliorated by teaching the adepts to teach. But 
this secondary problem just reduces to the issue of the mismatch in numbers. 
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learning emerges from proceeding in line with the application of Wittgenstein’s picture of language. In 
the language of the situative theorists, the problem would concern how one might get drawn in from 
the periphery to the core of a community of practice without interacting in appropriate ways with 
members of that community, i.e., with those closer to the core. Indeed, this may be logically impossible. 
Since it is the community that defines and gives form and substance to the relevant practices, even to 
engage in the practice qua practice one must interact with the community in specific ways. That is, it’s 
not a practice – and not learning – if it is not done in relation with certain others. If on the other hand it 
is somehow possible to proceed to bootstrap oneself from a community of practice’s periphery towards 
its core, then one would gain new practice, i.e., learn, only in grudgingly slow, haphazard, and accidental 
ways. 
In general a situative approach will involve an account of knowing/learning in terms of changing 
participation in a community’s practices, and in this respect we have here a fundamental theory of 
learning and epistemology. Thus the fundamental character of knowledge and learning concerns their 
relational aspects, that is, they are constituted in the first instance by social activity. Learning, 
understood in terms of participation, “focuses attention on ways in which it is an evolving, continuously 
renewed set of relations” (Lave & Wenger, 1991, pp. 49-50), and that learning “is not merely a condition 
for membership [e.g., in a particular community of practice], but is itself an evolving form of 
membership” (p. 53). Learning, then, is being able to do more and more of what the other members of 
the community can do, especially as these activities are performed and modelled by the adepts, 
masters, or experts in the community. In other words, learning is increasingly knowing how to go on in 
the ways the community can go on.   
Lave (1993) says elsewhere: 
That there is no such thing as “learning” sui generis, but only changing participation in the 
culturally designed settings of everyday life. Or, to put it the other way around, participation in 
everyday life may be thought of as a process of changing understanding in practice, that is, as 
learning. (pp. 5-6) 
Distinguishing cognitive theories from the situative approach, Lave (1993) goes on to say: 
The difference may be at heart a very deep epistemological one, between a view of knowledge 
as a collection of real entities, located in heads, and of learning as a process of internalizing 
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them [cognitive theory] versus a view of knowing and learning as engagement in changing 
processes of human activity. (p. 12) 
To some extent the learning paradox per se can only gain rocky purchase in a situative approach. If I can 
draw further connection here with some of the things Wittgenstein says, we can see that the learning 
paradox depends on discontinuities between the contents and structures of understanding, but in a 
situative context understanding is a matter of the continuous, generative interaction within a 
community. The modern learning paradox is about how it can be possible for structures to be able to 
form new, different structures, whereas in a situative approach it is rather the case that members of 
communities are invited to move actively into more and more sophisticated uses of signs within living 
and evolving economies of signs. 
As I have already intimated, the crux of this professional learning paradox can be seen, I think, most 
clearly in the work of Schön (1983, 1987), in which both the Meno and Theaetetus versions are relevant. 
Schön affirms the basic learning paradox problematic in the context of professional learning, i.e., in 
“teaching and learning of any really new competence or understanding … the student seeks to learn 
things whose meaning and importance she cannot grasp ahead of time” (1987, p. 83). The professional 
learning paradox arises, in turn, in the context of practical constraints on professionals inasmuch as 
Schön argues that a ‘coaching’ relationship is necessary for a range of professional learning. In brief, 
then, (i) students/novices do not know what questions to ask (Meno version), and (ii) when they do ask 
good questions in their learning process, they do not see them as good and so abandon them, or do not 
see lines or threads of inquiry as promising and so abandon those as well (Theaetetus version). 
Importantly, Schön resolves the learning paradox by accepting it. 
Note that for Lave & Wenger (1991), the decentering of the master/coach-student relationship is 
important inasmuch as it is part of the emphasis on how a community organizes itself, both in general 
but specifically with regard to its learning resources. The shift signaled here is one towards “the intricate 
structuring of a community’s learning resources” (1991, p. 94). While I think this is for the most part 
descriptively sound, I also think that this diffusion of learning resources precisely plays into the problem 
of the professional learning paradox, i.e., in the guise of peer groups struggling to learn on their own, at 
a remove from those close to the core of the relevant community of practice. 
But for Schön, an active, positive coach–student relationship in professional learning and development is 
necessary. He says in this regard, for example, that “students must be engaged in learning by doing and 
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in dialogue with someone in the role of coach” (1987, p. 162). Thus the basic Meno-version learning 
paradox (i.e., in order to learn something we already need to know that thing in some manner) entails 
that the student on their own does not know what needs to be learned, and so will never learn it. The 
paradox is practically resolved, however, by accepting it, i.e., in terms of situating learning in the context 
of a dyadic relationship in which the relevant knowledge does already exist. As part of this dyadic 
relationship between coach and student, the student is now part of a single entity, so to speak, that 
does know what is to be learned. Within this fairly tight dyadic relationship, the coach – who does 
‘know’ – finds whatever means are needed to motivate the student to initiate relevant dialogue in any 
way; this allows the skilled coach to use various (training) techniques to draw the student into a 
productive ‘learning circle’, and “so the stage is set for a continuing dialogue of actions and words, of 
reciprocal reflection in and on action” (1987, p. 166).126 In this way (and for the situative approach to 
learning as well), the stress gets put on teaching, training, and learning practices, a knowing-how, 
situated both in the immediate and in terms of the history and body of practice of the discipline or 
community of practice (viz., in terms of grammars). This stands most powerfully in contrast, for 
example, to the notion of transfer of objective, inert, knowing-that, i.e., propositional 
concepts/knowledge, as typical of most representational cognitivist-oriented approaches to learning. 
Thus, for Schön, these coached learning situations are such that the coach “knows that the student … 
can get good reasons for acting only by beginning to act. However much the master may dislike asking 
the student to give up his autonomy, he must invite him to enter into a temporary relationship of trust 
and dependency.” (1987, p. 95) Indeed, Schön says that students “do not as yet have the idea of a 
learning process in which imperfect actions are continually modified through reflection-in-action” (1987, 
p. 291), but it is this process all that same that must happen. The student’s learning is dependent “on 
the career of his dialogue with the coach” (1987, p. 169), and such dialogue in turn is dependent on the 
positive nature of the relationship between coach and student. 
It is possible to hear another echo here, between this characterization of the coach-student activity in 
Williams’ (1994) take on Wittgenstein and the notion of ‘stage-setting’, inasmuch as this notion can be 
applied to non-initiate learners. Williams argues that “naïve learner’s utterances” get provisionally taken 
                                                          
126 We can hear an echo Schön’s developmental notion of the ‘learning circle’ in Wittgenstein. In this regard 
Medina (2002) says: “The “circle” created by the process of training into a technique consists in the following: that 
what the learner is trained to do, blindly, becomes the criterion of identity for what he is doing. Thus the end of 
the process becomes the beginning: what is obtained by the learned procedure becomes criterial for having 
followed that procedure. The actual applications of the rule thus fix the normative standards of similarity that 
define what counts as following a rule” (p. 161). 
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in teaching/learning sequences as proper linguistic behaviors, and that this status is “extended to those 
utterances by masters of that practice … the initiate learner speaks, makes judgements, requests, and 
the like only by virtue of a courtesy extended to the learner by those who have already mastered the 
practice,” as the way to draw learners into normative behavior (p. 180; also see p. 185). This can be 
taken as a view on an aspect of ‘training’, i.e., the gradual mastery of a technique under the guidance of 
knowledgeable others. What is more useful is the notion that a coach will encourage repetition and 
practice of the relevant signs’ grammars through the play of different language-games, this pedagogical 
activity or intervention based on what the student actually says and does. See, for example, Schön’s 
(1983) extended description of the interaction between a resident and their supervisor in a 
psychoanalytic training situation (see pp. 108-127) for the pointed responsiveness of the supervisor to 
the student’s descriptions, interpretations, suggestions and hypotheses. This angle is absolutely crucial 
for both Schön and Wittgenstein, i.e., that the reaction of the other is the basis on how we proceed in 
learning. In the case of the coach-student relationship it is the mutual reactivity of each to the other, 
and Wittgenstein charts out his concern for this aspect of reaction between the different parties in 
learning situations in multiple places throughout his work (e.g., see PI §§143-146, 185-186, 208). 
Learners on the basis of their own developing understanding can be blocked in their learning, and we 
can perhaps usefully employ Wittgenstein’s statement, ‘a picture can hold them captive’ (PI §115) in 
such cases (though Wittgenstein had a different context in mind for this statement in the Investigations 
– and being held captive by pictures is only one way of learners’ learning getting blocked). Learners get 
stuck in that they can ‘see’ neither the detrimental aspect of their current picture of things nor any 
positive aspects of different pictures or approaches that might promote understanding. The coach finds 
ways to liberate the student past such blocks in understanding. This Theaetetus side to the professional 
learning paradox thus is seen in the importance of the coach helping students begin to recognize – to 
begin to see – what they could not see before, viz., a good solution or thread to follow. For Schön, one 
ideal for professional learning is the reflective practicum, in which students at all career levels are guided 
in a variety of ways by coaches/teachers/mentors (see, for example, 1987, pp. 157-172). Schön (1987) 
says in this regard, and with learning in design (e.g., architecture) in mind, that, 
A designlike practice is learnable but is not teachable by classroom methods. And when students 
are helped to learn to design, the interventions most useful to them are more like coaching than 
teaching – as in a reflective practicum. (p. 157) 
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To present matters in this way has the implication that autodidacticism is, with regard to certain 
learning, impossible. This is the crux of the professional learning paradox: that without the necessary 
coaching relationship (i.e., in Schön’s terms, and by extension in Wittgenstein’s terms), professional 
learning of the kinds we’re interested in is not possible given the constraints of professional work life. 
The practices that would enable individuals to be able to learn how to go (correctly) on are absent, and 
the normative pressures – i.e., from environments/communities of practice and from the active 
presence of masters of the relevant techniques – that could be brought to bear to influence new 
learners in the relevant ways do not exist. It would be like trying to learn how to play chess or hockey 
from a single page torn at random from a chess instructional book or a hockey magazine. With no one 
who knows how to play chess or hockey to guide you, to help you gain the capacity to make the moves 
in the game, it is unlikely you would get very far in your desire to learn how to play those games. 
But are these conclusions reasonable – i.e., that if there are no coaches there can no (professional) 
learning of the kinds we are interested in, and that, given the practical reality of many professionals but 
few experts in all the relevant fields who can serve as coaches, there can from that perspective be no 
learning? At first glance these conclusions seem somewhat odd. Of course we learn (don’t we?). But 
there is empirical evidence to the contrary, indicating that professional learning is difficult, lengthy in 
process, and can be very hard to produce. Let me provide a few examples of this. 
First, in a study by Judith Little (2002), she discusses a narrative which shows, in part, several educators 
in their working group resisting a new (and, from one perspective, correct) way of talking about relevant 
matters that is put forward by one of the discussants. It’s a promising line of inquiry to consider and to 
follow out, but the group cannot see the need to work through their colleague’s repeated suggestion; 
indeed, some members of the group show considerable impatience with their colleague’s suggestion. 
From my own perspective as a researcher, the new way of talking is something potentially fruitful they 
need to consider; Little shows (though does not focus on this) that the group simply cannot recognize 
this, despite the repeated provocations of one of their peers.127 
Second, two studies by Hoekstra et al (2009, 2011) provide evidence in this regard. In the earlier study 
(2009), a group of educators were tracked over the course of a year in terms of change in their 
conceptions and behaviours with regard to a developmental construct important for their pedagogy. 
The educators were to engage in their own learning efforts, and after a year little change was recorded. 
                                                          
127 I discuss Little (2002) again below in Chapter 5. 
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In the continuation of the study as reported in the 2011 paper, one educator was followed over two 
years, and change in their take-up of the same developmental construct was assessed. Left to their own 
learning efforts, very little change was observed. It was only when they were paired in a mentor-type 
learning relationship that evidence of learning began to show.128  
Finally, in my own work with educators and other professional groups in the social services, particularly 
in the context of peer group professional learning, I have seen how challenging it is for such groups to 
move their thinking and discussion out of the pictures and narratives with which they’re familiar, and to 
move into ways of talking and seeing that are new and different for them. I have found often enough 
that even professionals interested in developing new ways of talking about their own practice find it 
difficult to enter into solid inquiry about why they might need to (re-)consider their practice and the 
nature of the pictures behind those practices. Despite decades of enthusiasm for reflective practice, 
reflection as a body of language-games is still something difficult to master for many professional 
groups; it requires (in my view) hard-to-obtain combinations of training, practice, supportive working 
environments, community, and the political will of their organizations. 
In order to understand better how professionals learn, there is a need to observe both successful 
learning initiatives and those that are less successful. It is an issue of how both researchers and the 
professionals themselves conduct, document, publish, and discuss research about failure to learn, and 
this is a constraint on what we can learn about learning. Without question there are good reasons to 
focus on positive outcomes and not belabour ‘shortcomings’ (e.g., see Torbert, 1981; Noddings, 1986, 
1988). Nodding’s notion of a caring collegial community is an example of such a positive reason, in which 
collaborative inquiry and genuine mutuality between colleagues will make for the most effective 
research for teaching/professional development. However, despite such constraints with the relevant, 
published literature, there is all the same still a considerable body of literature about the difficulties 
inherent in professional learning, and which sets out various diagnoses and solutions. 
However, despite its seeming impossibility, it remains that the only feasible resolution of the learning 
paradox specific to professionals concerns the exigent necessity for the autodidacticism of professional 
learning, i.e., that it is principally through communities of peers and interaction with others at similar 
                                                          
128 Of course, one has to look carefully at the methodology and implementation of these studies in order to 
commit to their inferences. For example, in the Hoekstra et al (2011) paper, attention needs to be given to the 
investigation into the relationship between the various learning activities and the outcomes in question, whether 
the first year prepped the educator for the outcomes recorded in the second year, and so on. 
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levels of expertise that professionals will have opportunities to somehow bootstrap their own learning. 
See as well in this regard Bereiter & Scardamalia, (1993) (e.g., pp. 104-109), on their idea of the sub-
culture of experts and its role in supporting professional learning.129 If the situation is as I describe it, the 
question then is how professionals on their own can draw themselves into new practices or train 
themselves to take on new grammars, learn new language-games, and see new aspects of things. 
4.3  Responding to the professional learning paradox  
I have argued that the professional learning paradox emerges from the application of Wittgenstein’s 
sketch of a picture of language and meaning, and in the last third of this chapter I argue that framing 
professional learning in the light of this sketch also allows us to begin to develop ways that may help 
lead us through this paradoxical situation. To reiterate, the issue that has emerged is how individual 
professionals or professional peer groups on their own obtain the training necessary to allow them to 
find new, relevant, and correct places to go and to learn new move-making techniques needed to get 
them to these new places. 
Three important points need to be made here. First, unless organizational and practice environments 
change substantially, we need accept that the professional learning paradox inescapably remains a 
paradox or problem. Given the practical realities of the situation, diffuse learning environments and 
coaches’ action ‘at a distance’ will be the best that we can generally do, given the practical logistics of 
the situation (i.e., many professionals, few potential and relevant coaches/experts, many new things to 
be confronted and learned).130 I suggest we might have to be satisfied with this and to find the best, 
most creative and intelligent ways to optimize learning possibilities within these constraints. 
Second, a goal of training is to help in the development of autonomous participants who can interact in 
community with others. There are two basic senses of autonomy that we might talk about here: (i) being 
limited to existing language-games and grammar, and (ii) going beyond existing language-games and 
grammar. In the first sense a person is autonomous insofar as one regulates one’s own behavior with 
regard to making the right moves with the right signs in the appropriate contexts and circumstances, 
i.e., one can go on in the right ways without the continuing encouragement, correction, and guidance of 
                                                          
129 Though note that Bereiter & Scardamalia (1993) also discuss the “heroic element,” i.e., the individualism of 
expertise in this section of their book. 
130 The idea of ‘training the trainers’ needs to be considered, but given (i) the great variety of learning needs of any 
group of professionals, and (ii) the fact that ‘trained trainers’ is just a variation on expert coaches’ ‘action from a 
distance,’ this option does not go far to ameliorate the paradoxical situation faced by learning professionals. 
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another who is adept in the relevant ways. In other words, one has learned how to play the language-
game, and now one does play it. But we can go on to talk of forms of autonomy stronger than this 
important though limited form, especially given the background of the contingency and changeability of 
language: “… but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and 
others become obsolete and get forgotten.” (PI §23). Thus, in the second sense, a person either might 
be able to adapt to new grammars or language-games on one’s own creative initiative, by virtue of the 
characteristics of practices and grammars one has already mastered, and not have to be shown or 
trained into the practice by others, or might go beyond existing grammars of signs and the practices 
connected to them, innovating new forms (which might extend from the sublime to the banal). I will 
return in a moment to the question whether there is much room for this latter kind of creative, 
innovative linguistic autonomy of individual speakers and groups. For example, new ways of talking need 
to get taken up by the relevant community or communities if they are going to come to constitute new 
additions to our systems of signs, and not simply be considered nonsense. Ignored by others, new ways 
of talking remain local and eventually disappear. 
Third, and connected to my last point, these aspects of the growing autonomy of learners still play 
themselves out in the arena of training, of master-novice relations, and the normative pressures of 
communities. In other words it makes sense to speak of adult professional learning as still a matter of 
being trained in various ways into new grammars and language-games.131 I interpret statements like, 
“but how can I explain it [i.e., in this case, a specific language game] to anyone? I can give him this 
training.” (RFM VII 40), as applying generally, i.e., to adults as they encounter and learn new signs, new 
grammars, and new or better move-making skills. 
Let me return to this issue of autonomy in the development of language speakers, as it is an important 
one, and as just noted has ramifications for my overall project. Peters and Stickney (2018), taking up 
points from Medina (2004) and from RFM VII 61, state that “… the higher goal of initiate-training is to 
open possibilities rather than fix them” (p. 72).  That is, learning to play games and thus, simultaneously, 
to abide by the rules framing or structuring those games, makes possible the doing of things 
recognizable and understandable by others, and in turn allows the learner to recognize and understand, 
and to be able to go on in various ways, from the behaviours and utterances of others. This occurs and is 
made possible within the more-or-less broad arenas of action framed, given, or made possible, by rules 
                                                          
131 As I pointed out in Chapter 1, Wittgenstein does also talk about adults taking on new grammars and language-
games. Recall: “… when the boy or grownup learns what one might call special technical languages, e.g., the use of 
charts and diagrams, descriptive geometry, chemical symbolism, etc., he learns more language games” (BB, p. 81).  
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and language-games. All of this seems the best place within which to consider autonomy. However, part 
of what Peters and Stickney (2018) go on to explore is the idea that (an inevitable?) part of autonomy is 
that speakers contest language-games per se (see, for example: “Our need here is to see that simplified 
learning practices occasion philosophical investigations; they give us a perspicuous view of how pupils 
come to play, and later contest, certain language-games within the complex weave and rapid flow of 
life” p. 87). It is this stronger interpretation of “autonomy” (see my distinction above) that I am 
interested in considering here. 
I would argue that once you know how to play some game, you can come to play it creatively, 
imaginatively, innovatively, with flourish, and these all within the rules. And it does seem possible to talk 
about sometimes stretching or bending the relevant rules of language-games, and at times breaking 
them and forging new ways to go on.132 But where does this latter claim come from, and what evidence 
– what kind of evidence – is there for making it? The idea from Wittgenstein’s picture is that 
rules/language-games frame and contain action, but do not guide it in every instance (e.g., see PI 
§68).133 Indeed, the idea is that one does not follow a rule (or rules) in doing any one thing or in making 
any one utterance, but that one abides by rules that allow one to do this action or make this utterance, 
such that it is appropriate, recognizable, understandable … and meaningful. That the utterance does 
something legitimate within the language-game is its meaning, but its doing is not the causal result of 
following rules, and indeed its ‘meaning’ does not stand outside of these immediate actions in the 
particular context in which it is performed. In other words, one’s action or utterance is not meaningful 
by virtue of its connection to some other thing that is its source of meaning; it is the doing of that action 
                                                          
132 Recall Wittgenstein’s comment having to do with his method in just this regard: “Here I am stating something 
about the grammar of the word “language” by connecting it with the grammar of the word “invent”” (PG §140). 
My concern is that we can be led to reverse the kind of relationship we have with language as set out by 
Wittgenstein in his picture of language and meaning, viz., that we (as increasingly autonomous agents) control the 
nature of language, thus situating the source of meaning in a sense outside of language. This is the kind of 
ontological commitment that Wittgenstein stays clear of in drawing his picture of language. 
133 To return to the picture of playing games for a moment, most moves made by players in a hockey game, for 
example, are not the result of directly following rules, but are better understood as creatively-responsive 
improvisation, depending of course on the skill of the players. I would suggest that there is even creative 
improvisation in abiding by the very explicit and carefully monitored off-side rules (for example). In the context of 
playing a hockey game, though, one cannot contest such a rule (though can context particular rulings made on its 
basis). In play there cannot be bending, stretching, or breaking that rule (i.e., not without a set of very particular 
consequences ensuing). However, hockey comprises a family of games, in which different variations are based on 
modified versions of the rules. Thus ringette, for example, which is very hockey-like, has a modified version of the 
off-side rule. However, a lot of what I am considering here can take us in too many directions away from the focus 
of my thesis project, which is to draw a picture of professional learning influenced by Wittgenstein’s picture of 
language and meaning. I offer these comments here more as a way to show the complicated nature of this part of 
the picture, and that these important issues will not be easily or quickly resolved.  
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or utterance itself that is its meaning, as that action or utterance stands within (the form of) the rules of 
the language-game.134 
At any rate, the idea of stretching, bending, breaking, going beyond rules and language-games, is a 
statement perhaps suggested to us by analogy, and it strikes me that any number of conditions and 
caveats must surround such a claim with regard to any particular language-game or set of rules. Is it the 
possible that in many – or all? – particular language-games, one could not break any rules of proceeding 
legitimately with that game without simply becoming incoherent, in which no one could understand 
what you are doing. (Garfinkel’s (1967) early experiments conducted with the participation of his 
students are instructive in this vein.) What would be an example of bending or breaking such rules such 
that a new, understandable way of going on was forged and that nonsense was not produced or was not 
taken as evidence of madness? I might talk about some matter in a new way, and in doing so offer a new 
way of seeing things, but does that necessarily entail bending or breaking rules? For example, can one 
start to ask questions in a new way without ceasing to be asking questions? It is conceivable to envision 
new language forms emerging, and new language-games of certain kinds starting up, if indeed those 
ways of performing get taken up by others and do in time get established as parts of the language. 
However, it would seem that such questions bring us into the empirical-historical realm of the 
development of real languages in time. Need this be our concern here? Is it better to consider Einstein’s 
theory of general relativity as a new language-game, bending or breaking rules (though which ones?), or 
rather to describe it as a new picture, i.e., as a new and to some extent different perspective around 
which to organize our talk about certain things, recognizing that in speaking it one still played all the 
same language-games played by others? Simply saying new things, or talking about familiar things in 
new ways, or even dropping old ways of talking about things, do not strike me as best described in terms 
of bending/breaking rules, but rather as still working within the frame of existing rules/language-games. 
Innovation or creativity in such a case as the relativity theory example can be viewed as remaining 
within the (broad, fuzzy, ill-defined) frame or context of rules in which we have all been abiding, and is 
not at all a violation of them but rather an exploration of the possibilities made possible by them, even 
though we now talk about things differently than before. And perhaps that is the best way to view 
autonomy in the context of Wittgenstein’s picture (which returns us to the original quote from Peters 
                                                          
134 This, I think, is a general danger that tempts us in discussing Wittgenstein, i.e., we are still tethered to the 
picture that there must be some kind of objective source of meaning, something that stands outside of language. 
Resorting to what the community does is one such picture of meaning seeking objective anchoring; the gesturing 
towards ‘forms of life’ and/or our ‘first nature’ is potentially another such picture. These pictures run counter, I 
think, to the idea of the autonomy of language that is an important part of Wittgenstein’s picture. 
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and Stickney (2018, p. 72) above). As well, this way of considering autonomy has implications for how 
we draw a picture of professional learning, which begin to emerge in the next chapter of this thesis. 
Let me return now to the main theme of this chapter, i.e., professional learning, training, and the 
paradox. In a significant sense everyone can be a novice in some regard, i.e., in attempting to learn new 
approaches or subject matter (that is to say, learning how to achieve the new places marked out by the 
grammar of new signs or of modified existent signs). I urge that it makes sense to say that it is training 
that occurs – oftentimes – in less than explicit ways in diffuse social settings, for example, in cases in 
which no one else picks up on the particular way someone attempts to do or articulate something, with 
the result that that way of seeing and putting things is dropped.135 Thus a professional might try out 
different articulations of a particular point, and the silence and non-reactivity of her colleagues to 
certain of her offerings is the kind of reaction that dissuades the use of those particular articulations and 
encourages one to gravitate instead towards those articulations that garner more positive reaction and 
uptake. Such cases I take to be a kind of training, and in this way the development of an individual’s 
autonomy plays out on this kind of collective stage. Likewise training can occur in situations where one 
acquiesces to ways of putting things the group applauds, and where subsequent repetitive practice 
within the group using this formulation reinforces its increasingly-extended use. In this manner and in 
the dynamic aggregate, new ways of talking and acting amongst a peer group form and begin to take 
hold. There is considerable affinity here with the sort of position on learning as set out by ‘community of 
practice’ theorists (e.g., see Lave and Wenger, 1991) and by some of the socio-cultural theorists (e.g., 
see Rogoff, 1995; Rogoff et al, 1996). 
To pick up on the more creative, innovative aspect of autonomy, though still within the context of the 
training of adults who are adapting to new (for them) grammars, one way to approach the professional 
learning paradox impasse that may be productive begins to suggest itself, i.e., through the practices of 
inquiry. Wittgenstein makes two important points about inquiry and question-asking. First, he explicitly 
identifies inquiry as a language-game (see PI §23), and thus there must be rule-bound ways of making 
                                                          
135 For example, one may articulate a new connexion between one sign and another, which, if accepted, would 
forge a pathway between the two signs that did not exist before. The specific locutions doing this, e.g., “Something 
causes some other thing” or “Something is better than some other thing,” may be understood after a fashion, i.e., 
the locutions are not meaningless, but all the same they are not picked up by others in that no one goes on with 
this connexion, and no one makes any further moves on the basis of this new connexion. Thus the relevant signs 
do not become parts of each other’s grammar, at least not via these connexions. However, that the locutions 
attempting to mark out new connexions in such cases are ‘understood after a fashion,’ is a bit problematic, if 
‘understanding’ and ‘ going on’ are taken as linked. Dealing with the new is tricky, I think, given the picture of 
language and meaning sketched by Wittgenstein, and needs further attention. 
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moves with signs constitutive of ‘asking questions’ (and a range of associated move-making with regard 
to responding to questions, etc.) Note that inquiry would comprise a family of variously related 
language-games: ironic questions, sarcastic questions, ‘rhetorical’ questions, leading questions, 
questions asked while already knowing the answer, exploratory questions, ‘how to ask for a name’ 
questions, questions asking for information, strategic questions (e.g., asking a question to get your 
interlocutor to say/admit something they are otherwise reluctant to articulate, thus giving the question-
asker some form of an advantage), and so on.136 Thus it is more apposite to speak in the plural here, of 
the language-games of inquiry,” etc. 
What would also be involved in looking carefully at the language-games of inquiry would include such 
practices as sustaining/maintaining a thread of inquiry (versus drifting away from it) and 
inferring/drawing something from a line of inquiry (versus settling for vague inconclusivity). Here 
something along the lines of a grammatical investigation would yield rewarding understanding, i.e., 
various perspicuous representations of the relevant grammars and move-making. There may be other 
relevant, associated practices (and are these language-games?), but it would be up to the ‘grammatical 
investigation,’ should such be done, to bring these into clearer view. Further, I would hazard that there 
are various kinds of moves in the different language-games of inquiry that would prove to be more or 
less fruitful in the context of professionals attempting to bootstrap their own understanding on new and 
difficult matters. For example it would seem worthwhile to examine more carefully the move-making 
                                                          
136 What is difficult here, and what I have so far only alluded to in this thesis, is where to stop in identifying 
particular language-games. For example, is the idea of the practice of rhetorical question-asking particular enough 
in our discussions about the language-games of inquiry, or do we need to dig down to more specificity (for 
example, to different kinds of rhetorical question-asking language-games differentiated on the basis of purpose 
and circumstance)? The question, I would suggest, is ill-begotten, implying that there is a real substratum that we 
can find. Instead ask, ‘how do we learn the technique of rhetorical question-asking?’ Well, we learn by observing, 
i.e., by being shown examples of rhetorical questions being asked and observing what happens afterwards and 
how others know how to go on with them (and so on). “This is how we ask rhetorical questions!” Is one being 
shown a ‘bedrock’ practice in such instances? I am uncertain about that. Would the same kind of trouble ensue as 
with disputation about bedrock propositions (e.g., see OC §§301, 369, 507) if an instance of rhetorical question-
asking were disputed? And is that the proper test for bedrock practices? If we turn to consider rules, we say not 
that a hockey player is following rules in the particular instance of taking a slap shot in a particular hockey game, 
but is responding to circumstances and the flow of play in that particular game, improvising on that basis, though 
within the frame of certain rules, i.e., the rules of the game. Is one similarly not following specific rules in 
producing a rhetorical question, but simply acting in response to the particular context, and with one’s action 
framed within more general rules of question-asking? Can we say that the rules of games and language-games are 
in a sense basic – and general, in their applicability across concrete instances – in framing action; but the actual 
moments and movements of game-playing can be indeterminately multifarious within those bounds? For what 
purposes – philosophical or practical or quotidian – do we need to identify the kind of language-game? In practical 
terms, for example, when we ask of our interlocutor something like, “What kind of question is that!?”But what 
philosophically is our concern with such explicit identifications? 
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that constitutes rhetorical question-asking and the general consequences of making just those moves 
with signs, particularly in the context of professionals’ learning dialogues with each other. This is, of 
course, to steer things into empirical matters, at least in part – noting, though, that how anyone goes on 
to respond meaningfully to rhetorical questions, to continue the example, is also a grammatical matter. I 
will say that, in general, there is much of process value in asking questions in learning situations (at 
least, the asking the right questions, given the particular context). Both asking and responding to 
questions allows one to look and see better how the interlocutors see the world, i.e., which connexions 
they articulate, which is to see the nature of their mastery of the relevant grammars. 
The second things offered to us by Wittgenstein is that, insofar as each kind of inquiry is a language-
game bound by rules, i.e., each is a matter of certain kinds of move-making, it is something that we 
learn. More strongly put, these are practices into which we are trained by adepts or masters, both as 
child-novices learning our first language, but also as mature language speakers continuing to build, 
expand, better, and refine those various move-making skills. We are drawn into (or grow into) the 
relevant environment of practices that surround us with regard to these move-making skills just as with 
any other technique. Wittgenstein’s analogy in On Certainty is indicative of just this pedagogical point: 
That is to say, the teacher will feel that this is not really a legitimate question at all. … The 
teacher would feel that this was only holding them up, that this way the pupil would only get 
stuck and make no progress. – And he would be right. It would be as if someone were looking 
for some object in a room; he opens a drawer and doesn’t see it there; and he closes it again, 
waits, and opens it once more to see if perhaps it isn’t there now, and keeps on like that. He has 
not learned to look for things. And in the same way this pupil has not learned to ask questions. 
He has not learned the game that we are trying to teach him. (OC §315) 
The value of questions of all sorts in dialogue is that the performances of asking and responding to them 
can bring into view places that had not yet come into view (or had not yet come clearly into view) or can 
begin to make familiar places that were not yet familiar to the interlocutors, and this in ways unique to 
question-asking (as opposed to, for example, assertion-making). Questions can help drive interlocutors 
into more active relationships with one another, promoting action and reaction, and in which we 
confront with one another in more vibrant ways the connexions between signs and places. Question-
asking can be one of the more intimate kinds of language-game we play; in the give-and-take of a 
question-asking-and-responding sequence, we reveal of ourselves how we do indeed know how to go, 
and ‘how to go on’ in many senses. And like any language-game, skill in questions (both in the asking 
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and responding to them) needs be developed, through example, training, and practice. Further, it strikes 
me that it is through the various language-games of inquiry that we can see most clearly the strengths 
and limits of the autonomy of learners. This is particularly so in those cases where learners begin the 
process of asking about and questioning both the ways they have talked about the relevant issue or 
topic and the pictures that have guided them in their talk. Question-asking also can bring learners up 
against the limits of their own learning process, where they come to face, for instance, the learning 
paradox.   
My suggestion, then, in beginning to consider and talk about a way that at least helps learning 
professionals through the professional learning paradox, is to focus on developing the move-making 
skills of the body of language-games comprising inquiry.137 Thus learning sessions set up for and by 
professionals that make the deliberate and explicit focus on questions asked and considered by the 
participants themselves, questions that push after the connections between new signs and their 
grammar and what participants can talk about now, would be to take seriously this insight and would 
help serve the goal of professional development. For instance, it may prove just the right inquiry-based 
start for professionals approaching new content purportedly pertinent to their practice for those 
professionals to formulate clearly the questions concerning why it is important to engage with the new 
material, and to ask themselves in their peer groups why their existing way of seeing things might need 
to be changed. (In my own professional experience, questions such as these are in fact rarely asked or 
deliberated upon in actual professional learning events.) In terms of working to understand better or 
differently the relevant matters of their practice, the suggestion I am offering is that skilled and ongoing 
inquiry both about the material and about how they themselves have begun to talk about that material, 
learning professionals on their own can begin to sort out new grammars and new ways of going on. 
Further, through the linguistic activities initiated by skilled and thoroughgoing inquiries, learning 
professional can begin to make familiar to themselves the new places and paths between those places, 
by active participation and repetition and practice. (“We talk, we utter words, and only later get a 
picture of their life.” PI, II, p. 209) Thus through practice with the language-games of inquiry, learning 
professionals can at least begin to find some ways to navigate through the predicament of the 
professional learning paradox. (Again, while these suggestions have a strong empirical component – e.g., 
whether in fact such better-developed skills actually do make a difference – all the same they emerge 
                                                          
137 Or at least to increase professionals’ ease and familiarity with the practice. With the potential ‘intimacy’ can 
also come potential risk, and in my own experience with professional groups in learning initiatives, the risk is all 
that they can see in question-asking.  
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from the application of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, and can be considered as part 
of the picture of professional learning I am developing.) 
In terms of building skills in inquiry, I suggest, like Schön, that the emphasis be on doing, on example, 
practice, and training. Again we trespass onto empirical ground here, but my suggestions is that these 
kinds of learning sessions need consist of something other than transparently-didactic lessons in 
question-asking (viz., telling learners how to ask questions) if they are to be effective and have the 
desired effects on continued professional learning. The picture as I see it has it that such occasions need 
to focus in other ways on showing how to ask and work with questions that are productive of 
advancement in knowing how to go on in relevant ways, and in practicing these ways of doing things. It 
is of a piece of the growing autonomy of the professionals in question – and respect for that autonomy – 
that professional learning and growth happen in the terms of the emergent questions of practice asked 
by the learning professionals themselves.138 
All of this leads me to make a political point. An organizational culture that values and supports the 
ability of its professional members to ask better and better questions, and to handle in more and more 
sophisticated way the questions that are asked, stands at least at an advantage in facing the 
professional learning paradox. The main point I am making is that there will be no emergent questions 
of practice, or at best ill-considered ones, if the practice of inquiry is not encouraged, supported, and 
intentionally developed. In part, this speaks to the nature of an institution’s attitude towards its 
professional staff, whether it is in terms of respect for experts with appropriate ranges of autonomy, or 
in terms of its professionals as functionaries fulfilling tightly-constrained and designated programs of 
intervention and monitoring. 
These pedagogical concerns surrounding the issue and response to the professional learning paradox 
highlight the important need to respect the talk of professionals, to find it worth attention and 
                                                          
138 Certainly the importance and role of inquiry is a significant topic in the education literature – see, for example, 
Bereiter and Scardamalia (1993); Argyris (1976, 1982, 1986, 1989); Smith (1982); and see the concept map (Figure 
1.1) of learning in Novak and Gowin’s (1984/2002) book on learning how to learn. See as well the literature on 
more inquiry-focused pedagogical theory: for example, Hmelo-Silver and Barrows (2008); Blanchard et al (2009); 
Oliveira (2010); and the work of van Zee, Minstrell, and Schoenfeld, who provide multiple analyses of discourse in 
learning sessions, with an emphasis on the kinds of questions with which session participants work (e.g., van Zee & 
Minstrell, 1997a; van Zee & Minstrell, 1997b; Minstrell, 1999; Schoenfeld et al, 1999; van Zee, 2000, van Zee et al, 
2001). See as well the work of Haroutunian-Gordon (1991, 2009), who emphasizes for learning the development of 
skill in asking different kinds of questions, particularly interpretive questions. Finally, the tradition of problem-
based learning certainly falls within the notion of practicing skill in move-making in the language-games of inquiry: 
see for example Barrows (1996). 
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resources, and to take an interest in the talk of professionals as being at the core of their evolving 
expertise. Even in the case of professions in which material practice is important, there is still great 
importance given over to talk in learning situations (e.g., see Schön’s examples of coaching and learning 
in a design studio (1983, pp. 76-104; 1987, pp. 44-118), or the talk involved in the learning work of a 
master musician (1987, pp. 175-216); see also Douglas Harper’s (1987) wonderful study of a skilled – and 
articulate - mechanic). An organization must value the talk of its professionals, if it is to be concerned 
with their evolution as experts, and must devote resources to learning initiatives and environments that 
have their focus on the talk of professionals (as opposed simply to the delivery of programs or the 
circulation/management of information). I suggest that following the application of Wittgenstein’s 
picture of language and meaning allows for a case to be built in this regard. 
We can extend a bit further the talk here concerning the political implications of these pictures of 
language, meaning, and learning that I have been sketching, to consider the basic idea of political 
activation through expanding connexions between signs (i.e., through an expanding mastery of signs’ 
grammars). The general outline of this picture would look something like the following. We can talk of 
control over a professional group being achieved in part by constraining what the members of the group 
can talk about, and thus what they can legitimately ‘see’ as professionals. Finding ways to limit 
connexions and the opportunities to build connexions (i.e., through professional learning initiatives or 
environments), and keeping ‘acceptable’ connexions contained only within a very restricted area (of 
legally-allowed or profitable practice, for instance), we can say, are ways to exercise control over a 
group of professionals. Expanding the group’s hold on various connexions, on the other hand, and 
developing the group’s skills in various kinds of move-making, is a risk to an organization’s control over 
its professionals and its power to govern and guide practice. Schön’s distinction between ‘Technical 
Rationality’ and the artistic freedom of the reflective practitioner can be seen in this light as well.139 The 
practicing professional working only within the constraints set by the relevant machinations of Technical 
                                                          
139 And to which we can also connect Bereiter & Scardamalia’s notion of the expert constantly and progressively 
reinvesting in their own learning and development; we can connect these ideas  as well to Argyris’ interest in the 
reflexivity of ‘double-loop learning,’ which he takes as critically important for the possibility of significant 
professional learning and development. As is well understood, there is a powerful connection between education 
and the ways in which power gets manifested, and the case here with professional learning I should say is no 
different in this regard. This is largely the point of Freire’s work, for instance, and is emergent in many thinkers’ 
work, from Plato through to Marx and beyond. It is certainly a basic lesson any good propagandist understands. In 
connection to all of this, it is also perhaps instructive here to reflect back upon some of the discussion considered 
in the educators’ learning sessions in Chapter 5, in particular recalling what seemed to be a powerful connexion 
between those participants’ talk of the nature of anger and the signs and concepts of professional limits and (legal) 
responsibility. 
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Rationality has little free play or responsibility for the growth of their own understanding and approach 
to the problems of their practice. Professionals in these kinds of working environments are typically 
unable to do much beyond following more-or-less rigid protocols and programs which originate in 
external authoritative sources and are designated as the principle or only modes of practice behaviour. 
The work of Clandinin & Connelly is relevant in this regard as well; they canvas these matters in terms of 
the split working personality of the professional. To look ahead, we can continue in this vein by 
reflecting upon some of the discussion considered in the educators’ learning sessions in the next chapter 
(i.e., Chapter 5); there, as we will see, participants in professional learning sessions were reluctant to go 
very far at all in some of their discussions, citing various limits in their roles as professional educators. 
Does this show, in such cases, the connexions between those participants’ talk concerning human 
development with the signs and concepts of professional limits and (legal) responsibility?140 Here we 
return to talk of how organization and professionals understand each other, and in what terms (i.e., 
signs, concepts) they talk about each other (with an ‘organization’ represented not only by 
administrators, bureaucrats, boards of directors, investors, etc., but also by formal discursive objects 
such as mandates, organizational vision statements, codes of ethics and behavior, etc.). 
Let me leave the political and return to the paradox of professional learning. For despite my enthusiasm 
for the potential rewards for learning professionals from enhancing move-making skills in the language-
games of inquiry, I still see two main problems here. The main thrust of my suggestion has been that 
one kind of training can make possible or open us up to other kinds of training, i.e., knowing how to play 
well different language-games of inquiry makes possible more productive attempts to take on 
substantive content (e.g., the grammars of constructs from developmental science, and the pathways 
between the places marked out by those grammars – see Chapter 5 for the case of educators’ 
professional peer group learning). However, it strikes me first that attempting to learn language-games 
of inquiry replicates one of the main problems inherent in the learning paradox, that is, the learners of 
these techniques in turn still require interaction with a suitable coach/master/adept in order to learn 
                                                          
140 How do we consider this kind of thing? Are we describing a picture, around which these learning participants 
organized their talk? Are we describing rather a kind of conflict, or at least an opposition, between different kinds 
of language-games? Is this more a matter of the grammar of certain of the signs that these speakers were using, 
viz., in the orbit of the sign “human development” for these professionals are there powerful connexions to signs 
of “professional limits/responsibility” and “administrative oversight”? Or is something deeper, more 
‘foundational,’ in a sense, at work here, such as certain bedrock propositions, beliefs, or practices? For my own 
part, and on the basis of my own experience, I find that the course of professional learning rarely has to do with 
bedrock, and is far more about signs’ meanings, how to manoeuvre between signs, and pictures that guide or 
‘captivate’ us – though not in the sense of pictures that more fundamentally “lay in our language” (see PI §115).  
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how to do inquiry well, to be drawn into this set of practices, to develop mastery in these techniques. 
That advantage here, of course, that, as adult speakers, the learning professionals will have attained to 
some mastery of the language-games of inquiry, unlike the situation of facing a new subject matter 
concerning which one has had little or no experience at all. In both cases, however, where there is some 
experience of the relevant grammars or some mastery in the move-making skills of the relevant 
language-games, these may instead prove as such to be more detrimental than helpful in the short run, 
maintaining learners on wayward tracks or paths, as it were, and keeping them away from more 
‘correct’ ways of going on (and ‘correct’ as set out by the practices of adepts nearer the core of the 
relevant communities of practice). Supporting learners to break free from the constraints or captivity of 
their familiar ways of going on may precisely require the intervention of an expert coach, who can see 
what the learner cannot. 
Second, even when the techniques of inquiry are mastered, the learning paradox will still apply in those 
cases of learners trying to learn new, substantial content. No matter how well one asks and deals with 
questions in general, one is still faced with both the Meno and Theaetetus versions of the learning 
paradox when trying to find and adapt to the grammar of the signs of the new content material. A good 
example of this difficulty can be found in a special issue of the journal, Discourse Processes (1999), in 
which various contributors focus on analyzing from different perspectives one long transcript concerning 
medical students’ discussion in their problem-based learning session.141 The students in this discussion 
ask a considerable number of questions, and there is considerable interaction between them as they 
consider the questions and responses they proffer to one another. But it is clear from the transcript that 
the course of their learning was still very much dependent on the minimal but expert intervention of 
their tutor, who helped the students identify good questions and promising lines of inquiry/discussion. 
(Note, of course, that in the basic problem-based learning paradigm, the instructor, tutor, or facilitator 
must operate in a subtle way, participating in the discussion but neither formulating in clear terms the 
questions needed to be asked nor providing answers to the questions formulated by the students (e.g., 
see Barrows, 1996). As Roth (1998) has commented (though with regard to younger grade-school 
students): “On the basis of my data, the claim that good question techniques require a great deal of 
competence in the discursive practices of the subject matter domain appears justified” (p. 194). I revert 
here as well both to Smeyers’ (1998) remark that, “he looks for the underlying problem, the right 
                                                          
141 Discourse Processes, 27(2), 1999. The entire transcript in question can be found in Koschman (1999), pp. 110-
117. Eight different papers analyzing this transcript and commenting on each other’s papers comprise this special 
issue. 
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question to ask” (p. 294). This also echoes Schön’s interest in the issues of the proper framing of the 
problems of practice, which occurs largely through the ‘artistic performance’ of the professional (e.g., 
see 1983, pp. 62-63, 165-166). 
At the same time I do not want to diminish the possibilities and promise of increased mastery of inquiry 
techniques. Apart from bowing down to the exigent need of the learning situation and (as per Schön) 
offering and running expert coached sessions, or affording opportunities as close to this as possible (e.g., 
perhaps through extensive ‘train the trainer’ programs), it strikes me that enhancing inquiry move-
making skills as much as is feasible seems the best route forward in confronting the professional 
learning paradox. Indeed, the very nature of the professional learning paradox as I have described it 
makes inevitable the search for these kinds of directions, focusing on the self-directedness and 
capacities of the professional individuals and peer groups themselves. In this regard, then, I remain 
optimistic (or at least fight against pessimism), that discursive techniques exist that, robustly 
provisioned by the relevant institutions, can go a long way to serve professional learning outside of the 
kinds of reflective practicums favoured by Schön as the ideal. This in turn brings us back to the political, 
viz., that affording learning spaces and resources appropriate to the autonomous and self-directed 
learning of professionals, is part of the regard and value those institutions have for both the ongoing 
evolution of professional expertise and practice and for the professionals themselves, that is, how each 
side talks about and sees the other. 
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Chapter Five 
The Application of Wittgenstein’s Picture of Language and Meaning to Talk about 
Professionals Learning Something New – The Case of Educators Learning in Peer Groups 
 
5.1  Preamble 
In this chapter I consider the dialogue and interactions of professionals as took place in a qualitative 
study I conducted on educators’ professional learning sessions, sessions which were set up and run by 
the educators themselves in order to learn about the developmental construct of self-regulation. I do so 
in the terms of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning and the picture of professional learning I 
have been sketching on that basis. In other words, I am looking exclusively at how these professionals 
learn how to talk meaningfully. This study was one of many parts of an ongoing collaborative initiative 
involving Dr. Stuart Shanker’s MEHRIT Centre at York University, the Canadian Self-Regulation Initiative 
in Vancouver, B.C. (http://www.self-regulation.ca/), Pearson Canada Publishers, and various other 
organizations, groups, and individuals across Canada and internationally. I will say more about this study 
in a moment, and will provide some basic background about self-regulation. First I will draw together 
again the approach to considering professional learning that I have been fashioning. 
So far in this thesis I have done the work distinguishing Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning 
from representationalist and cognitivist accounts. We do not look for hidden beliefs, thoughts, 
representations, or processes of thinking; rather we look simply to how speakers use signs. The basic 
idea I develop here is that the learning of professionals can be seen – usefully and fruitfully – in the light 
of the picture of evolving mastery of the use of signs, i.e., of gaining more and/or different places to 
reach for; a picture, in other words, drawn on the plane of meaning. The work done in professional 
learning initiatives, then, is seen in the light of this perspective, of finding and employing pedagogical 
techniques and approaches that afford learners (1) more of the right places to go, (2) that develop and 
sharpen learners’ abilities and skills in moving between places, and (3) that train or initiate learners into 
new language-games, if what are deemed relevant language-games are indeed missing from learners’ 
repertoires and need to be played. We learn how to use a sign in learning what places we can go with it 
(which is meaning) and in playing language-games that move us between these places. This is a way to 
look at what professional learners do in their learning, a way guided by Wittgenstein’s picture of 
language. In this chapter, then, I begin to work out in direct terms how an application of Wittgenstein’s 
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picture of language and meaning would go in considering an actual instance of professional learning 
(i.e., through the narratives of small groups of professionals’ recorded discussions in their learning 
sessions). Application in this manner is projection, and the issues are whether this picture of 
professional learning remains consistent with what Wittgenstein says about language and meaning, as 
well as how much is illuminated and brought into new light about professional learning by such 
application. This movement from picture to picture is the key piece of my thesis; it explains in part why 
little of the material from those who have endeavoured to use Wittgenstein’s ideas to think about 
education find a place here in my project. As I pointed out in my literature review in Section 3.3, while 
there has indeed been important work done in various areas of Wittgenstein-inspired thinking about 
education (e.g., concerning the nature and emergence of normativity in language), nothing has been 
done which works from Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning to a picture (and its application) 
of professional learning. This is the contribution that this thesis makes.  
For anyone reflecting upon instances of professional learning, this picture of learning affords possibilities 
for making inferences about what places learners do have to go, from the observation of the places that 
participants do in fact actually reach for in their talk. Thus it is important to make a prime focus in 
educational research the close observation and examination of the ongoing talk of learners. The places 
speakers reach for in their talk shows how they see the world, i.e., shows what aspects they do see. In 
such educational contexts, comparing what learners actually say with how experts and adepts (or 
authoritative documents) talk about the matter in question, we thereby not only obtain a means to 
judge the ‘correctness’ or ‘meaningfulness’ of learners use of relevant signs, but we can also begin to 
infer differences between what aspects of things learners see with what others more versed see. I will 
return to this perspective in a moment. 
I reiterate my emphasis on the picture of the language-game and move-making over the picture of rules 
(as was emphasized by Berducci and Chaliès et al, for example) in the picture of professional learning 
that I am drawing and applying here. Recall that in playing an actual game of hockey, for instance, each 
move made by a player is not itself a product of following a rule, but is framed by rules, i.e., the rules of 
the game within which an indeterminate multiplicity of actual, specific moves is possible. Each particular 
move made is understandable insofar as it is framed by those rules, by the evolving life of the game, and 
in a particular game by the moves that preceded and follow that specific move. In a similar way, what 
one actually says in a moment of a professional learning discussion is not the product of following a rule 
but is made and is understandable within a frame of (1) rules of particular language-games (e.g., how we 
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ask certain kinds of questions, offer descriptions, rebut objections, proffer explanations), (2) the 
connexions between signs, and (3) the moves that are actually made in this discussion. For example, a 
species of answer concerning ‘resilience’ or ‘grit’ (to return to the example in Chapter 3), is what 
meaningfully follows a question concerning “navigation through significant threat,” given the 
appropriate contexts; an indeterminate number of moves not in accord with such connexions would be 
illegitimate moves in the context of the game played in such a discussion, and thus would be 
meaningless, or at least call for a variety of reparative moves. Nothing legislates absolutely particular 
utterances and responses in a moment of professional learning dialogue, but these are still contained 
within the relevant rules – viz., this is one way amongst many in which to play this game within this set 
of circumstances. 
A further angle of the perspective this picture of language and meaning gives us here is on the 
importance in professional learning of the self-awareness of one’s talk, such as would concern one’s talk 
about one’s own talk.142 Self-reaction, then, i.e., reaction to one’s own talk, is an important part of the 
attention given to reaction that I have been stressing (see Chapter 3).143 Being aware of your own 
performance in the form of reacting to and talking about your own performance (which is itself a 
performance in talk as well), gains its importance precisely from the perspective on language and 
meaning being offered up to us by Wittgenstein. Signs’ meanings emerge in the active relationship 
between persons, as they react to others’ (and to their own) varied uses of signs. Key questions that 
would help orient individuals’ or groups’ performances in learning might be: “How are we talking about 
the relevant things?”, and, “how do we want to be talking about the relevant things?” Learners 
responding to both these questions in the context of their professional learning may benefit from 
interaction with outsiders, ideally with expert outsiders if none already participate in the group, though 
this is not necessary. As seen in Chapter 4, however, this is what can lead us into the professional 
                                                          
142 I take it that this is one way to talk about a central methodological theme in Wittgenstein’s work, i.e., that we 
proceed and resolve – and dissolve – difficulties and obscurities through talk about our talk. Philosophically this is 
the concern of the grammatical investigation (e.g., see PI §§120-122, 132-134), but at least the basic ethos of that 
approach holds as well for more quotidian concerns, such as how professionals talk about the things they are 
trying to learn, as in the kind of case before us now. “One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at 
its use and learn from that” (PI §340). 
143 For example, as Wittgenstein says, “But how do I know that your mind catches hold of the same object as mine? 
Well, for instance by the very way you react to my command, e.g., “Copy the colour”. But in this case, you will say, 
we can only recognize what is essential to his reaction by having him copy more and more colours. Presumably this 
means that after a few such reactions I will be able to see others in advance; and this I explain by saying: Now I 
know “what” he is actually copying.”(RPP I §298) 
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learning paradox, which as I argued is a source of difficulty impeding the possibility of professionals’ 
learning. 
Given the application of the picture of having places to go (i.e., to the use and grammar of signs), and to 
place-finding and move-making as fundamental to language and meaning, can a more perspicuous view, 
as it were, be obtained about the activity that takes place in actual, particular, learning situations? What 
seems important in Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning is focus of attention on the 
sequences of moves being made by participants in their learning endeavours; indeed, without knowing 
how participants move from place to place one will know little of either their understanding or their 
learning, i.e., because just those moves are their understanding. These understandings can, as we turn 
to the practicalities of professionals’ learning, serve as basis in some forms of adjudication concerning 
how participants can materially go on in their learning of the relevant matters. It is from this stance or 
perspective of learning participants’ developing mastery of signs that we talk about participants’ 
understanding and ongoing developing mastery of the relevant subject matters. From this vantage point 
we observe and talk about participants’ range of employment of various signs in various language-
games in their learning efforts (e.g., language-games of asking, describing, telling stories, rehearsing, 
explaining, contesting, negating). It is from the perspective afforded by this stance that these features of 
talk can be brought out into stronger focus, which in turn can serve to open up possibilities for new 
ways of going on in how we together as professionals learn. 
Let me return to one part of Wittgenstein’s picture of language, i.e., seeing aspects, as a further preface 
here to my application of Wittgenstein’s picture of language to develop a picture of professional 
learning. The relationship between talking, experiencing, doing, and, in particular, to ‘talking 
meaningfully’ as knowing how to go on in the right ways, is a tight one. Despite certain distinctions 
between these signs in our common use of them, Wittgenstein sketches that relation in quite a different 
way, stimulated in part by the challenge of the puzzling phenomena of the “dawning of an aspect” and 
“changes in aspect” he struggles to understand in Part II of the Investigations (see particularly Section 
xi). For example, in this regard Wittgenstein says: 
In the triangle I can see now this as apex, that as base – now this as apex, that as base. – Clearly 
the words “Now I am seeing this as the apex” cannot so far mean anything to a learner who has 
only just met the concepts of apex, base, and so on. – But I do not mean this as an empirical 
proposition. / “Now he’s seeing it like this”, “now like that” would only be said of someone 
capable of making certain applications of the figure quite freely. / The substratum of this 
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experience is the mastery of a technique. / But how queer for this to be the logical condition of 
someone’s having such-and-such an experience! After all, you don’t say that one only ‘has 
toothache’ if one is capable of doing such-and-such. – From this it follows that we cannot be 
dealing with the same concept of experience here. It is a different though related concept. / It is 
only if someone can do, has learnt, is master of, such-and-such, that it makes sense to say he 
has had this experience. / And if this sounds crazy, you need to reflect that the concept of seeing 
is modified here. … / We talk, we utter words, and only later get a picture of their life. (PI, II, pp. 
208-209) 
So we can say that we have experiences of this-or-that kind or aspect only insofar as we have mastered 
in this or that way the use of relevant signs/concepts, viz., that we already know how to go on in the 
right ways. In Wittgenstein’s picture, to say that mastery of a technique is had is grammatically required 
to also be able to say that one experiences – or can experience – a this-or-that of some particular kind 
(viz., one has to learn how to use the word “dog” in order to be able to experience dogs).144 As 
Wittgenstein says, “grammar tells what kind of an object anything is” (PI §373 – and see again Cavell, 
1979, p. 185, on this matter, i.e., to know the meaning of a word is to know what that thing is). All of this 
has powerful ramifications for my account of professional learning. For one thing, only those who have 
mastered the requisite techniques can judge of others and be able to join in on agreement in the 
judgment of knowledgeable others, e.g., that some learner has experience of this-or-that kind. How one 
talks about the world is how one sees the world; and how one sees the world a matter of the way of 
talking, of ‘going on,’ into which one has been somehow initiated, drawn, or brought, i.e., into using 
particular signs in particular ways. Thus, to look ahead in this chapter to my discussion of the case of 
                                                          
144 I find introducing the notion of ‘technique’ here to be somewhat tricky. Understanding the meaning of a sign is 
given fully in how we use that sign, i.e., through the various techniques we employ in using that sign. But to say 
that “our assimilation of [a] word as the bearer of a specific technique,” as Stephen Mulhall (2001, p. 257) does, is 
a picture of things that I find confusing. (And it is a puzzling phrasing that Wittgenstein himself uses – see, for 
example, the critical comment from the Investigations: “To understand a sentence means to understand a 
language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique” (PI §199).) We can use the ‘same’ word or 
sign in many different ways, i.e., through many different language-games in many different situations and in 
accord with the range of the grammar of that word or sign. Our ability to use this word or sign is either shown 
through a mastery of many different techniques – which may be employed for other words or signs as well – or it is 
a global, complex technique encompassing many different kinds of linguistic actions. For example, what could be 
the ‘specific technique’ that the word “ball” bears, or what technique the word “thinking” would bear, a word 
which Wittgenstein calls a “fluid concept” (e.g., see PG §65) and a “widely ramified concept” (e.g., see Z §110)? At 
the same time, Wittgenstein does speak of technique in using words, though I do not think he tightly links a 
specific technique to a specific word. For example, see: “For he must say that spontaneously [i.e., the utterance, 
“That looks red”] once he has learnt what “red” means, i.e., has learnt the technique of using the word” (RPP I 
§326; see Z §418). 
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educational professionals learning about self-regulation, we can say something like the following. One 
person sees someone (e.g., a student) running out of energy and in need of some form of recovery 
insofar as that person can and does talk about this in that way; another person in the ‘same’ situation 
sees that student misbehaving and in need of corrective discipline insofar as they can and do talk about 
this in that (different) way.145 
This notion of seeing aspects also holds for observers of professional learners and their learning 
activities, who as well see the world in terms of how they can talk about it. Observers see the world of 
learning and learners in a certain way, by virtue of how they have been trained to talk about such 
relevant matters. If, for example, observers they have been trained in talk connected to Wittgenstein’s 
picture of language and meaning, they see and can go on to talk about such things in the terms of 
language-games, following rules, and grammars, of places and paths between places, etc. If, on the 
other hand, they have been trained to talk in Positivistic, cognitivist terms, they talk of, see, and look for 
representations, computational mechanisms, contents, beliefs and desires, etc., and find meaningless 
talk of “language-games,” etc., in describing and explaining professional learning. Given this tableau of 
powerfully differing aspects, one can imagine how various practical problems – of communication, for 
example – might begin to emerge. However, this is an area in which one can also begin to apply 
Wittgenstein’s picture of ‘change in aspect’ to potentially practical effect (e.g., in being able to talk in 
the terms of both perspectives, one potentially gains the capacity to maneuver to better effect between 
the two in appropriate circumstances).146  
                                                          
145 But this is difficult and complicated. The work of the eyes and hands in a professional artist’s drawing, for 
instance, may show what is understood to those who already know how to look. Indeed, one may never have 
words in such cases that do more than gesture loosely at what one can do with one’s hands – though one’s basic 
judgments, barely articulate, can show how one understands what one stands in front of. What it is that one 
experiences, then, lies in wait for expression, though there is a mutuality here that is difficult to articulate. We 
experience as familiar certain ways of going on, but can be blind to other ways of going on. The process of 
professional learning can be the process of opening eyes to other paths and to making the experience of these 
ways familiar. At any rate, these points deserve far more extensive and separate treatment, and many 
counterexamples need be dealt with. However, for the purposes of this thesis topic, we continue without engaging 
much more with these particular issues. 
146 Of course Wittgenstein does not talk this way in his discussion of ‘seeing aspects’ and ‘change in aspect,’ i.e., in 
terms of potentially practical effects. The suggestion of the argument here – and I will go no further here with this 
– is that talking in certain ways and seeing different aspects might help serve as an ability to bridge differences in 
view in cases of working through analyses (etc.) of professional learning situations. Wittgenstein says: “I am shewn 
the duck-rabbit [i.e., Jastrow’s optical illusion – see PI, p. 194] and asked what it is; I may say “It’s a duck-rabbit”. 
But I may also react to the question quite differently. – The answer that it is a duck-rabbit is again the report of a 
perception; the answer “Now it’s a rabbit” is not. Had I replied “It’s a rabbit”, the ambiguity would have escaped 
me, and I should have been reporting my perception” (PI, p. 195); “If you search in a figure (1) for another figure 
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In terms of how participants intercede in their own learning discussions, recall Smeyers’ (1998) remark 
on Wittgenstein’s philosophical methodology: “He looks for the underlying problem, the right question 
to ask” (p. 294). In the context of a professional learning session discussion, then, such a well-delivered 
question or comment may serve to put into question a path and a connexion someone follows, and be 
what opens up the possibility of other paths and connections (see Chapter 4). Here we do often ask for 
reasons, for warrant, or for robust or rich descriptions (and how ‘robust’ the descriptions are or can be 
will tell a lot about the places a learner can go), etc. In accord with the perspective of Wittgenstein’s 
picture of language and meaning, such descriptions of learning interactions and the careful looking at 
what learners do and say, are what are fundamentally important in reflecting on learners’ process, 
whether that reflection is done by the learning group itself as a whole, by an individual professional on 
their own, or by an expert coach or facilitator working with the group to support its learning efforts. 
(Note that I am not so much concerned in this thesis with the nature and role of actual facilitation and 
facilitators as played out in real professional learning situations. See my comments on this in Chapter 6.) 
As was noted for both Schön and Wittgenstein, the reactions to and between learning participants are 
vitally important for the learning process (see Chapter 2); different ways to proceed can open up 
depending precisely on learning participants’ responses and talk with each other. Thus the importance 
of the back-and-forth in learning situations of the various language-games involved in telling and 
showing. The range of activities that comprise language-games of showing one another things is 
important for both student and teacher for the processes of learning and teaching. In contrast, a 
participant’s ‘telling’ in a learning situation, for example that they know or understand something, will 
often not be sufficient for the purposes of ongoing processes of teaching/learning. Rather, it may be 
important that the learner shows in various ways that they understand the matter in question, and 
understanding here meaning saying/doing just these various things: “Suppose I have taught somebody 
to multiply; not, however, by using an explicit general rule, but only by his seeing how I work out 
examples for him. I can then set him a new question and say: “Do the same with these two numbers as I 
did with the previous ones”” (RFM VII 4; see as well Williams, 1994, 2010, on what she calls the 
“manifestation argument,” i.e., that understanding must be public and social). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(2), and then find it, you see (1) in a new way. Not only can you give a new kind of description of it, but noticing the 
second figure was a new visual experience” (PI, p. 199). From such comments as these by Wittgenstein I would 
begin to build the argument that I am suggesting here. 
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5.2  The educator learning study: Professional learning in peer groups147 
The qualitative study itself was completed during 2014-2015, and involved four groups of educators 
from four different school boards located in South-Central Ontario.148 This was a longitudinal qualitative 
study, the focus of which was to observe the dialogue of the groups in their own natural professional 
settings. Some of the context for these natural professional settings is given through the Ontario 
Ministry of Education’s promotion of what it calls “collaborative inquiry.”149 In other words, these 
meetings to learn about self-regulation were undertaken by these educators as one aspect of their own 
deliberate and self-guided ongoing professional development. In general, such collaborative inquiry 
groups are a normal part of educators’ professional life in Ontario.) The study’s three formal research 
questions were as follows: 
1. How do educators understand the construct of self-regulation? 
2. How does educators’ understanding of self-regulation change over time? 
3. How do educators explore the construct of self-regulation (i.e., what are the ways in which 
educator peer groups discuss the construct so as to learn about it)? 
A most important feature of this study was that the discussion groups were all initiated and conducted 
by the educators themselves – this was subject matter with which each group wanted to come to better 
grips, having begun to recognize the potential importance of the construct to their own professional 
practices. These collaborative inquiry sessions concerning the topic of self-regulation were all organized 
by the participants themselves largely through consensus methods. 
Groups of educators organized themselves to meet to discuss and learn about self-regulation; the target 
identified by the groups was to meet for these learning discussions 2-4 times per group. Because of 
                                                          
147 This project was approved by the York University Office of Research Ethics (Certificate #: e2014-296), and was 
approved through ethical review at each of the participating school boards. A copy of the consent form used in the 
study can be found in Appendix 1. 
148 Note that one of the educator groups managed only to meet once for a brief session (1 ½ hours) of 3-4 planned 
sessions before teacher action in the Spring 2015 forced the cancellation of the remaining sessions. Since very little 
was achieved in this group meeting beyond rehearsing the purpose of the learning sessions and planning for the 
subsequent sessions, nothing more than general information could be collected from this group. Two of the other 
groups had to give up one session each as well due to teacher action that Spring. 
149 See as background to this aspect of educators’ professional learning and development: Special Edition #16 of 
the Ontario Ministry of Education’s Capacity Building Series (September 2010), Collaborative Teacher Inquiry 
(http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/literacynumeracy/inspire/research/CBS_Collaborative_Teacher_Inquiry.pdf); and 
Special Edition #39, Capacity Building Series (September 2014), Collaborative Inquiry in Ontario: What have we 
learned and where we are now 
(http://edu.gov.on.ca/eng/literacynumeracy/inspire/research/CBS_CollaborativeInquiry.pdf).  
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teacher action that year (see footnote 4 above), one of the groups had to cancel all of their substantive 
learning sessions, and two of the groups had to cancel one session each. One of the groups which had 
scheduled two sessions was able to complete both. By the end of the study, one group had met for 
three full-day sessions, one group for two full-day sessions, and the third group for two half-day 
sessions. 
Only educators participated from the respective schools/boards, i.e., there were no outside participants, 
plus the author, who participated only minimally in the discussions. These sessions were for the most 
part lightly facilitated, and facilitated principally to keep groups to the agendas set by themselves. Those 
who might be designated ‘facilitators’ were educators from the schools/boards themselves, and 
participated in general like any of the other discussants in the sessions, sharing their narratives, asking 
and responding to questions, etc. None of the participants were represented as ‘knowledgeable’ about 
the area of self-regulation, with one noted exception being one educator who had a more official link 
with Stuart Shanker’s MEHRIT group.150 The groups ranged in size from 8 to 24 participants; and 
participants were mostly teachers, though a few others from different sections of the relevant 
school/board systems did participate as well (e.g., administrators, librarians, social workers). 
Participants were mostly from elementary schools, though a small number came from secondary 
schools as well. These meetings ran January – May 2015; all meetings were audio-recorded and then 
transcribed by the study researcher. All research ethics protocols were followed in the study; as noted, 
the study received its clearance by York University’s Research Ethics Office (October, 2014). The result 
from this study important for my work in this thesis is that recordings/transcripts of seven half-day/full-
day professional learning sessions are made available for consideration. 
The educators’ explicit and stated desire in these learning sessions was to develop their own 
understanding of the construct of ‘self-regulation’. Self-regulation has taken on pedagogical importance 
in elementary and secondary education in Ontario, with one aspect of self-regulation formally included 
as an evaluative category on report cards from kindergarten to grade 12 (see report templates at 
http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/document/forms/report/card/reportCard.html). Moreover, a concern 
with the self-regulation of students had found its way into many school board and school materials and 
                                                          
150 As far as I could tell, this latter person was also still in the early stages of learning about self-regulation, and was 
only slightly more advanced in their understanding about the topic than the other participants. However, this 
assessment is based solely on my observation of this educator’s participation in the relevant group’s discussions. 
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processes.151 The Ontario Ministry of Education, as another indicator of the importance of the construct, 
has, among other things, produced a number of important documents either focusing on self-regulation 
or including it as an important component in education.152 Many educators in these groups had 
attended one or more of Dr. Shanker’s presentations and were interested in exploring what seemed to 
them a potentially very salient component to their practice. 
The construct of self-regulation is indeed a very important and appropriate concern for any of the 
human services professions (i.e., education, health services, social work, police and legal systems, 
recreation, etc.) Self-regulation has become a construct of more general professional interest, and has 
been picked up in other organizations outside of education.153 The construct of self-regulation has been 
in use for a considerable time in many guises in the biological and developmental sciences. In common 
usage, “self-regulation” tends to be conflated with “self-control” and “will power,” and while these can 
be spoken of as aspects of self-regulation, these are only one part of the science and discourse 
concerning this feature of dynamic systems, which of course includes living organisms (e.g., see Burman 
et al, 2015 for a valuable study concerning the range of uses and understanding of “self-regulation”). 
Further, taking “self-control,” for example, as synonymous with “self-regulation” is misleading, and will 
miss the richness of the construct of self-regulation, a richness that leads to many exciting possibilities 
for action and thought. Understanding some of the exceptional richness of this construct in the case of 
human life and development, which comprises many functional levels of our life (i.e., at biological, 
neurological, emotional, cognitive, and social levels), makes possible a whole range of understandings of 
human behaviour not available in other ways of viewing ourselves (e.g., at behavioural levels, or in 
terms of folk psychological categories). From these understandings whole new ways of interaction 
between professionals and clients, and between professionals, is made possible.154 
                                                          
151 See, for example, the introductory booklet for full-day kindergarten at the Toronto District School Board 
(http://www.tdsb.on.ca/Portals/0/EarlyYears/docs/ComeLearnWithUs-KinderRegBooklet2018FINAL.pdf), or the 
materials provided on self-regulation through the Durham District School Board 
(http://www.ddsb.ca/Students/SafeSchools/Pages/Self%20Regulation/Introduction.aspx).  
152 See, for example, Research Monograph #63 (February, 2016) of the series, What Works? Research into Practice, 
titled Understanding Self-Regulation: Why Stressed Students Struggle to Learn, by Dr. David Tranter and Dr. Donald 
Kerr (http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/literacynumeracy/inspire/research/ww_struggle.html); see as well the 2013 
research brief prepared for the Ministry, Think, Feel, Act: Lessons from Research about Young Children 
(http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/childcare/ResearchBriefs.pdf). 
153 See, for example, the Canadian Foundation for Trauma Research and Education, who do self-regulation therapy 
training. 
154 Many excellent books pick up on self-regulation and ways of interaction, including Fogel (1993), Greenspan 
(1997), Greenspan & Shanker (2004), and Lillas & Turnbull (2009). 
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However, it is at the same time important to note here that the particular subject matter of interest to 
professionals in the context of their own developing expertise is incidental to the thrust of the argument 
of this thesis. Though I consider the professional learning of educators in this chapter, what I am doing 
here is developing further my sketch of a picture of professional learning applicable to any and all kinds 
of professionals, whether police officers, sports coaches, CAS workers, teachers, psychologists, 
administrators and bureaucrats, public health nurses, etc., to stay only within the sector of social 
services, broadly understood.155 Ideally the learning situations should involve professionals in learning 
about what they themselves have identified as issues or problems pertinent to their own understanding 
of their evolving expertise, and ideally as well in forums of their own choosing.156 The excitement of 
learning what is important to you, and about which you see the relevance and contribution to your own 
practice and profession, is obviously important and should be a part of how professional learning 
situations unfold.157 But these features are as well quite incidental to what I am doing. What I am 
working out here is a way to approach professional learning of any kind, on any topic, and concerning 
any professional group. As I have indicated in the early chapters of this thesis, I am developing a picture 
of professional learning giving us a perspective from which to view professional learning. The challenge 
and uniqueness in developing this picture is that it, in turn, is drawn on the basis of a picture of language 
and meaning (i.e., Wittgenstein’s picture), as an attempt to be able to say things in a more 
‘fundamental’ way about professional learning (i.e., “more ‘fundamental’” than quantitative studies, for 
example, or studies concerned with knowledge mobilization or research transfer). 
5.3  The aim of this chapter 
It is important to note again that this chapter is not about self-regulation, nor are the formal research 
questions of the original qualitative study my questions here, and nor is this chapter’s work only 
applicable to educators. Here I am interested rather in how the participants in their learning discussions 
talk about the relevant matters and how they conduct their own learning exercises, an interest I pursue 
from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning. Thus to a large extent a 
detailed understanding of self-regulation is quite secondary and incidental to the work of this thesis. 
What I am focusing on is what is shown in the group discussions in terms of the different processes of 
moves made by the learning participants, the language-games in which these moves are made, and 
                                                          
155 My own professional work experience ranges across these professional groups and beyond. 
156 Certainly the work of Bereiter and Scardamalia lends force to this point of view. See my Chapter 2. 
157 This is also a basic principle of adult learning. See, for example, the chapter on ‘Self-directed learning’ in 
Merriam, Caffarella, & Baumgartner (2007 – pp. 105-129). 
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participants’ attempts to find places to go (i.e., as constitutive of their work to understand the subject 
matter at hand). This kind of attention to what happens, and this kind of approach, holds for any group 
of professionals and for any topic that is the subject of the learning initiative. Of course, in the context of 
actual practice situations and the unfolding learning activities of a particular group of professionals 
wrestling with particular content, attention to the details of the relevant subject matter would be 
entirely salient, importantly so in considering whether and how professionals are making advances in 
the development of their mastery of the use of the relevant (new) signs, and subsequently considering 
the nature and necessity of the group’s further learning activities. However, I am here in this thesis 
project focusing more on the form of approach, so to speak, and so abstract over the (still important) 
details of whatever the subject might be, while noting again that the subject matter details will depend 
on the nature of the professionals’ expertise and the particular subject matter that is of interest. 
Smeyers (1998) says, “careful reading in this way [i.e., of Wittgenstein on his philosophical approach] 
would not lead to the development of theoretical views, or any such thing, but it would change the 
researcher: the world would come to be looked at differently” (p. 305). Applying Wittgenstein’s picture 
of language and meaning to develop a perspective on professional learning, we then say, results in the 
heightened sensitivities of observer and (potentially) learners to the discursive happenings and 
processes unfolding in learning occasions, e.g., in terms having to do with the mastery of use of signs. 
One wants to be alert to those points in any learning activity in which telling does do useful work to help 
build participants’ grasp of the grammar of relevant signs, for instance, or as part of how learners find 
more places to go and in gaining familiarity with new move-making (as per, for example, PI §§525, 534, 
595-596). Similarly, close attention needs happen to the points in a learning occasion where learners 
require some place or way of moving between places to be shown, as part of the training needed to be 
able to go on in just these ways. In this way we ask: Through what language-games do the showings 
happen – e.g., through describing, explaining, questioning, speculating, dissenting, telling, doubting, and 
what are the particular contexts in which these happen? We might ask further: What do we learn about 
our picture of professional learning from observing such happenings, e.g., what might we add to our 
picture by applying it in these ways? It follows from this picture as well that attention need be paid to 
the work that practice and example do to make familiar the relevant grammars and paths and pictures. 
But practice also has corrective possibilities as learners practice talking in the presence of experts and 
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adepts.158 It can also have growth or generative possibilities as places to go become more apparent in 
the talking both amongst the learners themselves and/or with any experts, adepts, or coaches 
participating in the learning discussions/activities.159 
Following Bakhurst (2016), the conversational ideal is to bring together participants into discussion from 
different ‘sectors,’ such as practice, science, management and policy, and even art, to creatively engage 
with each other’s ways of talking about the things of interest to all, and by that means to be able to talk 
and see things in richer, fuller ways.160 Bakhurst, thinking with Michael Oakeshott, says that, 
The perspective from which the voices in the conversation of mankind are perceived to be in 
conversation is that of the learner. … Oakeshott’s vision expresses an ideal of fellowship … 
where scholars and students in many different disciplines are expected to be able to converse 
with one another. This is an ideal of academic community where everyone, scholars and 
students alike, is a learner, and there are opportunities for informed conversation between 
thinkers who occupy very different walks of academic life. (p. 9) 
At the same time, within this context of creative conversation, Bakhurst argues that there is still need to 
be initiated into the languages of the conversation. He says, 
If you lack the basic concepts in a domain, if you do not have a feel for the kind of explanation 
and argument employed there, you will not be able to learn by observation, reasoning and 
testimony, since you will not know what to look for, how to work things out for yourself, or how 
to take instruction. In such a situation, you need to be ‘initiated into’ the domain in question, so 
                                                          
158 Ideally in the presence of experts and adepts. However, as I will take pains to point out, some measure of 
corrective possibility exists in professional peer group learning, either when difference in the level of mastery is 
shared between the participants, or when recourse can usefully be had to materials produced by adepts, or 
through various techniques (or language-games) applied to participants’ conversation by the participants 
themselves, e.g., rigorous inquiry and reason-seeking, both in terms of discussion about the topic and discussion 
about their discussion of the topic. (See my brief discussion of Bakhurst in the next paragraph.) 
159 Again, it is important for me to maintain that this is a perspective from which to view these things, and to resist 
fashioning a pedagogical programme or universal approach to all professional learning situations. At most I am 
developing a picture through which, in its repeated application, important sensitivities to certain features of 
learning situations and talk are brought out, heightened, and further developed. Such possibilities are opened up 
precisely through the application of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning to whatever the specifics 
might be of each individual occasion of professional learning. This is an ethos of attending, guided by the 
reminders, hints, and sketches of language provided by Wittgenstein, but not a programmatic application of a 
general metric. 
160 In other words, to expand participants’ holds on different grammars, to develop the possibility of having more 
places to go. 
142 
 
that you ‘grasp’ the relevant concepts, ‘pick up’ the forms of thinking or ways of acting that are 
characteristic of the domain. … Prior to that [i.e., such mastery] the learning process is a matter 
of finding your way – or being led – into the domain in question, and the relation of teacher and 
learner is akin to master and apprentice. (p. 17) 
In this chapter I consider closely what groups of one kind of professional, i.e., elementary and secondary 
school educators, do and say in their efforts in self-organized, conversation-oriented, peer-groups to 
learn about a particular developmental construct. This is done principally to illustrate the ideas from 
Wittgenstein with which I am engaged. Whether they can be taken up and put to use in other 
professional settings has to be part of my own ongoing professional development, though it is my 
suggestion that they can. I will say a few things here to help orient the reader to the particular subject 
matter discussed by these groups of professionals, i.e., the subject of self-regulation; and I will say more 
about self-regulation where necessary over the course of this chapter. However I will keep such 
background information to a minimum. Again, I think there is little need to understand much about the 
particular subject to gather the thrust of my argument here, which emerges wholly from an application 
of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning. 
Essentially, the main idea is that an organism’s process of self-regulation concerns both how the 
organism manages the flows of energy within itself (see, for example, Lillas and Turnball, 2009, Chapter 
2, esp. pp. 48-72), and, in turn, how these are affected by the energy flows outside and impinging on the 
organism (e.g., light, temperature, sound). All energy flow from the environment impinging on the 
organism has some effect on the organism’s self-regulation, e.g., causing the release of various kinds of 
hormones.161 Certain energy flows, for example, are stressors, in that the organism increases activity in 
the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, thus increasing the flow of cortisol, among other 
endocrinological events, which manifests itself in anxiety and distractedness, which in turn can be signs 
of hyper-arousal.162 And so on. All of this is important for understanding the organism when it faces 
certain stresses when, at the same time, it needs to focus attention on achieving different kinds of tasks 
                                                          
161 Note that developmental scientists talk about distal (or exogenous) and proximal (or endogenous) 
environments in this regard; proximal environments can, in a certain sense, be considered to exist within the 
organism, relative to the biological structures affected (e.g., see Schmidt et al, 2009). Further, it is the notion of 
organisms-in-environments that is important here – and a flow of energy from an environment can only be said to 
impinge on an organism when the organism reacts to it, and the ‘how’ of an organism’s reactions is essentially 
what self-regulation is about. 
162 Extending this idea, all expenditures of energy by the organism can be considered stresses. E.g., see Shanker 
(2016), esp. p. 5; but cf. pp. 97-99. 
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(e.g., in the case of humans, tying one’s shoes, driving a car, talking with a friend, buying groceries at a 
store, doing a presentation in front of others, etc. – and, of course, being in learning situations). 
Individual organisms react in the particular, differentiated ways they do to energy flows/stressors for a 
great variety of reasons, both phylogenetic and ontogenetic. Thus, even quotidian or mundane things 
like the sounds emitted by the various mechanical devices or operations around us, or the quality of the 
light, the colours in the immediate environment, or the feel of the surfaces with which we are in 
contact, can serve to affect our processes and state of self-regulation. And there can be considerably 
large differences in such reactivity across any randomly assembled group of organisms/people. In 
Shanker’s (2013) examination of self-regulation, various domains of the human organism are identified 
that are involved in inter-connected ways in the organism’s constant self-regulatory activity: biological, 
emotional, cognitive, social, and pro-social domains. A stress may impair or enhance the functioning of 
various aspects of these domains, i.e., serving to up- or down-regulate an individual. Thus it is 
considered important for professionals such as educators, whose work is primarily in the engagement 
with others, to know how and why these things happen in the context of the many learning and social 
situations in schools, and it is precisely these sorts of accounts which have caught the interest of 
educators. Indeed, the different groups of educators that participated in the study used Shanker’s 
(2013) book as their main reference material, and spent time, in the discussion groups or on their own, 
reading this book.163 
A second, and different kind, of background concern is useful to note upfront, having to do with groups 
that are at the beginning or in media res of developing their understanding of the relevant signs and 
concepts.  For such groups, the ways they use the relevant signs vary from the use of those same signs 
by other groups, particularly and most substantially by groups of recognized adepts or experts in the 
relevant fields. Alternatively, in some cases the new sign gets taken up and used by learners in ways far 
more connected to their use of other signs more familiar to them, which thus entails uses by learners 
which are quite different from the uses of these signs by those considered more advanced in the 
relevant content area. In these cases the ‘new’ signs are used in the other, more familiar ways, and so 
                                                          
163 There were other, shorter documents that Shanker had written that were accessed by the different groups, for 
example a summary-type paper published through the Ontario Ministry of Education (see Shanker (2013) paper, 
“Calm, alert and happy” at http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/childcare/Shanker.pdf). As well, for those who are 
interested, Dr. Shanker’s self-regulation work continues: see https://self-reg.ca/. Notice the ‘definition’ given to 
“self-regulation” on this ‘Shanker Self-Reg®’ website: “Self-Regulation refers to how people 
manage energy expenditure, recovery and restoration in order to enhance growth. Effective self-regulation 
requires learning to recognize and respond to stress in all its many facets, positive as well as negative, hidden as 
well as overt, minor as well as traumatic or toxic“. 
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adopt the normative hold that these familiar paths possess, which may be considerable and (thus) 
resistant to change. In such cases one picture of things might also be said to contend with another. Thus 
the group of learners and the expert groups are at variance in their use of the relevant signs; they do not 
agree in their judgements about the correct use of the relevant signs, nor do they agree in such 
judgments as concern the relevant similarities and differences. This ‘conservatism’ in learners’ use of 
signs, if that’s the way to name this feature, may promote resistance in jettisoning old uses and 
associations and learning new uses for such signs. Thus it may be important that learners get initiated 
into the use and grammar of the signs by adepts or experts on an ongoing basis, and important as well 
the ongoing, deliberate practice by learners in using these signs as part of learning how to go on in the 
‘right’ ways and gaining familiarity, as per experts’ and adepts’ uses of the signs (e.g., see Smeyers & 
Burbules, 2005, pp. 341-342, on the ‘complexity’ of practicing). 
A useful example of the development of a single group’s use and familiarity with certain signs/concepts, 
and their grasp of the relevant connexions between signs can be found in a study by Judith Little (2002). 
Little describes the interactions of a group of educators meeting to discuss a new programmatic element 
being introduced and integrated into their curriculum. In Little’s examination of the dialogue of the 
group, one participant repeatedly presses a particular line of inquiry which challenges and heralds 
potential change in the group’s use of certain signs. An interesting and valuable feature of Little’s 
example is that this participant’s line of inquiry and the potential change in use and grammar is resisted 
by the group. The group wants to evaluate the new curriculum element, but discuss potential 
evaluations in terms of trying out different – and unmeasured – variations of it across their different 
classrooms. The one participant iterates throughout the discussion that such variations may pose 
methodological problems if their goal is to assess the effectiveness of the curriculum-based 
intervention. This participant with comments like the following (offering up to the group connexions 
between “doing the same thing,” “how the program works,” and “success”): 
So what I’m asking though is what we are doing if we make a decision that we’re not all going to 
do the same thing with [the new curriculum program] and how it works and us having an 
opportunity to measure about how successful the [new curriculum] program is in the unit, in the 
course? (p. 940) 
This participant’s concern is with a fairly basic methodological principle in evaluation (i.e., consistency in 
intervention delivery – e.g., see Patton, 1990), but it has no take-up in the group’s discussion; the group 
does not overtly disagree with this principle, but rather shows that they cannot go on with such signs 
145 
 
and their connexions. Their actual use of such signs as “measure success” shows a certain range of 
places they have to go from it, and one of the pathways from this phrase leads the group to talk of 
“doing different things in each classroom.” One way to look at this bit of discourse is that, on the one 
hand, it is known that relevant experts and adepts in the evaluation field talk about measurement this 
way, and that a particular, localized group of non-experts learners, such as this group of educators from 
one school in Little’s case study, talk about measurement this other way.164 Such stories concerning the 
varying uses of signs illustrate aspects of the professional learning paradox, in which a particular group 
settled on a way to use (or not use) certain important signs struggles to bring in line through their own 
efforts their ways of talking and using signs with the uses of those signs by experts residing deeper in the 
relevant communities of practice. Another lesson to draw from this example is that changing use of 
signs can be difficult. Further in this regard, Wittgenstein says: 
It is very difficult to describe paths of thought where there are already many lines of thought 
laid down, – your own or other people’s – and not to get into one of the grooves. It is difficult to 
deviate from an old line of thought just a little. (Z §349)165 
The ease or difficulty of changing ‘lines of thought’ (i.e., ‘ways of talking’), and how such lines or ways 
get changed, strikes me as largely an empirical matter. This latter concern is, I think, again tied to what 
Wittgenstein has to say about the familiarity of paths of language (as per, once more, such comments as 
PI §§525, 534). How such impasses can be overcome through different group dynamics is not my 
primary concern here, which has rather been to develop a way to talk about and see such learning 
situations. Such empirical/pedagogical matters, however, do become the concern of educators who 
make the effort to look closely at how professionals talk in their learning activities, with the expectation 
that from such efforts certain pedagogical levers and processes can be developed and implemented in 
                                                          
164 Note that Little (2002) takes up another approach to look at the dialogue of the participants in her study. 
However, this does not affect the point I am making here, of which I take Little’s case study to be an excellent 
illustration.  
165 It would be useful to be able to identify what stands as bedrock for any group of speakers. For example, socio-
political ideological differences may be so hard to bridge precisely because of what constitutes each group’s 
bedrock layer, and a bedrock layer in propositions or beliefs more substantive than “I have two hands” (OC §125) 
or that “the earth existed long before my birth” (OC §288), e.g., in such propositions as “might makes right” or 
“God speaks directly to us through our ministers’ interpretations.” If this does make sense in terms of 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning (i.e., whether these are the kind of propositions that can stand as 
bedrock propositions), and if questioning or changing these latter (potentially) bedrock propositions would have 
the kind of implications Wittgenstein suggests throughout On Certainty, then it is easy to see how fruitful 
communication, negotiation, accommodation and resolution of certain issues is impossible between positions that 
are intractable because they are set on quite different sorts of bedrock layers. However, my intuition is that 
ideology and ideological differences are better captured in terms of ‘pictures’ and their clash. 
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which change from one line of thought to another can be achieved, insofar, of course, as this is the 
desired goal. 
Let me reiterate once more what I have set out to do here. In this chapter I consider the talk of the 
educators in their learning discussion groups through the application of a picture of professional 
learning drawn from Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning. As I have tried to make clear, this 
is not an application of a template allowing for straightforward thematic or categorization work. In the 
course of this thesis project I have been thinking with Wittgenstein about language and meaning, and 
now I begin to look at the talk of professional educators in their own deliberately-engaged learning 
situations and to think about what might be going on in their performances in language from that 
meaning-oriented perspective. My contention is that to approach things in this way opens up 
possibilities for understanding that are difficult to achieve through other kinds of approaches. There is a 
kind of transparency in the approach I take on the basis of this (meaning-based) picture of professional 
learning. I consider, among other things, the nature of the (relevant) places that the participants have to 
go, and in what manner the discussants see the paths between places.166 I consider the means that 
discussants have to move between places, viz., what are the language-games they play to make moves, 
to move from place to place. Do they move from place to place through joke-telling, for example, or 
through certain kinds of question-asking, or through descriptions or story-telling? How skilled – or 
hesitant – do learning participants seem in their play of these games? How familiar are these games and 
move-making to the discussants, viz., how far do they in fact go playing the games they play? I consider 
the efforts discussants make to strengthen certain paths/connexions, and the work they exert to 
weaken others. In the first case, I look for things like their encouragement and affirmations of others’ 
locutions, their statements of agreement or approval, and their going on familiarly or fruitfully from the 
stated utterance to the next place. In the second case I look for their statements of discouragement, 
their stated and implicit disagreements with others’ locutions, their corrections of other participants, 
and their ignoring or dropping certain ways of going on that have been proffered. With the heightened 
sensitivity afforded by these pictures of language and meaning and professional learning, I look for the 
places where explanations are offered, and observe how they are offered and how they are received, 
and then what participants do in going on from them. My sensitivities in this regard are heightened 
                                                          
166 In other words, (1) what places do they have to go?; (2) how do they get from one place to another place?; and 
(3) how do they, by working together and interacting with each other, change in such ways that they get from one 
place to another place where the second place is a new place for them? 
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further by my interest in seeing where showing and where telling happen, and what the effects of these 
are, for example, in terms of the continuing flow of the discussions, in how participants then do go on. 
Through the perspective on professional learning I am developing, I focus on use, in terms of both act 
and reaction. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, for both Schön and Wittgenstein, sequences of reactions 
between participants in learning situations are a vitally important part of learning. These reactions both 
reveal understanding (inasmuch as they are understanding) and provide the basic linguistic materials for 
participants to develop their mastery of the relevant language-games, grammars, and pictures. Thus I 
consider in the talk of discussants in learning situations how a participant uses a term, then whether and 
how the group reacts to that use of the term, and then how the first participant reacts to the group’s 
reaction, and consider all of these on the plane of the use of signs. I consider how sequences of 
utterances, unprovoked or in reaction to other utterances, hang together such that in their particular 
flow and contiguity they are meaningful, i.e., by considering the moves and movements performed and 
achieved in each utterance and in sequences of utterances. And in considering that these are the paths 
they are travelling, I ask whether these are the same paths that the recognized, authoritative experts or 
adepts travel. (Thus the need for at least a basic primer on self-regulation; though, as noted, this step or 
angle is part of an investigation richer and more full than I need explore properly here.) Finally, 
throughout my close look at discussants’ talk, I have the elements of the ‘professional learning paradox’ 
in the back of my mind. How does ‘same’ look to the discussants in the absence of the authoritative 
experts or adepts, for example? If ‘same’ is, in the end, a matter of being shown in the relevant cases, 
how are the discussants being shown in appropriate or effective ways, given the peer-group setting of 
the educators’ learning sessions I consider here? 
In sum, I look at and consider these professionals’ learning discussions from what I been at pains to 
describe as the core of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning: How do these professionals find 
new places to go, and to have those places to reach for in their discussion and work? In the material that 
follows, I first consider three different examples of educator groups working to sort out on their own the 
grammar of relevant signs. I then consider a long conversation by one group as they try to work out the 
grammar of “anger” in the context of its connexions to “self-regulation”; in this section of the chapter 
the language-games of inquiry (i.e., ‘asking and responding to questions’), and perhaps as well the 
language-games of asking and giving reasons, are taken up as important aspects of professional learning. 
To end my examination of the educator learning discussions, I look carefully at a long segment of 
discussion in which group participants work to explain something, and which I examine in light of my 
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comments on ‘explaining’ and ‘showing’ in Chapter 3. I organize the sequence of these examinations in 
terms of a progression, i.e., from more or less straightforward examples of professionals considering the 
grammar of signs, to more complicated examples in which the various discussants engage in multiple 
language-games as they try to work out together how to talk about the various concepts in question. 
 
5.4  The educator professional learning sessions 
Working to get the grammar right: Making connexions and having places to go 
I turn now to consider the actual discussions that took place in the educator learning group sessions. In 
this first example, I consider how one of the participants works to sort out how to use the sign, “domain 
of self-regulation,” i.e., how they work to find and adopt the grammar of this sign.167 I consider in this 
example one discussant’s effort to locate the other places to which the term connects, as well as how 
the group interacts with this discussant such that one path is encouraged and another discouraged, both 
for the one discussant but in terms of strengthening one connexion/pathway for all. As I have been 
labouring to make clear, this is part of Wittgenstein’s method in the context of his picture of language 
and meaning, and in turn is a key part in developing a picture of professional learning. I take as one 
example of this Wittgenstein’s statement that, “Here I am stating something about the grammar of the 
word “language” by connecting it with the grammar of the word “invent”” (PG §140; PI §492). While the 
participants in these professional learning sessions are not concerned with this kind of fundamental 
topic, this characterizes how I look at what they actually do in their discussions. 
The context of the discussion sample is that two participants have just related a story about the 
interaction of several of the students in their class. In this session participants have been taking turns 
relating such stories that are of interest and/or concern to them, and the group discusses and analyzes 
each story on the basis of what they have so far been learning about self-regulation. This selection from 
the transcript begins with a question from one of the participants: 
Participant 1:  Which domains, do you think … so which ones are [relevant in] this [i.e., the 
scenario just described by the two teachers] and tell us why you think they are affected. 
[Many teachers together: saying the names of all the domains.] 
                                                          
167 The participants likely have some mastery in using “domain,” but it is the whole sign, “domain of self-
regulation,” that is at issue here. 
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Participant 2:  It’s cognitive too, because you’re teaching then and actually naming it, and 
labeling, and biological? … not so much … 
Participant 3:  I’m really just going to sit and listen, because I feel strongly that I cannot fit 
myself into a little domain, or a behaviour into a little domain.  I feel that there are so many … 
[Another teacher: Layers.] for example, I heard someone say “cognitive”, I heard someone say 
“emotional”, I heard someone say “social”, and I heard someone say “prosocial”, and I feel I, 
maybe that is where I’m at for my learning, I want to learn from you, how to make it agreeably 
sit in one camp … 
What happens here? The group decide to spend devoted time reading Shanker (2013); some 
participants have attended presentations by Dr. Shanker – thus it could be said at this point that they 
have been given the words/names of the five domains of self-regulation as identified by Shanker, 
though at this point not in much more than the guise of a ‘bare notation,’ as I have called it. As we have 
seen, words have no meaning until they have begun to be used – indeed, they are signs only in their use. 
The group now begins to find places to go with these terms (i.e., the domain names), spurred on by their 
own interest in talking about the story that has been presented in terms of the domains and to gain an 
analytic and practical grip on the story. It is interesting that many speak together, rehearsing the names 
of the domains, as perhaps confirming together that these are the signs that need to be included in their 
utterances to come. Participant 2’s attempt goes a little further in beginning to draw some connexions 
between one of the domains (i.e., “cognitive”) and other concepts (i.e., “teaching,” “naming it,” and 
“labeling”), in connection with the moments of the story that has been related. This participant 
continues, querying, by tone of voice, whether connexions to the biological domain need be attempted 
here as well. As per Schön, this is already to say a lot. It potentially provides ample place-seeking and 
tentative reachings for new places from which to begin to make other moves in a discussion that in turn 
can begin to open up different paths between various elements in the story told, on the one hand, and 
the domains of self-regulation. In the course of such discussion, some paths will get strengthened and 
others weakened, and attending to what happens to which paths is important. 
At this point Participant 3 speaks up, and in the course of their contribution makes moves in the context 
of several language-games, the most important of which (in one sense) is to push for clarity on the 
grammar of “domain of self-regulation.” The participant is asking whether the (grammatical) connexion 
is between “domain of self-regulation” and “one-to-one mapping,” i.e., that one domain only need be 
considered in talking about behaviour, or whether the connexion is rather to “many-to-one mapping,” 
i.e., that multiple domains need be considered. In other words, how do we use “domain of self-
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regulation”? Another way to look at this is that Participant 3 is requesting to be shown how “domain of 
self-regulation” can be used in the context of explaining behaviour. Their tentative reach to a place – as 
a kind of querying assertion – is that “domain of self-regulation” is being primed here for use as a single 
explanatory factor. “Is that right?”, Participant 3 seems to ask, and looks to the group for reaction. 
In the next contribution to the discussion, Participant 2 opens up the grammar, though does not close 
down on any one path, by questioning the necessity for the one-to-one explanatory mapping of 
“domain of self-regulation” to “behaviour” (which in this case connects to the specific story that has 
been shared in this group and that is the ostensible topic of discussion). In this regard, Participant 2 says, 
and is backed up by the affirmation of several other group participants: 
Participant 2:  But why does it have to? Does it have to? [Dissent from other teachers.] 
Participant 3 now responds to Participant 2 (and to the other participants) by deferring to the 
authoritative text (i.e., Shanker, 2013), setting out a little more firmly the place that is being reached for, 
i.e., that it is not a one-to-one explanatory mapping, and thus that it is correct to use “domain of self-
regulation” in the one way but not the other. It is interesting that the language-game used to move the 
discussion to here, and to move the activity to sort out the grammar of “domain of self-regulation” 
further along, was question-asking, though question-asking that was a rhetorical challenge to Participant 
3’s proposed, but contestable, pathway (i.e., one of the family of language-games one can play with 
inquiry). Here several participants in the group murmur together, “no,” which works to strengthen the 
group’s taking hold of one connexion or pathway over another. 
Participant 3:  And I don’t think Stuart Shanker is saying ‘sit in one camp’, [Other teachers: No.] 
but I’m saying that when someone says to me, “Now what domain is that?”, then I think to 
myself, I mean, is it helpful to me to know that that’s an emotional domain or a prosocial 
domain (cuz it’s so much the same)? 
However, Participant 3 in their response is still concerned with how one does use any one of the self-
regulation domain notations in beginning to form an explanatory account of such behavioural stories or 
situations. This clearly is an aspect of things that needs to be shown to them. How does one go on to say 
correct things in this regard, and how does the group know they are going in the right direction (as 
would be given by the use of these signs by relevant experts or adepts)? So what is the move made to 
establish the right place to go in this context with “domain of self-regulation”? 
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Participant 4:  Well the one thing about that situation that’s critical, is that they have to care, 
like maybe they [the students in the scenario discussed] don’t even care that [student name 
from the scenario] was upset, right? [Participant 5: And that’s empathy.] … And that’s really 
where you have to start, right? 
And Participant 4, with the help of Participant 5, makes the very interesting and promising connection to 
a new (though still implicit) sign/concept, viz., “explanatory method,” by invoking the phrase “[a place] 
where you have to start”. So, the suggestion is being made progressively here that, in talking about 
behavioural stories/situations in the terms provided for by the “domains of self-regulation,” all the 
domains are potentially to be engaged in such talk, and one way to do so is to start by talking about one 
domain and from there pull in the others. To a large degree Participant 4 is simply telling this to 
Participant 3 (and to the group), and it may be the case that, without examples to show this connection, 
the participants will still not be able to use “domain of self-regulation” in this manner. This is both a 
grammatical and an empirical point; the further learning here hinges on the group’s reaction to this 
proposed connexion. What Participant 4’s utterance does do is to open up a place for showing to 
happen, i.e., to get a place ready for showing to have any effect in the growth of the group’s grammar 
and their use of the signs. Note that Participant 5’s comment while Participant 4 is talking is potentially a 
good place for the showing to happen, i.e., as per their stated connexion to “empathy.” This is a sign 
they have been exposed to something connected to one of the domains of self-regulation (i.e., the pro-
social domain) – and it is as well a sign with grammar already familiar to the participants – and so can be 
taken up as a way to begin to talk about the story of the interacting students that began this part of the 
discussion.168 
Further, it is tempting to say that this group of educators has not yet arrived at, or become familiar with, 
the grammars of “self-regulation,” and thus neither of “domain of self-regulation,” and so, in a manner 
of speaking, these signs are meaningless. They are, in effect, asking, “what do these signs mean?” (or, 
“how can we use these signs in accordance with the social practice of those experts in the relevant 
fields?”). The absence of any relevant experts or adepts participating with them in their discussions, we 
might also say, constrains these learners in developing desired ways of talking about this construct of 
self-regulation. All the same they are not entirely bereft of supports that might aid in initiating them, at 
least to some extent, into these practices. For example, they have authoritative printed materials, there 
                                                          
168 My own impression is that “empathy” is, in fact, a word or concept whose grammar and use is uncertain to 
many people. For example, asking for the distinction between “empathy” and “sympathy” (and “pity,” etc.) almost 
always generates rich controversy. 
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are many other such resources available, and they have each other in their committed and positive 
working peer-group. Regardless, it is instructive for us to see in this instance the group beginning to 
exercise their autonomy and affirm to itself that these are certain places to go, that these are where 
connexions can be made, i.e., between “domain of self-regulation,” “single versus multiple domains,” 
and “explaining behaviour.” We see, in this very brief selection from the study transcripts, a professional 
group working with the grammar and language-games already familiar to them to try to find leads and 
openings in their discussion that could generate a deeper familiarity with the grammars of these new 
signs of interest. 
In the following second example from the group discussions, we see each participant or pair of 
participants in the session take turns describing their own classrooms, noting the very specific physical 
features of their spaces. The explicit aim of this exercise as set out by the participants is to begin to 
apply what they have been learning about self-regulation to think out together how the nature of the 
physical environment of their classroom learning spaces affects their students’ – and their own – self-
regulation. This excerpt begins with an orienting question from one of the participants who is nominally 
in charge of keeping the group to their agenda: 
Participant 1: So did you set up your room with self-reg in mind at all, any of those, of those 
pieces of things, or what were you thinking about when you guys …? 
The question is deliberate in its indicating the move from “self-regulation” to “setting up your 
[class]room.” The first part of the question might only invite a “yes-no” response, but the second part 
makes the move in the language-game of asking for reasons for doing whatever they did in arranging 
the participants’ classroom learning spaces. We can read this inquiry as asking for connexions between 
“self-regulation” and their talk about the various physical features of the environment of their 
classrooms. Certainly there is considerable enthusiasm from the first responding participant:  
Participant 2: Uh, it’s funny cuz last year we kept moving it all the time, and, like where the 
kitchen is right there, we’d have, we didn’t have the big couch last year, and we put the red 
couch there with the smaller thing in the middle, and then we moved it to this, like, we couldn’t 
really figure it out.  And this year we’ve never moved it again, it, like, just fit all of a sudden.  And 
we wanted, I went to my day care, was it this year or last year, I think it was last Spring, it came 
out that Deb Curtis, we have one of the books in our classroom, “Designs for Living [and 
Learning” (2003)], I think, she was coming to my kid’s day care and she was talking about how to 
arrange your room, and so I kind of got to see, because it was my kid’s day care, I got to see, 
like, their ‘before and after’, and they said that, like, it should be like a house, and it should 
kinda be flowing, so I think I kinda kept that in mind, so that when you walk in, you’re like 
flowing around the science area, like it’s kinda like a loop, like a living room.  And a lot of the 
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time when we’re talking, I’m like, “whoa, go to the living room, or go to the, we call it the 
“kitchen,” actually, where the sink is, like the, “it’s in the kitchen, open it on the kitchen 
counter.”  It’s kinda like a house.  And everything should be neutral, except for one or two 
colours that you see through the whole room.  That’s what we had in mind when we did that. 
As noted, I am interested simply in looking and seeing how participants in these learning discussions do 
in fact use the relevant signs. So, for example, in the case of this participant’s description and rationale 
for the way they have arranged their classroom space, one might consider the question whether they 
added any new places to go in their talk as would be indicated by explicit connexions to “self-regulation” 
or any of the related relevant signs located in their previous reading and discussions. This might be 
manifested both by the participant themselves or by other participants in their comments and reactions. 
Alternatively, saying something new for them, in these circumstances of learning new things, might be 
brought out by various lines of questions or comments in the group discussion. As in the first example 
above, the participants in this discussion group have been actually reading some of Shanker’s material 
on self-regulation, so we can say that they have been exposed to, and have available an authoritative set 
of the uses of relevant signs. Indeed, some of the group time in these sessions was devoted to reading 
some of these materials. In Shanker (2013), there is a considerable discussion of how physical 
environment can affect human beings’ self-regulatory processes (e.g., the auditory environment – see 
pp. 12-14; see also pp. 53-54 on issues of auditory processing).The issue is how the group comes to grips 
with this new grammar and begins to work with it as potentially adding new places for them to go in 
their talk. 
In the case of the brief exchange between the two participants indicated in the transcript selection 
immediately above, Participant 2’s utterances connect up to “room design” (or “room set-up”), and 
belong at least to the language-game of giving reasons for the actions taken (and can be viewed as well 
as moves made in the language-game of ‘describing’). What is interesting here is that there does not yet 
seem to be any particular connection being made between “self-regulation” and “room design,” though 
there are openings in what Participant 2 says that potentially could lead to making such connexions. For 
example, a line of inquiry concerning the kinds of effects on students from any of the features described 
in Participant 2’s narrative (e.g., the big couch and its specific location, its size and the material it is 
made of, its colour, how it is used by the students, when they use it) might serve to draw the discussant 
or group into finding new places to go in talking about physical environment and self-regulation, i.e., in 
how they begin to connect together these signs. Asking for more detailed description concerning the 
“loops” that “flow” through the classroom space, for instance, and wondering how that might make a 
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difference for students’ focus and attention or to how students feel in the classroom, might similarly 
serve to open up paths to new signs. And so on. While these strategies can be viewed as empirical (i.e., 
these are in a sense hypotheses that need to be tried out as experiments in classrooms, or imagined in 
‘virtual spaces’ in the learning session discussions (e.g., see the discussion of Schön in Chapter 2), they 
are at the same time grammatical in nature, i.e., the effect in these discussions is the beginning of paths 
being drawn between signs and, through repetition, rehearsal, and practice in the group discussions and 
elsewhere, to make these increasingly familiar pathways. 
When this participant finishes speaking there is a long (i.e., a four or five-second) pause during which no 
one speaks before Participant 1 tries to reframe their initial question, this time by introducing relevant 
content, in effect suggesting places the group might go in their talk about classroom space and self-
regulation. 
Participant 1:  I know, one of the challenges, I’m not speaking to this picture of the classroom in 
particular, but one of the things that Dr. Shanker talks a lot about, is, sort of, the visual impact, 
element, in a room, and often times, y’know, traditionally, visual clutter that’s happening in 
classrooms.  And I know sometimes, walking into early learning classrooms, like, it’s finding that 
balance between, you need stuff for kids to use and interact with, and then really looking at, 
what just sits on shelves and what’s not really used, and how do we balance that and manage 
the visual environment, right, so I don’t know if anybody has thoughts or experiences with 
intentionally looking at their room and decreasing that … 
It is interesting now to note how the different discussants carry on their dialogue in reaction to 
Participant 1’s comments. For instance, it is an important contribution to the learning dialogue that the 
word, “clutter,” now makes an appearance. This word tended to be used quite often in these educator 
learning discussions in such contexts, and in the participants’ use of it showed a grammar that included 
connexions to “mess,” “over-stimulation,” “frustration,” and perhaps other emotionally pejorative 
words. It was an easily convenient-at-hand word, if that is a way to put it, in that its grammar was 
familiar to most participants and had the kind of connexion to self-regulation that seemed ‘natural’ and 
familiar as well, i.e., playing on the connexion between “over-stimulated” and “dysregulated.” However, 
it is also interesting to see that, over the course of the different discussions, what was actually said 
about the notion of ‘clutter’ was rarely in the form of talk of reasons connecting “clutter” to any of the 
different aspects of “self-regulation” that had been discussed.169 For example, why is clutter a sign of 
                                                          
169 So while participants might ‘see’ dysregulation in a ‘cluttered’ classroom space, for instance, there appears to 
be little more they can articulate in this regard, and certainly no discussion that picks up on any of the issues noted 
below in this paragraph. So while participants may not be blind to this aspect, they are certainly myopic about it. 
155 
 
something dysregulative? What is the range of relevant connexions available here to talk that lead from 
the one sign to the other in ‘reason-giving’ language-games? Is it possible to talk about ‘different kinds 
of clutter,’ and if that is possible, do connexions between these multiple ways of talking and 
“dysregulation” apply? And so on. Let us follow how the group participants do in fact go on to connect 
up the relevant utterances. 
Another participant in the group picks up and continues the discussion on the basis of the comments by 
Participants 1 and 2, and while part of the importance of the place-making move here is masked by the 
language-game of joke-telling, something important happens all the same.  
Participant 3:  Well I did like how [Participant 2] did have that cloth overtop that shelf, because 
that reduces the visual stimulus, of seeing everything over the shelves … 
Participant 2:  The actual intention was more, ‘don’t touch those things!’ [laughter] But it works 
that way too, yeah! [Other teachers: Yeah.] 
Participant 3’s comment, in picking up on an element of Participant 1’s comments, effectively 
strengthens the process of adding a place to go in the grammar of self-regulation here for the group. 
Participant 3 brings together “visual stimulus” and “reduce” with “self-regulation” through the 
language-game of asserting ‘cause-effect’ relations.170 There are many more places to go from here – 
and the experts and adepts in the various relevant disciplines do go to those places and establish 
connexions and thus grammars of the signs in question. This line of inquiry ends here with the joke 
made by Participant 2; the conversation is then taken up by another one of the group participants, who 
switches the discussion to the topic of constant change in classroom physical arrangement over the 
course of the school year, and so the effort to explore these connexions between “clutter” and “self-
regulation” is over for the moment. But what is important here is how a salient connexion is brought out 
in the grammar of the relevant terms, and the many openings to new places it offers for future 
consideration. It is also worth considering how firmly the group took hold of this potentially new 
pathway, given Participant 2’s fairly offhand and casual reaction to Participant 3’s suggestion concerning 
visual stimulus. Further, it would be useful to consider what the audio recording of the group’s 
discussion suggests about the other teachers’ final, “Yeah!” – for example, was it ironic laughter in 
reaction to the joke made by Participant 2, or was it of a more serious nature? This would say something 
                                                          
170 Assuming that asserting a ‘cause-effect’ relationship is a language-game; it may be the case that the language-
game is simply one of ‘asserting’ which also plays upon the grammars of “cause” and “effect.” However, that the 
relation of ‘cause-effect’ gets us from one place to another strikes me as indicative of the language-game-like 
quality of the utterance. Regardless of its status, the ‘cause-effect’ locution is what Participant 3 uses to bring 
together in a path “visual stimulus,” “reduction,” and “self-regulation.” 
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about the development – or non-development – of a pathway between these signs, and which it was 
would only be a matter of how the group went on with regard to this topic and these potential 
connexions. (In other words, did playing the language-game of joke-telling facilitate the building of a 
path between those signs or not?) 
Generally important here is to attend to the back-and-forth between observation (i.e., to participants’ 
descriptions of relevant things – and to which things get talked about/described) and the various 
‘explanation-type’ language-games played (hypothesis-making, promising speculation, descriptions-in-
context-as-explanations/showings, etc.). My suggestion is that both facilitators and observers of 
professional learning discussions want to develop an ear for this; but, importantly, the 
professionals/discussants want to develop an ear for this as well themselves, in order to be more highly 
attuned to their own reactions to what each other have said, how they have said it, and the places it has 
led them. This particular excerpt from the educator understanding study is a provocative and useful 
example in this regard. How does one assess the process of this bit of a learning discussion? What work, 
in terms of new places to go, and new ways of getting from one place to another, has actually been 
done here, and what has been achieved? Making the effort to articulate these things is extremely 
important in the ongoing process of professionals’ learning. 
Further, it is interesting to observe how groups across the study attempt to confront interesting 
questions as ways to generate or open up possible connexions between relevant signs of interest.171 
What is also interesting about these conversations is what they show concerning the difficulty of 
learning or absorbing new grammars, i.e., especially in terms of the professionals finding on their own 
the new places to go or new ways of going on in the relevant matters in the absence of appropriate 
experts, adepts, coaches, or mentors. In other words, these groups are confronting the professional 
learning paradox, in both the Meno and Theaetetus versions of the paradox. All sorts of promising lines 
of (grammatical) development briefly open up, but the pressing issue is whether such lines could only 
really be properly capitalized upon through the skilled intervention of a coach or expert who has 
mastered to some degree the material of interest, i.e., someone who resides closer to the core of the 
community of practice in question. The evidence suggests that such is the case, though the body of 
                                                          
171 Again, recall that these are signs made relevant by the participants’ own stated interests. That there might be 
different kinds of resistance to participating in the kind of peer-group learning setting they had set up for 
themselves is, of course, an important question. However, it is a question for another kind of investigation. Here I 
am operating on the plane of (linguistic) meaning, engaging in as close an application as I can of Wittgenstein’s 
picture of language and meaning to situations of professional learning.  
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evidence is still fairly slender. However, it is useful to note lines of questions in these discussions that do 
not seem to emerge out of any deep measure of expertise concerning the subject of self-regulation, but 
are rather questions that simply probe for clarity in what others have said. This reinforces a suggestion 
made earlier, viz., that such abilities in the language-games of inquiry belong as a needed and natural 
component of professional training (see Chapter 4). 
Let us consider a third and final excerpt from the transcripts of the educators’ learning sessions. In this 
part of the learning dialogue, one participant describes the case of a student in their classroom in terms 
of “self-regulation,” while a second participant queries the first participant’s use of the relevant words, 
in this case “compliance” and “self-regulated/regulating.” A third participant ends this bit of the 
discussion with a play of very interesting word-work, making important statements concerning just 
these grammatical concerns. 
As background to the subject matter, note that a basic feature of self-regulation is that all organisms 
self-regulate all of the time. In any case in which one ‘environment’ (or ‘system’) is in interaction with, 
and reacting to, another ‘environment,’ both systems of necessity need to self-regulate themselves; the 
termination of self-regulatory processes means the end of the self-sustaining organization of the 
organism (or ‘systems’) in question, which in other words would entail the end of life for an organism. In 
this regard, then, ‘self-regulation’ is not a binary-type concept, viz., it cannot be the case that an 
organism can either ‘have’ self-regulation or not ‘have’ it (or be ‘self-regulating’ or not). There is no 
organism without self-regulation (e.g., see Sameroff, 2010). This we can say is part of the authoritative 
grammar of “self-regulation,” i.e., as it emerges from the talk and practice of all those near the core of 
the relevant disciplines/communities of practice. So this is an interesting sample of discussion in that the 
three discussants involved are ostensibly working out the connexions between “compliance” and “self-
regulated/regulating,” but also interesting by virtue of the discussants working out the relevant 
grammar as it concerns “self-regulation” and “binary feature” (though perhaps the participants would 
not, on this occasion, use the word, “binary,” nor might they explicitly connect the sign “feature” to 
“self-regulation”).172 Let us now turn to the excerpt from the educators’ discussion. 
                                                          
172 This is a challenging aspect of how one can talk about such learning discussions. One adopts a kind of 
shorthand, attributing the use of certain signs to learning participants that is in effect to put those words in their 
mouths. In some cases a unit of narration serves as proxy for the sign in question (i.e., ‘this particular sign is what 
they are in fact using’), and while this shorthand approach might be permissible in summary-type viewings such as 
I am performing here, all the same in fuller accounts close attention need be paid to the signs as the participants 
actually use them. If in interacting with an expert or adept in the learning session, or in post hoc reflection on what 
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Participant 1:  What is the relationship between compliance and self-regulation … [are they] 
exclusive or whether you could have both at the same time? 
Participant 2:  They were alternate points.  Somebody had made the first point, and we were 
responding to it, we were basically disagreeing with it, what the first person had said.  But I feel 
you can be compliant and not self-regulated; I have a girl in my room who is very compliant, but 
she’s not self-regulated.  And vice versa, you could have someone who is self-regulated but not 
necessarily compliant. 
As can be seen in this first segment of this excerpt from the discussion, Participant 2’s response to 
Participant 1’s inquiry – which rather pushes the grammatical issue of the possible/right connexions 
between “self-regulation” and “compliance” – shows that they see the grammar of “self-regulated” as 
involving a connection to the sign, “binary.” This gets revealed, simply enough, by Participant 2 saying 
that the student in question is “not self-regulated.” Participant 2 is also talking in such a way as to make 
the grammars of “self-regulated” and “compliance” in effect independent of each other, i.e., they say 
that (i) one can be compliant but not self-regulated and (ii) self-regulated and not compliant. In other 
words, “self-regulated” and “compliant” have little to do with each other, i.e., there is little connexion 
between these signs/concepts. In grammatical spirit, Participant 1 now asks whether Participant 2 wants 
to modify their talk about “self-regulation,” and in doing so thus raises the issue of the (possible) 
connexion of “self-regulated” to “binary” (i.e., these connexions would constitute part of the grammars 
of these signs). 
Participant 1:  Do you mean well self-regulated? 
Participant 2:  Oh, she self-regulates, but she often has meltdowns, she’ll get upset because she 
can’t find a mitt, or she’ll cry because her mitt isn’t in the right part of her back pack, or her 
library book was supposed to be handed in, or whatever, it doesn’t matter, but she’s very 
compliant, she would never, she’s very compliant. 
Here the grammar of the two words seems to be unclear for Participant 2, and is still very much being 
worked out, as this participant seems now possibly to identify in some way “self-regulated” with 
“compliant” (i.e., the student self-regulates, though with many episodes of apparent dysregulation, 
while all the same also being compliant). This way of putting things also shows a different understanding 
than shown in the above passage just uttered by Participant 2, i.e., here they seem to say that one can 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
they had said in their discussion, it was pointed out that ‘what you are talking about here is called a “binary 
account”,’ for instance, then this sort of thing certainly has a place in the ongoing learning of the professionals. For 
the purposes of this much too brief chapter, however, my hope is that the reader will permit me the use of this 
shorthand. 
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be self-regulating while at the same time being in ‘dysregulative’ states, though they don’t put it in quite 
these terms. However, it is still not clear to view what Participant 2 makes of the possible connexion 
between “self-regulated” and “compliant”; their take on the connexions seem muddier than before. In 
other words, there does not seem to be any clear, familiar path yet for Participant 2 here between these 
signs/concepts. 
At this point a third participant enters the discussion and, while still offering something of a confused 
‘grammatical-style investigation’ of the signs in question, manages to push further the issue of the 
connexion between “self-regulated” and “compliance,” but also injects several new signs for 
consideration in the grammar of these terms. 
Participant 3:  What I had said in the first point there, [teacher name] had wrote down for me, is 
we were talking about it, and I said, isn’t non-compliance just a symptom of not being self-
regulated, isn’t it a, like, and it was sort of, I don’t know, I think they’re different, very different, 
than compliance and self-regulation aren’t the same thing at all in my brain, that’s why I was 
happy to hear when the doctor173 was talking about it, because it was something I slipped in and 
out of for a while getting confused with self-control, y’know, and self-regulation.  And self-
regulation isn’t always what we, it’s not always good what the children are doing when they’re 
self-regulating, maybe they just need to self-regulate differently, they’re doing it but it’s not 
optimal for the school environment, y’know when they’re regulating they need to leave and 
come back, or whatever it is they, we hope they stay and learn.  But anyway I was just thinking 
that non-compliance is more like a symptom of not doing, um … 
In a way this is a wonderfully interesting and important contribution to the discussion, in that this 
participant makes explicit the need to get clear on how different signs/concepts connect up with each 
other (though this participant does still seem to be living with the connexion that a living organism can 
not self-regulate and still be living). Somehow, in the course of the continuing discussion (though in fact 
it doesn’t go this way174), this participant together with the group need to find a way to begin to connect 
                                                          
173 This would be Dr. Stuart Shanker, and as per Shanker (2013). 
174 In fact the conversation drifts quite quickly into a discussion of ‘free choice,’ and from there into the happy 
circumstances of having senior kindergarten students being examples for the junior kindergarten students, ending 
with comments on the importance of showing young students that “this is what school really looks like” as one of 
the responsibilities of educators. In coming to a clearer understanding of how these professionals talk about such 
matters in the context of their own self-devised learning situations, it is, of course, important to pay close 
attention to the entirety of discussions like this and how they evolve, i.e., the sequences of one utterance after 
another, one line of thought after another. Again, from the perspective I am taking up here, this would be done on 
the plane of (linguistic) meaning, that is to say, seeing how one utterance ‘has meaning’ inasmuch as it has just this 
place in the sequence of utterances. Recall again statements by Wittgenstein along the lines of signs having 
meaning only in ‘the flow or stream of life and thought’ (e.g., see Z §§135, 173). Of course, a lot of what can be 
said about how these discussions in fact evolve can be brought into view by applying other kinds of 
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“self-regulate in a different way” (as per Participant 3’s comment) to the grammar of “dysregulation,” 
partly in order to draw tighter the connexion or path between the “symptom” of “non-compliance” to 
“dysregulation,” and partly thus in order to make the space for the connexion to “dysregulated, but still 
always self-regulating.” These sorts of moves in the ongoing discussion would settle a lot and bring this 
group closer to the authoritative grammar and use of the signs by the relevant experts closer to the core 
of the various communities of practice – which, again, is the stated desire of these groups of learning 
professionals. In addition to all of this, it is important to note that Participant 3 has also added to the 
richness of this, essentially grammatical, discussion by bringing into play through their comments such 
signs/concepts as “self-control,” “symptom,” and “optimal [self-regulation] for an environment,” which 
are all important parts of the picture of self-regulation. Finding ways to take these up and connect them 
with the talk of the other signs can form some of the focus of subsequent activity in these learning 
sessions. 
Let me step back for a moment and ask how it is possible to get a view on how groups of professionals 
understand some issue. This ‘need to get a view’ applies across the board to many interested parties: 
the professionals themselves, their mentors/coaches/instructors, educational researchers, support staff, 
and organizational administrators – and there is likely a range of different purposes and desires in 
getting such views on learning and understanding. In the context of the discussion above, it is certainly 
plausible to ask participants directly – for example, by administering a questionnaire – whether self-
regulation is a binary feature (e.g., “Is it correct to say that an organism either self-regulates or does not 
self-regulate?”). This might generate one or another general response, but it is still possible that 
participants/respondents still talk about it, when they do, as if it were the other.175 I suggest that this is 
because the grammar of the relevant signs is still only loosely grasped or mastered, and the 
participants/respondents are still in mid-process finding the right places to go, and in this case, for both 
of the relevant terms. In other words, these participants are still developing their ‘know-how’ in the 
right use of these signs. Thus the questionnaire responses may bring into clearer view very little that is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
accounts/pictures or ways of talking, such as, for example, psychological-social accounts. What I am maintaining, 
on the other hand, is that much of salience to those of us interested in professional learning can be brought out 
here from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s notion of having familiar paths between signs (e.g., see PI §§525, 534, 
p. 181), and that this picture can usefully inform our talk about such learning discussions. 
175 So, for example, most respondents to the questionnaire might indicate that self-regulation is not a binary-type 
feature of organisms, while their talk about self-regulation might all the same still follow the pattern we saw above 
in the excerpt from the study transcripts. Answering close-ended questions on a formal questionnaire is one kind 
of activity, practice, or ‘know-how’; answering context-sensitive, emergent questions in an ongoing discussion 
which presses the grammar of “self-regulation” from all sorts of different angles can be quite another kind of 
activity, and one which shows something different from instrument response.  
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useful for professionals’ ongoing efforts to develop their own expertise. One of the contentions of this 
thesis is that the learning participants need to show or manifest their understanding in the activity of 
going on in the right ways (i.e., in the same ways as the relevant masters), which is much more than can 
be shown through responding to more formal instruments or data-gathering techniques. It is instructive 
in this regard to consider Williams’ (1994, 2010) discussion concerning what she terms, “the 
manifestation argument.” 
These last points lead us into the next section, which has a focus on the playing of a particular general 
kind of language-game, i.e., inquiry, in a professional learning discussion. (Which of the various 
language-games of inquiry, or “asking” (e.g., see PI §23), are being played can be best observed in the 
narrative itself.) 
The grammar of “anger,” and the language-games of ‘asking questions’ as a way to find places and 
build mastery of the use of signs 
The emotion and phenomenon of anger is important in discussions of self-regulation, especially in 
contexts of behavioural studies and concerns (e.g., see Rueda et al, 2005; Rothbart et al, 2011). With 
regard to such ‘negative’ emotions such as anger, Shanker (2013) relates the story of a school teacher 
dealing with his students’ outbursts, that “he now constantly asks himself why certain children are 
behaving in emotionally unsettled ways, or what emotional upset might be getting in the way of his 
connecting with a particular child” (p. 43). So understanding anger is important for educators, and the 
connection between anger and self-regulation is a reasonably studied one, and for which there is now 
considerable literature (e.g., see Baumeister & Heatherington, 1996; DeWall et al, 2007). I return here 
once again to Cavell’s (1979) remark: “to know how to use the word “anger” is to know what anger is. 
(“The world is my representation.”)” (p. 185). 
Anger in the self-regulation literature is usually taken as a sign that a person is (i) being subjected to 
various stressors and (ii) has entered or begun to enter a state of dysregulation (e.g., hyperarousal). In 
many cases, anger is recognized to be a ‘natural’ and appropriate response to certain kinds of 
circumstances. In other cases, however, those characterized by prolonged, ‘unreasonable,’ or 
inappropriate anger, the anger manifested is understood to be more pathological than natural, and thus 
needs to be taken as a subject for concern. The topic of the anger of students is what educators often 
turn to in their discussions about self-regulation, particularly those educators who are still in the early 
stages of learning about this construct. It is important, then, to consider what educators do and can say 
about anger and its connection to self-regulation. 
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My focus in this section is to consider the grammar of “anger” as it emerges in the discussion of one 
group’s learning session.176 I am interested in seeing what aspects of anger we can say the participants 
experience or see, and observing this through how the participants talk about anger (i.e., having the 
words – or places to go – is to be able to see those things, as I have been indicating). The language-
games of inquiry/asking-questions are also of secondary interest here; it is not clear how much the 
session’s participants would have talked about anger, and thus explored the relevant signs’ grammars, 
had there not been a line of questioning encouraging that talk. My tentative conclusion will be that 
language-games such as inquiry are important both in terms of enabling anyone so concerned to see 
what professionals can actually say about some concept, and thus to see how they understand the 
concept. It is the continued back-and-forth of question-and-answer that shows understanding in this 
case. As I pointed out in Chapter 4, there is much of process value in both asking and responding to 
questions, i.e., in the process of reacting to one another’s talk in this way. Engaging in the language-
games of inquiry allows one to look and see better how both interlocutors see the world, i.e., to see the 
nature of their mastery of the relevant grammars and use of signs. 
Let me turn now to the excerpt from the transcripts. This segment of conversation picks up just after 
one of the participants (i.e., Participant 2 below) has just finished telling a long story about an angry 
student. 
Participant 1:  So how do you understand anger?  Uh, what precedes anger, what’s anger’s 
object? 
Participant 2:  Uh, what is he angry about? Or, why is he being angry …? 
Participant 1:  What is he angry about, does one need to be angry about something? 
Participant 2:  He usually identifies afterwards, it’s often something that he wanted but couldn’t 
have, whether it’s a physical object, the teacher’s attention, the time to do what he wants, it’s 
usually when he is unable to do what he wants when he wants.  But there is usually, he often 
has a good understanding of what it is he wanted to do, and it’s, sometimes when he’s calm and 
                                                          
176 It is important to note that this thread of inquiry about to be investigated concerning the grammar of “anger” 
(and its continuation into a further group discussion about the nature of emotion) was entirely in keeping with the 
overall context of the group’s work in this session. Shanker’s (2013) Calm, alert, and learning, identifies as one of 
the domains of self-regulation the emotional domain, and his book devotes considerable space to discussing the 
basics of emotional development and the nature and role of emotions in self-regulation (e.g., see all of Chapter 2 
(pp. 22-44), and also pp. 112-117 for discussions about the development of empathy, one of the ‘moral 
sentiments’). As well, all the groups often referred to and discussed the emotional responses of students and 
others, though limiting these discussions precisely to these more ‘negative’ emotions, e.g., anger, frustration, 
anxiety. 
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is articulating it, it’s reasonable enough, like, or, or sometimes it’s unreasonable, and he knows 
it’s unreasonable, he wanted this particular book, the other student had the book, “so I got 
mad!!”, and that’s what he’ll say, ”so I’m mad!!”, and then he reacts inappropriately, and then 
he becomes angry at himself, he reacts in a way that sounds like he’s angry at himself. 
Participant 1:  Oh, so it’s a double kind of [Participant 2: Yes!] anger that you’re seeing with this 
child?  So, anger, from frustration [Participant 2: Yes!], and then anger that’s sort of reflexive, 
he’s angry at himself for being angry. 
Participant 2:  Yes! ‘I’m stupid, I’m dumb, I don’t want to live, I’m awful’. 
Participant 1:  Because he’s angry, he’s reflexive about …? 
Several participants (all at once):  That’s part of his reaction, he’s reactive … 
In this first segment of the excerpt, two participants discuss how to talk about “anger,” and in doing so 
show the places they have available to go concerning this sign/concept (and, by default, the places they 
struggle to find a way to). Participant 1 asks questions about the concept of ‘anger’ (i.e., how do we go 
on with the general word, “anger”); Participant 2’s responses are all connected with spelling out further 
details of the specific situation and circumstances of their angry student, about whom they had just 
related a narrative (i.e., the connexions being set out here lie only between “anger” and “this particular 
student”).177 For example, Participant 1 asks questions exploring possible links between “anger” and 
“objects [of anger]” – e.g., an important though unspoken question here is whether one can be angry 
but not be angry about anything specific. Neither Participant 2 – nor the group, if the group’s silence on 
this matter is to be taken as an indication of their understanding – have anywhere to go in response to 
such a question, i.e., there are no pathways between “anger” and “object [of anger]” for them yet, at 
least none that are familiar. But the question does introduce the possibility of such a pathway, and while 
it is not taken up in this excerpt, it has all the same been put on the table for future 
grammatical/learning work. 
Participant 2 continues on in their description of the particular student and the developmental arc of 
their anger, saying that (possibly) the student becomes further angry because they have been getting 
                                                          
177 In other words, that “describing a particular situation” is an acceptable way of responding to a question about 
general connexions. This is how these discussants play the language-game concerning this specific kind of inquiry, 
i.e., inquiry about general connexions. A momentary shift in the conversation to show, perhaps by analogical 
examples, how one might otherwise respond to this specific kind of question-asking might have proven effective in 
training this group of professionals how to play this kind of language-game. Certainly it is a kind of language-game 
they can play well in other contexts, and it would be an important matter to show that it can also be played in this 
context as well. This approach would shift concern away from grammar to learning how to make moves, such that 
certain elements of the relevant grammar could, in turn, be mastered. 
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angry. Participant 1 notes that this seems to be a new way of talking about anger (i.e., a kind of 
“reflexive anger”), and Participant 2 becomes excited by this new way of talking, and carries on by 
paraphrasing the angry student, attaching the kind of exclamations typical of this kind of anger. This 
seems a promising grammatical line to pick up and pursue, and its relevance and importance by several 
participants in the group affirms this. On the basis of the kind of ‘authoritative’ talk about self-regulation 
offered by Shanker’s materials (mainly Shanker, 2013 – though several members of this group have seen 
Shanker present in different forums), there are also possibilities to begin to make out paths between 
various aspects of self-regulation (e.g., self-awareness, self-image) and this new way of “anger” talk. 
How do the group’s participants pick up on this? 
Participant 2: [At same time] I don’t know, that, right?  As we tell the parent we’re not 
psychologists, we’re not, like, that’s not my training, so always being clear about that, and then, 
but we are trying to figure out what it is he’s angry at, or why is he angry.  But when he gets like 
that, if you keep telling him, “don’t talk to yourself that way, don’t say that”, or “those things 
are hurting us, we don’t want you to hurt yourself”, or, you say things like that he’s not listening 
when he’s in that state, he is not receiving those messages, he’s not processing what you’re 
saying, he’s just escalating. 
Participant 3:  Dr. Shanker did talk about that in his first session, which was an ‘aha!’ for me … 
Participant 2 does three interesting things here in their lengthy response to the proposed new way of 
talking about anger (i.e., that there is also a reflexive kind of anger). First, they follow a path of 
connexion between “understanding” and “professional limits/constraints,” which in turn will later lead 
to a thread of connexions that exist for educator groups between “understanding,” “action,” and 
“administrative responsibility/liability.” Second, this leads Participant 2 to make the move to ‘deferring 
understanding’ on the basis of their own perceived restrictions (or, perhaps more properly, to make the 
move of ‘deferring understanding’). That there is uncertainty about this move to defer inquiry and 
understanding is shown when the participant says in the same breath that “we are trying to figure out 
what it is he’s angry at, or why is he angry.” Generally, in the educators’ material practice, stating 
“professional constraints” is considered as a reasonable – and thus familiar – place to go; it is less so in 
the context of an exercise in deepening understanding, and this participant appears to recognize this. 
However, as we will see, the group takes up this general theme (i.e., the connexions between 
“understanding,” “action,” “professional constraints”) and the discussion will eventually abandon the 
relevant set of language-games that had been productive of professional learning. Finally, Participant 2 
introduces into the discussion additional elements of the grammar of “anger,” beginning to try out some 
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explicit links between “anger” and “self-regulation” in the guise of talking about “processing 
[information]” and “hyperarousal.” Again, these are not the signs actually used by participants; rather, 
Participant 2 connects “anger” and “self-regulation” to these signs’ narrative equivalents (see my 
footnote 172 above about the ‘shorthand’ I am using here). However, the hope might be that in the 
course of the ongoing discussion these signs may be proffered and used.178 Another participant enters 
the conversation at this point; such affirmations are important reactive moves, in both positive and 
negative senses, in the self-training of a professional peer group. 
Note that it is a staple of “self-regulation” talk that there is a functional hierarchy of the domains (see 
Shanker (2013), e.g., pp. 29-31, 74-76, 83-85). In this case, what is important is that the emotional 
domain is in mutual relationship with the biological domain – organically, hyperarousal functions in such 
a way as to either hamper or shut down various of the cognitive functions, such as attention and (serial) 
information processing. The connexions between all these signs/concepts start to give the kinds of 
places a group can find and have to go to in their progressive learning in how to use “self-regulation.” 
The remainder of the discussion in this excerpt leaves behind these promising efforts to forge new 
connexions and to make inroads to grammars new to the participants, while returning also to follow out 
other familiar patterns and pathways. The (possible) extremity of the anger of the student in question, 
and the stated “professional constraints” now lead the discussion along the path to “professional 
responsibility,” (appropriate) “interventions,” and “institutional liability” (again, these are largely not the 
words that are used, though their narrative equivalents are in active play). 
Participant 2:  Yes, you have to wait … But when the student is calm, he will tell you, “no, I don’t 
really want to hurt myself, and no, um, I don’t really”, but he still doesn’t really like himself, 
though, he doesn’t often, even when he’s calm … 
Participant 3:  Does he say that he doesn’t want to hurt himself, or he wouldn’t hurt himself? 
[Participant 2: He says …]  When he’s calm, would he tell you if he would actually in that state 
hurt himself? 
Participant 2:  When he’s calm, I say, ‘would you really do those things, did you mean those 
things you said?’, he’ll say, “no”.  But, to other individuals he has said that he would hurt him, he 
does, he does want to hurt himself.  When he’s calm he has said that, but he has not said that to 
me, so … 
                                                          
178 Though, in fact, they were not, at least not in the immediate discussion. It is a promising possibility, however, 
and the sort of thing that groups in their professional learning sessions can work to keep their eye on. 
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Participant 4:  Does the parent, do the parents, have a sense of where that comes from?  
[Participant 2:  Oh yeah!] Because those are pretty extreme words, so is somebody else in the 
home … regulating that way … [two participants talk at same time, obscuring Participant 4’s 
comments.] 
Participant 2:  Yeah, there’s huge … there are, well, yeah, there’s a whole, he has a whole lot 
going on.  He’s … 
Participant 4:  Cuz we have lots of kids who get angry who don’t talk about hurting themselves 
or doing something drastic … 
Participant 2:  He’s been exposed to things and that’s probably where he’s picked it up, and 
there are things that have happened that we have no awareness of, um, but he’s definitely on 
the radar for a bunch of different interventions, although I do think, like he, I don’t know, 
there’s something about him that I think, he can regulate himself, I do, I think he can … I think if 
we can stop him from going from here to here [hand motions low and then high] and he realizes 
he can be successful, um, then I really, I don’t know, I just don’t think he’s, I don’t know. 
Participant 5:  I’m wondering, if I can intervene for just one second, I’m wondering, just to be on 
the safe side of everything here, is he involved with other resources, external resources in our 
board? 
Participant 2:  We just started all of that. 
Participant 5:  Cuz I think one of the critical pieces … 
Participant 2:  … We are definitely not qualified to diagnose or to treat, we definitely have him 
on other radars. 
Participant 5: [Continues over Participant 2’s response] … Absolutely – Right, cuz I think that’s 
the one piece that, it’s kinda like when we rolled out mental health in the board [… and then 
continues on to deliver a cautionary note about teachers feeling they had become the ‘experts’ 
in that context …] 
Participants 2 and 5 talk over each other in the last phase of this excerpted discussion, interested in 
making moves to state the important issue of professional limitations. Having seen this as a possible 
road travelled by these kinds of utterances, one conclusion is that it could be important to set the 
specific context and purpose for the learning discussion more clearly, so as to switch off or minimize the 
effect on the generative conversations caused by following out these kinds of pathways, which in this 
case leads to the end of the desired learning discussion. And while other places are tentatively proffered 
here (e.g., a connexion to “parents” and “family”), the familiarity of these other paths (i.e., to 
“professional responsibility/liability”) diminishes the energy and interest in pursuing these new 
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angles.179 However, the discussion about “anger” does not end here, despite the group’s attempt to 
make the move to switch to another topic. It is Participant 1 who returns to talking about “anger,” 
asking at this point whether anger is learned, that is, asking after those connexions, and the discussion 
continues further in this vein for a short time. 
A case of explaining 
It is an interesting and curious feature of these professional learning discussions of the educator groups 
that the language-games of explaining are rarely in evidence, at least explicitly so. What the participants 
in all the groups mostly do is describe, mainly in narrations, and sometimes clarify or expand on the 
details of the descriptions and narratives. But, in total, there are hardly any moves made that might be 
characterized as belonging to the game of ‘explaining.’ 
However, one group of educators, in the last half of their third full-day session together, provoked by a 
series of questions put by one of the participants (i.e., Participant 1), begin to provide explanations for 
how they understand various relevant aspects of self-regulation. This group had spent considerable time 
talking about two different features of self-regulation (i.e., as belonging to the grammar of “self-
regulation”) – consistency, schedule, pattern, and predictability as representing one feature, and free-
choice as the other. Their talk about both of these features ostensibly emerged from their reading of 
Shanker (2013); both were taken as, in some manner, constitutive of self-regulation.180 One of the 
participants points out that these two features can be construed as contradictories of each other, and if 
that was agreed to be a tension, asks how the group could resolve that. In other words, how can the 
group explain how self-regulation can be comprised of two seemingly contradictory features, i.e., how 
                                                          
179 Again, an analysis of such dialogues on the basis of the familiarity of certain grammars and connexions over 
others is promising. I touch on this analytical angle here and there in this thesis, but don’t make it the focus of my 
efforts. Familiarity, and other associated features of Wittgenstein’s picture of language (e.g., the ‘experience of 
meaning’), it seems to me, straddle the grammatical and the psychological, and for that reason I have given these 
ideas only short shrift in this document. I acknowledge that they deserve much more thoroughgoing attention in 
the kind of investigations I perform here. I would refer the reader to such passages as PG §34; BB, pp. 127-129; PI 
§§203, 525, 534, p. 181; Z §§149, 277, 349; and so on, and would also proffer the suggestion that Wittgenstein’s 
turn to ‘familiarity’ and the discussion of the ‘experience of meaning’ in Part II of the Investigations form some of 
Wittgenstein’s attempt to work out a response to the frame problem (e.g., see Dennett, 2006; Apperly, 2011, p. 
119 for primers on the frame problem). I also identify this topic in Wittgenstein’s thought as one of the next steps 
in my overall project (see my Chapter 6). 
180 Note, however, that this group still talks about self-regulation in such a way as to lead to the notion that an 
organism can either have it or not, i.e., either be self-regulated/regulating or not self-regulated/regulating. The 
grammar of “self-regulation” is still not strongly linked to the signs, “all organisms self-regulate all the time” and 
“there are different states or conditions of self-regulation.” However, this is all very much within the ongoing 
process of their learning.  
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signs that are used as contradictories of each other can be connected together to some other sign? This 
complicated discussion is a good example of, as I put it at the beginning of this chapter, how these 
professionals learn how-to-talk-meaningfully, and this couched entirely in their developing mastery of 
the use of signs. 
Recall the discussion in Chapter 3 where I indicated that explanation can be considered solely on the 
plane of meaning, that is, in terms of grammar and as showing the places we have to go and in terms of 
the ways of getting between the relevant places. In this case, the group needs to explain how some one 
kind of thing can be comprised of the conjunction of opposing or contradictory features. There are at 
least five different general moves in which an explanation can be delivered, so there are solid 
possibilities available for the talk of participants to work fruitfully with these seemingly troublesome 
signs. 
1. Reject one of the items as a feature of self-regulation; 
2. Reject the other item as a feature of self-regulation; 
3. Reject both items as features of self-regulation; 
4. Show that the two items are such that they are not contradictories; 
5. Accept both items as contradictories, but show that there is a way for both features to 
characterize self-regulation (e.g., at different times, in different circumstances, in a hierarchical 
manner). 
In the terms I proposed in Chapter 3, (1) is done by showing that the grammar of “self-regulation” does 
not link to the grammar of “schedule/pattern”; (2) by showing that the grammar of “self-regulation” 
does not link up with the grammar of “free-choice”; (3) by showing that the grammar of “self-
regulation” links up to neither signs’ grammar; (4) that the construal of contradictoriness between 
“schedule/pattern” and “free-choice” is grammatically incorrect, and that the grammars of these two 
signs are, as we in fact use them, compatible with one another (or are at any rate nothing more than  
subcontraries, as the ‘Square of Opposition’ has it), and so the group’s current use of the signs 
“schedule/pattern” and “free-choice” needs to be adjusted; and (5) by showing that the grammars of 
“schedule/pattern” and “free-choice” link up with the grammars of other signs/concepts, such that 
these two signs can be put in the right, correct, or appropriate (grammatical) order or relationship with 
one another. 
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How does this peer group of professional educators then go on to talk in explanatory ways whether and 
how schedule/pattern and free-choice can both be important, constituting features of self-regulation? I 
start with the first response to this by participant 2 (recall that Participant 1 posed the initial questions 
about the possible conceptual/grammatical tension): 
Participant 2:  I think it’s more philosophical than developmental.  [Participant name] started off 
by telling us the story of when she was stay-at-home mom when her children were younger, and 
it gave her the flexibility to allow her kids to sleep in, to stay home if she felt they needed a 
down-day, etc.  Part of our schedule, a lot of our schedule at school is dictated by timetables, 
and that’s not always in our control and that’s sometimes frustrating.  Um, y’know, I see kids at 
play and I wish they could keep building and not have to stop for gym or for recess or for 
whatever, that’s sometimes a bit frustrating. 
Participant 2’s reaction to Participant 1’s inquiry elaborates the grammar of “schedule,” i.e., follows out 
certain pathways from “schedule,” but does not make explicit anything about the grammar of “free 
choice” such that this sign might connect in acceptable ways with that of “schedule,” nor how the 
grammars of “schedule” or “free choice” might connect with that of “self-regulation.” However, 
Participant 2 does introduce a new term into the discussion, i.e., “flexibility,” and begins to connect it up 
with such signs as “stopping students’ self-directed play.” This latter bit of talk gets picked up by the 
next participant.   
Participant 3: I have something for play, that’s someplace where the kids CAN self-regulate 
because they DO play.  We structure the day where we need to get that information to them 
and to teach them particular skills and things.  But I think that play, I think that’s something 
where they’re capable of, I think that’s one of the starting places where they can develop self-
regulation, is because that’s what kids can do, they can play. So they need to tweak that, they 
need to know how much time they can spend and focus and all that stuff, and who they can 
work with and how long they can work.  I think that’s a good starting point to do self-regulation.  
It’s kind of a natural, it’s, it’s, because they’re choosing, they have more choice, they can choose 
what they’re working on, and who they working with. 
 
Participant 3 focuses on “play” and “self-regulation” in their response, and in doing so begins to work 
out an explanation taking up the form of response 5 noted above. What Participant 3 tries to show is 
that students’ overall time at school is structured time, but that part of what is structured by educators 
as time for students is ‘time for play,’ and in the latter one can talk of “free choice.” Participant 3 
connects “play” with “choice,” and “play” with “self-regulation”; however, this latter connection is not in 
accord with the ‘authoritative’ grammar of “self-regulation.” This participant appears to be making the 
connection between “self-regulation” and words having to do with ‘what a person does on their own,’ 
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or ‘doing things on your own,’ which while interesting in terms of the progression from Participant 2’s 
explanation, is not quite an appropriate articulation concerning “self-regulation.” (Again, all organisms 
self-regulate all the time; play for young children would be one kind of activity in which they 
demonstrate aspects of the nature of their ongoing self-regulation, and this is interesting in that it is an 
environment different from scheduled class time activity.) Participant 3 in their response does not refer 
back to the problematic construal of “free choice” and “schedule/pattern” as contradictories, but does 
seem to be saying that both can be taken as constitutive of the grammar of “self-regulation” in that they 
take place at different times, or perhaps in a hierarchized, nested manner, i.e., play/free choice within 
structured time. 
Note that there is a feature of this discussion to which the group or a facilitator need attend. As 
indicated above, this excerpt is from the last hours of the third full-day learning session for this 
particular group of educators. The evidence from this segment of the transcript is not so much that 
participants remain unsure of the grammar of “self-regulation,” but rather that they have begun to 
settle on a grammar of the sign that is incorrect (as per the authoritative use of signs by experts and in 
relevant texts). Thus it is important to attend to how the practice of talk in these sessions takes place, 
and what is being practiced, as this kind of practice/training can also ingrain or make more solidly 
familiar certain ways of going on which are not in accord with the right ways to go in the relevant 
subject matter. Participant 1’s contribution looks to be an attempt to dislodge discussants from 
continuing on down certain paths regarding “self-regulation,” though so far only indirectly through 
questions that potentially lead other participants to (re)consider their talk. However, given Participant 
8’s comments which conclude this segment (see below), it is not clear that the language-game played by 
Participant 1 is having a suitably re-orienting effect (though recall, as noted above, Wittgenstein on the 
‘difficulty of changing from an old line of thought only a little’ – Z §349), nor even the effect of provoking 
the group to talk more deliberately and clearly about the paths they are on and how these fit with the 
paths followed by the available authoritative materials. 
It is also interesting that so far none of the responses to the initial general question have picked up on 
saying things about the sign, “self-regulation,” but have focused mainly on talk about young persons and 
the connection to their own use of time. 
Participant 4: Guys, I think there’s definitely a tension, and a balance, and philosophically, um, I 
see it as within, within, a very organized and scheduled, uh, thing there is freedom.  So I really 
think that there needs to be some sort of, something, set up, an organization that is part of a 
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routine that is kind of like the skeleton of the body, so to speak.  And within that, there is, there 
are lots of different people and different choices that come in to skeleton and weigh in and then 
there’s freedom within that.  Because we are in life bound by time and schedules and rules, we 
just are, we’re human beings.  And there are deadlines, and our bodies need food and water at 
certain points of the day or it doesn’t go very well.  So, that’s how I look at it in setting kids up, 
showing them what a day looks like.  I was a stay-at-home mom as well with my kids, and, ha, 
‘letting my kids sleep in’!, I think I would have encouraged them to sleep in, but they never did! 
[Laughter from others.] Yeah, they were always up, but there was freedom in that.  So now as 
they grow up if they say they need a day off of school, I say ‘knock yourself out’.  Now they will 
usually say I have way too much to do, and [inaudible].  But in the classroom, um, that’s really 
how I think there is a tension, and it’s a good tension, to, uh, to the day, with that flexibility.  I 
think they get more resilient as they have to pop in and out of things – there is an end to play, 
there is an end to lunch, for me.  But every home is different!  These are all little homes to me, 
and every personality of teachers is going to come forth, and children in the room.  Every year 
my room is going to look different, with different kids in there.181 
Participant 4 continues Participant 3’s attempt to explain how contradictory items can both be features 
of the same thing (which falls within the form of response type 5 noted above), while at the same time 
explicitly recognizing the “tension” that exists between the two concepts. Participant 4 also begins to 
talk a little more generally about the issue, i.e., they don’t begin to connect issues of self-regulation to 
any age group until midway through their response. Note that Participant 4’s talk is more about the 
grammars of “schedule/etc.” and “free choice” and their connection to talk about the whole pattern of 
life; Participant 4 does not draw any connexions, however, between these grammars and “self-
regulation” (despite their recognition in their opening statement of the applicability of the sign, 
“tension”). This participant introduces and begins to tie in new signs/concepts: e.g., “organization” to 
“schedule/routine”; the metaphor of the “skeleton” to “schedule”; the reiteration of “flexibility” as 
connected to “free choice,” but also to “freedom” here; and the link to “resilient” from “flexibility” (and 
thus, possibly, from “free choice”). Participant 4’s response pushes the explanation a little further by 
describing the connection between “organization” and “free choice/freedom” in that the former 
underlies in some manner, and makes possible, the latter. 
Participant 1:  Does free choice compensate for what people don’t get from schedule?  In other 
words, does schedule militate against self-regulation?  That’s sort of a theme that seems to be 
emerging from your original responses.  We HAVE to do schedules, we HAVE to do it [regularly?] 
                                                          
181 It is interesting to observe the somewhat free flow of associations between signs in this long contribution by 
Participant 4 – “[my kids] were always up, but there was freedom in that.” There is work being done in Participant 
4’s articulations here, though it can be difficult in the course of a conversation to see just which useful grammatical 
moves have been made and achievements gained. Given the relatively loose format of most of these groups’ 
sessions, the kind of contribution made by Participant 4 here was more typical than the exception. 
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if we want to get things done, as you say we’re human beings, we need schedules.  But that’s to 
pose it in a kind of negative light, that in some way, it’s a necessary evil. 
In this contribution to the discussion, Participant 1 returns with questions that seem to work to sharpen 
– or further shape – the talk. Participant 1 seems to pushing against the proposed explanation being 
formulated by the first three responding participants, viz., an explanation taking the form of response 5 
noted above. Are “free choice” and “schedule/routine” contradictories? Participant 1 indicates that the 
responding participants are talking as if they were contradictories, but is asking for the group to say 
more about the tension, by bringing out more of the grammars of “schedule/routine” and “free choice.” 
Further, Participant 1’s questions attempt to re-orient the group’s talk back towards “self-regulation,” 
and, further, provokes consideration of the pathway between “schedule/routine” and “self-regulation,” 
i.e., that schedule/routine does not promote optimal self-regulation. Note as well that Participant 1’s 
questions are maintained on a general level, asking for talk about concepts, and not about descriptions 
more specific to age-groups or population groups, e.g., young students/children.182 
Participant 4:  I don’t think it is a necessary evil, and I don’t mean for it to be negative AT ALL.  I 
think it’s a really, it’s a great thing for us to become part of a, y’know, there’s seasons of the 
year, there’s morning, there’s evening, the sun comes up, the sun goes to bed.  I think that’s all 
really, I think of it as positive, I don’t think … for me, I don’t see a schedule as being negative, I 
think of it as an opportunity for kids to work within. [Other participants clamouring to get a 
word in, e.g., another participant says loudly, “A framework”.] 
The first response to Participant 1’s questions, from Participant 4 here,  connect “schedule” with the 
“positive,” affirming that “schedule” connects up with a universal pattern (e.g., “the seasons of the 
year,” etc.), and affirming as well that the basics of response type 5 are still on the table. However, these 
affirmations are repetitions of what has already been said, and nothing offered here is a move to work 
out the relations between the grammars of “schedule/routine” and “free choice,” nor to work out any 
connexions between these signs and “self-regulation.” Participant 4’s comment that they think of a 
schedule “as an opportunity for kids to work within” would perhaps be stronger in this context of 
providing an explanation if it showed more of the grammars of the relevant terms and the connections 
between them. As it stand, however, it is unclear how what they have shown or attempted to show fits 
with any of those. 
                                                          
182 That is, Participant 1 is in effect asking, “Don’t (simply) describe the different things that children do, for 
instance, but rather show me how we can use the signs “schedule/routine” and “free choice” in their connexions 
to “self-regulation”.” 
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Participant 2:  Let’s be honest here, there are people who believe that it IS a negative thing, and 
those kids, those people may end up choosing Montessori or [unclear] or other choices because 
school, as we know it, public school system, is a bit of an anomaly in the world, I mean, it’s 
regimented, there are rules, there’s … and those kids who show up late every day because …  
and in their hearts they don’t believe that the schedule and that is conducive to their children 
being self-regulating adults.  So for sure there are people who … now whether we could totally 
live that way, I don’t really know.  I don’t see how it would work, if I have to have gym at 10:45 
every day. 
Participant 2 re-enters the discussion by ostensibly disagreeing with the previous comments by 
Participant 4, and more explicitly draws a connexion between the terms of the discussion and “self-
regulation.” Participant 2 also introduces pieces of evidence into the discussion, i.e., that some parents 
do choose to have their children taught in less-regimented schooling environments (e.g., Montessori), 
and some parents do not appear to abide by the public school schedules (e.g., their children “show up 
late every day”), indications that there are indeed issues concerning “schedule/routine” – and issues 
that Participant 2 links up with the development of optimal self-regulation.183 Further, Participant 2’s 
comments seem to be advocating a form of response types 1 or 2 (i.e., that these items are 
contradictory and that one of them – i.e., “schedule/routine” – should be rejected as connecting to 
“self-regulation,” in the sense that it cannot be said to promote optimal self-regulation. 
Participant 1:  If predictability is good in the one case why isn’t it good in all cases?  The second 
last discussion that we had on those posters [i.e., this was a group exercise held earlier in the 
session] was that compliance was in some way, though I’m not sure in which way, but it was in 
some way opposed to self-regulation.  So I’m wondering how all these things fit together.  So if 
predictability, routine, is good … for what?, for some parts of us, why can’t we say it’s good for 
ALL parts of us?  Why isn’t routine, a solid regime of compliance, just good? 
Participant 1 re-enters the discussion fairly quickly, asking a new set of questions that continue to 
sharpen, but now also to widen, the conversation. Further, “predictability” here gets linked to 
“schedule/routine” and “compliance.” However, Participant 1’s questions again force the other 
participants to show how they use “self-regulation” in connection to these various signs. In other words, 
Participant 1 asks the group to order grammatically all these signs, showing how the connexions and 
links between them all in fact stand – or how they take them to stand. Reacting to this, various 
participants deliver a sequence of short responses, with these participants articulating and briefly 
following out different aspects of the grammar of several of the relevant signs, e.g., “organization,” 
“organizing thoughts,” “liking schedules/predictability,” and so on. 
                                                          
183 I am attributing to these participants, though not quite justifiably, that in such cases they are essentially using 
the sign, “optimal self-regulation.” 
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Participant 2:  [Several participants clamouring.] Because it takes the fun out of it! [Other 
participant: We have different skills, different talents…] 
 
Participant 5:  Well [participant name] made a good point saying it supports their learning of 
organization, and then the choice within that, learning of organization, is that what [looking at 
named participant] … 
 
Participant 6: Yeah, it helps them organize their thoughts, y’know, like there’s an order for 
things to happen … 
 
Participant 4: … in the real world. 
 
Participant 6: As an adult, I like to know, like you, there is a schedule.  I mean, part of it is that 
I’m trained as a teacher, ‘it starts at 8, ends at 3’, haha, it’s ingrained in me right now, but … I 
like my weekends because there’s no time [I’m supposed to be doing anything?].  But I still like 
to know that it starts Friday it ends Sunday and Monday the routine starts again, and I survive 
[?] by the routine.  By the end of August I can’t WAIT for the routines to come back, I love it … 
 
Participant 1:  So where’s the place of free choice, which was also identified as importantly if 
not essentially vital for self-regulation? 
 
Participant 1 concludes this short sequence of responses by again reiterating the issue of the place of 
“free choice” with regard to “self-regulation,” given the expressions of enthusiasm by the group 
participants for “schedule/routine.” All of the discussion so far can be read as an effort to find the terms 
that are relevant to the issue, i.e., to find ways to the respective places in the grammars of these terms. 
Moving between those places in one way or another would constitute ways to show how the grammar 
works so that two seemingly contradictory features (i.e., free choice and constraining schedule) 
comprising one thing (i.e., self-regulation) can be given a clear accounting (“Grammar is the account 
books of language” – PG §44). We observe the group working its way through this process; the 
questions the group asks itself – principally through the contributions of Participant 1 – is the motile 
force that moves the conversation from place to place. The discussion continues, participants taking up 
Participant 1’s last questions. 
Participant 6: [Laughing] There is still free choice in the set routines, I cannot go on holiday 
tomorrow, but I can decide certain things, where I’m gonna, what I’m gonna do, what I’m gonna 
teach, where I’m gonna, … 
 
Participant 4:  Do you [to Participant 1] mean in the classroom or in our own personal lives? 
…. 
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Participant 1:  Well, we were talking about the classrooms but we can broaden it.  [Couple of 
other participants talking. “We can get too broad, haha!”] I’m wondering where one stops, and 
what it affects, and where the other begins, and what it affects.  Like, do they connect to 
different aspects of what it is to be a human being in a society? 
What is Participant 6 doing in their response? On the one hand, they are simply describing (again) how 
someone lives, with a nesting of moments of free choice within structure. Is this an exploration of 
whether the two purportedly contradictory signs are indeed contradictory? On the other hand, by 
returning to such description, are they averting from the main issue, which concerns the connexions 
between these two seemingly contradictory signs and “self-regulation”? Participant 1 responds to 
Participant 4’s question about scope, and then returns to Participant 6’s comments and asks for 
clarification, i.e., ‘show me how the grammars work such that the one term can be viewed in such a way 
as not to be opposed to the other,’ though this approach draws Participant 1 and their line of 
questioning away from the concern with connexions to “self-regulation.” At any rate, Participant 1’s 
questions could conceivably be the start of work on an explanation of how two seemingly opposing or 
contradictory features can be attributed to some other one thing. An exchange then follows between 
Participants 1 and 7 on this matter. 
Participant 7:  I don’t think that one starts and one stops, I think they go on [together?], they 
converge and diverge depending upon the situation and my response, or, the situation in itself. 
 
Participant 1: Do they always run parallel?  Do they ever connect, overlap? 
 
Participant 7:  I would say sometimes they overlap, sometimes they come together, and live 
happily, and other times they run away from each other, and [Other participant laughs loudly – 
drowns out part of what Participant 7 says] what happens about our choices [?]. 
Participant 1 and Participant 7’s talk about “schedule/routine” and “free choice” veers away from any 
firm commitment to, or rejection of, the use of “contradiction” in this context. Participant 7 does say 
that the two features can come together – but again neither participant is making the connection 
explicit between these signs and “self-regulation,” which is the point of the discussion. However, a 
pattern of talk which is concerned with these features has been proffered – i.e., that these features can 
co-exist or diverge depending on the specifics of the situation. This, of course, very much needs to be 
explored, as well as brought back into contact with “self-regulation,” as it may be the case that, in 
connection with other concepts, “schedule/routine” and “free choice” are acceptable in conjunction 
with one another. In order to achieve what is desired, the discussion must be drawn back more explicitly 
into the vicinity of the grammar of “self-regulation”. (It is unfortunate that Participant 7’s closing 
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comment is inaudible, as it does seem to be about “choice,” and so may be making the attempt to say 
something more explicit about the purported contradiction between the two relevant terms.) We end 
with two comments by a participant new to the discussion so far. 
Participant 8:  And I think, for me, well-being drives what’s most important and at what time.  
So, that’s sort of bottom-line for me, if it’s the well-being of, if I have planned to go out for 
dinner, and desperately not wanting to do that, I have become more honest as I age, and I feel 
comfortable to say, ‘I can’t, I just can’t,’ but that’s, social stuff is not my favorite first pick either, 
so [school bell rings – a few words inaudible] … for my well-being, maybe that’s a bad example, 
but changing plans and being flexible around those plans, but, y’know, when my son has karate 
tonight, he has to be there at 6:15, and he’s looking to me to get him there, cuz he likes to be on 
time. 
…. 
Participant 8:  In the classroom, we’re [inaudible] tomorrow, [participant name] will be away, 
we have a supply, it’s the day before the four-day-long weekend, we just went on a class trip 
yesterday, today I’m hearing that it’s a little loud in the class, a little loud, a little unregulated 
maybe, um, and so tomorrow, we just had a very quick discussion about, ‘okaay, this is the day 
that’s going to look different’, because, we are preparing that, maybe, the mood will be a little 
off, the regulation won’t be as good, um, we wanted to say that, and, y’know, and we’re making 
choices around that, that we’re going to be more flexible than we normally are.  HOWEVER, in 
that we still need to fill out [?] the day to be about the same, so that the kids also have some 
flexibility … 
In these two comments we see made explicit a drift often implicit in the conversation, that is to say, a 
drift headed towards narratives that were simply about the difficulty with schedules and constraint. 
(Again, “self-regulation” as used by this participant assumes a grammar here still somewhat displaced 
from, but beginning to get closer, to the authoritative grammar.) Such language-games of telling stories 
which contain various of the signs deemed important in the general discussion can be viewed as doing 
several important tasks. All the same, these stories contribute little to the process of working out an 
explanation of the main issue, that is, in showing the correct use of the relevant signs such that the 
alleged problem of contradictory features making up self-regulation might get resolved or dissolved. On 
the other hand, such contributions do allow participants the opportunity to join a conversation and to 
try out and practice some of the signs in question, to be corrected or encouraged – or to correct or 
encourage others – and that is certainly useful in such professional training contexts. It is finding the 
connexions, if they exist, between common usage of signs such as “schedule/routine,” “predictability,” 
“free choice,” and the use by experts or adepts of the sign “self-regulation” (which has been shown to 
this group mainly through Shanker’s (2013) text), that is the challenge in this moment of professional 
learning. 
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As I have been arguing, one of the main issues in professional learning, in the terms of the picture I have 
been applying, is that one lacks exposure to and familiarity with the grammar of a sign/concept as it is 
used in the relevant communities. By virtue of that lack a learner is unable to make any moves with that 
sign; that sign does not yet mark out any places to go on the terrain. Until it is used, it is just bare 
notation, if that is an acceptable way to put it. One is effectively blind as concerns this sign and cannot 
see to get anywhere; as an inert notation only, no aspect of things is revealed or given (“Every sign by 
itself seems dead. What gives it life? – In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? – Or is the use its 
life?” PI §432). Only by having connexions to other signs/concepts and by using the word in various 
language-games does one start to be able to travel with the word and thus to see a world (i.e., which 
one didn’t see before) and to be able to get around in it. And it will be an empirical question as to how 
and through what pedagogical techniques any specific group of professionals in their particular context 
is initiated – or initiates itself, if possible – into a way of talking and seeing. But all the same we are 
enabled to see the grammatical moments where grammatical change is possible, e.g., in the conflux of 
particular move-makings with particular signs, with a new aspect of grammar just within reach to be 
taken hold of. This gives us an interesting and valuable perspective as we give careful consideration to 
professional learning discussions, such as we have looked at in this chapter; and further, this perspective 
provides a means to think more clearly about how to go forward in developing professional learning 
initiatives. In the next and final chapter, amongst other things I consider there, I briefly look at some of 
the practical issues that will be our concern as we begin to work to apply these pictures of language, 
meaning, and professional learning in thinking about and assembling actual professional learning 
initiatives. As I noted in Chapter 1, this has been one of the main purposes of this work in the context of 
my own professional work. 
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Chapter Six 
Concluding Comments – From Picture to Picture 
 
The general theme of this thesis is that we can draw a picture of professional learning on the basis of a 
picture of language and meaning. Through the questions and context I set out in Chapters 1 and 2, I 
worked to make clear that my project was one of exploring how Wittgenstein’s picture of language and 
meaning in particular could be applied to an understanding of professional learning (i.e., in 
Wittgenstein’s sense of ‘understanding’), and to set it out as importantly different from other ways of 
considering (or ‘theorizing’) language, meaning, and learning. Despite Wittgenstein’s many 
‘educationally’ oriented remarks, my focus in this thesis project is on treating Wittgenstein in the first 
instance as a philosopher of language. Further, I emphasize again that what I work with here are 
pictures, as Wittgenstein has called them, and not theories or theoretical-causal models. As with 
Wittgenstein, I do not explain, but look for ways to describe.  
In Chapter 1 I asked what difference is made in the application of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and 
meaning to both the topic and practice of professional learning. The hypothesis I proposed in Chapter 1 
was that applying this picture of language and meaning does make a considerable difference, and thus 
that the principal purpose of this thesis was to begin to work out something of the nature of those 
differences. From these starting points I worked to contextualize both Wittgenstein’s project and my 
own work as reactions to dominant trends in philosophy of language and in the professional learning 
literature, viz., reactions against representationalism (following Frege), cognitivism, and intellectualism, 
and to differentiate Wittgenstein’s and my perspective from these. Throughout Chapters 1-3 I walked 
with Wittgenstein to disentangle talk about language and meaning from theoretical, causal explanation 
which postulated ‘hidden,’ hypothetical entities, such as propositions, thoughts, etc., turning away from 
such accounts and turning to description (e.g., see PI §§109, 124) and pictures of language and meaning 
(e.g., see PI §§144, 423). In this way Wittgenstein offers us an interesting, deep, and fruitful, albeit at 
times puzzling, alternative to the representationalism and cognitivism that has dominated a wide swath 
of our views and approaches to language, understanding, and learning and teaching. 
Representationalism and cognitivism lead us to portray professional learning as a matter of having the 
right entities in the mind (or brain, if we follow out the neurological paths that become available 
through the cognitivist approach), and having the right cognitive mechanisms in place to manipulate 
representations (or thoughts, propositions, etc.). Wittgenstein, I argued, troubled this picture of 
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meaning and learning, and ultimately rejected it. Wittgenstein then drew another kind of picture of 
language and meaning, made up of such parts as language-games, rules, and grammar, as well as ‘form 
of life,’ context, etc. Working on the basis of this picture, I sketched out a picture of professional 
learning in harmony with Wittgenstein’s picture, with prominence given to the picture of language-
games. The picture I sketched was not oriented around having something, but rather around the images 
of doing and moving. My picture of professional learning developed these underlying gesture drawings 
(which, as I argued, can be seen most clearly in the opening sections of the Investigations), and led me 
to focus on the real talk of professional learners, i.e., what professional learners say in and about their 
learning sessions, how they react to what other participant learners and coaches (in Schön’s sense, for 
example) say, and the nature of learners’ ongoing discursive relationality to one another. Insofar as 
meaning in Wittgenstein’s picture can be viewed through the spatial metaphor of the connexions and 
moves from place to place, I sought to look at and consider professional learning situations precisely 
from that perspective, i.e., of having places to go and in learning/finding new or different places to go, 
within the context of the appropriate community of practice. This perspective stands at a distance from 
the representationalist and cognitivist approaches, which focus on having – internally – the right 
propositions, representations, thoughts, etc., and then, on the causal basis of possessing those ‘things,’ 
being able to go on to do certain things. In other words, representationalists focus on (propositional) 
content as key in learning, whereas I focus on changes in learners’ grasp or mastery of meaning, 
understood as use, doing, movement.  
As noted, the focus in Wittgenstein’s work and in this thesis is on a picture of language and meaning, 
and this I have emphasized throughout this project. I argue that Wittgenstein’s primary importance for 
me is as a philosopher of language, and while the various pedagogical features of his work are important 
and vital even, they gain their importance only in relation to the picture of language and meaning that 
Wittgenstein is sketching. For my own part, I take it that Wittgenstein’s various ‘educationally’ oriented 
remarks (and techniques – for example, his dialogues with himself or with unknown interlocutors, the 
anthropological and fantastical thought-experiments, the multiple examples concerning instruction, 
etc.), which might tempt one to draw out pedagogical theory from his texts, are better understood as 
the mechanisms and moments of his argument working to shift or switch us from one picture of 
language and meaning (e.g., representationalism) to another picture. The direction of the argument is 
from, in the first instance, the picture of language and meaning, and then to pictures of training, 
instruction, learning, and of initiation and enculturation. The picture is that language is playing games; 
how we come to play those games, how we are brought or drawn into those practices, is in an important 
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sense contingent and incidental.184 What is most salient in this regard is that observation and 
description of how we ourselves come to be language-speakers or sign-users (in whatever sense) reveal 
no connections to hidden entities, such as to thoughts, senses, propositions (as per Frege), as 
constitutive of meaning. It is how signs are used, tout court, that lies at the heart of Wittgenstein’s 
picture of language and meaning, and not their connection to ‘objective’ things, i.e., things outside or 
independent of language (e.g., see PI §§97, 120). 
Further, while the techniques of grammatical investigation are powerful in the hands of Wittgenstein, 
they have not in the strict sense been employed as technique in my thesis, nor do I foresee its 
employment in the educational work I do with individual professionals and groups as I attend with them 
closely to their talk (as exemplified in my work in Chapter 5). Grammatical investigation is primarily 
about ordering and clarifying talk so as to clear away philosophical problems (e.g., see PI §§122, 132-
133); carefully examining important signs and concepts in education and professional learning in this 
way has not, for example, been my interest, as it has been for other scholars (e.g., see Hirst & Peters, 
1970; Winch, 2017). Nor am I interested in submitting to grammatical investigation the signs and 
concepts used by professionals in their learning session discussions. What I am interested in is finding 
out how learning participants use the signs they do use, to observe and describe more clearly the 
connexions between the signs in use, and to describe, where useful, any pictures around which 
participants organize the things they do say. The learning of the professionals will be viewed in these 
terms, viz., signs, connexions, moves, language-games, and pictures that are new to them. If it can be 
put this way, then it is at least something of the general ethos of grammatical investigation, emerging as 
it does from within the context of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, which is an 
important influence on my own developing picture of professional learning and my own developing 
practice in the field. 
Wittgenstein’s picture of the ‘language-game,’ i.e., how we use signs, as I have been at pains to 
articulate, emphasizes move-making and performance, in getting from one ‘place’ to another (as per 
Sudnow, 1979, whom I have taken up as useful in this regard), and these as constitutive of meaning. 
Speaking in a developmental sense, one can say that once one has learned how to play games (however 
that happens), learning thus becomes a matter of learning how to play more games and learning how to 
                                                          
184 We learn to play games by being shown them, and by starting to play them while being guided by those who 
know how to play. Some games we ostensibly learn by having them explained to us, but, as I have argued, not only 
does this depend on a lot of know-how in playing games that we have already gained, but that ‘explaining’ can only 
be another kind of showing.  
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make more moves in the games one can play. Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘grammar’ comes into the picture 
inasmuch as the grammar of a sign is the fuzzy set of connexions between that sign and other signs that 
have grown through their use, and this is one part of the ‘technique’ that one masters in learning – e.g., 
see PI §§150, 199. (As I have pointed out, neither grammar nor rules exist separate from use of signs, 
but in this picture exist in the actual play of language-games in the flow and circumstances of life.) This 
applies, not accidentally, to both learning a language and learning about something (e.g., learning 
geography); and the developmental transformative moment lies not so much in learning how to play the 
language-game(s) of the ‘asking and giving of reasons,’ as per Brandom, McDowell, Luntley, etc., but 
rather in learning how to play a game simpliciter.185 Looked at from this angle, Wittgenstein’s picture of 
language and meaning yields the further picture of normativity emerging in the first instance from 
game-playing and, in a sense, secondarily from rule-following, as one is still said to be following rules in 
playing a particular game correctly or acceptably.186 Further, it is relationality that this picture of 
language and meaning raises into focus, the give-and-take of response and reaction of mutually 
participating game-players that is a key feature both of Wittgenstein’s picture and my picture of 
professional learning. While we can most certainly talk usefully of the autonomy of mature speakers or 
adepts in language as a kind of ideal (and see my discussion on autonomy in Chapter 4), it is the 
autonomy of language that Wittgenstein emphasizes in this picture, and our collective, shared 
participation in language that fully characterizes us as speakers, and that sustains language itself. Games 
exist insofar as we play them, and we play them insofar as they are there for us to play. Recall again 
Bakhurst’s (2016) excellent discussion extolling the virtues of conversation and dialogue and highlighting 
“the human drama of the conversation” (p. 13), i.e., reaction and relationality. 
Finally, through the work of Chapters 4-5 we saw various aspects of the application of these joined 
pictures of language and meaning and of professional learning to actual instances of talk concerning 
professional learning. We saw this first in the guise of a troubling ‘learning paradox’ type problem 
emergent from the ideas of Wittgenstein and from professional learning theorists such as Schön and 
                                                          
185 Of course, one learns how to play a game simpliciter by learning how to play specific games. While the issues 
concerned with learning how to play games are an important and interesting offshoot of this picture of language 
and learning, we need to be careful how we look at this when we begin to talk about human development, 
including how we first learn language. Couching the discussion in these terms risks veering into empirical matters, 
which is neither to the point of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, nor to the point of the picture of 
professional learning I am drawing on the basis of an application of Wittgenstein’s picture. The interplay between 
the scientific (and causal) and the grammatical specifically in this area does, all the same, remain an issue of 
considerable interest and deserving of further, appropriate consideration. 
186 For intriguing, albeit empirical, work in this area of game-playing and the emergence of normativity, see 
Fantasia et al (2014). 
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Lave and Wenger, and second in a close reading of the discourse of professionals in their own learning 
endeavours and performances. In these chapters I showed how we can view and talk about professional 
learning without recourse to representationalist, cognitivist, intellectualist perspectives, and thus 
without recourse to postulated, hypothetical, causal, ‘hidden,’ entities such as propositions, thoughts, 
truth values, beliefs, etc. Further, by means of these two chapters I provided examples of the application 
of these pictures of language, meaning, and learning, showing how they could be applied. Now, to move 
forward with these ideas, further examples and practice are required to develop and hone these 
techniques.  
The picture of professional learning that emerges from the application of Wittgenstein’s picture of 
language and learning has significant import for both our research and pedagogical programmes, though 
Wittgenstein himself would not of course have talked of “programmes.” I have argued that, by contrast, 
the research programme that emerges from representationalism is concerned with uncovering ‘things’ 
that we possess, i.e., concepts, beliefs, thoughts, ‘propositions in the head,’ contents, cognitive 
mechanisms, etc., and to explain in causal terms how we come to possess such things. In turn, the 
relevant pedagogical programme is concerned with getting the ‘right’ concepts, mechanisms, etc., into 
the heads of learners, and with developing ways of assessing that these are in fact possessed by 
learners. Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, with an emphasis on ‘language-games,’ 
however, leads us otherwise, to a different picture of professional learning (and knowing and 
understanding), as a matter of how we actually do know how to go on, in how we actually do and say 
things. This picture has its focus on doing, on the performance itself – there is nothing hidden here for 
Wittgenstein (e.g., see PI §126) – and thus this focus on doing itself is not viewed as evidence of 
something else which is possessed and which stands in a causal relationship to this doing. (See the 
different fundamental, orienting metaphors I discussed in Section 1.3.) From the perspective of these 
latter pictures of language, meaning, and learning, research and pedagogical approaches look instead to 
actual discourse in ‘natural’ (i.e., non-test) situations, that is, to how learners do actually talk about 
whatever is in question, in terms of the connexions they do make and the different ways (i.e., the 
specific language-games) in which they make them. Further, this picture promotes (from a different 
angle than usual, being based on linguistic meaning) a discursively-oriented approach to viewing and 
doing work in professional learning and development, viz., from a context of talk about language and 
meaning. Thus what is demanded in this kind of pedagogical work is close reading of professionals’ 
discourse, by facilitators and the participating professionals themselves alike, and discourse from both 
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professionals’ day-to-day practice activities as well as from their more deliberately engaged learning 
activities, though there is by no means any clear line distinguishing the two. 
Let me begin to turn to discuss something of the practical, as part of moving forward with the 
application of these pictures. Recall from Chapter 1 that the intent of this work has always been that it 
would lead not only to a different approach in the scholarship concerning both professional learning and 
development and philosophy of education, but would lead as well to differences in the actual practice of 
professional learning in situ. Certainly I anticipate and see how this work makes for difference in how I 
do my pedagogical work in my own continuing professional work in communities and organizations. 
Indeed, In the course of working on this thesis, I have begun to put these ideas into practice in my 
interactions with colleagues and other professionals. In one case, as a result of our conversations, a 
colleague has significantly restructured her professional learning sessions with early childhood 
educators on the basis of notions of the professionals talking with each other, their reactions to each 
other’s talk, and their own reflection on how they have talked and reacted to talk, i.e., as revelatory of 
the places they have to go and the work they need to do to find their way to the places they want to be 
able to get to. In another case, a discussion with a kindergarten teacher around this picture of having 
places to go as a way to view understanding led her to re-vision how she conducts and thinks about 
various learning exercises and activities she does with her young students. I have as well as a teaching 
assistant been applying this picture of professional learning to my own pedagogical interactions with 
teacher-candidate students in the Faculty of Education at York University, and acting from this 
perspective have seen rich, fruitful discussions emerge in the context of different forums, i.e., face-to-
face and online discussions. As well, I have begun to test out in different ways how the students as 
professional learning participants can enter into reflexive relationships with their own performances in 
learning sessions, and have found the results intriguing and promising.  Of course, at best these 
moments can only be considered as weak anecdotal evidence for the useful application of the picture of 
professional learning I have been sketching, though they represent at least a beginning in testing out 
these approaches with real learners, and the results encourage me to continue the conversation with 
others. 
The first important practical aspect emerging from my work, then, is the heightened recognition and 
appreciation of the importance of professionals’ talk, appreciating in their talk their reactions to one 
another and their generating sequences of moves together, and appreciating as well the reflexive 
possibilities and moments as learners work to attend to their own reactions and sequences of moves 
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and to their overall talk. This basic procedure is, of course, nothing out of the ordinary. It is what we do 
when we listen to or read what others have to say. And here we often operate with a picture of 
language, meaning, and the mind such that we hear or read another’s words as evidence of what they 
understand, with what they really understand having to be inferred from these visible signs. What 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning offers us is an entirely different way to view these 
exchanges. What we understand, and what the words we use mean, are what we say or write in the 
context of exchange with others and the ‘world.’ There is nothing deeper or hidden that we need to 
seek and find in order to determine what our words really mean or what we or our interlocutors really 
understand. Meaning and understanding is the doing, is the moving from sign to sign, from sign to 
action, from place to place (e.g., see: “Conversation flows on … and only in its course do words have 
meaning” Z §§135; “Only in the stream of thought and life do words have meaning” Z §173). To do these 
is to speak meaningfully. These pictures of language, meaning, and learning put learning on the plane of 
meaning, on the plane of knowing how to use signs, and not in terms of content, of having propositions, 
thoughts, sentences, etc., in the mind, which in turn in some manner causally produce our utterances. 
Learning, then, is changing the way we talk, and the way we talk takes place in the context of each 
speaker’s relation with others. One might see this as finding the extraordinary in the ordinary; another 
way of putting this might be to find the ordinary, qua ordinary, extraordinary. Wittgenstein says in this 
vein: “Don’t take it as a matter of course, but as a remarkable fact, that pictures and fictitious narratives 
give us pleasure, occupy our minds” (PI §524; see also PI §129). 
Practically speaking, then, one of the principal challenges in moving ahead in the terms of this 
perspective lies in creating the occasions in which there is as much (relevant) talk as it is feasible to 
generate, and for that talk to be as ‘natural’ as possible. By ‘natural’ I mean talk in contexts or occasions 
that are a part of the regular flow of the professionals’ working life. In the case of the educator study 
concerning self-regulation looked at in Chapter 5, for example, the learning sessions were part of the 
educators’ own ongoing efforts to organize their own ‘collaborative inquiry’ professional development 
work. In these sessions they were not speaking to an interviewer or researcher, or being ‘taught’ by an 
expert or facilitator (though this latter can certainly oftentimes be an element in the regular working life 
of a professional). They were rather engaging in serious, focused discussion with each other in the 
context of their own genuine effort to learn about a developmental construct that had come to their 
attention and that they saw as potentially important to their own professional practice. To describe a 
concrete instance of this, one of the educator groups had already begun to implement initiatives and 
practices in accordance with how they understood the construct, and wanted to think more deeply 
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about what they were in fact doing and how they might consider it and the possible effects of the 
interventions. These kinds of learning occasions that are built into the regular rhythms of the learners’ 
professional working lives are very likely the ideal in terms of generating talk. Again, setting up and 
exploring different kinds of venues for such occasions is limited only by the imagination of participants 
and the structural and administrative limits of professionals’ organizations. Time and resources can be 
set aside for learning sessions, time in staff meetings can be given over to discuss matters of educational 
interest, formal or informal study or book groups can be set up and run, etc. Hallway conversations, 
comments made in non-learning meetings, ad hoc efforts to contact colleagues or knowledgeable 
others, study ex situ, etc., are all extremely important in professional learning as well, but obviously 
much harder to track. Self-report can tell about them, but the nature of the talk that was had, i.e., what 
the discussants actually said in those (past) moments, the nature of action-reaction in those 
conversations, can be hard to access or capture – though the reflexive talk itself on such post hoc 
occasions can be valuable and telling. Hearing the professionals talk about the matters in question, and 
observing how they react to one another – and the professionals themselves hearing how they talk with 
each other about such matters – is what is most important. (It hardly seems necessary at this point to 
indicate again that the application of the picture of professional learning I have been sketching, and 
using the language afforded us by Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, encompasses the 
learning work across all professions, and is certainly not restricted to the education sector. The educator 
learning sessions I discuss in Chapter 5 serve to illustrate the application of this picture of professional 
learning in a specific case, but that applicability is by no means restricted to education.) 
Further, these do not need to be learning occasions as such, in order for the group or interested 
outsiders to be able to look at what and how the professionals in question do talk about whatever the 
relevant things may be. Observing how professionals talk in the course of planning meetings, for 
example, or in the course of their strategy discussions, can provide much of what is useful and needed in 
order to investigate what places the discussants have to go and how they get from place to place. This in 
turn will be instructive in continuing to think with the professionals in question (if this is not a matter 
wholly of self-observation) about how to consider their own evolving ability to talk about these matters, 
which, I offer, is equivalent to their own evolving expertise. 
However, as I have been emphasizing, great care has to be taken in such observation and any 
subsequent inference from it. First, circumstances can influence what gets talked about. Knowing how 
to go on in the circumstances of being in the presence of superiors in such discussions can influence 
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what gets said (for example, see my discussion concerning Clandinin & Connelly in Chapter 2). However, 
this might simply entail that multiple occasions of relevant talk in the context of varying circumstances 
ought to be pursued in order to observe in some larger measure or more global way learning 
participants’ talk. Second, some attention needs to be given here to the problem of the professional 
learning paradox. A relevant version of that problem here would be that, once learning participants have 
thought about and discussed what has been said in whatever ‘learning activity’ they took up, and if we 
hold (on the basis of Wittgenstein’s picture, i.e., on the basis of the meaning of signs) that there are 
places or aspects that the participants do not have or cannot see, this entails that these participants will 
not be able to take on/come to see the places/aspects that are the desired ones.187 This is perhaps an 
old lesson put in a new way. Speaking of his own music training as a jazz pianist, Sudnow (1978/2001) 
says: 
It’s not enough to get into a chord. It was essential to get from one to the next, playing 
progressions smoothly. And a host of expanding skills, ways of looking, moving, and thinking 
were needed to execute such successions. (p. 13) 
There is a powerful sense that we take from Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning that one 
cannot see what one cannot talk about, and thus Wittgenstein’s discussion concerning ‘seeing aspects’ 
and being ‘aspect blind’ (e.g., see again PI, pp. 213-214) are pertinent in this way to professional 
learning and the encroachments of learning paradox type issues. This important angle deserves more 
investigation, with more thought given to how to deal with this feature of professional learning than 
appears in the literature. (For example, I have seemingly left here too large a gap between ‘talking’ and 
‘seeing,’ whereas ‘seeing’ and ‘talking/doing’ are far more tightly bound together.) 
To sum up these comments on the practical angle of the application of these pictures of language, 
meaning, and professional learning, there are indeed many ways in which professionals generate talk of 
different kinds in both learning-related and non-learning-related working life activities. These hardly 
need to be catalogued or described here. It is on the basis of examination of these various narratives 
generated through whatever means or contexts that we can then talk about the places the professionals 
in question do have to go to, and what, if anything, those professionals might desire to do about that. 
Comparison between what they say about a subject topic and what the relevant adepts say about it 
                                                          
187 Wittgenstein gives a nice statement of the principle of this problem at RFM VI 11. There he is talking about 
needing to learn one kind of language-game in order to learn another. (“Now, how can he prove it to him? He has 
got to teach him to calculate.”) 
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would be useful – and I think it would ultimately be necessary, if the aim of the group is to move closer 
to the core of the relevant community of practice. Again, I invoke the possibility that fostering improved 
skill in the language-games of inquiry can mitigate some of the difficulty inherent in at least some 
professional learning activity given the absence of such adepts (see my Chapter 4). In the playing of such 
language-games of inquiry we can see as well the strengths and limits of the learners’ developing 
autonomy. Further, though this is simply to re-emphasize the main point here, professional learning talk 
can advisedly include a reflexive component or ‘feedback loop’ process (e.g., recall Eraut, Bereiter & 
Scardamalia, and especially Argyris and Schön). What I would emphasize – perhaps differently than is 
the norm – is the iterative, or even recursive, nature of the ongoing learning process, which serves 
neither for confirmatory or evaluative purposes, but is rather generative, both of more relevant talk 
from the participants and of further learning process design, for and by the professionals themselves. 
The actual forms of such learning/discursive processes, i.e., how the talk gets to be generated, as I have 
said, is as varied as human imagination and the tolerances of the professionals and their organizations 
allow. 
To return to the context of my thesis project, it was never my intent to develop novel forms of 
professional learning – as if these new ways of learning would somehow do what all other forms could 
not – but rather to find a way or perspective from which to be able to think in a deeper, and perhaps 
more fruitful way about professional learning. Nor was it my purpose to suggest programmes of 
improvement to existing forms of professional learning initiatives. Thus, for example, my silence on 
examining the matter of facilitation and facilitators in learning sessions.188 Certainly I acknowledge that 
facilitation is important – indeed, it is in a broad sense important in different ways in my discussions of 
the work of Schön and Lave and Wenger (see Chapter 2), I discuss it as a key issue concerning the 
paradox of professional learning (see Chapter 4), and allude to this paradox repeatedly in Chapter 5. As 
well, Wittgenstein can essentially be said to be discussing facilitation (again, in a very broad sense) in his 
many ‘scenes of instruction’ as showing some of the very important ways in which learners are drawn or 
initiated into practices, i.e., learn the right moves to make, as well as showing something of the ‘borders’ 
of his picture of meaning and learning and instruction (e.g., see PI §§185-188). But the clear part of the 
picture depicts that we are trained and brought into ‘correct’ practice, i.e., ‘correct’ move-making, by 
those who have mastered those moves, and given this picture we can talk in practical terms of how a 
                                                          
188 I have demurred from exploring facilitation and facilitators in practice in this thesis, though I see it as a next 
further step to take in expanding this project concerning the application of these pictures of language, meaning, 
and professional learning. (See below in this chapter.) 
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learning paradox can come to exist for professionals. However, the role and importance of facilitation in 
actual, concrete professional learning ventures strikes me both as (1) requiring a separate (and at least 
partly empirical) investigation, and (2) as beside the point of my own thesis project, which has the focus 
of drawing and beginning to apply a picture of professional learning on the basis of Wittgenstein’s 
picture of language and meaning. Much of what I wanted to say about facilitation I said in setting up the 
learning paradox, and as noted I do entertain favourably the general situative (or relational) notion of 
practitioners/learners being drawn by adept others into practice and thus into a community of practice. 
But the point of my picture of professional learning is that it applies to all professional learning 
situations, whether un-facilitated, lightly-facilitated, extensively-facilitated, well-facilitated, or poorly-
facilitated. Further, what the paradox means is that most of professional learning won’t be facilitated, or 
will be ‘facilitated’ in only loose, fleeting, or relatively slight ways, and thus it is important to investigate 
the struggle of professionals learning on their own – though, again, either way the picture of 
professional learning I have sketched is equally applicable and informative. (Thus my Chapter 5 was in 
fact largely about professionals learning on their own and what that looks like from the perspective of 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning.) Finally, I think some care has to be taken in 
emphasizing ‘facilitation’ and ‘facilitators’ in such discussions; for me an approach emphasizing these 
needs to be kept clear of the area of ‘leadership,’ which runs counter to my own concerns with equity 
and a democratic ethos in professional learning. 
One of the things I am suggesting in this final chapter that might serve as re-orientation to professional 
learning in re has to do with the extent and significance of the emphasis placed on approaches that 
focus on the performances of talk of the learners themselves, as well as on the necessity for learners to 
perform discursively. Practically speaking, this is what emerges by working with Wittgenstein’s picture of 
language, and by focusing on the plane of meaning above all. The performances allow learners (as well 
as any participating coaches, facilitators, experts, etc.) to see what it is they themselves can do. It is as 
well through repeated performances – in the ideal guided in some manner by an expert in the content 
area – that learners practice performing, i.e., gaining familiarity with the grammar and the play of the 
relevant language-games, by being shown how to make moves that accord with the grammar of new 
words/concepts., and then in turn by showing that they can in fact go on in ways new to them in accord 
with the relevant grammar. This is ordinary, no doubt, but cast on the foundations of the extraordinary, 
i.e., on Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning. In turn, we can begin to re-read the work of 
thinkers like Schön and Lave and Wenger from this meaning-based perspective as a way to deepen our 
understanding (i.e., our ways of going on with) their important insights. 
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I would like to emphasize further here one aspect of this picture of professional learning, and that 
concerns the language-games of inquiry. Recalling the discussion in Chapter 5 of the educator peer-
group learning study (i.e., focusing on learning about self-regulation), it would be profitable to continue 
thinking about the possible role and place of questions in professional learning, and to begin to re-orient 
one’s approach to professional learning from the perspective of these language-games in particular. In 
learning discussions, we look for the question that opens things up, that allows for a clearer view of the 
grammar and paths in play amongst the learning participants, that brings into view new places to go by 
virtue of the unique active form of question-asking. Questions are asked so that all can see how we 
know how to go on, what connexions between signs we have taken hold of, the places we have to go 
and how we traverse the paths between them – noting as well all the ambiguity that attends these 
sequences of moves. I contend that on this picture of professional learning, drawn as it is from 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, that focus on these language-games of inquiry 
represents an important perspective to take up. In learning one gives and/or receives encouragement, 
direction, suggestions – and asks or is asked the ‘challenging question,’ the one that is promising, 
fruitful, productive, and generative. Thus my proposal for a grammatical-style investigation into 
inquiry/questions (see Chapter 4), which would be productive not only of a clearer view of the roles 
questions-and-answers play in dialogue, but of a clearer view of the possibilities questioning-and-
answering could play in professional learning, particularly in contexts of peer-group learning. There has 
been significant study on inquiry and question-asking (see the short list of relevant references in 
Chapter 4), and an important next step in my work would begin by more thoroughgoing and serious 
consideration of that literature and practice. 
It is interesting to look again at the educator group discussions in Chapter 5 and to consider there the 
place and role – and consequences – of any of the sequences of questioning-and-answering. This might 
be one way in which to begin to track how issues of grammar and ‘know-how’ rise to the surface or get 
pushed back. How are questions asked, how are responses made; what issues of knowing how to go on 
are pressed, and how are they pressed, if not through question-asking? These are not to be talked about 
as issues of grammatical investigation per se, but rather as attempts to seek clarity in the actual 
practices of learning participants in terms of signs and their grammar and use. We can as well, of course, 
otherwise produce accounts of these discussions and the discussants in psychological or other kinds of 
causal-explanatory terms. For example, it can be hypothesized that one or more learner participants 
hold back from saying something out of fear (e.g., fear of offending a superior, fear of looking ignorant, 
fear of appearing to challenge the credentials of a colleague), and such hypotheses certainly take 
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account of important features of discussions. But doing that kind of work is not my concern here, which 
is to focus just on what the learners in question actually do say. That, as far as I can be concerned with 
it, is understanding, and all the understanding with which the discussant can go on. 
What I’m suggesting in all this is that a range of important observations and insights about professionals’ 
in situ learning are made possible by taking up these ideas of Wittgenstein. They are important because 
they open up on a view of these learning situations as they unfold that is not provided by other 
perspectives, though other perspectives do stand in different, important relations to this (i.e., 
pragmatism, socio-culturalism, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, science studies). 
Grounded in a different way of talking about language and meaning, this thesis, then, sets out the 
ground from which to generate observations and insights about particular instances of professional 
learning that can in some manner make for new discussion with the participating professional groups 
and organizations. The actual fecundity of such observations and insights as might be generated and 
discussed can only be observed inasmuch as these observations, etc., are articulated in the context of 
real-life practical situations of professional learning – such real-life situations as, for example, 
government ministry managers trying to learn about and make decisions about the place of the 
construct ‘resilience’ in human development policy, local community family literacy groups preparing to 
engage with a visiting academic who is notable and relevant in their field, municipal politicians and local 
funders discussing issues of poverty in their community, or school educators attempting to learn in peer 
group sessions about a developmental construct new to them. These observations and insights become 
part of the talk of these groups – or they do not. The learning discussions that happen about learning 
are all still part of the same flow of professional learning, and the picture of language and meaning 
applies as much to those conversations as to the learning discussions of participants in professional 
learning encounters. (To some degree, these points return us to Argyris – see Chapter 2.) 
Any excitement potentially generated by the approach to professional learning I have been sketching 
here will vary by profession and by the particular contexts of each specific group of professionals. 
Certainly most of the variation here will be due to the nature of the topics and their connection to 
problems or issues of practice as identified by the professionals themselves, as well as to the kinds of 
understanding had by the professionals, and their facility with various, relevant language-games (such 
as, once more, with the language-games of inquiry, etc.). However interest – and excitement – in this 
picture of professional learning can extend beyond the learning of just the professionals themselves to 
those who surround them, with whom they interest and who have influence on their work. This can lead 
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us into talk of a political dimension of both Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning and the 
picture of professional learning that I have been drawing. Here we would begin to connect our talk of 
grammar and language-games with talk of social arrangements, power, equity, and social-political 
change (not to mention with moral signs). To give an overly-simplified situation by way of example, 
consider cases in which professionals interact with influential others in their surround in order that new 
ways of talking can be developed as a means to progressive change. Educators facing conservative or 
regressive push-back with regard to new positive developments in curriculum can work to effect change 
in how those pushing back talk about the curriculum features, would be a more specific example. The 
same discursive/relational view of things we have been applying in the case of professional learning can 
be applied to those outside the immediate sphere of the professionals themselves, as opening up 
possibilities for further change. However, in an important sense, these sorts of things follow trivially 
from the pictures of language, meaning, and learning I have been setting out.189 Seeing the world in 
different terms, and acting in different ways (as per our developing descriptions of those actions), simply 
are changes in the ways in which we talk about things. (Recall again from Section 3.2 the underlying 
gesture drawing of PI §1ff.) How our talk actually does change over time, for the better or for the worse 
(as we might so describe it), are empirical matters. I have briefly discussed in Chapter 4 some relevant 
political matters that we can say attach to Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning and the 
picture of professional learning I have been sketching, and I encourage the reader to return to those 
passages, if indeed the political is of interest. However, as should seem obvious, the political is quite 
secondary to my purposes in this thesis. 
Where to next in this investigation? As a way to finish this chapter and thesis, I would like to conclude 
with a few suggestions about how I can proceed with this project of looking at professional learning 
from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning. As a preliminary, recall the 
context I set out for this particular project in Chapter 1. There I indicated that this was one part of a 
larger inquiry into the connection between our understanding of language and meaning and our 
                                                          
189 ‘Trivial’ in the sense that Wittgenstein himself (as per his background in mathematical logic) uses the term, 
meaning that the conclusion follows, in a sense, tautologically from the premises. As Wittgenstein says, “What we 
find out in philosophy is trivial; it does not teach us new facts, only science does that. But the proper synopsis of 
these trivialities is enormously difficult, and has immense importance. Philosophy is in fact the synopsis of 
trivialities” (Lectures, 1930-1932, p. 26; also quoted in Monk, 1990, p. 298); and “It is, for example, nonsense to 
ask where the number 1 is. This comment may be trivial, like all the comments we shall make; but what is not 
trivial is seeing them all together” (Lectures, 1932-1935, p. 44). Something of this notion of ‘triviality’ is what is at 
work as well, I think, in the various statements Wittgenstein makes of the kind: “If one tried to advance theses in 
philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them” (PI §128). 
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understanding of professional learning (and, more broadly still, the connection to our understanding of 
learning in all of its variation and complexity). In this project I have largely focused on one picture of 
language and meaning, viz., the picture sketched out by Wittgenstein, and that focus due, in part, to the 
conviviality of Wittgenstein’s approach to many of my own intuitions about professional learning forged 
in my own professional working experience. Thus I need to move beyond the cursory sketch I provided 
of the other ways to talk about language and meaning, e.g., as per the representationalist tradition, and 
to consider in clearer and fuller terms what pictures of professional learning can be drawn from them in 
order to give fuller expression to this larger project.190 I need as well to enrichen Wittgenstein’s picture 
of language and meaning from which I draw. What first needs to be done is to build up more the part of 
the picture that has to do with what Wittgenstein calls “familiarity” (and its connection to 
“recognition”). Wittgenstein in fact makes much of this concept in describing use of signs; one important 
example of this is his repeated gesture in the Investigations: “A multitude of familiar paths lead off from 
these words in every direction” (PI §525, 534).191 I need also to further my understanding of 
Wittgenstein’s methodology, in particular his employment of the notion of the ‘picture’ as the only 
appropriately suitable way to talk about language. While I have given some rationale for this move (see 
in particular Chapters 1 and 3), I am not entirely convinced of the rightness of “picture” talk and that 
such talk can be used in a way that escapes the problems of causal-theoretical explanation. It would be 
interesting and useful, I think, and as I discuss immediately below, to explore the prima facie overlap 
between the ‘picture’ of the language-game and the ‘theory’ connecting games and language. 
More specifically, one of the key next steps will be to begin to put these ideas into practice, in the field, 
as it were.192 As one example, it will be useful, and a contribution to the field of professional 
development scholarship, to look carefully at how the reflexive relationality that I suggest be employed 
actually does work in practice with different groups of professionals. How might groups of professionals 
take up the data of their own learning discussions, and to what effect will they do so? How close a 
(reflective) reading of their own learning narratives can be expected from busy professionals? A second 
                                                          
190 I need as well to consider in this vein those non-representationalist approaches to language and meaning taken 
up in post-modern thought, such as by Derrida. 
191 Consider as well, in terms of movement and ‘finding places,’ Wittgenstein’s statement connected to this 
gesture: “Phrased like this, emphasized like this, heard in this way, this sentence is the first in a series in which a 
transition is made to these sentences, pictures, actions” (PI §534). 
192 In a sense, these kinds of empirical questions and issues reach out of the purview of this project, and caution 
need be taken in considering them in association with the work and approach of Wittgenstein. However, for the 
practically-minded educational professional, it is these kinds of questions that open up most readily; I suggest that 
as long as care is taken in the framing of them within the context of the kind of talk afforded to us by Wittgenstein, 
we can continue to walk with Wittgenstein in working on issues of professional learning and development. 
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example concerns how strategies to develop facility with the language-games of inquiry can be 
developed, implemented, and then assessed, either as preparation for substantive professional learning 
or simultaneously with it. What about the language-games of inquiry makes the difference in 
professional learning, exactly? Can we make useful, practical progress on such a question by orienting 
our investigation along the lines of the ethos of a grammatical investigation, i.e., as performed in the 
terms of a (grammatical) description and not as causal explanation? Third, I have discussed at some 
length the issues connected with the interactions between learners and experts, masters, and adepts; 
Wittgenstein, along with Schön and other similarly-minded thinkers, give us ways to consider these 
relations and to open up a range of questions about these in practice (which perhaps connects better 
with Schön’s project than with Wittgenstein’s). The issue of these relations need not concern exclusively 
the issue of active facilitation of group processes and learning. For example, an expert can assess how 
well a group understands (in Wittgenstein’s sense) a relevant subject area by listening to just a few 
minutes of the group’s focused conversation, or by engaging with the group even for a very short time, 
or by reading brief selections from learning session transcripts. An expert might also be able to proffer a 
reasonable diagnosis of where the group is in its understanding. But then what? How does the group 
progress in light of such expert readings, assessments, or diagnoses, should they be given? How might 
the expert advise the group, especially since the duration of interaction between expert and group will 
most often be limited to the short-term? (This is, again, an aspect of the ‘professional learning paradox’ 
discussed in Chapter 4.) If indeed there is opportunity for ongoing interaction between expert and 
learners of a non-facilitating kind, how might that interaction best unfold? Will this be a matter 
completely dependent on context? And more generally across both facilitating and non-facilitating 
interactions, what need might there be to tutor the participating expert in their interactions with the 
group? How much of a limiting factor might this prove in the educative course of such learning sessions? 
Certainly Schön makes much of the nature of the relation between coach and student, and while this is 
not a feature of professional learning activity that is entirely appropriate for further scholarship, it is all 
the same vitally important in the learning activities themselves. The picture of professional learning I 
have sketched out here gives us an extremely interesting and fruitful angle from which to investigate 
and pursue just such issues. 
There is another quasi-empirical issue that is important here and worth exploring for multiple purposes. 
It is an issue that emerges from Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, viz., the association 
between game-playing and language-learning. Though this kind of question is largely outside my interest 
in professional learning, having to do mainly with infant learning, it still does strike in an empirical way 
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at the heart of my focus on language-games as centrally important in these pictures of language, 
meaning, and learning with which I have been working. Wittgenstein’s is a picture of meaning, not of 
specifically human development, which is an empirical matter. But if it is a picture of any language, then 
we should be able to characterize the language of any group of language speakers (at least by those who 
have taken on board Wittgenstein’s way of looking at language and meaning) in terms of language-
games and game-playing.193 If this is correct, then there should also be some way to see and talk about 
each group in the terms of the development of language-speakers from non-language-speaking, non-
game-playing, beings, and to do so while staying on the plane of description, i.e., ‘to look and see’ (e.g., 
see PI §66; but also cf. PI §401).194 There is already a longstanding research literature examining just 
such associations between learning to play games and learning language in infants and young children – 
see, for example, the work of Tamis LeMonda and Marc Bornstein (1990). Thus another next step in my 
project is to consider both this literature – as well as the scientific literature exploring the development 
of language in individuals and the species – and how to position these vis-à-vis Wittgenstein’s picture of 
language. This is a delicate maneuver, however, one calling for a deft touch.195 Aside from the 
cautionary note already quoted (in Chapter 1) from Philosophical Grammar (i.e., PG §30), Wittgenstein 
concludes the Investigations with this important, and here relevant, note: 
For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. … The existence of 
the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which 
trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by. (PI, p. 232) 
                                                          
193 Could something be a language but not be characterizable in terms of the picture of language-games? 
Wittgenstein’s is a picture to be applied, and we are to see and learn from what comes of its application (e.g., see 
PI §130). We may in the end be dissatisfied in our application of it – for example, we are still finding ourselves 
captive in various fly-bottles (see PI §309) – and thus work to modify this picture or to find another picture. 
Further, it is as yet unclear to me what the implications are for Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning 
that the sign, “language-game,” can have a family of meanings derivative, perhaps, on the unboundedness of the 
sign “game” (e.g., see PI §§53, 65-76). 
194 Assuming of course that this is, in fact, the way in which a language-speaking being does develop; some such 
beings may simply come into existence (i.e., ‘be born’) being able to speak (though it may be problematic to 
understand how grammar organically works in such cases). This would be pushing nativism – and perhaps 
modularity – to their extremes. Note that this way of phrasing the issue of interest here represents the rocks upon 
which the work of Luntley can be seen to founder. Thus it is important to recognize that what we are interested in 
here is not a way to view Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, but is rather an interesting offshoot 
stimulated by the application of that picture. 
195 Which I am certainly not claiming to possess. Observe, for example, how the work of Chaliès et al is troubled by 
their uncertain mixing of the empirical with an aspect of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning (see 
Chapter 2). 
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However, importantly, the problem we are trying to ‘solve’ here is not the problem of accounting for 
meaning, but returning to consider the scientific literature from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s 
picture of language, meaning, and, in particular, the picture of language-games. In this way I do not 
think we run afoul of Wittgenstein’s imprecations against theory and causal explanations of language.196 
Two final notes here. As I have suggested, a keener focus can be given to investigation of the presence 
and role of the different language-games played in professional learning discourse. How does one place 
follow after another in these narratives? How do learning participants move from or connect one sign to 
another? And how might we understand the ambiguity that often attaches to these discursive 
sequences, of question-and-answer, for example, where discussants’ utterances seem to pass each 
other by, or where moments of inquiry are characterized by significant inconclusiveness? I have begun 
to emphasize the language-games of inquiry as an important feature of professional learning, and thus I 
contend that the employment of these deserve more energetic, grammatical-type investigation than I 
have been able to give them in this project. Again, there is an empirical strain that runs through these 
issues, and so some caution needs be taken in methodology here for the ongoing project I am 
proposing. I would add to these issues the (also empirical) question of how paths and grammar become 
familiar to professional learners. All of these issues are of important interest to the practitioner involved 
with real people in their endeavours to learn and develop. 
Last, and again as I have implied or suggested at different places in this thesis, re-reading the 
educational theorists in the light of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning would be a 
rewarding exercise, both theoretically and practically. I have begun this somewhat in the case of Schön, 
in Chapter 4 and elsewhere; but there is much more to do, in particular with the situative type thinkers 
such as Lave and Wenger, but also with those thinkers emerging out of the socio-historical tradition of 
Vygotsky (such as connected to the work of Barbara Rogoff, for instance). In this regard, Sfard’s (2008) 
important work would be an excellent place to start in following this road. 
Much of the contribution of this thesis, it must be said, remains at a high level of generality, that is, it 
abstracts over any particular, actual professional learning occasion. In this thesis I am concerned above 
all with the application of pictures, as Wittgenstein calls them, and in that application to come to talk 
about and see things differently. I do not suggest specific guidelines or programmatic steps that must be 
                                                          
196 What difference does it make that much of this literature concerning learning to play games and learning 
language is associational in character, i.e., is describing how the relevant things hang together? Given 
Wittgenstein’s encouragement to ‘look and see,’ how acceptable, then, is consideration of this scientific research? 
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followed in each case of professional learning; that would be quite counter to Wittgenstein’s insights 
concerning language and meaning, and that is the plane I follow out here. These new aspects given us by 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, applied to the context and situations of professional 
learning, open up a new way of looking at these situations of learning, allowing us to see in different 
ways what goes on in such situations. Whether the application of such a picture to particular situations 
and contexts of professional learning bears fruit is an open question, and that is the question as 
Wittgenstein has framed it (see PI §§422-426). Remembering Wittgenstein’s encouragement at PI §66 
(i.e., “don’t think, but look!”), we simply have to look and see if it does. 
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Appendix 
Educator Understanding Project – Participant Informed Consent Form 
 
Study Name: How educators are dealing with the construct of ‘self-regulation’: Educator understanding 
This research is a joint project between York University and Pearson Canada Inc. (educational publishers).  It is 
funded by MITACS-Accelerate and Pearson Canada Inc.  Its purpose is to study how educators understand self-
regulation and how their understanding of self-regulation changes over time.  The goal of this project is to gather 
information that will help support teachers’ efforts to learn about self-regulation (and about other similar concepts). 
Should you consent to participate by signing this form, normal professional meetings concerning self-regulation in 
which you participate will be tape-recorded and transcribed and reviewed by the research team at York University 
and Pearson Canada. (Note that sessions will only be audio-recorded and not video-recorded.) We ask that you 
review the relevant parts of the draft study report to ensure that this document accurately reflects what went on in 
the meetings in which you participated.  The final document will be shared with you and your colleagues to help 
support your own continuing efforts concerning professional learning and development.  Reviewing the draft final 
document should take 1-2 hours of your time, and will happen in May-June 2015. 
We do not foresee any risks or discomfort from your participation in the research.  Our purpose is not evaluative.  
Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may choose to stop participating at any time for any 
reason.  Should you exercise this right, the comments you make in the professional meetings concerning self-
regulation in which you are participating will be removed from the meeting transcripts, or these meetings will no 
longer be recorded, whichever is your choice. If you choose to withdraw from this study (i.e., about educator 
understanding), you can continue to participate in the ongoing group discussions, which are independent of the 
educator understanding study.  Should you wish to withdraw from the study any meetings in which you participated 
and which were recorded up to that date, all relevant data that had been collected to that point will be destroyed 
immediately.  Your decision not to volunteer for the study, or to withdraw from the study, will not influence the 
nature of any ongoing relationship you may have with the researchers, nor will it affect the nature of your 
relationship with York University or any other group associated with this project, either now or in the future. 
All information provided will be held in confidence.  Unless you specifically indicate your consent, your name will 
not appear in any report or publication of the research.  Any student names that are mentioned in the recorded 
discussions will be removed and replaced with a code number (for purposes of continuity in cases in which self-
regulation issues concerning that student are subsequently discussed).   Interview recordings and notes will be kept 
as sound files and as transcripts (i.e., Word files) on the project coordinator’s password-protected computer hard 
drive in his locked office.  Hand-written notes will be destroyed once they have been transcribed and entered onto 
the project coordinator’s password-protected computer.  Transcript material will not be shared until after data have 
been key-anonymized (with the key kept only on the project coordinator’s password-protected computer), and then 
will be shared only with authorized project team members. All raw interview materials will be destroyed following 
the completion of the project coordinator’s doctoral studies at York University, or within seven years after the 
completion of the project (whichever comes first).  Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by 
law. 
If you have questions about the research project or about your role in the study, please feel free to contact the 
[Project Coordinator].  If you have concerns about the project, please feel free to contact the [Principal Investigator] 
either by telephone or by e-mail.  This research has been reviewed and approved by the Human Participants Review 
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Sub-Committee, York University’s Ethics Review Board and conforms to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council 
Research Ethics guidelines.  If you have any questions about this process, or about your rights as a participant in the 
study, please contact the Sr. Manager & Policy Advisor for the Office of Research Ethics, 5th Floor, York Research 
Tower, York University. 
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wish to participate.  I am not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form.  My signature below indicates my 
consent. 
I agree to waive my right to anonymity (i.e., information identifying me may appear in study reports and 
documents):  □ 
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